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ABSTRACT
Continuity in interorganisational cooperation was the focus of this thesis. The research
aimed to contribute to interorganisational theory and practice with respect to the
governance of informal business alliances. The question addressed the extent to which

alliances are maintained by organisational interdependence, satisfaction with the excha
relation and compliance with 'norms of practice'. A multi-theoretical framework was
developed for analysis of generalist-specialist alliances in the health industry and a
study research design was employed involving the collection of quantitative and
qualitative data from four networks. A randomised survey of generalists within two
urban networks identified alliances and explored issues in alliance maintenance. In

addition, qualitative data was gained by structured interview from randomly selected su
sets of the generalist samples and from specialists with whom they had alliances. The

study found that the norms of practice governing generalist-specialist alliances were o
central importance. Norms of practice included timely and educative communications,
clinical competence, evidence that the partner could be trusted and an exchange
environment which supported learning and mutual respect. Furthermore, the study found

that alliances are more prevalent where there is greater interdependence between networ

members and that level of interdependence is positively associated with satisfaction an
with compliance with norms of practice. It is concluded that social exchange theory in
combination with network analysis, coordination theory and interorganisational
knowledge provide a suitable conceptual basis for a study of continuity in

interorganisational cooperation. The thesis confirms the robust nature of social exchan

theory by finding a positive association between generalist satisfaction with an exchan

relation and level of interdependence and extends interorganisational theory building b

finding that norms of practice governing alliances are central in the mediation of rewa
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1. INTRODUCTION
"Cooperation will not continue if its benefits do not equal or exceed its costs" (Smith, Carroll et
al., 1995: 17)

The focus of this thesis is continuity in interorganisational cooperation. The thesis
to contribute to interorganisational theory and to management practice with respect to the
governance of alliances. T h e research question is "To what extent are alliances
maintained by organisational interdependence, satisfaction with the exchange
relationship, and compliance with 'norms of practice'?" Exchange theory, network
analysis, coordination theory and interorganisational knowledge are utilized to develop a
systems framework for analysing alliance maintenance within a network of exchange
relations. A case study approach (Yin, 1989) to research is employed to explore the
robustness of the framework using data from four regional health care networks.

DEFINITION OF FIELD OF STUDY

Faced with rapid changes in organisational technologies and an increasingly turbulent
and competitive environment, m a n y organisations are establishing cooperative
relationships in order to survive and thrive (Kanter, 1989a; O h m a e , 1989; Boyle, 1994).
"Alliance" and "network" are terms used to describe n e w interorganisational
configurations (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 60-73; Alter and Hage, 1993) and are
sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. "Alliance" and "network" both imply a
linkage for cooperative effort, a quest for some kind of mutual business advantage and
independence of the players. In general, business organisations decide to m a k e an
alliance in order to "gain competitive advantage, leverage critical capabilities, increase the
flow of innovation, and improve flexibility in responding to market and technology
changes" (Zuckerman, Kaluzny et al., 1995: 55). "Network", on the other hand,
describes the structure of the larger configuration which emerges w h e n a number of
organisations agree to cooperate, whether under c o m m o n ownership or not and whether
public instrumentalities or not (Alter and Hage, 1993: 45 & 46; Limerick and
1

Cunnington, 1993: 60 & 61; Devers, Shortell et al., 1994). It follows that alliances can

develop between parties, whether or not they share a network affiliation. Neverthele

alliances are more likely to emerge between parties which are embedded within a pre-

existing network of organisations. Alliances and networks are increasingly important

vehicles for interorganisational cooperation (Smith, Carroll et al., 1995) and are t
domain of this study. In particular, the study focuses on cooperative relationships

between organisations which are entered into voluntarily, imply partnerships of equa
and preserve the autonomy of the participants.

Drawing on Limerick and Cunnington (1993), Alter and Hage (1993: 46) and Emerson

(1972), I have defined a network as a regional cluster of legally separate organisat

which have opportunity for voluntary work-related exchanges. In terms of this thesis

the networks involve generalist and specialist health care organisations which exch
about patients and their treatment.

Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 70-79) define various types of interorganisational
network among which are "industry clusters" and "regional clusters". The former

specialise in an industry segment, while the latter are defined by location and prod

The "Emilian Model" is an example of a regional cluster in which "very small and som

medium-sized firms are grouped together in different zones according to product. Eac

is highly specialised, but they collaborate with each other through a series of netw
mechanisms" (p 70). Alter and Hage (1993: 61) label such organisational forms

"systemic production networks", a configuration which is of importance to this study

Of particular interest are the "strategic alliances" which develop among firms withi

"systemic production" network and the activities which contribute to continuity in t
alliance. Following Nohria and Eccles (1992: 11), this study accepts, that "it is
insufficient (and probably erroneous) to explain the strategic behaviour of firms
without paying particular attention to the network of relations among them." The

concepts of network analysis provide a useful basis for a study of informal alliance
within regional networks.
2

Within the health industry in Australia and the United Kingdom, generalist and specialist

firms are forming alliances in the context of networks of service providers (Williams a
Clare, 1981; Llewellyn-Jones, 1993). The networks are defined by the type of service

they provide (eg. services for care of mentally ill people or services for care of peopl
with older-onset diabetes). Hakansson and Johanson (1989: 239-240) describe this type
of network as industrial rather than social, differentiating networks according to the

focus of interest. For example, in a social network the characteristics of the actors a
key importance. However, with industrial networks, while the actors are of some

import, it is the activities, and resources required to support those activities, which

central. An industrial network is likely to be less reliant on the personal characteris
the actors and more able to withstand change among network members as long as the
vital activities occur and resource supply is maintained (Hakansson and Johanson, 1989:
239-240). Brass and Burkhardt (1992: 197-198) describe two types of industrial
network, namely, workflow networks and communication networks. The first is
defined by the division of labour associated with the task with the parties exchanging
inputs and outputs while the second involves the exchange of information. Actors who
are centrally located within either of these networks have the potential to access and
mediate the flow of resources.

While the regional health care network is visible and definable, informal generalist-

specialist alliances are not. Furthermore, while much has been written about generalist

specialist referral practices, little has been written about the nature of generalist-s
alliances. Dowling (1995: 143), defines alliance in health care, as any form of

association or joining together for "mutual benefit" (p 143) that contributes to integr
service delivery. "Mutual benefit" acknowledges that the parties to an alliance are not
necessarily working towards shared objectives or even improved integration.
Nonetheless, there are usually common interests that link alliance partners. Zuckerman
and Kaluzny (1991) use the term "alliance" to describe cooperation between generalists,
specialists, researchers and informal carers contributing to Community Clinical

3

Oncology Programs. They consider alliance to be an acceptable descriptor for
relationships between small, independent and interdependent groups of health service

providers and researchers contributing to the care of patients with cancer. Furthermor

by using the term "strategic alliance", they imply that the linkages are highly valued
reasonably enduring. Dowling (1995: 143) proposes that alliances vary according to

degree of connectedness, level of formality, breadth of coverage of shared activities,
degree of autonomy.

I have defined an alliance as a relatively enduring, voluntary, cooperative arrangemen
for mutual benefit in which the actors have an informal or formal understanding
concerning the way they will manage their exchange relationship.

The above definition is similar to Kanter's (1989b: 186) "stakeholder alliance", where

the "stakeholder" can assist or inhibit an organisation in the achievement of its goal

example, suppliers, customers and employees. The basis for alliance is that the partie
perceive a need to cooperate. "Stakeholders are those groups on which an organisation
depends - the people who can help it achieve its goals or stop it dead in its tracks"

(Kanter, 1989b: 186). Alliances between generalist and specialist organisations in the
health industry have much in common with Kanter's "stakeholder" alliance.

The organisations of interest include small business generalist and specialist firms a
public sector hospital units and health agencies. The function of the generalist firm
provision of primary level care to people in the community, while the role of the

specialist is the provision of advice and procedural expertise in situations beyond th

expertise of the generalist. Hence, in some respects the specialist firm can be percei

as a "supplier" of services to the generalist and the generalist as a "customer" of th

specialist. Small business medical practices, on average, include 2.5 doctors plus two
more support staff. Public sector health agencies may include up to 20 clinical and

administrative staff. Even though some medical firms are quite small, it is argued tha
meet Silverman's criteria for definition as an organisation. According to Silverman
4

(1987), organisations are "social institutions with certain special characteristics:
consciously created at an ascertainable point in time; their founders have given them
goals which are usually important chiefly as legitimating symbols; the relationship

between their members and the source of legitimate authority is relatively clearly def
although frequently the subject of discussion and planned change" (p 147).

Alliances among stakeholders assist organisations to achieve greater certainty in a
changing and increasingly uncertain environment. However, for cooperative

relationships to endure, participant expectations must be met and the relationship, its
requires nurturing (Kanter, 1989b). Smith, Carroll et al., (1995) observe that
cooperation is "the process by which individuals, groups, and organisations come

together, interact and form psychological relationships for mutual gain or benefit" (p
To this understanding of cooperation, Ring and Van de Ven (1994), add the important
dimension of continuity in that cooperative relationships are "socially contrived
mechanisms for collective action, which are continually shaped and restructured by
actions and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved" (p 96). Cooperation

continues only for as long as all parties perceive that it is in their best interest t

such a relationship. But it is not entirely clear what factors contribute to the decis
remain in an alliance or to separate. Few studies have examined continuity of

interorganisational cooperation and further research is needed in view of the importan
of the issue (Smith, Carroll et al., 1995). This study contributes to knowledge on the
subject of continuity in cooperation between organisations.

Improved coordination of effort is a frequent benefit of cooperation (Smith, Carroll et
al., 1995), involving the "collective pursuit of shared goals" (Gamm, 1984: 60). The

purpose of cooperation for the individual organisation is to "accomplish their respect

individual goals" (p 13). Hence, cooperation is an essential antecedent of coordination

and coordination is a "specific form of cooperative activity" (Alter and Hage, 1993: 82
Smith, Carroll et al., (1995) propose that "coordination stemming from cooperation
seems particularly important in today's new organisational forms, where relationships
5

are m u c h more voluntary and self-defined than organisationally mandated" (p 11).
Voluntary forms of cooperation may be either, "formal", involving written contracts

addressing the responsibilities of the various parties, or, "informal" based on share
values and understandings (Ouchi, 1980; Axelrod, 1984; Alter and Hage, 1993). This
thesis addresses alliance maintenance under conditions of informal cooperation.

Of particular interest in this study are the non-economic measures of cooperation whi

the players associate with superior outcomes, for example, improvements in the qualit
of the product, conflict management (Alter and Hage, 1993) and decision-making

(Smith, Carroll et al., 1995). Other measures of interorganisational cooperation are t

processes which facilitate understanding of roles and expectations (Levine and White,
1961), and feedback mechanisms (Thompson, 1967). Smith, Carroll et al., (1995)

make the remarkable observation that "there is little empirical evidence of the influ

of such feedback mechanisms on cooperation or of the effect of past performance on an

individual's decision to continue in a cooperative relationship" (p 16). Statements s

as this in the recent international literature provide a justification for research t

factors which influence continuity in alliances. Similarly, Alter and Hage (1993: 90-9
in a comprehensive analysis of interorganisational cooperation, observe that most

research has addressed cooperation at the policy making level and at the administrati

level, while little attention has been given to coordination at the task, or operatio
level. This level of dynamic interactivity is central to this thesis.

However, approaching alliance maintenace at the operational level raises an important

question for the researcher, namely, whether the focus of analysis should be exchange
between individuals or exchanges between organisations. The characteristics of the
organisations within the regional health care network suggest that exchanges need to
viewed from both perspectives. For example, exchanges between general practitioners

and medical specialists are frequently seen as exchanges between individuals. However

this thesis maintains that these individuals are, in the main, owner-managers of smal

businesses who form alliances in order to advance the performance of the business. In
6

addition, the regional network includes public sector specialist agencies accountable to

the regional health authority. Despite their larger size and affiliation with the region
health authority, exchanges between these organisations and generalists typically occur
between individuals. Alliance development with generalists, for instance, occurs at both
the organisational level and the individual level. This thesis recognises this complex
situation and seeks to address the issue by gaining information from individuals and
from leaders of both private sector and public sector associations and organisations.

Kanter (1989b & 1994) implies that organisations tend to act like individuals by likening

continuity in alliance to a "marriage", that is, a dynamic relationship based on trust an
commitment and requiring ongoing attention to maintenance activities. Identified
challenges to continuity in alliance include 1) unevenness in levels of commitment, 2)
power imbalances associated with differences in wealth, expertise and access to
information, 3) one organisation benefiting more than another from the alliance, 4) lack
of attention to the alliance due to conflicting loyalties, and 5) failure to commit time
resources to managing the relationship (Kanter, 1989b).

Kaluzny (1991) proposes four necessary conditions for effective alliances between
members of health service provider networks. First, exchanges between and within
levels of care need to be mutually rewarding. This requirement is consistent with
Kanter's proposition that there needs to be a perception of equality in the accrual of
benefits from the alliance. Secondly, Kaluzny addresses the administrative processes
required to facilitate coordination by recommending the development and use of
protocols relevant to the unique characteristics of patients and providers. His third
criterion concerns the technical competence of the member organisations and the
appropriateness of the services that they provide to clients. Finally, Kaluzny
emphasises the importance of feedback about the products of the alliance, stressing the

need for evaluation of patient care outcomes and cost-effectiveness. It is likely that th

four conditions for alliance maintenance are widely applicable with adaptation according

to service activities, inter-professional linkages and location of specialist and general
7

organisations. Kaluzny's conditions for effective alliance specify a number of activities

which, if agreed by all parties, become "norms of practice". This seminal proposition is
examined in this research under conditions of informal alliance.

Limerick and Cunnington (1993) conclude from their study of Australian companies that

effective management of alliances requires attention to both the "soft" and "hard" issue

Soft issues include perceptions of equity and fair sharing and hard issues include trust
and information systems designed to facilitate control of cost and quality. Anderson

(1992) identified three factors in successful collaborative efforts in the health indust
namely, mutual respect, understanding, and trust among collaborating parties.
Kaluzny's criteria operationalize these values. Mutual respect is demonstrated by
approval behaviour, (Homans, 1974), a prerequisite for mutual reward. Understanding

is a product of shared information gained through the use of treatment protocols specifi
to particular tasks. Trust is a personal and organisational outcome which develops over
time through feedback from cooperative experience. It is proposed that exchange theory,
in combination with network analysis, coordination theory and the emerging theories of
interorganisational cooperation, provide an appropriate conceptual basis for analysing
both "soft" and "hard" elements of alliance maintenance.

Alliance becomes operational through a series of agreements, formal or informal, which
structure exchanges between two or more parties in order to make transactions more
predictable. Accordingly, exchange theory is a suitable theoretical basis for exploring

the psycho-social aspects of alliance relationships (Smith, Carroll et al., 1995), while
network analysis provides tools useful for describing situational factors influencing
alliance maintenance. Furthermore, established alliances between small business firms

in the health industry have characteristics consistent with successful alliances in othe
industries as described in the literature (Kanter, 1989b & 1994; Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993; Alter and Hage, 1993). Therefore, the rich and complex literature
applying coordination theory to the governance of interorganisational cooperative

arrangements has been utilized to throw light on the activities of these small health ca
8

organisations. It appears that no one conceptual paradigm can adequately capture the
complex and dynamic processes that maintain interorganisational cooperation.

Many studies of interorganisational cooperation have addressed reasons for alliance
development (Smith, Carroll et al., 1995), and this issue is not addressed here.
However, literature concerning this topic is reviewed in order to identify situational
factors that influence alliance maintenance. This thesis does not address the impact of
alliances on the overall integration of service delivery within a regional network nor the
outcomes for customers, nor report changes over time in alliance configurations,
processes or outcomes. The study does not explore the financial transactions between
alliance partners. It is assumed that improved cooperation between members of regional
health care networks would impact favourably on both service integration within a
regional network and client care. However, outcome studies from interorganisational
cooperation are costly and, beyond the resources available to the researcher.

In summary, this study explores the variables influencing continuity of cooperation
between members of regional health care networks, and the ways in which generalist and
specialist small business firms and public sector agencies in established alliance manage
the "hard" and "soft" issues. In so doing the research contributes to the emerging body
of management knowledge concerning continuity in interorganisational cooperation.

CONTRIBUTION TO PRACTICE
In common with all business sectors, broad economic, demographic and social forces
combined with rapid developments in technology are having a dramatic effect on the
organisation of health care in m a n y countries (Devers, Shortell, et al., 1994; Boyle,
1994; Council of Australian Governments, 1995). For example, while the demand for
surgical procedures has increased in concert with the ageing of the population,
developments in micro-surgery have resulted in reduced length of stay in hospital.
Hence, more disabled, elderly people are requiring post-operative care in the community
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1991). In
9

addition, n e w medications, financial constraints and changes in community attitudes
have led to most mentally ill people living at home or in community based boarding
houses (Australian Health Ministers Advisory Committee, 1992). As a result of these
changes, managing care in the community is of equal importance with managing care in
the institution. This changing scene has significant implications for health care
organisations, whether publicly or privately funded. Furthermore, funding bodies and
communities are demanding new and cost-effective methods of coordinating services
provided by multiple organisations (Council of Australian Governments, 1995). One
approach which holds promise is the "networked" organisation (Commonwealth of
Australia, Bureau of Industry Economics, 1991).

Health networks in Australia characteristically comprise independent private sector an

not-so-independent public sector organisations, some predominantly generalist and some
which have a specialist function. No single organisation or person has responsibility
ensuring coordination of effort among network members. Traditionally, linkage

between organisations has occurred via the patient referral with the patient coordinat
the services he/she receives. This works well with patients who have relatively
uncomplicated, time-limited conditions in which the roles and responsibilities of
generalist and specialist organisations are clearly understood. However, with complex

chronic conditions, such as diabetes mellitus and serious mental illness, coordination
effort is more challenging. For instance, the patient may be unable to access needed

services in a timely manner, resulting in unnecessary exacerbation of illness. In addit

the roles of the various players are often unclear, increasing the likelihood of dupli
of effort and conflict between agencies. Furthermore, treatment methods have become
more complex, requiring timely transfer of information between provider organisations
for effective decision-making.

Traditionally, generalists and specialists have managed exchanges through an ad hoc
referral process. However, during the last decade, the term "shared care" has emerged

in the Australian and British health literature, reflecting a change in cooperative pr
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between generalist and specialist organisations. Shared care refers to a formal, or
informal, agreement between small business generalists and specialists (individual or
collective) to share the management of patients with certain conditions. It implies a

enduring, collaborative relationship between generalist and specialist firms and great
specificity in the roles and responsibilities of each. Some general practitioners and
specialists have made greater advances towards voluntary linkage than others,
suggesting that some find the practice rewarding and some do not. However, there is no
detailed examination of "hard" and "soft" factors which encourage maintenance of
"shared care" arrangements. Shared care arrangements involving small business

generalists and specialists and public sector specialist health agencies have characte
in common with "alliances" between business organisations in other industries. For
example, one of the driving forces for shared care or alliance formation is increased

competition for resources. Australian private sector general practitioners and special
are faced with growing competition for patients and resources as the number of doctors
continues to increase (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1994: 153) and the
number of privately insured people continues to decline. At the same time the
Commonwealth Government is seeking to maintain expenditure on health care at
approximately 8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (Macklin, 1990). Furthermore,
shared care arrangements are entered into voluntarily. A general practitioner chooses

specialist organisation to whom he/she refers, or consults, and the specialist organis

is free to accept or decline the referral or consult according to expertise and availa
Finally, neither party has authority over the other. The relationship is between
independent, relatively autonomous partners.

In Australia, general practitioners make up 66 per cent of the medical workforce and
approximately 80 per cent of the population consult a general practitioner in any one
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992: 8).

The general practitioner acts as the "gatekeeper" to specialist services such as priva
public medical specialists, public and private hospitals, and specialist allied health
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professionals (Strasser, 1992). This role is supported by legislation and financial
incentives under Australia's universal health insurance scheme, Medicare
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community
Services, 1993: 6). For these reasons, this study uses the small business general

practitioner as one of the delimiting elements of a health care network. Medical condi

is used to define the boundary of the network. Two patient conditions which require ongoing care from a range of organisations have been selected for case examination,
namely, diabetes mellitus and mental illness.

General practitioners and medical specialists have a long history of voluntary linkage
the private sector but general practitioners and public sector organisations have less
experience of cooperation. Established patterns of linkage are reflected in Australian
general practitioner referral statistics. Seventy-six per cent of new referrals go to

specialists and the remainder go to allied health professionals (Bridges-Webb and Brit

al., 1992). This study pays particular attention to processes which general practitione

and medical specialists utilize to achieve and maintain cooperative effort and compare
these practices with general practitioner-public sector health professional linkage
arrangements and outcomes. This study contributes to management knowledge of
factors influencing continuity of cooperation between various health industry players.

CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY
Many theoretical frameworks have been utilized to analyse interorganisational
cooperation. Smith, Carroll et al., (1995) identify five frameworks, namely, exchange

theory, including social and economic exchange, attraction theories, power and conflic

theories, modeling theories, and social structure theories. To this list, Alter and Hag

(1993: 25) add population ecology theory, and interorganisational relations theory, and
Laumann and Pappi (1976: 9-10) add administrative theories. Grandori and Soda
(1995) use a discipline based approach to organise and review the vast body of
interorganisational literature. Seven disciplines are identified because of their
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contribution to this field. Clearly, the study of interorganisational cooperation can be
approached in a number of ways. In recent years a leading role has been played by
organisational and management studies which tend to employ an eclectic approach.

Exchanges between organisations in the business sector are necessary to acquire
resources, material and clients and/or markets. Similarly, in the health industry,
exchanges between professionals are necessary to acquire resources, materials and
clients and to provide complementary elements of care for clients (Levine and White,
1961). Hence, a regional health care network which includes small business medical

firms and public sector health care organisations is instrumental in gaining business
advantage for the participants and coordinated services for clients. The traditional

referral from general practitioner to specialist has been described by Longest (1990)

simple market transaction in which the general practitioner advises the patient of th
to see a specialist and prepares a letter of referral. The specialist usually agrees

patient. The specialist's income is increased by the additional patient visit. Exchan

theory and resource dependency theory have been used as suitable theoretical bases fo
analysis of "market" transactions (Levine and White, 1961; Shortell, 1974; Longest,
1990). However, as already indicated new patterns of exchange are emerging in
response to environmental turbulence and these new forms of generalist-specialist
cooperative activity are central to this thesis.

By definition, alliance maintenance is a dynamic process which involves multiple
exchanges and on-going judgements by the participants of the costs and benefits of

cooperation. To cope with this cyclical process of negotiation and decision-making th
thesis develops a systems framework which draws from four streams of knowledge,
namely, 1) exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974; Emerson, 1972; Cook,
1977), 2) network analysis (Turner, 1991; Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992), 3)
coordination theory (Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1983) and 4) the rapidly growing
body of knowledge concerning interorganisational cooperation (Ouchi, 1980; Hakansson
and Johanson, 1989; Starkweather, 1981 & 1990; Sofaer and Myrtle, 1991; Kaluzny,
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1991; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Alter and Hage, 1993; Limerick and Cunnington, 1993;
Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Smith, Carroll et al., 1995;
Zuckerman, Kaluzny et al., 1995; Grandori and Soda, 1995).

Social exchange theory provides a sound theoretical spring board for exploring compl

interpersonal and interorganisational phenomena and is particularly useful for explo
organisations "coming together to cooperate and continuing to engage in cooperative
relationships" (Smith, Carroll et al., 1995: 18). Exchange theory predicts that
relationships between individuals are maintained on the basis of rational choice,

specifically, the desire to maximise utilities or rewards. Hence, a relationship will

maintained only for as long as it is rewarding (Negundhi, 1980: 40). Central to socia

exchange is the concept of functional autonomy. It follows that, in a health care de
network in which the parties are free to choose with whom they relate, cooperation
between the parties will be greater between those who believe the exchange to be

rewarding. Confident that these notions are an accurate representation of social lif
study explores the psycho-social and administrative processes associated with
cooperation between members of regional health networks and compares them with

processes associated with an absence of cooperation. Of particular interest is the r
that feedback plays in the realisation of rewards and the development of trust, and,
consequently, in decisions concerning future cooperation.

Coordination theory provides a basis for predicting processes governing established
alliances based on workflow interdependence and reasons for collaborative activity
(Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974; Minztberg, 1983). Similarly, emerging from the

interorganisational literature is a set of "norms of practice" governing exchanges b
members of networks and alliances (Kaluzny, 1991; Kanter, 1989b; Powell, 1990;
Larsen, 1995). The fourth source of knowledge employed in the development of my
systems framework is network analysis which is used to describe the regional health
network within which alliances between generalists and specialists are embedded.

Among the relevant situational factors are 1) industry environment (Zajac and D'Aunn
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1994: 274-293), 2) medical condition which influences level of differentiation and
workflow exchanges (Levine and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967), 3) the distribution of
power and influence (Cook, 1977), and 4) status and cultural differences among the
parties (Pfeffer, 1978). Each of these factors may impact on alliance activity and
governance.

There is growing support in the literature for the use of a multi-theoretical approac

researching continuity in interorganisational cooperation. For example, Smith, Carroll
al., (1995), in reviewing forty-six empirical articles concerning intra- and inter-

organisational cooperation, conclude that "a multi-theoretical perspective" (p 19) off
number of advantages, among which is the opportunity to address multiple levels of

analysis. This issue is quite central to my study of alliance maintenance but remarkab
difficult to resolve. If the core of alliance is the relationship between individuals

individuals and organisations, then the analysis can suitably utilise behavioural, soc

and resource exchange theories. On the other hand, if the essence of alliance has to d
with the network of organisations to which members owe allegiance, then the analysis

can appropriately utilise theories such as systems theory, modeling theories, and soci
structure theories or a synthesis of these paradigms. Smith, Carroll et al., (1995)

suggest a pragmatic resolution, namely, "since cooperation at any level must ultimatel
be reduced to cooperation between individuals - such as managers from different

organisations - the distinction between levels is blurred" (p 11). Further support fo
pragmatic approach to analysing interorganisational cooperation comes from Cook and
Whitmeyer (1992) who propose the integration of exchange theory and network
analysis. These researchers maintain that the combination of network analysis and
exchange theory addresses the micro/macro dilemma by defining an actor as an

individual or collective unit, such as a corporation, and by defining social structure
"patterns of connections among actors in networks of exchange relations" (p 112).

Other integrative theoretical approaches to the study of interorganisational cooperat
have been adopted. For example, Alter and Hage (1993: 22; 81-105) drew on
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interorganisational relations theory, population ecology theory, and rational choice

theory to develop a conceptual framework to predict choice of coordination method, used
by networks of organisations providing services to "multi-problem clients" or solving

"multifaceted research problems", under different conditions of task, size and types of
interdependence. Lamb (1991) combined social exchange theory with technology theory

to explain factors influencing nurse practitioners as to which doctors they would engag
in exchange.

My thesis contributes to theory by developing a research design for examining alliance
maintenance within the context of a network of organisational and individual exchange
relationships. My systems framework is an attempt to provide a research design that 1)

is sufficientiy rigorous to examine relationships between variables, and 2) is sufficie
complex to capture the dynamism of alliance maintenance. Underpinning my theoretical

framework is the proposition that established alliances which the partners find rewardi

are characterised by relatively high levels of organisational interdependence, perceive
rewards from alliance activities and compliance with norms of practice specific to the
health industry. The thesis contributes to knowledge of 1) the application of exchange

theories and coordination theories to the processes governing and maintaining alliances
2) the utility of "network exchange theory" to empirical research, and 3)
interorganisational theory building with respect to the interplay between rewards and

compliance with norms of practice governing alliances among generalists and specialists

in the health industry. It is possible that my theoretical framework may have applicati
beyond the health industry in industries where alliances develop within networks of
exchange relationships.

RESEARCH APPROACH
The study uses a multi-modal approach to data collection and employs inductive and
deductive logic. The research design is best described as a "multiple-case replication
design" (Yin, 1989: 27-60) involving two cases and the establishment of a chain of
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evidence with data gathered by quantitative and qualitative methods from various sources
by survey, semi-structured interview and analysis of relevant documents. Case study

design has been selected in preference to an experimental design, because it is a usefu
method for gaining answers to "how" and "why" questions about real world phenomena

over which the researcher can exert little control (Yin, 1989:13-26) as is the case wit

professional organisations. The collection of quantitative and qualitative data provide

opportunity to describe what is happening in terms of linkage activities within case si
to test predictions about cooperation and satisfaction based on social exchange theory

and organisational action theory, and to gain insights into relationship dynamics whic
may influence cooperation.

The design of the study is cross-sectional. As such it does not allow for observation o
changes over time in interorganisational relationships. However, the framework for

analysis of alliance maintenance encourages repeated 'snapshots' which could, resources

permitting, provide longitudinal data. The study is therefore best described as a varia
analysis rather than a process analysis (Kaluzny and Zuckerman, 1992). Furthermore,

the study does not seek to impute causality, but, rather to explore relationships betw
variables.

Two patient care networks have been selected for examination, namely, networks for the
care of people with mental illness and networks for the care of people with diabetes
mellitus. These two systems of care were selected because the conditions are chronic
and the consequences are costly to patients and the health system if they are poorly
managed. Because the conditions are chronic, exchanges between organisations are

likely to be more established and enduring. In addition, the identification of two pati
related systems permitted the researcher to describe variation associated with client
condition which may affect linkage practices and outcomes.

The collection of data from the organisations selected for study was predominantly by
survey and interview with individuals. With small business medical firms, the decision
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was m a d e to obtain information from one of the principals of the firm. According to
Bridges-Webb, Britt et. al., (1992) approximately 30 per cent of Australian general

practitioners are in solo practice, 40 per cent are in group practices involving 2-3 pa

and the remaining 30 per cent are in practices with 4 or more partners. Discussions with

key informants indicated that the phenomena of interest "generalist-specialist alliance
predominantly involved exchanges between individual doctors and that they were not
greatly influenced by the other members of the small business organisation, such as,
administrative and clinical support staff. With respect to the relevant public sector
organisations, the approach was to interview the clinical director or team leader. In

brief, the approach selected for data gathering was to target key individuals and to cal
the response an organisational response. Analysis of data occurred at three levels. At
one level, responses from individuals/organisations within each network were examined.
At another level, responses from individuals were aggregated to explore within-network
differences across exchange categories (eg. small business generalists, small business
psychiatrists and mental health professionals). In addition, across-network differences
were examined using individual responses and aggregated exchange category data.

In summary, this study employs a multi-theoretical and a multi-modal approach to a

consideration of factors affecting continuity of interorganisational cooperation at the

operational level. Of particular interest are alliances involving small business genera
and specialists and public sector units and agencies which 1) extend beyond a simple
referral or market transaction, 2) are based on "informal" understandings rather than

formal contracts, 3) are entered into voluntarily, 4) are perceived by the participants
partnerships of equals, and 5) preserve the autonomy of the participants. This type of

cooperation is of interest for two reasons. In the first place, participants in the netw
retain flexibility and avoid the morale effects characteristic of centrally controlled

systems. Secondly, such an alliance has the potential to establish relatively stable and
effective arrangements between members of health care delivery networks. Kaluzny,
(1991) concludes that voluntary linkage arrangements, or "partnerships of equals" are
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m o r e acceptable and appropriate for managing interdependence between health
professionals than more traditional approaches with a heavy reliance on regulation and
compliance. Furthermore, in networks characterised by high task, complex or highly
differentiated structure, impersonal coordination methods are ineffective (Alter and
Hage, 1993: 257):
"External controls with an emphasis on regulation and structural differentiation may be used by
state and federal authorities as a means of avoiding conflict and perceptions of poor performance,
but they only m a k e them worse" (Alter and Hage, 1993: 257).

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

In Chapter 2, exchange theory, network analysis and coordination theory are introduced,
together with concepts relevant to the application of these constructs for the analysis of
continuity in interorganisational cooperation (alliance maintenance).

Chapter 3, reviews the literature on interorganisational cooperation in six sections. T
first section reviews literature on networks and alliances and the measures used for their
analysis. T h e second section explores factors motivating organisations to cooperate and
relates these to changes occurring in the Australian health industry. The third section
examines factors associated with continuity in interorganisational cooperation. Sections
four and five describe regional health care networks in the Australian context including
the practice of shared care. The final section explores design and methodological issues
important to researching alliances within regional organisational networks.

In Chapter 4 a theoretical framework is developed and propositions are advanced about
alliance maintenance within regional networks drawing on the review of the
interorganisational literature, on the propositions of exchange theory and network
analysis, and on coordination theory with a particular emphasis on the management of
reciprocal interdependence.
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The research questions, research design, units of analysis and methods of data collection

and analysis are outlined in Chapter 5. In addition, strategies to enhance the validity

reliability of the study of alliance maintenance are described including the developmen

a chain of evidence. The chain has six links and the evidence pertaining to the first li
"Stage 1: Preparatory," is presented as part of the methodology.

Chapter 6 reports the study findings. Following an overview of the total number of

participants, the findings are presented in six stages. Stage 2, reports the outcomes of
pilot study involving a small rural, regional network. The third stage describes two
regional health care networks while the fourth stage reports the findings of a two-case
comparative study of alliance maintenance. The fifth stage reports the outcomes of two
research workshops which provided opportunity for participant validation of the study
findings. The final stage reports the findings of a focus group meeting with a
convenience sample of city-based general practitioners.

In Chapter 7 the findings of the study are discussed in a manner consistent with the

research design. First, the findings relevant to the research propositions are discusse
Secondly, the situational findings are addressed, including, industry and network

environment. Thirdly, differences in the structure and nature of alliances associated w
funding arrangements are explored. Finally, the limitations of the research design and
methodology are examined.

Chapter 8, outlines the theoretical and practical conclusions of the thesis and identif
possible directions for future research.
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2. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
This Chapter introduces exchange theory, network analysis and coordination theory. In
addition, concepts useful for a study of interorganisational cooperation are introduced,
specifically, organisational domain, adaptation, integration and interdependence.

Essential to an analysis of factors that maintain cooperation is an understanding of th
forces that drive organisations to cooperate. The drive to o w n , control and extend
territory is very primitive and ingrained in all social animals, including, organisational
power-brokers. In order to fulfil this drive, and in s o m e instances to survive,
organisations need the capacity to adapt to changes in their environment.
Interorganisational cooperation is one w a y whereby some organisations seek to adapt to
changing environmental conditions. Like adaptation, differentiation and integration are
concepts derived from biological survival which have been appropriated and applied to a
study of interorganisational cooperation. Growing complexity of task and resource
scarcity demand greater differentiation at the level of the organism or organisation. A s
organisations b e c o m e m o r e differentiated they b e c o m e m o r e dependent on other
organisations for needed elements. With growing organisational interdependence and
differentiation comes a greater need for integration and coordination. Thus underpinning
interorganisational cooperation and alliance building and maintenance, there are
profound, biologically based principles which orient the researcher to the nature of the
phenomenon. Cooperation, it seems, is a corporate adaptation in the interests of
survival, a civil form of territoriality.

EXCHANGE THEORY AND NETWORK ANALYSIS
"Institutions do not keep going just because they are enshrined in norms, and it seems
extraordinary that anyone should ever talk as though they did. They keep going because they have
pay-offs, ultimately pay-offs for individuals" (Homans, 1974: 55).
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Traditionally, there has been antipathy between exchange theorists and network analysts.
Much of the debate has concerned the level of analysis, with network proponents

claiming that exchange theory is atomistic and reductionist. At the same time, exchang
theorists, such as Homans (1974), have criticised network analysts for being overly
concerned with structures and societal norms and for marginalising the behaviours of
individuals. Others have claimed that exchange theory is utilitarian and prone to
problems of tautology. The convergence of these two streams in sociological research
addresses, to some extent, the limitations inherent in each.

Homans' (1974) social exchange propositions were developed using inductive logic

derived from five case studies, deductive logic based on empirical research, and "cre
borrowing" from behaviouristic psychology (p 303). Homans refrained from using
sociological concepts such as status and role to describe human behaviour. Instead he
focused on the "activities", "interactions", and "sentiments" of individual "actors".

Activities are what individuals do in given situations. Interaction "denotes the proc
which one unit of activity stimulates a unit of activity in another person" (Turner,

304) and sentiments refer to the internal psychological states of the individuals inv
(Turner, 1991: 304). Homans proposes that these key elements are interrelated and

dynamic and that they operate within a given environment. Homans pays little attention

to external environmental factors. His major focus is on the internal environment as i
applies to activities, interactions and sentiments among a given population (Homans,
1974). In other words, he fails to take into account the context in which individuals
engage in exchange (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992). This is a limitation of social
exchange theory which network analysis addresses.

The basic premise of exchange theory is that human behaviour consists of "exchanges of
rewards (and punishments) among interacting individuals" (Turner, 1991: 311).
Furthermore a given behaviour is maintained by the pay-offs which the individual
receives (Homans, 1974). Inherent within this construct is the first principle of

economics, namely, that people "calculate the long-range consequences of their action
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in a marketplace and attempt to maximise their material profits in their transactions"
(Turner, 1991: 311). However, to this materialistic notion, Homans adds a social

dimension, arguing that people do not always seek to maximise profits, but only to mak
some profit, and that exchanges are not only monetary but include social commodities,
such as approval, esteem, compliance, love, and affection (Homans, 1974).

Homans' rationality proposition summarises a number of his principles and captures the

essence of social exchange theory. The rationality proposition states that "In choosi
between alternative actions, a person will choose that one for which, as perceived by

or her at the time, the value, V, of the result, multiplied by the probability, P, of g

that result, is greater" (Homans. 1974: 43). In so acting, an individual maximises his

her expected utility. With respect to repeated actions, this proposition is of interes
study of continuity in alliance where it "implies that, if the rate at which a man or
performs an action is designated by A, then Action = Value . Probability" (Homans,
1974: 45)
Turner (1991) operationalises this proposition with an example: "if Action^ is highly
valued (say, 10) but the probability of getting it by emitting Actioni is low (0.20)

Action2 is less valued (say, 5) but the probability of receiving it is greater (0.50)
Actioni, then the Actor will emit Action (because 10 . 0.20 = 2 yields less rewards
than 5. 0.50 = 2.5)" (p 313).

In brief, social exchange regards individuals as calculative. People make decisions ab
exchanges with other parties on the basis of anticipated costs and benefits. Axelrod
(1984) and Kelley and Thibaut (1978) supported Homan's propositions, finding in

laboratory experiments, that cooperative behaviour could be increased by manipulating
reinforcement schedules. Levine and White (1961) applied exchange theory to an
analysis of exchanges among not-for-profit health and welfare agencies. They found
that dependency between organisations was influenced by practical and social
considerations. Practical considerations included organisational function, the extent
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which the agencies were aware of one-another and the extent to which they had access to
resources external to the local community. Organisational prestige was among the

important social considerations. Shortell (1974) used social exchange to explore the

relationship between doctor referral rates and status. He found a relationship betw

rates of exchange and status among specialists but not with respect to generalists.
recently, Lamb (1991), utilising social exchange theory and technology theory to
examine exchanges between nurse practitioners and doctors, found that nurse

practitioner decisions to consult a doctor were not based solely on the condition o

patient. In addition to patient condition, exchange decisions were influenced by the

expected outcomes of the exchange with the available consulting doctors, implying t
previous encounters have a substantial influence on exchange behaviour.

Social exchange theory has ideological detractors and more substantive critics who
criticise Homans' propositions on the basis that they are overly utilitarian. Those

making this claim consider that his deductive logic about the behaviour of individu

reduces to "things are as they are because they are rewarding" (Turner, 1991: 317-32
However, Homans' (1974) argues that, in the absence of any laws underpinning
sociological reasoning, propositions grounded in observations of the behaviour of

individuals and reinforcement theory provide building blocks for understanding macr
level trends in society. For Homans, society is made up of small groups and the
exchange processes which govern the small group also govern the wider community
(Homans, 1950: 468). Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) maintain that it is likely that
Homans' analysis of social behaviour endures precisely because his vision of the

underpinning's of social structure and institutional forms is straightforward and l
closely with the actions of individuals (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992: 111). Turner

(1991: 317-322) concludes that exchange theory is one of the few approaches that can
bridge the micro/macro gap with common principles.

However, despite the strong endorsement of social exchange theory by these

researchers, the issue of tautology remains problematic. Risks to logic are inheren
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the key concepts, namely, value, reward, and action. For example, rewards are

gratification's which have value and value is the degree of a reward (Turner (1991

Homans argues that the issue of tautology does not arise if his propositions are vie
as axioms, within a deductive system (Homans. 1974). Emerson (1972) partly

addressed the issue of tautology by emphasising the 'exchange relation' rather tha

individual actors. According to Turner (1991), "this approach bypasses the problem o
tautology so evident in much exchange theory by viewing an established exchange

relation - not actors in the relation - as the smallest unit of analysis. In this wa

questions about each actor's values become less central because attention is focus
the relationship between actors who exchange resources" (p 560- 561).

While social exchange is well grounded theoretically and empirically, network anal

largely empirically driven. Network analysis is based on the premise that all impo
social phenomena can be explained by social structure. Network analysts describe

regular patterns of interaction of many actors and "use their description to learn h
network structures constrain social life" (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992: 114). With

respect to the study of interorganisational linkage, network analysts explain "coo

in terms of the position of the cooperating partners in a network relationship" (Smi
Carroll et al., 1995: 19).

Emerson (1972) links network analysis and Homans' dyadic exchange approach by

using the exchange relation as the structural unit for studying "the formation and
of social structures among specified actors" (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992: 113).
Furthermore, Emerson (1972) made it easier to apply exchange theory to the study of
interorganisational networks by defining exchange networks as "sets of exchange
relations among actors, individual or collective" (Emerson in Cook 1977: 68).
Accordingly, an organisation can be defined as a corporate actor. Furthermore, an

"exchange network is a set of three or more actors each of whom provides opportuniti
for transactions with at least one actor in a set" (Emerson, 1972: 70). According

definition, a regional health care network can be considered an "opportunity struc
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comprising both individual actors and corporate actors and exchanges between
organisations can be viewed as actions. Using this approach, Emerson (1972) and Cook
and Emerson (1983) explored relationships between power and dependence and
concluded that one "organisation's power over another is rooted in dependence on the
resources it controls" (Starkweather and Cook, 1988: 357).

Following Emerson's logic, Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) make a strong case for the
integration of exchange theory and network analysis on theoretical and empirical
grounds, a linkage which they perceive is "both natural and potentially fruitful" (p 114).
Given the strong endorsement of these researchers, this thesis draws on both network
analysis and exchange theory to explore alliance activity and maintenance within the
context of regional health care network. Network analysis provides appropriate
constructs for describing the structure of the network within which alliances between
generalist and specialist firms and agencies are embedded. Useful measures include ties,
connections and configurations with ties described in terms of numbers, direction,
reciprocity, density and centrality. Exchange theory provides propositions for
examining the dynamics of exchange relations and places the emphasis on the actions,
interactions and sentiments of the actors. The units of analysis employed in this thesis
are defined in Chapter 5. With respect to methods of data gathering, both network
analysis and social exchange frequently use observation, diaries and surveys.

ORGANISATIONAL DOMAIN

"It is a law of nature that territorial animals - whether individual or social - live in eternal hostilit
with their territorial neighbours" (Ardrey, 1972: 188).

Ardrey (1972) reminds us that among social animals there is "the drive to dominate
fellows" (p 9) and that this is an "instinct three or four hundred million years old" (p 9).
Furthermore, a m o n g animals the drive to dominate territory is independent of, and more
powerful than, the drive for sex (Ardrey, 1972: 9). This deep urge to maintain control
over a specified territory is associated with the protection of resources for survival.
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Similarly, organisations lay claim to territory including space, resources and functions.

The innate drive to extend the domain over which an organisation has control may ta

number of forms, including, competition ("business is war"), or cooperation with ot

organisations, in which case it may involve merger or alliance. Whatever, the metho

used to extend domain, the objective is to achieve greater certainty in an increas
uncertain environment (Thompson, 1967). Several writers have observed (Kanter,
1989c; Limerick and Cunnington, 1993) that the 1980s were characterised by
opportunism and competition while the decade of the 1990s has seen a trend towards
cooperation in business.

Starkweather (1981) describes organisational domains as "defined areas within which
exchange transpires" (p 60) and Levine and White (1961) define domain in terms of

specific goals that an organisation "wishes to pursue and the functions it underta

order to implement its goals" (p 597). In operationalising the term, these research

propose that a health organisation's domain includes the claims it makes with resp

the illnesses it addresses, the population it serves, and the services it provides.
Consensus concerning organisational goals and functions is required to the extent
the various players are willing to provide each other with the elements each needs
achieve their respective goals (Levine and White, 1961). Furthermore, domain

consensus only continues for as long as the various players continue to fulfil thei
expected functions and maintain acceptable standards. Achieving and maintaining
domain consensus involves on-going negotiation, readjustment and compromise. There
seems to be a relationship between the level of negotiation over domain and the
specificity of the function of the organisation. Organisations with very specific
spend less time in exchanges concerning domain than organisations with diffuse

functions. Furthermore, some organisations know very little about other organisati

in the community and this leads to a lack of domain consensus and to competition am
the various authorities (Levine and White, 1963).
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ADAPTATION

"The more scarce, dynamic, and complex the environment, the more organic a structure should be"
(Robbins, 1993: 528).

The biological principle of adaptation maintains that all species must change as thei
environment changes in order to survive. The application of this principle is as true for
organisations, including methods used to manage interdependence, as it is for
populations. Population ecology is a conceptual approach closely allied to the principle
of adaptation. With respect to networks, its central concern is the survival of
organisational arrangements. Several studies have observed a positive association
between network formation and organisational survival (Grandori and Soda, 1995).

Starkweather and Cook (1988: 344-378) interpret the natural selection model, or
population ecology approach, to imply that certain populations of organisations are
"selected out" for survival as environmental circumstances change. The primary thesis
of the model is that "organisations whose internal features can be arranged to best match
the demands of their environments will adapt and thrive" (p 351). Hence, this model
emphasises the impact of exogenous factors on organisations and says little about the
potential for organisations to influence their environment. Scott (1981) proposes that
this model is best utilised with respect to an analysis of small organisations which have
little ability to influence their environment. Ring and V a n de V e n (1994) maintain that
while the natural selection model " m a y be appropriate for the failure of discrete
transactions that are governed by atomistic market norms, it is less relevant to relational
forms of exchange which....are largely structured and governed by and for the parties
involved" (p 107).

Starkweather and Cook (1988: 344-378) also refer to the resource dependency model.
While the natural selection model is strongly deterministic, the resource-dependence
model permits organisations to be more proactive. This perspective is based on the
premise that few organisations have all the resources they require to achieve their goals.
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Hence, it is necessary for them to "engage in transactions with elements in the
environment that can supply these resources" (p 353). Necessity therefore drives
organisations to relate with one another and, in the process, the network can influence its
environment.

Robbins (1993) describes three dimensions by which an organisation's environment can
be measured, namely, "capacity, volatility, and complexity" (p 526). Capacity refers to
the extent to which an environment has available resources which can support
organisational growth. Volatility refers to the extent to which managers are able to
predict change and likely outcomes. In situations of unpredictable and rapid change the
environment can be described as highly volatile (Robbins, 1993: 526) and the change as
"discontinuous" (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 37). Complexity refers to the relative
heterogeneity/homogeneity of the environment. For example, industries in which there
are few players and where each is acquainted with the ways of the others are relatively
homogeneous. Whereas, in industries where there are m a n y players, operating in highly
innovative and opportunistic ways, the environment is heterogeneous or complex.
Organisations that operate in environments with scarce resources, unpredictable change
and complexity face the greatest uncertainty because they "have little room for error, high
unpredictability, and a diverse set of elements in the environment to constantly monitor"
(Robbins, 1993: 527). Such organisations require management strategies for effective
adaptation.

Starkweather and Cook (1988) maintain that an "important goal of management is to
maximise the organisation's future" (p 360). Given that organisations depend on the
external environment for resources to survive, they must develop proactive strategies for
managing these dependencies. These researchers identify six management strategies
important for successful adaptation, including, using the environment as a primary
source of intelligence, increasing the organisation's ability to acquire essential resources,
establishing strong relationships with key stakeholders with respect to the core-task of
the organisation, developing a network of useful exchange relations, including plugging29

in to the relevant community power network, and, acquiring community credibility and

legitimacy. Inherent within these survival strategies is the move to a more different
organisation, with corresponding challenges to coordination.

INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION

Integration is defined as "the act of combining various parts into a whole" (Turner, 1
557). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) applied the concepts of integration and

differentiation to the study of organisations. Integration and coordination were defin
by these researchers as "the process of achieving unity of effort among various sub-

systems in accomplishing the organisation's tasks" while differentiation was defined a

the "segmentation of the organisational system into sub-systems, each of which tends t

develop particular attributes in relation to the requirements posed by its relevant e
environment" (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 3-4).

Lawrence and Lorsch, (1967) addressed the question of integration with respect to leve

of certainty and uncertainty in an organisation's external environment. High performin

organisations were found to be those which had a structure suited to their environment
For example, high-performing organisations with turbulent environments were found to
be highly differentiated while organisations with relatively stable environments had
differentiation. Furthermore, the most successful organisations were "both highly
differentiated and successfully integrated" (Starkweather and Cook, (1988: 352). With
respect to coordination methods, organisations operating in conditions of high

uncertainty were found to rely more heavily on integrating units and integrators. High
performing organisations in reasonably stable environments were found to achieve

coordination through the organisational hierarchy. Furthermore, these researchers foun
that, irrespective of environmental conditions, high performing companies were
characterised by open communication and the use of a problem-solving approach to the
management of conflict (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
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O f further relevance to an examination of methods of interorganisational integration are
the study by V a n de Ven, Delbecq et al., (1976), of the work-task environment and
methods of coordination and Argote's (1982) study of the relationship between worktask environment and performance. V a n de Ven, Delbecq et al., (1976) found that
uncertainty in work tasks was related to the use of less formalised approaches to
coordination. That is, as uncertainty in the work task increased work groups used more
horizontal channels of communication. M o r e informal means of coordination replaced
coordination by rules, plans and the hierarchy. Argote (1982) found hospital emergency
departments which employed less formalised approaches to coordination in situations of
high task-uncertainty were more effective. These studies of integration alert the
researcher to the substantial impact that situational factors m a y have on a study of
alliance maintenance within regional health care delivery networks.

Integration can be viewed as a management strategy, in which case we may speak of
either vertical or horizontal integration. Vertical integration refers to the development of
closer working relationships between different types of organisation "that share inputoutput relationships with each other along the production chain" (Luke and Begun, 1994:
372). Vertical integration aptly describes strategies to improve cooperation a m o n g
generalist and specialist health providers contributing to a regional health care network.
Horizontal integration refers to the development of closer relationships a m o n g different
organisations in the same business, such as a group of nursing h o m e s

(Luke and

Begun, 1994: 372).

Differentiation can also be viewed as a management strategy. For example,
organisations m a y be horizontally differentiated or vertically differentiated. O n e form of
horizontal differentiation is exemplified by the concept of task specialisation. The
complexity of the technology required to complete tasks has a large influence on the
extent to which a work force becomes horizontally differentiated.

T h e more

technologically complex the tasks, the more an organisation needs to hire people with
special skills. Pfeffer (1978: 33), argues that specialisation m a y also lead to
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differentiation in power. For example, if specialisation of tasks means that there are few
people with the expertise to perform the task, then the person in that position acquires

additional control and influence within the organisation. Pfeffer (1978) cites the examp

of the medical specialist trained to treat a particular illness where "the greater divis
labour has created a situation in which persons doing very non routine and complex

tasks have relatively few competitors" (p 38). Vertical differentiation usually refers to
the number of levels in the organisational hierarchy. Hence, organisational position
differs not only by task but also by the amount of authority and control attached to a
particular position. Vertical differentiation may also occur with respect to level of

payment that a particular position attracts. An organisation may be highly differentiated

with respect to this dimension if there is considerable disparity between the highest pa
worker and the lowest paid worker. These two dimensions of differentiation help to

explain status and power differentials between generalists and specialists within region
health care networks. Medical specialists in comparison with general practitioners and

health professionals hold additional control and influence based on their special expert
and their higher rate of remuneration.

Turner (1991) reasons that within society there is tension between forces that hold soci
units together and forces that drive them apart. Potentiating forces of differentiation
include "competition, exchange and mobilisation of power in ways that produce
subcategories, subgroups, subcultures, and sub ranks" (p 627). He identifies three sets
of disintegrative processes, namely, "problems of coordination", "problems of symbolic
unification" and "problems of political consolidation". Problems of coordination are
associated with increasing differentiation among subgroups of populations. In the health
industry, increasing differentiation is most frequently associated with increasing
specialisation. Problems of symbolic unification refer to differentiation in language,
values, beliefs, and institutional norms, while, problems of political consolidation are
associated with the use of power by subgroups of a population to further their own

interests and, in the process, increase differentiation. Hence, just as power may be used
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to integrate a population through the establishment of hierarchies, it m a y also be used to
divide groups (Turner, 1991: 616-618).

For each of the above three sets of disintegrative problems, Turner, (1991: 620-627)

employs three corresponding response patterns, namely, integration through "structural
coordination", integration through "symbolic unification" and integration through
"political consolidation". Three important theoretical streams flow from structural

coordination, namely, "structural interdependence", "structural inclusion" and "struct

overlap". The first of these streams is of major interest in this thesis because of its
relevance to the type of linkage which exists between members of regional networks.
However, structural inclusion and structural overlap are also referred to because they
have a place in recent multi-perspective, interorganisational literature.

Structural interdependence is associated with the "creation of interdependencies among
sub-groupings" (Turner, 1991: 620). Exchange theories emphasize that differentiation
leads to specialisation, which in turn leads to interdependence. As a result, subunits
"must exchange resources with other units in order to sustain themselves" (p 620). In

addition, exchange theorists note that, inherent in exchanges between groups are "power

dynamics, since those units with scarce and valued resources are often in a position to
extract compliance from other units" (p 620). An important corollary to structural
interdependence, is that "networks and chains of interdependence (and varying degrees
of dependence) can emerge to resolve problems of coordination" (Turner, 1991: 620).
Luhmann (1982) is identified as the founder of structural inclusion theory. His basic

premise is that "coordination revolves around the process of inclusion, in which one u
is lodged inside a more inclusive unit, with the latter lodged inside an even more
inclusive unit" (Turner, 1991: 620) and so on. A large bureaucracy, described in terms
of structural inclusion, locates groups within departments and departments within an

organisational structure. The structure facilitates distribution of resources and deli
the exchanges which can occur. Furthermore, structural inclusion facilitates the
development of strong cultural cohesion with commitment by the group to shared values
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and norms. Structural overlap is a pattern of coordination described by network
theorists which has its foundations in "structural theorising" (p 121). This view of
coordination emphasises the overlaps that occur between units with some units "partially
part of another, either through networks of interdependence or through incomplete
inclusion" (p 121).

Each of the above patterns of structural coordination is facilitated by integration t
symbolic unification and integration through consolidation of power. The presence of
shared values, "norms of fair exchange, justice and media of exchange" (Turner, 1991:
621) are recognised by m a n y theorists, from various streams of thought, to facilitate
coordination through structural interdependence in exchanges, structural inclusion and
structural overlap. Similarly, m a n y theorists have argued that political consolidation
through regulation and centralised authority also facilitates coordination (Turner, 1991:
621).

Through all theoretical approaches used to explore issues of integration and
differentiation, the message is clear that as organisational environments become more
uncertain, successful adaptation requires both differentiation and effective integration
through the management of interdependence.

INTERDEPENDENCE AND COORDINATION
"Under conditions of rationality, organisations group positions to minimise coordination costs"
(Thompson, 1967: 57).

Organisational interdependence refers to the extent to which organisations depend upo
one another. Alexander and Morlock (1994: 219) maintain that "interdependence exists
whenever one actor does not entirely control all the conditions necessary for the
achievement of an action or for obtaining outcomes desired from the action" (p 219). In
situations of interdependence, organisations must develop the capacity to influence other
organisations on which they depend (Alexander and Morlock, 1994: 219). Hence,
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interdependence implies a need to negotiate in order to gain the resources required for
survival.

Interorganisational exchanges become necessary because, in situations of scarcity,

organisations must restrict the activities they perform to specific functions (Levin
White, 1961). As a result, organisations become dependent on other organisations for
necessary elements and as a consequence must enter into exchanges with them.
Interdependence implies that "each one has some power over the other which places
limits on the extent to which each may with impunity exercise power over his/her

colleague. The pattern of interdependence which characterises a relationship may also

affect the kinds of process agreements the pair must achieve if their relationship i
maximally satisfactory" (Thibaut and Kelley, 1969: 100-125). Thus to achieve
maximum rewards from an exchange relationship partners will develop rules governing
the way their exchanges are carried out. These 'norms' governing exchange relations

provide opportunity for both parties to "gain from the introduction of mutually acce
rules which introduce regularity and control into the relationship without recourse
direct interpersonal application of power" (p 134). This thesis proposes that some
exchange relations, namely, alliances among small business organisations, whose

owners place a high value on freedom from bureaucratic interference and organisation
autonomy, are governed by a set of informal norms.

This type of coordination is "organic" rather than "mechanistic" (Victor and Blackbu
1987: 493). Thompson (1967) proposes that as interdependence increases, coordination
measures become increasingly informal, localised, and collaborative. Furthermore,
Thompson maintains that the nature of task interdependence affects organisational
structures, specifically, he proposes that "organisations seek to place reciprocally

interdependent positions tangent to one another, in a common group or team which is 1
local, and 2) conditionally autonomous" (p 58). This action makes coordination
between reciprocal units easier. However, this strategy is not always possible. In

regional health care networks, while there is a high degree of interdependence betwee
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the parties, it is frequently impractical for them to be located together. Hence, other costeffective approaches to coordination must be devised.

Methods of coordination can be either formal or informal. Thompson (1967: 51-65)
described three approaches to coordination, namely, "contracting", "co-opting", and

"coalescing". Contracts or negotiated agreements may be formal, as in the case of a l

agreement, or informal. In the latter case, the agreement may rest on an understanding
that each party will deliver as expected. Coopting refers to a practice in which one
organisation absorbs elements from the other organisation into its leadership. With

coalescing the parties combine or coalesce their efforts in some way. Hence, coalesci
places greater constraints on individual organisational autonomy and independent
functioning than the other two approaches to managing interdependence.

Thompson (1967) describes three "types of interdependence stemming from

technological requirements within organisations" (p 64), namely, "pooled", "sequentia
and "reciprocal". Pooled interdependence occurs under conditions in which units

separately contribute to a larger whole in the interest of mutual gain, but, they may

very little functional contact. Sequential interdependence refers to situations in wh
outputs of one unit become the inputs of another part of the organisation. Both parts

contribute to the whole and both are sustained by the whole organisation. Hence, while
their interdependence is serial in nature, it also has a pooled dimension. Reciprocal

interdependence is more complex in that the outputs of each unit become the inputs for
the others. That is, each unit provides "contingency for the other" (Thompson, 1967:
55). Units that are reciprocally interdependent may also have elements of pooled and
sequential dependence.

"Under norms of rationality" (Thompson, 1967: 54-55), organisations seek to minimise
the costs of coordination by selecting mechanisms appropriate to the technological
requirements of the task. For example, work units with pooled interdependence require

little coordination because the actions of each unit can proceed with little referenc
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other units as long as the overall organisation remains viable. Whereas, with sequential

interdependence, improper action by any member unit of the set affects all other unit
With reciprocal interdependence, constant adjustment of member units is required as

each unit responds to the actions of the others. In this type of work situation, sub
coordination is required because attention must be directed to social structures and
technical systems which support timely communications about non-routine events

between the relevant parties. Coordination of units which are reciprocally interdepe
is a particular interest of this thesis.

Mintzberg (1983) and Galbraith (1974), working independently, proposed that
coordination techniques are largely determined by the complexity of the task. For

example, where the tasks to be addressed are routine, relatively simple approaches to

coordination are effective, including, mutual adjustment, the standardisation of work
processes, and the use of rules and procedures. However, in non-routine situations

which require complex problem-solving, other approaches to coordination are required,

including, the appointment by one unit of a liaison person, the use of committees, th
appointment of an independent coordinator, standardisation of outputs through the
development of target and outcome measures, and the standardisation of skills and
knowledge (Dessler, 1986: 148-162). The recent trend towards the use of bench

marking is a good example of coordination by standardisation of outputs. Of particula

interest to this thesis is coordination by mutual adjustment. Mintzberg (1983) obser

that mutual adjustment was not only used in routine problem-solving but also in the m
complex situations. That is, where the problem to be addressed is unpredictable and
complex. This is frequently the case in exchanges between generalist and specialist
firms within regional health care networks.

While organisational goals and strategies are important determinants of interdepende

the goals of people critical to the survival of the organisation need to be considere
(White, Levine and Vlasak, 1980: 185-191). Pfeffer (1978: 56) supports this

hypothesis. He proposes that decisions about organisational goals and design are made
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by the people w h o hold power in the organisation. Furthermore, these decisions m a y
not be fully rational or based solely on criteria designed to meet the best interests
organisation. Rather, the people with power will make decisions that meet the minimal

requirements of the organisation and that enhance their own ability to control. In other
words, politics is one way that organisations seek to manage interdependence.

Pfeffer (1978: 57-61) addresses the use of interpersonal approaches to managing

interdependence. Organisational control is achieved through ensuring that people "will
act in the way desired by the authorities, either because they have been selected for

willingness and ability to do so, or because they have been trained to act in conformity
with the authorities' preferences" (p 57-58). With respect to the regional health care
network, discussion of the factors influencing the recruitment of new workers is
particularly relevant. Pfeffer (1978) proposes that "much of the recruitment and hiring
that takes place tends to differentially favour persons at different points in a social
network, and often rewards loyalty and conformity above performance or other such
standards" (p 58). Furthermore, he refers to the operation of "old boy" networks and
the important part that having the right social contacts plays in decisions about the
of people. Decisions about hiring on the basis of social similarity are likely to be

influenced by feelings of attraction and perceptions of the extent that the appointmen
particular person will further the referent power of the person in authority (Pfeffer,

1978). If we apply these propositions to the regional health care network we should find
shared values within particular groups and differentiation in values across groups. For

example, medical specialists within a particular specialty are likely to be drawn from a

particular stratum of society and, having shared a similar and lengthy education, can be
expected to hold similar values. Some of these values will be shared with general
practitioners because of their common undergraduate education and professional
socialisation. However, allied health professionals tend to be drawn from a different
stratum of society and hold a different set of values. Hence, managing interdependence

between doctors is likely to be based on shared values and norms of practice applying to
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the medical profession. Whereas exchanges between doctors and health professionals
may be characterised by differences in values and norms of practice.

SUMMARY

This Chapter has introduced exchange theory, network analysis, coordination theory and
concepts arising from the growing body of knowledge pertaining to interorganisational

cooperation. The purpose of introducing these concepts is to facilitate the process of
developing an integrated theoretical and methodological framework for the study of
alliances within regional networks. Among the forces driving organisations to enter

cooperative arrangements are powerful environmental forces and the primitive biologic
desire to acquire, maintain and enhance control over territory or domain. As the
environment of an industry becomes more turbulent organisations need to adapt to
survive. Organisations most likely to survive are those which are successfully
differentiated and integrated. One differentiation strategy is the establishment of

cooperative arrangements with other organisations. Cooperative relationships result i

growing interorganisational interdependence and require effective integration through
employment of cost-efficient methods of coordination. Coordination theory maintains

that in situations involving high differentiation, complex problem-solving and recipr
interdependence, coordination through mutual adjustment based on feedback is an
appropriate method.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review is in five sections. The first section is titled "Networks and
alliances" and the objectives are to explore the two bodies of literature in order to identify
concepts and measures useful to an analysis of alliances within regional networks.

The second section is titled "Motivators for interorganisational cooperation" with an
emphasis on forces for cooperation in the Australian health industry while the third
section addresses the m a i n theme of this thesis, namely, "continuity in
interorganisational cooperation". The objectives of sections two and three are to describe
situational factors that influence the development, configuration and management of
alliances, identify the expected rewards of alliances and describe factors k n o w n to
maintain and destroy alliances. Figure 2 summarises the motivating forces for
interorganisational cooperation and Figure 3 draws together the important findings from
the literature concerning the costs and benefits of interorganisational cooperation and the
factors k n o w n to influence this calculus.

In the fourth section, the health care literature provides insights into regional health
networks within the Australian context. T h e purpose of this review is to identify
situational factors pertaining to regional health care networks, to describe organisational
characteristics, including the people involved, and to outline the nature of exchange
relations. T h e fifth section of the literature review addresses the practice of shared care
and compares shared care in the health industry with alliances in other industries. It is
proposed that the practice of shared care in the Australian health industry is a form of
interorganisational cooperation which can be accurately described as an alliance.

The purpose of the final section of the review is to explore research methodologies
appropriate to the study of alliances within a network of business exchange
relationships. O f particular interest is case study research applied to the study of
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organisational networks, survey research and the use of multiple sources and methods of
data collection.

NETWORKS AND ALLIANCES
"Actors in network models are not seen as atoms locked in a crystalline grid, their every action
determined by their structural location. They are

active, purposeful agents w h o are constantly

trying to wrest control for themselves or blocking others from taking control" (Nohria and Eccles
(1992: 7).

The interorganisational literature reveals that studies in this area cross ideologica
disciplinary boundaries. For example, Grandori and Soda (1995), in a review of the
relevant literature, discuss the contributions of organisational economic theory,
organisational theory, negotiation analysis, resource dependency theory, the neoinstitutional approach, organisational sociology, sociology and economics, social
psychology, general management and population ecology. Hence, it is hardly surprising
to find that there are marked ideological differences between groups of researchers with
an interest in interorganisational cooperation. Those w h o employ a "network" approach
tend to favour a "normative" perspective while those w h o study and write about
"alliances" are associated with an "atomistic" or "individual differences" viewpoint.

Burt, (1982) proposes that these approaches imply two different sets of criteria which
are in use to "evaluate the marginal utility of alternative actions" (p 4). The atomistic
perspective is defined by "separate actors having exogenously formed interests, one
actor's interests, or preferences, being analytically independent of another's" (p 5). The
assumptions associated with this view of the world underpin liberal democratic theory
which supports "possessive individualism" (p 5) and economic theory based on supply
and demand. Interorganisational researchers w h o define networks and alliances as
intermediary forms of organisation (Thorelli, 1986; Williamson, 1991) between
hierarchies and markets, are associated with this orientation (Grandori and Soda, 1995)
as are researchers w h o employ social exchange theory. Burt (1982) argues that actors
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do not exist as social atoms, but, rather as members of society. " A n actor exists within a
system of actors and evaluates alternative actions within that context" (p 5). This is
"normative" approach and assumes that "actions are evaluated interdependently by

separate actors as a function of socialising processes that integrate them within a sys
of actors" (p 5), a stance having its origins in Aristotle's De Anima, and influential
symbolic interactionism, ethno-methodology and social psychology (which uses a social
definition). Burt concludes that action theory supports a normative "perspective for
descriptive work while an atomistic perspective is assumed for deductive work" (Burt,
1982: 7). Furthermore, he endorses Ekeh's (1974: 5) warning that the two perspectives
"exist in non-marriageable terms only joined by the virulence of the polemics against

each other's tradition of thought" (Burt, 1982: 8). However, the literature suggests th
in the complex arena of interorganisational cooperation the benefits of eclecticism
outweigh the joys of paradigmatic conflict and that a marriage is well underway.

Toward networks
In support of a more eclectic approach, Kanter and Eccles (1992: 524) conclude that
most studies of networks have examined structural characteristics. They propose that
further research is needed into network characteristics which facilitate the effective
of information and network characteristics associated with organisational outcome and

process measures, such as, profitability, job satisfaction, sense of participation, and
autonomy. In other words, having considered the structural attributes of networks,
Kanter and Eccles call for studies which combine structure and process to derive

information of utility to managers. Similarly, Nohria and Eccles (1992: 11) propose tha

researchers who use a transaction-cost perspective to explain interorganisational allia

"pay scant attention to how these alliances interconnect to bind the firms into a netwo
of relationships. They also ignore how the network of relationships that emerges over

time as a result of alliances between firms shapes and constrains the strategic conduct
firms involved in them" (p 11). These writers argue that strategic decisions about

entering an alliance are made within the context of an overall network of relationships
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Mayntz (1993) argues that most organisational research has focused on the individual
organisation and the relations it develops with other organisations. He holds that a
network approach to the study of organisations "poses very different questions from

those asked of organisational research" (p 5); the significant difference being the le
analysis. For example, he proposes that the theoretical relevance of the study of
networks of organisations "lies on the macro-level of society, not the meso-level" (p
Similarly, Scott (1995: 38-39) proposes that it is time to take a more macro-level
approach to the study of organisations than that usually employed in the study of

strategic alliances. Taking a long-range perspective, Scott asks the question "could i
that the recent growth of strategic alliances represents an attempt by existing

organisations to transcend the limits of their current structure and to move in the di
of becoming 'network' forms: new types of organisations?" (p 38). This question, in

part, expresses the interest of this study. It is further recognition that alliance fo
is not only an interesting sociological phenomenon of the '90s', but may signal a
powerful, proactive strategy to extend organisational domain.

Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 60-68) note that networks may occur at the global or
international level as well as the regional level. These global networks involve
cooperation among multi-national organisations which have the potential to exert
considerable influence across nations. Grandori and Soda (1995) propose that the
management of external "inter-firm" networks is particularly relevant in contemporary
Europe, given the move toward European integration. These researchers maintain that

networks lie at the very core of economic activity and organisational theory given tha
major emphases concern "modes of organising economic activities through inter-firm
coordination and cooperation" and "striking the right balance between differentiation
integration" (p 184).

Grandori and Soda (1995) draw attention to the many approaches to defining network.
For example, they note that organisational economists, such as Williamson (1991) and

Thorelli (1986), define network as "an 'intermediate' or 'hybrid' form of organisation
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economic activities with respect to markets and firms". This approach is contrasted with
that taken by Powell (1990) and Johanisson (1987a) who "maintain that a network is a
'third type' organisational arrangement with its own characteristics and properties,

qualitatively different from both markets and firms" (p 185). Grandori and Soda (1995)

provide a further definition of a network which they claim is "more operational and m

balanced". These researchers define a network as "a mode of regulating interdependenc

between firms which is different from aggregation of these units within a single firm

from coordination through market signals (prices, strategic moves, tacit collusion, et

and which is based on a cooperative game with partner-specific communication" (p 185).
Of major interest to these researchers are the approaches employed to manage various
types of interdependence. They recognise that approaches to coordination may take
many forms "from lateral informal communication, to inter-firm information and

planning systems, to complex integration structures; in addition to, or in substitutio
market mechanism" (p 184). Measures useful to the study of inter-firm networks are
identified and discussed with respect to the discipline most associated with it.

Grandori and Soda (1995) propose that historical and evolutionary disciplines have

addressed the issue of technology related costs and learning problems associated with
formation of networks (Nelson, 1993). Economic theorists, such as Williamson (1985)
and Powell (1987) added the dimension of the cost of governance of transactions. The
researchers note that while these theorists have concentrated on market failure they
paid little attention to networks in response to the failure of bureaucracies.
Organisational theorists, including Schermerhorn (1975), Van de Ven, Walker et al.,
(1979) and Gadde and Mattson (1987) have focused on contract negotiations, the
distribution of power, the types of arrangement governing networks (eg franchising),
differentiation, complementarity of resources between firms, intensity of
interdependence, the number of organisations to be coordinated, the complexity of the
interdependent activities and the flexibility of the network. Those favouring a
negotiation analysis (Schmidt and Kochan, 1977; O'Toole and O'Toole, 1981; and
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Weiss, 1987) have highlighted "the structure of the games as a predictor of both network
foundation and shape" (Grandori and Soda 1995: 189). Sociological studies have
emphasised resource dependence and the nature of the dependence which exists between
organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979, and Benson, 1975). In

addition, this group of researchers has described various forms of interorganisation
arrangements, including joint ventures, interlocking directorates, associations and
cartels, and social and personal networks. Dependence is also of central concern to
those adopting a neo-institutional approach (Baum and Oliver, 1991). In this case,
dependence not only includes material resource transactions but also the resource of
legitimation. Hence, this approach emphasises the importance of institutional
embeddedness within the pillars of society; for example, the legal system and the
banking system (Whitely, 1990 and Grabher, 1993). Embeddedness is also of interest
to organisational sociology. However, in this case embeddedness is associated with

social and cultural embeddedness and the institutionalisation of social norms and va
among participating organisations (Granovetter, 1985; Ring, 1993). Those adopting a
Marxist approach have explored network strategies designed to increase power for

purposes of reinforcing elites and class dominance (Whitt, 1980). Social psychologist

have employed network analysis to explore changes in network structure and boundarie

(Burt and Minor, 1983), the patterns of relations (Lomi and Grandi, 1993) and to stud
the position of individual firms within networks (Gerlach, 1992). Grandori and Soda
(1995) maintain that the most eclectic group is general management. Researchers

favouring this perspective have drawn on all of the conceptual paradigms. In particu

business administration is said to have focussed on strategic alliances (Ohmae, 1989;
Contractor and Lorange, 1988), while Swedish scholars of industrial marketing have
employed exchange theory to explore the dynamics of long-term buyer-seller
relationships (Hakansson, 1982; Ford, 1980; and Forsgren and Johnson, 1992). This
thesis contributes to research that employs a general management approach.
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In a recently reported study, Anderson, Hakansson et al., (1994) combine network
analysis and exchange theory to explore dyadic business relationships within two
business networks. These researchers recognise the importance of examining
relationships between organisations in the context of the network in which they are
embedded. They define a business network "as a set of two or more connected business
relationships, in which each exchange relation is between business firms that are

conceptualised as collective actors" (p 2). In operationalizing this definition, mana

of focal organisations are considered to be the appropriate people to define the netw

Of particular interest to Anderson, Hakansson et al., (1994) are the direct and indir
connections which a focal dyad has with other organisations. Drawing on the work of

Cook and Emerson (1978), organisations are considered to be connected to the extent to
which "exchange in one relation is contingent upon exchange (or non-exchange) in the
other relation" (p 725). However, in applying Cook and Emerson's (1978) proposition
of how organisations are connected, these researchers found that organisations can be

both positively and negatively connected with another relationship at the same time a
that some connections are easy to estimate, while others are a matter of perceptual
judgement. These researchers conclude that cooperation is a "pivotal construct" (p 9)
and that interdependence is an essential consideration with respect to the need for
cooperation.

Orton and Weick (1990) used interdependence as a basis for describing the degree to
which departments or organisations are coupled. The term "loosely coupled" suggests
that any location in an organisation or system may contain elements which are

interdependent and that the level of interdependence may vary (Orton and Weick, 1990).

The term "coupled" implies that the elements are not only connected in some way but th
they have some choice in being linked. Coupling is seen as producing stability, while

the term "loosely" implies that the coupled elements recognise that each is subject to
spontaneous change; hence, requires a degree of independence and flexibility. A
network can be described as being loosely coupled, however, it may have some elements
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which are more tightly or loosely coupled than others, implying that interdependence
between some organisations within the network is greater than among others.

Grandori and Soda (1995) identify ten broad approaches to managing interdependence
among members of networks, namely, negotiation and horizontal communication, social
coordination and control, linking-pin roles and units, the appointment of common,

dedicated staff to manage coordination, hierarchical and authoritarian relations betw
organisations, planning and control systems, incentive systems, careful selection of

partners with concern for commitment to cooperate and the establishment of appropriat
information systems. A complex interorganisational network, such as a joint venture,
said to employ most of these approaches to coordination, while a social network may
rely on personal communication and negotiation (Grandori and Soda, 1995).

In a study of entrepreneurial "network dyads" (p 76), Larson (1992) considers network
to be an alternative form of organisation to hierarchies and markets with their own

unique form of organisation. Using Powell's (1990) definition Larson (1992) describes
networks as characterised by a "heavy reliance on reciprocity, collaboration,

complementary interdependence, a reputation and relationship basis for communication,

and an informal climate oriented toward mutual gain" (p 77). Her findings suggest tha
economic transactions "cannot be isolated from the social world in which they take

place" (p 97). In other words she proposes that exchange relations are governed by bo
economic considerations and social considerations and that "a middle ground must be
found" (p 97). Organisations engaged in relatively stable relationships were
characterised by "multiple transactions and a high degree of cooperation and
collaboration. They were governed in important ways by social controls arising from
norms of trust and reciprocity. Governance was explained in large part by

understanding the subtle control of interdependent and self-regulated players engaged
and committed to mutual gains" (Larson, 1992: 98). Larson (1992) concludes that her

findings match Powell's characteristics of networks, namely, that they are "long-term
and recurrent exchanges that create interdependencies that rest on the entangling of
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obligations, expectations, reputations, and mutual interests. The initial transactions
become embedded, not only in a larger set of economic exchanges but also in a rich and

active network of social relationships that couple the two organisations strategically
administratively" (p 98). Furthermore, she found few exchanges were governed by

formal contracts and that little importance was placed on contracts when they did exis
Predominantly, the contracts could be described as "informal and implicit social
contracts" (p 98). Much greater importance was placed on trust and reciprocity by the
alliance partners.

Powell (1990) observed that firms most likely to engage in network arrangements were
those with a need to exchange complex, knowledge-intensive skills that require
collaboration and firms engaged in fast-moving industries with short product cycles.

The first situation is consistent with the proposition that mutual adjustment is frequ
the preferred approach to coordination when the task requires complex problem solving
Mintzberg, 1983; and Galbraith, 1974). While the second situation, is consistent with
resource dependence theory and the findings of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Van de
Ven, Delbecq et al., (1976) and Argote (1982), namely, that in situations of high
uncertainty organisations become highly differentiated and rely on more informal
approaches to coordination.

Van de Ven, Walker et al., (1979), in a study of health and welfare agencies in the
United States, defined "the interagency network as the pattern of interrelationships

among organisations that are meshed together as a social system to attain collective a

self-interest goals or to resolve specific problems for a target population" (p 21). T
place emphasis on the patterns of relations among agencies rather than the exchanges
between agencies or the way in which exchanges are managed. In so doing they are
following in the tradition of Emerson (1972) in which an actor may be defined as a

collective (organisation) or an individual. This conception of "actor" allows the theo
of exchange to be applied at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, Emerson (1972)

proposed that his definition of structures as enduring exchange relations among specif
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actors allowed the researcher to explore the distribution of power and dependence among
actors in various network structures.

Van de Ven, Walker et al., (1979), describe three levels for examining
interorganisational relationships among members of industry networks, namely, "pair-

wise inter-agency relationships," "inter-agency set," and "interagency network" (Figu
1). The "interagency set" provides for analysis of exchange activities between two
agencies, including the volume of exchange and the reasons for exchange. The second

level of observation selects a focal organisation and examines the exchanges which th

organisation has with other organisations. Studies of this kind are able to explore ho
the focal organisation is affected by, or affects, other organisations. At the level
"interagency network" the full range, or pattern of exchanges among a network of
agencies is able to be observed.
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Figure 1: Levels for examining interorganisational relationships

A. Pair-Wise Inter-Agency Relationship

n

B. Inter-Agency Set

<N,^©

C. Inter-Agency Network

Source: Van de Ven, A.H., Walker, G. and Listen, J. (1979) Coordination Patterns Within an
Interorganisational Network. Human Relations, Vol. 32, No. 1: 21.
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Morissey (1992) indicates that level of cooperation between organisations within a

network can be influenced by several situational factors, including, the extent to wh
members are aware of each other's existence, the degree to which they depend upon one

another for needed resources, such as clients, information and funds, the similarity o

their roles or domain and the extent to which there is agreement over role demarcation

and the number of organisations within the network. Other factors influencing the lev
of cooperation include the level of formality governing exchanges between members of
the network and differences between members with respect to level of autonomy and
ability to control and influence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Brass and Burkhardt,
1992).

Properties commonly associated with an analysis of network structure are "density,

connectivity, and hierarchy" (Ibarra, 1992: 170). Density refers to the actual number

ties between members of the network over the number of potential ties and connectivity

refers to the degree to which members are connected either directly or indirectly (Bu
1982). A combination of high density and high connectivity implies a high degree of
interdependence among organisations (Ibarra, 1992: 170). Hierarchy, has several
dimensions, including the extent to which relations involve a single actor or are
centralised, and whether the structure can be described as mechanistic or organic

(Shrader, Lincoln et al., 1989: 45). The latter are usually distinguished on the basi

the extent to which there is a high or low incidence of clustering or cliquing (Shrade

Lincoln et al., 1989). Mayntz (1993) identifies several further measures used to descr
networks, including size as defined by number of organisations, stability, level of

articulation (whether at the macro-level or sectoral level), location, changes over ti

characteristics of the organisations involved in terms of sociotechnical variables an
functions. Hence, Mayntz, like Morissey, (1992) addresses the issue of organisational
domain.

51

F r o m networks to alliances
H a g e (1995), uses the terms networks and alliances to refer to "nonhierarchical
collectives that are distinguished by joint decision making across organisational
boundaries" in which cooperating groups "have approximately equal power" (p 193).
He distinguishes between networks and alliances according to the number of

organisations involved which may vary "between three or four, to a hundred or more" (p
193). Situations involving a few organisations are defined as alliances, while
configurations with larger numbers of participants are referred to as networks. Hage
(1995: 193) suggests three basic dimensions for describing networks and alliances in

public and private sectors. The first is the number of organisations involved, the se

is the type and level of cooperative exchanges that occur, and the third is whether th

organisations have competitive or symbiotic relationships with each other. Using thes

three dimensions, Alter and Hage (1993: 44-80), develop a typology of 12 distinct kind
of network.

Zajac and DAunno (1994: 276-279), propose that alliances involve formal arrangements
between two or more members and that they can have up to 100 members, inferring that

size does not act as a determinant of whether the configuration should be referred to
network or alliance. These researchers observe that size substantially affects the
governance structure. Hence, as with networks, governance structure is a way by which
alliances can be defined (Zajac and DAunno, 1994: 280). Yet another way of

describing an alliance is whether it is mandated or voluntary (Zajac and DAunno, 1994:

280). Most alliances are described as voluntary. However, in industries such as healt
where governments have a substantial investment in service integration, cooperation

between organisations may occur in response to the actions of powerful external playe
(Zajac and DAunno, 1994: 280).

Kanter (1989b) defines three types of alliance based on the intent of the alliance
formation. Hence, Kanter moves away from a structural approach to exploring
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relationships between modes of administering alliances and the reasons for alliance
formation. Kanter's three types are "multi-organisational service alliances",

"opportunistic alliances", and "stakeholder alliances". In service alliances two or mor
organisations decide to pool resources to establish a new organisation which provides
them with necessary services, such as research and development, and which they jointly

control. Trade associations are a further form of this type of alliance in which agenc
in the same industry form a new organisation for some specific purpose, for example, to
take political or advocacy action on behalf of the contributing organisations. The

opportunistic alliance, is, as its name implies, usually of short duration. It comes in
existence when two or more companies perceive the possibility of jointly undertaking a
new, profitable, business venture. The perceived competence of the partner, plus the

opportunity to share risks, are among the motivating forces for cooperation in this type

of alliance. Kanter (1989b) proposes that pre-existing interdependence distinguishes t
stakeholder alliance.

Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 281), also describe alliances based on the reason for their
formation. They define alliances according to the type of resources contributed by each
partner, the expected outcomes of the alliance, the degree to which the alliance seeks
enhance outcomes such as innovation, organisational learning, and quality and whether

the alliance has been formed to increase influence or reduce uncertainty. Alliances ba
on type of resources include "pooling" alliances and "trading" alliances. With pooling
alliances, organisations may pool similar resources in an attempt to gain purchasing
power over a powerful supplier or group of suppliers (Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994: 281).
With trading alliances, each partner contributes something different, and each partner
may be known and respected for their particular expertise. Pooling alliances tend to be
characterised by larger numbers and may take the form of federations or coalitions.
Trading alliances on the other hand, may have only two members (Zajac and D'Aunno,
1994: 281). Of all the expected outcomes of an alliance, financial performance is
paramount. Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 281) propose that financial expectations can be
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based on either "cost reduction" or "revenue enhancement" (p 281), and while these are
not mutually exclusive, the predominant expectation is important. For example, if the

expectation of an alliance is to increase revenue through increasing the volume of pati

treated, then success will be measured according to this indicator. If, on the other han
the expectation of the alliance is to share the costs of providing care to a given
population, then the indicator of success will be cost reduction.

A third type of alliance is defined by the nature of the interdependence between
cooperating organisations. For example, Kanter (1989b: 186) describes stakeholder
alliances as "complementary coalitions among a number of stakeholders in a business
process who are involved in different stages of the value-creation chain" (p 186).
Partners in this type of alliance are suppliers, customers and employee organisations.
While none of these definitions neatly describes cooperative relationships developing
between general practitioners and specialists in the Australian health industry, the

supplier-customer partnership is the type that most closely matches. In one way, general
practitioners can be seen as customers of specialist firms, and specialist firms can be

seen as suppliers of services to general practitioners. Kanter observes that this type o
alliance often results in empowering the purchasers.

Like Kanter, Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 282) observe that the approach to coordination
in an alliance is likely to vary according to the reason for cooperating and the type of
interdependence which exists. For example, where organisations cooperate to achieve
revenue enhancement, interdependence is reciprocal. Hence, interdependence theory

indicates that substantial coordination is required. Where cost reduction is the expecte

outcome, the interdependence is pooled, hence, less coordination is likely to be require

Similarly, Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 282) distinguish between alliances according to the

desire to increase power and reduce uncertainty, and the desire to share risks. In the f
instance, one organisation is seen as being motivated by a desire to gain influence over
some aspect of its environment on which it depends. An alliance may reduce the
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uncertainty of maintaining access to a needed element. Hence, the alliance is a means of

gaining influence over a partner. However, with respect to the latter type of alliance,
organisations have the expectation of pooling their resources "to reduce common risks"
(Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994: 282).

A further intent of an alliance may be performance and reputation enhancement due to
improved quality, innovation and learning (Zajac and DAunno, 1994: 282). However,
in this case the organisations may have to wait sometime before the expected benefits

emerge. Hence, these alliances may suffer challenges in continuity because the expecte

benefits are not rapidly forthcoming. Furthermore, alliances based on these expectatio
require a more substantial flow of personnel between alliance partners.

Dowling (1995) uses a further approach to describing alliances based on level of
autonomy and control. He reflects that the term "strategic alliance" has been used to

describe a wide range of interorganisational arrangements from "non-binding agreements
to work together" based on a handshake, to "complete consolidations into a single
organisation (perhaps through acquisition, merger, or employment)" (Dowling, 1995:

144). This approach to classifying interorganisational arrangements is similar to that
DeVries (1978) who developed a continuum, based on level of organisational autonomy
and control, along which alliance arrangements could be located. Zajac and D'Aunno
suggest that this approach to describing alliances has sometimes reflected the degree
ownership maintained by an organisation and that this can be misleading. They propose

that the degree to which one organisation exercises control over the alliance, may have
little to do with ownership. Rather, it may be a matter of power associated with
organisational size and wealth, or it may be directed by the values and traditions

underpinning the alliance which have been established in the interests of the long-ter
relationship.

Longest (1990) provides a useful classification of a range of interorganisational

relationships relevant to the health industry based on the type of interdependence whi
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exists between organisations. These are grouped into three sets, namely, market
transactions, voluntary interorganisational transactions, and involuntary transactions.
Market transactions are the most prevalent form of transaction. These involve buying
and selling transactions by which organisations gain and distribute goods. Negotiated
contracts are mechanisms widely used for managing linkage. In simple contracts, on the

other hand, each party believes that the other will behave as agreed. Negotiating skills
are the most important skills for managing market transactions. Issues which need

resolution by negotiation include the division of tangible resources and decisions abou
intangible goods. The latter include "the resolution of problems of psychological

dynamics and the satisfaction of personal preferences of the leaders of the organisatio
(p 19). These intangible elements incorporate factors such as appearing to win or lose,
perceptions of fairness, and ability to compete effectively.

Voluntary interorganisational transactions are summarised as "co-opting" and
"coalescing" , "quasi-firm" and "consumption" or ownership (Longest, 1990: 20). Co-

opting usually involves linkage at the management level with the focal organisation "co
opting" elements of leadership from the other organisation (Starkweather, 1981: 61).
Coalescing is defined as "the partial pooling of resources by two or more organisations
to pursue defined goals" (p 21). Longest draws on the concept of "loose coupling" to
describe the type of interorganisational linkage (Longest, 1990: 21) in which
"interdependent and mutually responsive organisations are linked in ways that preserve

their legal identities and most of their functional autonomies" (p 21). These relations
are stronger than market transactions and less binding than "consumption" or ownership
(Longest, 1990: 20). Longest (1990) indicates that these cooperative arrangements may
differ according to several dimensions, including the importance given to them by the
respective organisations. Secondly, they may differ in terms of their permanence, and,
thirdly, they may differ with respect to the direction of the linkage. For example, as

already indicated in Chapter 2, some organisations may be linked vertically while other
may be linked horizontally. In addition, in situations in which "organisations
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complement each other in the provision of services to customers/or achieve joint
competitive advantage in other areas" the relationship may be described as symbiotic

(Longest, 1990: 21). This situation may apply with vertically integrated systems, where
one organisation depends on another for referrals, and the other organisation depends
the return of patients for ongoing care. With vertically integrated systems,

interdependence is most likely to be reciprocal (Thompson, 1967). It is this latter typ

loosely coupled, symbiotic, linkage arrangement between legally distinct organisations
which most closely resembles the emerging alliances or "shared care" arrangements

among private sector generalist and specialist firms and among private sector firms and
public sector agencies. Furthermore, the literature suggests that the governance of
exchanges between these organisations will be characterised by "seller-customer" type
contracts and a heavy reliance on reciprocity, collaboration and a relationship basis
communication.

Starkweather (1981: 35-42), in a study of hospital mergers, introduces the concept of
change over time. He observes a tendency for organisations to move from the "coopting" end of the continuum toward "consumption". Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 284),
also observe that alliances change over time. They describe alliances as having four

phases, namely, "emergence" (or "finding partners"), "transition" "maturity" and "criti

crossroads". Important at the time of transition is the investment of resources by all

partners for managing their increasing interdependence. Maturity in the relationship i
characterised by the development of trust and the management of conflict. Furthermore,

trust and conflict management systems are seen as subsets of a range of norms governing
alliance exchanges which include "shared expectations of reciprocity between alliance
partners and a growing sense of the value of preserving the relationship" (p 285). The
final stage is the critical crossroad which involves judgements by the partners as to
whether to continue in-alliance. Zajac and D'Aunno (1994: 284) note that alliance

partners may move between phases, not necessarily in one direction, and that each phase
tends to raise a set of critical issues.
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Measures to describe alliances are numerous and include, the number of organisations
involved in the arrangement, the degree of formality underpinning the alliance, the level
of individual autonomy which each organisation maintains, the nature of the
independence, the type of linkage and the direction of the linkage, the values
underpinning the agreement to cooperate, the degree to which each partner has the ability
to influence the arrangement, the scope of alliance, namely, whether it is narrow in scope
to broad ranging, and the changes which occur in the nature of the relationship over time
(Starkweather, 1981; Longest, 1990; Zajac and D'Anno, 1994; Smith, Carroll et al.,
1995; Dowling, 1995: 144).

Summary

There are many disciplines and conceptual approaches which inform the interorganisationa
literature with researchers drawing from this rich fount according to their preferences and
interest. In general, the literature related to networks emphasises the situational and structural
aspects of the "net", the density and centrality of exchanges, differences in social strata of
actors, and explores relations between actors and the distribution of power and conflict. The
alliance literature, on the other hand, is concerned with describing the nature of the
interdependence which exists between alliance partners, the cost of transactions, the nature of
the contractual arrangements, the intent of the alliance and the changes which occur in
relationships over time. Table 1 draws on this review of literature to summarise measures
useful to an analysis of alliances within health care networks.
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Table 1: Measures useful to an analysis of alliances within regional
networks
Networks
• Level of analysis
- patterns of exchange relationships
- level of articulation: macro; sector etc.
• Location
• Importance and intent
- importance economically and socially
- purpose of the network: obligations;
promotional; policy; infrastructure
• Actors and structures
- number of actors
- characteristics of the actors involved:
functions; socio-technical etc,
- patterns of interdependence
- changes over time
- nature of coupling
- degree of stability
- consensus over domain/ level of conflict
- similarity of roles/domain
- awareness of each others existence
- level of autonomy/ability to control
• Interactions/exchange relations
- modes of coordinating activities
- density/centrality/connectivity/ hierarchy:
degree of interdependence; form of
organisation (mechanistic-organic)

Alliances
Level of analysis
- exchanges between dyads, triads etc.
Environmental forces
- antecedents to cooperation
Actors and structures
- number of actors
- goals and functions of the actors
- ownership
- type of resources contributed; tasktechnology
- nature of interdependence; competitive;
symbiotic; sequential; pooled; reciprocal
- degree of domain consensus
- stage of the alliance life-cycle
- type and direction of linkage
- permanence of the alliance
- governance structure: contract; cooptation;
coalescence
Interactions
- mandated or voluntary
- degree of formality/informality
- scope: narrow to broad ranging
- type and level of exchanges: voluntary;
involuntary; market
- costs of transactions
- individual autonomy and control
- ability of partners to influence the alliance
- importance ascribed to the alliance
- experiences over time/trust
- perceptions of fairness
Expected outcomes
- reduction in uncertainty: extension of
influence; changes in resource dependence
- adaptive efficiency: revenue generation; cost
reduction

Measures used to study interorganisational cooperation by researchers favouring a

network approach overlap measures used by researchers favouring the alliance appr

This demonstrates that the interorganisational field is eclectic and that researc

frequently employ theories and concepts from more than one paradigm (Smith, Carro
al., 1995). Furthermore, there is growing support for a multi-level approach to
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analysing interorganisational cooperation. It appears that both multiple levels of data are
required to capture the complexities of interorganisational cooperation.

The following section of the literature review explores situational factors which influ
organisations to enter cooperative arrangements.

MOTIVATORS FOR INTERORGANISATIONAL
COOPERATION
"In health care, much of the development of alliances can be traced to changes in the environment.
A s access to needed resources is threatened and n e w challenges are presented to health services
providers, organisations seek to reduce their dependence on and their uncertainty about the
environment by banding together" (Zuckerman and Kaluzny, 1991).

Powerful world wide "megatrends" (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 3) are driving
change in all industries together with national and state level initiatives to promote
productivity and economic growth while controlling expenditure in the public sector
(Kanter, 1991). Researchers agree that the major driving force for alliance formation in
the 1990's is environmental turbulence (Ohmae, 1989; Kanter, 1989b & 1989c; Alter
and Hage, 1993; Zuckermam, Kaluzny et al., 1995). In m a n y instances governments are
key protagonists of turbulence (Boyle, 1994).

In an early review of the literature, Schermerhorn (1975) proposed that three condition
influence interorganisational cooperation. The first is "resource scarcity or performance
distress" (p 848). For example, interorganisational cooperation is more likely to occur
between organisations facing increasing costs, shortages in labour supplies, and a need
for m o r e highly trained staff (Levine and White, 1961; Black and Kase, 1963).
Similarly, Aldrich (1979) observed that a major motivating force for interorganisational
cooperation was the need to gain additional resources in order to survive. M o r e recently,
Zuckerman and Kaluzny (1991) and Kaluzny, Zuckerman et al., (1995) have confirmed
that resource scarcity, environmental volatility and environmental complexity continue to
be major motivating forces for interorganisational cooperation.
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M u c h of the non-health related literature reiterates these propositions. For example,
Kanter (1989b) proposes that the enormity of the challenge of competing for customers
and resources in today's "global Olympics" (p 183) is sufficient to overcome traditional,
organisational rivalries. Secondly, Schermerhorn (1975) reports that organisations
which perceive "cooperation" to be a "good thing to be doing" (p 848) are more likely to
enter a collaborative arrangement (Guetzkow, 1966). Health and welfare organisations
place a high value on cooperation in the interest of preventing gaps and overlaps in the
provision of services to clients. Thirdly, Schermerhorn indicates that organisations will
seek partners w h e n a "powerful external force (such as government), demands this
activity" (p 849).

Scarcity, volatility and complexity in the Australian health
industry
The Australian federal government is faced with increasing competition for overseas
markets, an ageing population, high unemployment, a current account deficit, and a
population accustomed to a welfare safety-net which ensures that everyone has a basic
income and universal access to health care. These powerful socio-economic and political
forces are having a substantial impact on organisations within all industries. W h e n
governments drive change, those industries heavily dependent on government funding
are frontline organisations which need to respond rapidly and effectively to survive. The
health industry in Australia is such an industry with an annual expenditure of
approximately $ U S 2 4 billion. Cost control and measures designed to improve quality
and productivity are, inevitably, high on the agenda (Council of Australian Governments,
1995).

Like organisations in the manufacturing sector, Australian and international health ca
organisations are confronted with resource scarcity, uncertainty concerning funding
arrangements and increasing demands for health care associated with changes in
consumer expectations, the ageing of the population and rapid developments in medical
61

and informational technology. In 1983, Australia's expenditure on health care as a

proportion of Gross Domestic Product was 7.7 percent. This level of expenditure fell in
the mid-range of OECD countries (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 1992).

However, in 1994, this figure increased to 8.5 per cent (Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare 1995) resulting in mounting concern over the country's ability to control
rising health care costs.

Funding arrangements for health care organisations change rapidly as state governments
change and as new ministers take up the health portfolio (Health Cover, 1995: 15).

Under Australia's Medicare system, State and Territory governments are responsible for
the provision of public hospital and community based health services for which they
receive a fixed payment from the Commonwealth Government (Duckett, 1992). These
payments are negotiated on a five yearly basis. Within the guidelines of the Medicare

agreement, State governments are free to allocate resources to public hospitals and he
services. There is wide variation across the country in the funding of hospitals with
trend toward implementing market based incentives with prospective funding based on
Diagnostic Related Groups and the separation of purchasers and providers (Duckett,

1994). In 1995, five of six State governments are led by the Liberal Party which favour
small government and micro economic reform through market incentives.

Most medical and dental services are provided on a fee-for-service basis by private
practitioners. However, governments have been taking an increasing role in the
financing and control of health services over the past decade. Furthermore, harsh
economic times have led to change in the behaviour of doctors. Under Medicare, the
majority of doctors receive payment on a fee-for-service basis from the Commonwealth
government. In 1993, private, for-fees medical services accounted for approximately 90

per cent of payments to general practitioners and 83 per cent of payments to specialis

(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1992). In 1984/85, when Medicare was first
introduced, only 45 per cent of doctors were prepared to "direct bill" the Health
Insurance Commission for the services they provided to the citizens of the country.
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Under "direct-billing", the patient receives no account; the only action required of the

patient is to verify (by signing) that they have received a particular service. By 199

the proportion of all doctors direct-billing the Commission had risen to 60 per cent w

most of the rise occurring among general practitioners (Australian Institute of Health
Welfare, 1992). During the same period of time the number of general practitioners had

increased by almost 27.4 per cent and the number of specialists by 20 per cent (Deeble,
1991). Furthermore, the number of Australians choosing to be privately insured fell

substantially from 68 per cent in 1982 to 38 per cent in 1993, placing considerable st

on public hospitals which experienced increases in their waiting lists (Australian Ins
of Health and Welfare, 1994: 136). Hence, pressure has mounted for rapid throughput,
namely, shorter length of stay, with people being discharged into the community
"quicker and sicker".

Seventy three per cent of acute hospital beds are within the public sector with a total
4.5 beds per thousand population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1994:
155). The total number of acute hospital beds has been steadily declining since 1985

when there were 5.4 beds per thousand. In addition to public and private acute hospital

Australia has approximately 45 public psychiatric hospitals. As in the acute sector, t
number of psychiatric beds has been declining from 12,741 beds in 1985 to 7,266 beds
in 1991 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1994: 155). These trends are
continuing with the result that more and more people require care in the community.

Much of this burden of care is falling on general practitioners, community based health
professionals, families and informal carers.

Despite the growing need for community based services, most health workers are to be
found in hospitals. Of the approximately 500,000 persons employed in the health
industry, 45 per cent are employed in hospitals and 16 per cent in nursing homes.
Fourteen per cent are doctors, some of whom are community based and some of whom

are institutionally based (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1994: 148). Onl
four per cent of the workforce are identified as being employed in community health
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centres. T h e remaining health workers are spread across a range of occupations

including dentistry and ambulance services (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
1994: 149).

Furthermore, the problems needing to be addressed by the industry are growing more
complex demanding innovative approaches for their solution and the re-skilling of the
workforce (Council of Australian Governments, 1995). For example, the elderly and the

disadvantaged are among the highest users of health care services (Australian Institut
Health and Welfare, 1994) and their health problems tend to have both a physical and a
social component. In addition, rapid changes in technology and economic recession have
resulted in high levels of unemployment which impacts unevenly on age and ethnic
group. For example, the unemployment rate for Aborigines in 1991 exceeded 30 per
cent while for non-Aborigines it was less than 10 per cent (Thomson, 1991). Loss of

traditional overseas markets for agricultural products has resulted in a decline in in

for many rural families with indigent young people moving to the cities in search of w
(Harris, 1992b). The de-institutionalised mentally ill are among those most socially
disadvantaged (Palmer and Short, 1994: Burdekin, 1993). These differentials in access
to employment and economic security place substantial pressure on the Federal
government, publicly committed to principles of social justice and equity, and on the
health care system.

In addition to funding changes, change has also occurred in the mix of the workforce.
For example, some occupations experienced high growth and others experienced low
growth. Low growth occupations included nurses, dentists, and pharmacists, while high
growth areas included medical practitioners and a range of allied health professionals
such as physiotherapists, occupational therapists and speech pathologists (Australian

Institute of Health and Welfare, 1994: 149). The health industry employs 7.6 per cent o
all employed persons (580,000 people): one doctor for every 524 persons or
approximately 230 per 100,000 persons; 24,000 general practitioners, one for every 700

persons; 9,000 specialists, one for every 1,300 - 1,500 persons; 173,440 registered an
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enrolled nurses, one for every 100 persons; 10,640 pharmacists, one for every 1,624

persons; and 6,310 dentists, one for every 2,739 persons (Australian Institute of Heal
and Welfare, 1992). Over the past decade the total number of doctors has increased from
27,807 in 1984/85 to 34,731 in 1989/90 with a substantial percentage increase in the
number of doctors who are general practitioners (GPs). In 1984/85 and 1989/90, GPs
represented 64 per cent and 66 per cent respectively of the medical workforce (Deeble,
1991). The more restrained growth of specialist doctors reflects the influence of the
medical colleges in Australia to limit the number of accredited training positions
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992).

The resulting picture is one of resource constraint in the public sector and increasing
competition among a growing group of health occupations in both the public and private
sector for resources and patients. Workforce issues of concern to governments in 1994
include productivity, maldistribution, gender imbalance (eg. less than 10 per cent of

medical specialists in rural areas are women), cultural sensitivity, improving cooperat
between general practitioners and other health professionals caring for people in the
community, and the alignment of workforce numbers with educational preparation.

Strategies being employed include multi-skilling, enterprise agreements, incentives fo
increased productivity, involving clinicians more in management, and an emphasis on
customer responsiveness (Australian Health Ministers' Forum, 1994).

Organisational willingness to cooperate

Sofaer and Myrtle (1991), in their review of the interorganisational relations literatu

identify three sets of motivating factors, namely, the need to acquire additional resou

such as funds, clients, raw materials, information, political support and legitimacy, t
desire to reduce uncertainty, and technical considerations such as the pursuit of
operational efficiencies and joint goals and projects. Van de Ven and Walker (1984)
observe that perceptions of resource dependency act as a powerful motivating force for

interorganisational cooperation among child care and health organisations, resulting i
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increased communication between organisations, exchange of dollars and clients, and the
development of consensus regarding the terms of relating. Furthermore, these

researchers found that client referrals occurred at the technical, or operational, level
were transacted on a less formal basis than were monetary exchanges which occurred at
the managerial level.

In this thesis, the focus is predominantly exchanges that occur at the operational level
Sofaer and Myrtle (1991) note that early studies of interorganisational relations, such
those conducted by Levine and White (1961) and others (Dill, 1958; Evan, 1966), paid
particular attention to the managers of the focal organisation, or the people at the
"strategic apex" or "institutional level" Sofaer and Myrtle (1991: 374). These early

studies alert the researcher to the possibility that the players at the operational lev
have limited discretion in choice to cooperate. This is particularly pertinent in the
Australian health care environment in which approximately 70 per cent of organisations

depend on government funding, hence, the players at the strategic apex are likely to exe

considerable influence. It is interesting to note that at the level of the regional heal
network, many of the generalist and specialist firms are small and "institutional",
"managerial" and "technical" functions (Thompson, 1967) rely on one or two people.

This is particularly the case with general practitioners and medical specialists in the

business sector. Specialist health professionals, on the other hand, tend to work within
community based agencies administered by state health authorities where levels of

authority are clearly demarcated and those at the technical or operational level of the
organisations may have little discretion in regards to developing cooperative
relationships. However, it would appear from recent publications (Commonwealth
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1991; Council of Australian
Governments, 1995: 14-19) that cooperation does not readily occur at the operational

level within these public sector organisations even when health authorities mandate tha
should. In a recent policy document, improved continuity of care is to be encouraged
through the introduction of different funding arrangements (Council of Australian
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Governments, 1995: 14-19), an apt example of a powerful external force (Guetzkow,
1966).

Galaskiewicz (1985) notes that, in situations of uncertainty, organisations tend to see
partners with backgrounds similar to their own. Similarly, Alter and Hage (1993: 37-

39), in an extensive review of the interorganisational literature, conclude that willin
to cooperate arises from an understanding that the needs and ways of another
organisation are "sympatico" with one's own. Furthermore, these researchers maintain

that the decision to cooperate is based on a belief that interorganisational cooperatio

result in "adaptive efficiency" (p 39). In other words, an understanding must emerge th

small, lean, flexible, customer focused organisations, working together, are better able

develop new products rapidly and efficiently than are large organisations seeking to go
alone (Kanter, 1989b). Alter and Hage (1993: 38 & 39) emphasise that strategic
decisions about interorganisational cooperation have both a "hard" technical and
competitive edge, and a "soft" human edge. In addition, they note two important forces

"tilting" organisations towards cooperation, namely, the need for financial resources a
sharing of risks, and the need for further expertise. These researchers found that the

business literature, which addressed alliances involving large companies, emphasised th
need for funds and the need to share risks. Acquiring additional money had the implied
benefit of gaining greater influence over domain while sharing of risks applied to the

sharing of costs in the development of new products and/or services. On the other hand,

the literature examining successful ventures, stressed the need for expertise. Among th
benefits of acquiring additional expertise was the ability to "penetrate new markets,
manage uncertainty, and to have rapid responses to changing market demands and
technological opportunities" (p 39).

Zuckerman, Kaluzny et al., (1995), also refer to "hard" and "soft" forces associated wi
the formation of alliances in health care. Cooperation emerges "out of mutual need and
willingness between organisations to share risks and costs, to share knowledge and

capabilities, and to take advantage of interdependencies to reach common objectives" (p
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55). A d a m e k and Lavin (1980: 206) propose that, in their dealings with one another,

organisations frequently act like individuals. These researchers found that organisati
with resources to spare were more likely to engage in cooperative arrangements with
other organisations than organisations with scarce resources. Using social exchange
theory to explain their unexpected findings, these researchers concluded that

organisations with an abundance of resources were in a better position to reciprocate
honour their exchange obligations than were less well endowed organisations. On the

other hand, for the less well endowed organisation, cooperation with other organisatio

had the potential to lead to a further loss of "prestige, encroachment by other agenci
and loss of community support" (pp 207).

Williamson (1975) proposes that organisations move toward more administrative modes
of transacting exchanges when the costs of "market" exchanges become unacceptably
high. Furthermore, he maintains that "environmental" and "human factors" influence
decisions about when "to bypass the market and resort to hierarchical modes of

organisation" (p 9). Among the environmental factors influencing transaction costs are
"uncertainty/complexity and small-numbers" (p 254). Human factors influencing choice
of organisational form are "bounded rationality" (defined as the inability to address
complex problems), and "opportunism" (p 9). Confronted with increasing transactioncosts and with the limits of "bounded rationality", firms are likely to move towards
formal modes of exchange. Similarly, in situations involving small numbers of
exchanges combined with a high risk of being exploited due to the self interested,

opportunistic behaviour of another firm, Williamson (1975: 254) argues that a firm wil
move away from market exchanges towards more formalised modes of exchange.

According to the markets and hierarchies paradigm, the factors motivating firms to mo
towards alliances and networks can be summarised as environmental uncertainty, the

need to gain additional expertise due to the complexity of problems confronting the f
and the wish to decrease risk and uncertainty due to opportunism.
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Alter and H a g e (1993: 285) argue that Williamson places too great an emphasis on
transaction-costs as the basis for organisational decisions about which type of
cooperative arrangement best suits them. They propose that, in the 1990s, production
costs play an equally important role in decisions about whether to move "away from
vertical integration and toward systemic production networks" (p 285). From their

research of interorganisational networks, they conclude that "opportunities for learnin
overcome fears of opportunism" (pp 286) and that there is currently a movement away

from reliance on formal contracts towards a greater reliance on social contracts based
trust.

Kogut, Shan et al., (1992: 348-349) consider that the most important decisions facing a

organisation are decisions about which activities should be carried out internally, wh

activities should be purchased, and which activities should involve cooperation with o
or more other organisations. Adopting a dyadic approach to interorganisational

cooperation, these researchers propose that such decisions are made in the context of a
existing and evolving network of structural relations rather than as responses to an

abstract competitive market. Over time it is "the structure of the network, rather than

attributes of the firm, that plays an increasingly important role in the choice to coop
(p 364). Established relationships among members of the network were found to have a

substantial influence on decisions to cooperate. These findings are consistent with tho
of Alter and Hage (1993), who observed that decisions about cooperation are influenced
by beliefs about other organisations in the network.

From a study of human service organisations in the United States, Van de Ven, Walker et

al., (1979) conclude that organisations relate for very different reasons and that the
reasons, in turn, influence the approach to cooperation. These researchers found that

network clusters based on the need to transact resources had a higher level of formalis

agreements than did networks based on the direct provision of services to clients. Thes

differences were partially explained by the fact that considerable public accountabili

required in the transaction of funds. Hence, it is to be expected that formal contracts
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to govern financial exchanges between organisations. With respect to networks with
dependency based on the need to achieve effective planning and coordination,
cooperation was mainly achieved through "boundary spanners", that is, people with
designated responsibility for achieving cooperation between organisations. Patterns of
relations between networks of agencies providing direct services to clients were mainly
based on personal communications, involving face-to-face contact and telephone calls,
with a low frequency of written reports and letters between agencies. This type of
network, is similar to regional health care delivery networks in Australia.

Summary

There is consensus in the literature on the factors that influence organisational decisi
about cooperation. These factors include, environmental forces leading to resource
scarcity and performance distress, both of which significantly impact on organisational
needs and wants, and the beliefs and values which predominate within the organisation.
In addition, the literature suggests that the factors which motivate organisations to
cooperate have a substantial impact on the modes of cooperation selected. Furthermore,
while environmental resource scarcity is consistently associated with the decision to
cooperate, scarcity of selected elements has a differential effect on the reasons for
cooperation. For example, in situations of resource scarcity, driven by a limited number
of clients, organisational uncertainty is likely to be high due to the high level of
competition, and, possibly, the opportunistic behaviour of some organisations. Under

these conditions, interorganisational cooperation is a means of reducing the risk of losi
clients to competitors. However, in situations in which there is no scarcity of clients,
there is scarcity of other necessary elements, such as funds, personnel with relevant

expertise, information, and political support, then interorganisational cooperation may b
seen as a means of gaining the funds and expertise needed to "produce" adequate services
for clients and, thereby, to survive. Where competition for clients is the major driving
force for cooperation, approaches to managing cooperation are likely to be more
formalised than in situations in which there is no scarcity of clients, but there is
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considerable scarcity of expertise. In the latter case, exchanges m a y be governed by
informal, social means. Different scenarios for interorganisational cooperation may
emerge depending on the type of resources in scarce supply and the readiness of
organisations to enter cooperative arrangements which in turn is influenced by needs,
beliefs, values, funding arrangements and location. Figure 2 summarises the main
factors motivating organisations to cooperate.
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Figure 2: Motivating forces for interorganisational cooperation
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Complexity
• Technology
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l
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• Problems
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TOWARDS CONTINUITY IN INTERORGANISATIONAL
COOPERATION
"In practice, success is often couched in terms of meeting objectives set for the collaboration and
usually covers whether the product was developed as planned and according to time and cost
estimates" (Bruce, Leverick et al., 1995: 35).

The expected benefits of cooperation
The benefits of interorganisational cooperation for manufacturing organisations, are
usually associated with profit (Kanter, 1989b; Bruce, Leverick et al., 1995). Profit is
stimulated by the ability to 1) respond faster to changes in customer needs, 2) respond
faster to market opportunities, 3) reduce the risks and costs of product development, and
4) shorten the lead time to develop n e w products (Brace, Leverick et al., 1995). These
attributes are aptly described by Alter and Hage (1993) as "adaptive efficiency" (p 285).

Revenue generation is also important in private sector health care. For example, with
respect to "hospital-physician" alliances in the United States, Mackesy and Mulligan
(1990) expect that establishing a "referring physician network" would increase the
number of referrals to the hospital. Similarly, in relation to mental health care in the
United States, Tropp, Gershon et al., (1994) report that increases in market share have
been w o n by organisations w h o enter partnerships. These researchers conclude that,
given the current trend, there will be fewer players in the future, each with a larger share
of the market. Such expected gains reflect the w a y m a n y hospitals and provider
organisations are funded in the United States. For most Australian hospitals, the
scenario is very different. For example, most hospitals in N e w South Wales currently
receive a prospective, negotiated budget which remains constant irrespective of the
number of activities performed. In other words, funding provided to hospitals is capped.
In Australia, therefore, the expected benefits for public hospitals of alliances with
referring doctors have to do with reducing hospital activity, thereby, reducing costs.
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In addition to revenue generation, other benefits are frequently said to follow cooperation
in health care. For example, Tropp, Gershon et al., (1994), report that
interorganisational cooperation resulted in more rewarding relationships, shared
objectives, a more comprehensive complement of delivery settings, and improved

efficiencies through the better utilisation of facilities and personnel. Improvements in
relationships between organisations occurred as a result of greater clarity about one
another's expectations and less redundant activity. Shared objectives have developed in

treatment outcomes and activities to aggressively contain internal and external costs ha
been stimulated (Tropp, Gershon et al., 1994).

Improved efficiencies through better coordination of services is also espoused as a

benefit of interorganisational cooperation by several researchers, including Aiken, Dewa
et al. (1975), Hall, Clark et al., (1977), Rogers, Whetten et al., (1982) and Alter and
Hage (1993). Some researchers have, however, questioned the benefits of tightly
coordinated services for people with mental illness (Scott, 1985). These criticisms have
been based on the benefits ascribed to multiple, "loosely-coupled" systems, with a range
of organisations providing similar services (Bendor, 1985; Weick, 1976). Protagonists

of these systems argue against coordinated systems on the basis that they restrict varie
healthy competition and result in a lack of responsiveness. Glisson and James (1992)
found that, with respect to services for children in custody, the benefits ascribed to
"loosely coupled" competing systems were not forthcoming. These researchers
concluded that competition actually "worked to create gaps through non-redundancy" (p

78). In their efforts to avoid redundancies, providers of competing service systems were

found to maintain their traditional client group and their traditional modes of operatin

As a result, they paid little attention to the coordination of the range of services req
by any one child with multiple problems. Lehman, Postrado et al., (1994), found no

support for their thesis that mental health systems would be most effective if funding a
the coordination of primary care service delivery were consolidated. On the other hand,

Pro van and Milward (1995), in a study of networks for care of the severely mentally ill,
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found a positive association between network effectiveness and network integration, "but
only w h e n integration is achieved through centralisation of the network" (p 6). In
addition, they found a positive association between network effectiveness and general
system stability. These findings suggest that, with respect to the severely mentally ill,
network integration achieved through centralisation, is likely to have beneficial outcomes
for clients. However, centralisation is frequently associated with the employment of
external, regulatory methods of control, something which Alter and Hage (1993: 257)
conclude only makes things worse.

Potential barriers to continuity: the costs of cooperation
"One of the persistent nightmares in the minds of those who enter external networks is that the
transfer of technology and know-how will create a potential competitor" (Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993: 87).

Fear of opportunistic behaviour by an alliance partner is among the factors that may l
to failure. While there is extensive literature on the benefits of alliances and networks,
the news is not all good. In fact, several articles indicate that the failure rate could be
quite high (Kanter, 1989b; Zajac and D A u n n o , 1994: 278). In 1975, Schermerhorn
summarised the potential costs associated with interorganisational cooperation as 1) loss
of decision-making autonomy, 2) loss of organisational prestige or identity, and 3) the
need to expend scarce organisational resources on coordination activities, including,
information exchange and transport.

Autonomy is challenged because interorganisational cooperation requires "a commitment
for joint decisions on future activities and thus places limits on unilateral or arbitrary
decisions" (Thompson and M c E w a n , 1958: 28). Loss of autonomy and ability to
unilaterally control decisions have been recognised by other researchers as a cost of
interorganisational cooperation (Gouldner, 1959; Hladik, 1988; M o x o n , Roehl et al.,
1988; Tropp, Gershon et al., 1994; Zuckerman, Kaluzny et al, 1995). A u t o n o m y in
decision making is highly valued by most health professionals, particularly doctors
accustomed to working outside the public health system. They value working conditions
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in which they are able to exercise considerable professional, organisational and personal
self-direction (Friedson, 1970). Professional autonomy may be challenged in
cooperative arrangements with non-medical health specialists; organisational and
professional autonomy may be challenged in a cooperative arrangement involving another

medical organisation. Hence, an alliance which is perceived to threaten organisational o

professional autonomy is likely to be regarded negatively by doctors unless other benef
clearly outweigh these costs. Tropp, Gershon et al., (1994), conclude that sometimes

doctor groups are driven to enter alliances by the fear that if they do not collaborate
ability to control their future will be diminished.

Loss of organisational prestige may be a further cost of collaboration. Forming an
alliance with an organisation which fails to deliver a quality product or service, may

to loss of reputation, status and financial position for both organisations (Alter and H
1993: 33-38). As indicated by Tropp, Gershon et al., (1994), each party should have
knowledge and respect for the quality of care provided by the other.

Lack of resources, or failure to commit resources to maintaining the relationship are
further potential barriers to continuity. Resources are needed to develop and maintain
effective communication and coordination activities (Kanter, 1989b) between "sovereign
independent units" (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 87). The extent to which

independent organisations commit resources to maintaining the alliance will depend on i
relative importance to each (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 87). Klonglan, Dillman et
al., (1969) and Litwak and Rothman (1970) observed that organisations with "extra"
resources were in a better position to form alliances. Similarly, Adamek and Lavin
(1980: 207-208) found that organisations with the "greatest abundance of elements" were
most likely to engage in exchanges with other organisations. Schermerhorn (1975)
suggests that alliances may require participants to expend "slack or discretionary

resources to pursue the benefits of interorganisational cooperation" (p 850). Stein (199
32) observes that most alliances are poorly organised and "undermanaged". He makes
the interesting comment that approximately 50 per cent of the time that top management
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put into an "average joint venture goes into creating it. Another quarter goes into

developing the plan, and less than 8 per cent into setting up the management systems" (
32-33).

Alter and Hage (1993), Schmidt and Kochan (1972), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978),
DiStefano (1984), Hladik (1988) and Limerick and Cunnington (1993) all identify the

potential for conflict over domain, goals and methods as further barriers to continuit
Such conflict may arise when organisations fail to articulate clearly the obligations
responsibilities of each (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 87). To these barriers,
Zuckerman, Kaluzny et al., (1995) add loss of stability and certainty, and delays in
problem solving due to coordination problems. Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 86)

propose that relationship problems arise because there is "no common hierarchy" to hol
organisations together. The organisations must "rely on each partner to direct his or
own efforts towards the common purpose" (p 86). In situations where this does not

happen the alliance is likely to fail. Hence, these researchers reflect the observation

Stein (1995) concerning the paucity of organisational and management infrastructure to
promote continuity in alliance.

Asymmetry in flow of benefits, or costs, is a further potential pitfall identified by
Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 87) and Kanter (1989b). Where one organisation
appears to be more advantaged by the alliance than another organisation, a sense of
inequity is likely to arise. Furthermore, there is the potential for one organisation

exploit the alliance. In such circumstances, "trust relationships deteriorate" (Limeri

and Cunnington, 1993: 87). Trust is a key element in the success of interorganisational
relationships, together with "a carefully negotiated mutuality in the relationship"
(Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 87). Sometimes, organisations, in their enthusiasm to
enter a cooperative arrangement, give away too much, which, in hindsight, they regret;

hence the need for a solid legal foundation on which the relationship can be built (St
1995: 32). Fear of takeover is a further barrier driven by mistrust (Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993: 87). An organisation may fear that, by entering a cooperative
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arrangement with another organisation, it m a y spawn a competitor. This scenario is well
described by Starkweather (1981: 35-42) as "consumption" or "consolidation" with
respect to hospital mergers.

Stein (1995) also identifies asymmetry in commitment to alliance as a potential barrier
success. For one partner, the alliance m a y be "central to its business, but, for the other,
it m a y be peripheral" (p 31). Furthermore, these differences can lead to imbalances in
power associated with resources and access to information. T w o types of information
are necessary; "technical knowledge that permits contributions to decision-making, and
'relationship' knowledge-understanding of the partner, knowledge of partnership
activities and political intelligence that provides the background for successful
negotiations" (Stein, 1995: 31).

Cultural differences may be exacerbated and problematic when combined with
perceptions of inequity in flow of benefits or costs. Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 89)
propose that one of the main reasons for entering an alliance is to m a k e use of the diverse
capabilities of the other organisation. However, this very diversity m a y act as a barrier to
continuity. Similarly, Stein (1995: 33) identifies insufficient integration and the absence
of a c o m m o n framework as reasons w h y alliances fail to live up to expectations.
Elements which need to be integrated include organisational structures, processes,
procedures and style. Failure to adjust these systems has both short term and long term
consequences. In the short term, it affects the efficiency and effectiveness of exchanges
and, in the long term, it demonstrates a lack of commitment to the alliance (Stein, 1995:
33). Internal politics are a further factor which m a y threaten the continuity of an alliance.
For example, individuals m a y perceive that the alliance threatens their territory and power
base (Kanter, 1989b). Hence, like all organisational change strategies, alliances m a y be
sabotaged by people opposed to change.

Shortell (1995) suggests that perverse incentives at the macro and micro level hinder th
success of alliances in the United States. At the macro level, he suggests there is a "need
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to align the economic incentives of payers, physicians, hospitals, and all components of
the system" (p 189). At the micro level, behaviour directed towards the overall success
of an alliance needs to be rewarded. This is difficult in health care alliances, because
most of the expected benefits "have a long ran rather than a short run" (p 189).
Furthermore, the alliances that pose the greatest challenges are those "that involve
fundamental changes in the w a y in which patient care is delivered or what w e have called
clinical integration of services in local markets" (Shortell, 1995: 189).

Bruce, Leverick et al., (1995) found that when asked to weight factors associated with
failure of alliances, experienced collaborators cited "failure of the partners to contribute as
expected, a lack of consultation between partners, low levels of trust between
collaborating parties, and the lack of a collaborating 'champion'" (p 39). A person
prepared to put time and effort into managing the relationship is pivotal, given the
voluntary nature of alliances (Bruce, Leverick et al., 1995).

Choice of alliance partner is addressed in the next section of this report. This issue
figures so prominently in all the literature on factors influencing the success of an alliance
that it precedes the review of literature on requirements for continuity in
interorganisational cooperation.

Choice of alliance partner
"Relationships between companies begin, grow, and develop - or fail - in ways similar to
relationships between people. N o two relationships travel the same path, but successful alliances
generally unfold in five overlapping phases" (Kanter, 1994; 98-99).

Schermerhorn (1975) reminds us that, in decisions about interorganisational cooperation,
key people decide whether there is a good reason to cooperate. In this way, individuals
act as "mediators of the organisation's interorganisational roles" (p 852). Similarly,
Kanter (1994), in the above quotation, affirms the h u m a n side of decisions concerning
interorganisational cooperation. Kanter raises two further important issues, namely, that
each interorganisational arrangement is, to s o m e extent, unique, and, like any
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relationship, cooperation between organisations evolves over time. Similarly, Dowling
(1995: 172) emphasises the importance of hospitals taking due care in the selection of
doctors in the formation of hospital-physician alliances in the United States.

D'Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) identify the critical phases of any relationship as
emergence, transition, maturity and critical crossroads, while Kanter (1994) likens the
various stages of cooperation between organisations to a personal relationship, namely,
"selection and courtship", "getting engaged", and "setting up housekeeping" (p 99). In
the first stage, two companies discover that they are attracted to one another. This
usually means that the senior executives have a comfortable personal relationship and
develop shared "dreams" about the potential benefits of future cooperation. Kanter

proposes three criteria for choosing an alliance partner, namely, careful "self-analysis"

the organisation's financial situation and its future prospects, personal "chemistry", or
the degree to which key people like one another, and "compatibility" of philosophies,

values, and objectives. Kanter notes that, unless due attention is given in the early sta

of the relationship to the possibility of longer-term projects, then it may die at the en
the first cooperative project.

In their study of 100 companies, Bruce, Leverick et al., (1995) found that "compatibility
of culture" which included management style and operation, was regarded by
experienced collaborators as very important. These researchers conclude that potential
collaborators should invest early in the relationship in "developing an appreciation of
each other" (p 40).

Similarly, Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 99) place great importance on choice of
partner and the need for compatibility between the partners. In particular, these
researchers propose a need for symmetry in contribution to the alliance and in the
strength of the partners. For example, while some companies may fear joining with a
strong partner, it is considered unwise to choose a weak partner. They make the point
that both partners must have power, and, together, enhanced ability to make "things
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happen" (p 99). Central to an empowering relationship is choice of partner on the basis
of their technical and functional complementarity and compatibility. In addition,
Limerick and Cunnington, (1993: 99-100) propose that there needs to be compatibility in
decision systems, decision styles, and core values which assist in the development of
trust. Choosing a partner with a reputation for integrity and fair dealing is wise because
such a partner has a reputation to protect (Jarillo, 1988: 37).

The second important stage involves institutionalising the partnership, or, "going publi
by informing other important organisations with which the relevant parties have ties, and
finalising the agreement (Kanter, 1994). Kanter proposes that there are three essential
elements to a successful agreement. T h e first is that it should incorporate a "first-step
venture" (p 103) or joint activity, the second is that there should be a commitment to
expand the cooperative activities, and thirdly, the agreement should clearly demonstrate
the continuing independence of each partner.

"Setting up housekeeping" is the most difficult stage as it involves players other than
those originally committed to the cooperative arrangement, some of w h o m m a y not like
the idea. A s m o r e people b e c o m e involved, differences in values, attitudes, and
measures for accountability m a y emerge with the potential for conflict and mistrust.
These aspects of the on-going relationship require managing.

Requirements for continuity in interorganisational
cooperation
"The key to success in any collaboration must be to give added benefits to both parties on an
equitable basis. At the end of the project you must have two winners not one" (Bruce, Leverick et
al., 1995: 35).

Kanter (1989b) identifies flexibility as a major determinant of success in alliance
maintenance. Flexibility has two dimensions, namely, "letting the form of the alliance be
determined by the goals, and letting the ventures evolve in form over time" (p 192).
Hence, Kanter highlights the importance of the intent of the alliance as a basis for
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determining the type of administrative arrangements required to coordinate the
relationship and the temporal nature of organisational configurations.

Kanter (1994) also identifies "Eight I's That Create Successful We's" (p 100). Factors

associated with successful alliances include attention to the relationship which must be

regarded as important, a view to the longer term relationship which assists in equalisin
benefits over time, and the importance of the partners being interdependent, lest power
imbalances occur. In addition, the organisations need to keep each other informed about

their "plans and directions" and they need to integrate "their appropriate points of cont
as well as manage their communications (Kanter, 1989b: 192). In addition, Kanter

(1994) proposes that the alliance needs to become "institutionalised" (p 100) and that t

partners behave towards each other with integrity. Institutionalisation is associated wi

the development of a supportive infrastructure, including formal legal ties, plus informa
social activities which assist to develop shared values and trust (Kanter, 1994).

Like Kanter (1994), Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 92-94) emphasise that the partners
need to be kept informed. They propose that adequate, appropriate information
technology is essential to the development of horizontal communications. This is
particularly the case where partners are geographically dispersed. Furthermore, they
propose that information systems should be capable of addressing the needs of the

collaborative venture rather than the activities of individual partners alone. In additio
Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 89-113) propose that other important success factors
include the "liberation of managers" (p 90), the development of boundary roles, the
development of an appropriate "mindset" (p 94), careful definition of the focus of the
alliance, and the management of the "soft" and "hard" issues (p 102-113). The liberation

of managers at the operational unit level is essential; managers at this level are not l

to form voluntary relationships with alliance partners while they rely on the hierarchy,
they are being "sat on" by more senior managers (p 90). Boundary roles are required to

establish and maintain relationships between partners. Defining the focus of the alliance
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clarifies the scope and the purpose of joint interests and, consequently, reduces potential
for conflict.

Changing the "mindset" of managers is necessary, because few managers in Australia
have been adequately trained for network and alliance management (Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993: 94-96). With reference to Jarillo's (1988: 35) "value-chain",
Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 94-96) view the activities of the firm as a "chain of
activities that adds value between the supplier and customer" and makes it easier to

change the mindset of managers: "it becomes easier to consider the transaction costs of

possible arrangements, including farming out some activities to others" (p 96). Limeri

and Cunnington (1993: 97-98) also raise the issue of cultural values and their influen
on the manager's mindset. For example, they suggest that Japanese managers find it
easier to move into alliances than Australian and United States managers. Reasons for
these differences relate to the high value placed on competition in the United States
the Australian image of the "rugged individual" (p 97-98). They propose that, in
Australia, we should work towards the development of "collaborative individualism" (p
98). Two further issues requiring management are the "soft" and "hard" issues
(Limerick and Cunnington, 1993).

Management of the intangibles such as trust and reciprocity are often termed "soft"
issues, requiring constant reinforcement and management over the life of the alliance
(Limerick and Cunnington, 1993: 103-103). The basic ground rules seem to be "focus
on equity, focus on long-term relationships, and focus on leadership" (p 103). When

focusing on equity, each partner acts in a way which demonstrates concern for the other

If the relationship is not perceived as equitable by one of the partners then the alli

likely to fail. As expressed by Buono (1991) "an alliance will be effective only as lon

as the benefits of membership or group activity are greater than the costs of particip

for the individual members" (p 97). Like Kanter (1994) these researchers also emphasis
the importance of focusing on the long-term relationship. Such a focus assists
perceptions of equity by lifting the actor's eyes beyond immediate pay-offs.
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Furthermore, it removes the likelihood of destructive opportunistic behaviour and aids
the development of trust. As observed by Powell (1990), managers tend to trust the
information that comes from people they know. One drawback to focusing on the long-

term is that the partners may become locked in and find it difficult to end a relationshi

Ganesan (1994), in a study of retail-buyer relationships in the United States, concluded

that creating trust is related to the actual behaviours of the partners rather than to a

in the benevolence of the partner. These researchers defined trust as "the willingness to
rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence" (p 40) that they will deliver as
expected the "expertise, reliability, and intentionality" (p 40). Ganesan found no

relationship between beliefs about partner intentions and the importance of the long ter
relationship. However, delivering as expected on expertise and reliability were

significantly associated with perceptions of the importance of the long-term relationship
Hence, it would seem that trust has a "hard" edge. Limerick and Cunnington, (1993:
105) support the notion that trust is closely related to negotiations about roles and
obligations of the partners.

Ganesan (1994) found that environmental uncertainty, and level of contact explained 36
per cent of the variance in a retailer's dependence on the vendor and 55 per cent of the
retailer's perception of the vendor's dependence on the retailer. Furthermore, Ganesan
(1994) found that 75 per cent of the variance associated with a retailer's long-term
orientation toward a relationship with a vendor was explained by trust related to
perceptions of the credibility of the partner, the extent of a retailer's and vendor's
dependence in a relationship, and the retailer's satisfaction with the outcomes of a
relationship.

Bruce, Leverick et al., (1995) asked experienced collaborators to indicate the factors
which most affect collaboration outcomes. In order of importance these were choice of
partner, people factors, process factors, ensuring equality, establishing the rules, and
environmental factors. People factors emphasised the need for conflict management,
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including the need for a person to put time and effort into managing the relationship.
Process factors included the need for 1) frequent communications, 2) mutual trust, 3)
regular progress reviews, 4) delivering as agreed, and 5) trust and openness. Equality
was associated with balance in contributions and benefits; an issue raised by many
researchers. Elements about which ground rules were needed included, the objectives
for collaboration, the "modus operandi", awareness of responsibilities and milestones.

The establishment of clearly defined tasks, responsibilities and targets was associated

with the development of trust between the parties. Environmental factors were variables
beyond the control of the partners which influenced the relationship. These included
issues such as changes in customer preferences, changes in legislation, and changes in
the activities of competitors. Experienced alliance partners were aware of the need to
attention to environmental factors with new alliance partners. As stated by one of
Brace's respondents "the key to success in any collaboration must be to give added

benefits to both parties on an equitable basis. At the end of the project you must have
two winners not one" (p 42). Important measures of success were meeting expected

targets, including deadlines and costs, and continuation of the relationship beyond the
initial project (Bruce, Leverick et al., 1995).

A further hard issue identified by Limerick and Cunnington (1993: 109) is the network
control system, which they propose should be based on principles of "Quality
Management". Brace, Leverick et al., (1995) found no consensus among experienced

alliance partners as to methods suitable for measuring the success of an alliance. This
an area which has attracted little attention, to date, in the manufacturing sector.

Kaluzny (1991), identifies four management challenges which need to be addressed for

strategic alliances in the health industry to be successful. Exchanges between particip
should be mutually rewarding, protocols should be developed to guide providers and
carers, equality among members of multidisciplinary teams should be emphasised, and
quality and cost-effectiveness should be measured. Kaluzny applies to health care

alliances many of the issues which have been identified as essential for the success of
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alliances in other industries. Like Kanter (1994), Kaluzny perceives a need for flexibility
or willingness to adapt to partner differences and changes over time, and the need to
institutionalise transactions and experiences through mutual reinforcement. Like
Limerick and Cunnington (1993), Kaluzny emphasises the need for a paradigm shift in
management philosophy, from a control perspective to a commitment perspective built on
a unified vision and common values with accountability achieved through the sharing of
information. With Ganesan (1995) and others, Kaluzny maintains that alliance be

viewed in the long term with benefits and costs accruing to each of the participants in a
equitable manner over time. Kaluzny also supports an alliance control system which

assesses the quality of the content and delivery of health care and the cost-effectivene
of the program. Like Limerick and Cunnington (1993), Kaluzny (1991) proposes that a
Quality Management approach is needed to evaluate quality; one which incorporates the
total flow of exchanges.

With respect to mental health agencies in the United States, Tropp, Gershon et al.,
(1994), found three factors were necessary for successful interorganisational
cooperation, namely, leadership, strong relationships between partners, and strong

bilateral commitment to the success of the relationship. Leadership qualities include an
understanding of the broad policy context impacting on service delivery, outstanding
communication skills in order to successfully argue the case for interorganisational

cooperation to their own constituencies, and strong negotiating skills in order to devel
partnerships which benefit their own organisation. Strong relationships emerge when

organisations carefully assess their similarities and differences in values, philosophie
vision for the future, and objectives, when they share a respect for the quality of care
provided by the other, and when each party is committed to the creation of a "win-win"

situation in which the financial interests of each are protected. Finally, each party ne
to be committed to the long-term survival of the collaborative arrangement which may
involve sacrificing some autonomy and involve sharing of financial risk.
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Dunbar (1994) identifies two factors critical to the success of vertically integrated health
systems in the United States, namely, smooth working relationships between medical
and non-medical administrators and commitment to information access. This article

emphasises the central role of doctors in health care alliances and the importance of
shared information in a highly professional industry in which managers need to forge

partnerships and gain cooperation rather than seek to control via coercion and regula

Like Brace, Leverick et al., (1995), Dowling (1995: 171-174), reports about health car

alliances in the United States, which mainly target the policy and administrative lev
interorganisational cooperation. He identifies 12 success factors but ventures no
weighting as to the importance of any of these factors. Success factors included
commitment from top management and key doctors to "champion and manage the great

amount of change required to move from today's structures to true integration" (p 171

Shared decision making and shared control were seen as critical. This finding is simi

to the conclusions of Limerick and Cunnington (1993), that managers in alliances must
be prepared to share power in order to be empowered. As with Kanter (1994) and

others, Dowling reports that health care managers considered education to be critical
provide the competencies required for managing change and to assist in changing

attitudes. Like Dunbar (1994), Dowling reports that in any health care alliance betwe
hospitals and doctors, managers need to involve key doctors in decision making. For

example, he states that "Affirmation of the physician's autonomy in clinical decision
making is especially important" (pl72). Furthermore, doctors are more open to "new
ideas that come from other physicians than from nonphysicians" (p 172). Careful

selection of doctors for leadership roles was also considered to be important. Import
doctor characteristics included openness to change and enthusiasm for improving the
delivery of care. Like Kaluzny (1991), Dowling (1995: 173) notes that managers
emphasise measures that examine the full continuum of care and that focus on meeting
the needs of customers. Dowling (1995) concludes that there is a "need to break away
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from the acute hospital paradigm and see integrated delivery as the n e w 'core business'"
(P 174).

The findings of Dowling (1995) and other research from the United States, suggest that
in health care there is a trend away from "markets" towards "hierarchies" (Williamson,
1975). In Australia, the trend is in both directions; that is, there is a movement away

from hierarchies to markets in the public sector, while in the private sector the trend i
from markets to hierarchies. Networks and alliances represent the middle ground in both
situations. The literature from the United Kingdom on interorganisational cooperation
suggests a similar trend (Ovretveit, 1993; Boyle, 1994).

Summary
Figure 3, summarises the findings arising from the literature with respect to the costs

benefits of interorganisational cooperation and the factors known to enhance and destroy

continuity in alliance. Of particular note are the different benefits from cooperation f
private sector organisations and public sector organisations. However, despite
differences in outcomes, the factors promoting and inhibiting continuity are similar.

The next section of this report examines the context within which regional health care
delivery networks operate in Australia and describes the organisations, the players and
the exchanges between members of the network. This prepares the way for an
examination of shared care as a form of alliance involving small business medical firms
and public sector specialist units and health agencies.
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THE REGIONAL HEALTH CARE NETWORK
"Many of the most fateful factors affecting the operation of health care organisations are external
ones. Professional occupations determine m a n y aspects of organisation structure and functioning:
the division of labour, the m o d e s of coordination and control, the locus of discretion.
Technological innovations create n e w occupations, shape patterns of practice and interdependence,
and help drive demand. A n d health care rationalisers-increasingly federal officials-employ
changing combinations of incentives and regulations in an attempt to improve the equity,
efficiency, and effectiveness of health care services" (Scott, 1983: 112).

In the early 1980s, health care organisations were buffeted and changed by
environmental forces associated with "strong institutionalised connections and a strong
technical foundation" (Scott, 1983: 102). In the nineties this is the case with regional
health care delivery networks in Australia. Medical and informational technology are
developing at unprecedented rates, governments are seeking to contain expenditure and
improve organisational performance, and traditional professions struggle to hold their
ground while emerging professions fight for recognition. It is argued that forces of such
magnitude are leading large public sector organisations, such as hospitals, to decentralise
towards the networked organisation, and smaller business firms within regional health
care delivery networks to enter collaborative alliances. In addition, organisations within
rural health care delivery networks experience challenges due to contracting resources.
Inequalities in resource distribution due to location are not unique to Australia. Before
describing a typical regional network, differences associated with location need to be
addressed as they influence the nature of interdependence between organisations.

Location and organisational interdependence
The Australian population, which numbers approximately 17.2 million (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 1991), is mainly clustered in capital cities and large urban locations
close to the coast. However, approximately 30 per cent of the people are located in rural
and remote areas (Harris, 1992b: xiii). Rural populations have a higher proportion of
elderly people and hence require additional services. While people living in the seaboard
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capital cities have ready access to medical and health professional services, m a n y of their
rural "cousins" experience problems of access. For example, there are approximately
97.28 medical specialists per 100,000 persons in capital cities, 79.68 in other urban
areas, 28.30 in rural regions and 25.90 in remote regions. It is commonly understood

that in urban locations the ratio of psychiatrists to population is approximately 1:12,000
and in rural locations it is approximately, 1:37,000. Similar distributional problems are
also evident for general practitioners and allied health professionals (Harris, 1992b).

The factors motivating organisations to enter cooperative arrangements provide a basis

for exploring ways in which generalist and specialist firms contribute to service delivery

networks in remote, rural and urban areas of Australia. In the remote and rural situation,
interorganisational cooperation is driven by scarcity of everything but clients. General
practitioners have need of ready access to appropriate specialist services for patient
referrals, for support with patient emergencies, for reassurance, for education, and for

advice on issues likely to result in litigation if not well managed. Secondly, rural gener

practitioners need opportunity to update their skills on a regular basis, particularly in
areas as trauma treatment, obstetrics, surgery and chemotherapy (Harris, 1992b: 177).

One way that small business general practitioner firms can survive in remote rural areas i
to develop cooperative alliances with relevant specialist firms, usually located in urban
areas. Specialist firms, on the other hand, could be motivated to enter alliances if they

are experiencing a scarcity of clients, or if they perceive a need to extend their domain.

In closely settled urban areas there are many doctors and specialists competing for
clients. Client scarcity is the main issue. General practitioners are concerned with 1)
maintaining a viable patient load. Many doctors see viability threatened by the
encroachment of specialists and allied health professionals (Douglas, 1993: 3-4), 2)
gaining access to hospital beds since specialists control the domain of most hospitals
under rules governing the delineation of clinical privileges, and 3) the opportunistic
behaviour of some specialists who fail to return patients referred to them by general
practitioners (Harris, 1992b: 177). In the urban environment, alliances with specialists
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enable the generalist to reduce the risk of losing clients to specialists, gain access to
expertise based in the hospital, and, enable him/her to maintain influence over domain.

For the specialist firm the driving force toward alliance with generalists is to gain a
maintain access to clients, given the "gatekeeper" role of the general practitioner in
Australia. In addition, alliance with generalists enables specialist firms to reduce
transaction costs, and to acquire greater influence over their specialist domain.

Irrespective of location, health care delivery networks throughout Australia share some
common characteristics.

The organisations of the regional health network
In New South Wales, public hospital and health services are organised regionally
(Harris, 1992b). In the main, funds are allocated to regional health authorities on a
population basis using a formula which is weighted for age, sex, and health status. The
formula also takes into account the presence or absence of tertiary referral hospitals
South Wales Health Department, 1991a). Each regional health authority serves a
population of between 200,000 and 500,000 people and is responsible for the provision

of most hospital and community based health services apart from private sector hospital,
specialist and general practitioner and non-medical services (Illawarra Area Health

Service, 1994a). Hence, the regional health authority is a powerful player in the region

network. Organisations of the regional health authority include hospitals, rehabilitati

services, and specialist and generalist community based health agencies (Illawarra Area
Health Service, 1994a). However, the organisations which see most of the people, most
of the time, are the private sector, small business firms owned and run by general

practitioners. Within a twelve month period, 82 per cent of Australians, visit a general

practitioner (Deeble, 1991) while less than 5 per cent see an allied health professiona
(Southern Community Health Research Unit, 1989).

The "major role of general practice is to provide a service to people who are sick, name
to manage the problem for which patients visit the doctor" (Commonwealth Department
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of Health Housing and Community Services, 1992: 17). The domain of general practice

is primary health care, that is, the "point of first contact, combining clinical skill

knowledge of the patient's wishes with referrals to specialists where necessary" (p 19
Hence, general practitioners have considerable influence over the use of other health
services, including medical specialists, hospitals, and allied health professionals
(Commonwealth Department of Health Housing and Community Services, 1992: 18).
Furthermore, the general practitioner may be involved in several health care delivery

networks based on patient condition. For example, a general practitioner may relate wi

one network for care of people with mental illness and with a different network for car
of people with diabetes mellitus. In addition to acting in the interests of individual

patients, the role of the general practitioner may extend to health promotion activiti
local community health planning and evaluation activities (Commonwealth Department of
Health Housing and Community Services, 1992: 17). Hence, the role of the general
practitioner is complex and demanding (Strasser, 1992).

Approximately 35 per cent of general practitioners are in solo practice, 41 per cent a
small practices comprising two or three doctors and the remaining 24 per cent are in
practices with four or more doctors (Bridges-Webb, Britt et al,. 1992: S14). Since
Australia has a national general practitioner-population ratio of 1:700, in a region
population of 500,000 people, there will be approximately 714 general practitioners.

However, this ratio varies substantially, depending on the location of the region, with

many remote, rural regions having fewer resident doctors. This has led to the conclusio

that, in respect of medical services, rural regions are disadvantaged (Dickinson, 1991)
Characteristically, these small firms include doctors working in partnership, or some
other kind of cooperative business arrangement, supported by administrative staff and
nursing staff (Bridges-Webb, Britt et al., 1992: S14). Using Mintzberg's (1983)

classification of organisations, the general practitioner firm can be described as a "

structure characterised by low complexity, low formalisation, and authority centralise
a single person"(p 159).
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Private medical specialist, and non-medical specialist firms, operate in a similar manner.
Based on the national, specialist-to-population ratio of 1:1,300, a region with a
population of 500,000 people would have approximately 400 specialists, of whom 30
would be psychiatrists and 95 would be physicians. However, as with general

practitioners, these figures vary widely according to location (Harris, 1992b: 100-128).

Specialist firms are predominantly located in the larger population centres, while gene
practitioner firms are dispersed throughout a given region (Humphreys and Rolley,
1991). Because of the isolation of many doctors, particularly general practitioners,

together with widespread professional dissatisfaction, a second type of organisation ha
recently developed among general practitioners.

During the past decade, the Federal Government has allocated substantial funds to assis
the development of regional Divisions of General Practice (Douglas, 1993). Typically,
Divisions are geographically defined and have a membership of 200-300 doctors who
elect an executive to administer the business of the Division. By 1993, there were 100
Divisions of General Practice throughout Australia (Douglas, 1993). The role of the
Division is to provide general practitioners with an avenue for participating in public
sector health policy development and the promotion of quality patient care through
education, quality assurance, and research. Hence, within regions, small, independent,
general practitioner firms are "loosely coupled" within Divisions of General Practice.

Begun and Lippincott (1993: 142) describe this type of organisation as "a large structu
unit" which develops to give a group of professionals "the capacity to exert
countervailing power" when negotiating with powerful funding bodies. These
researchers are speaking about circumstances in the United States, but the underlying
principle holds true for doctors in Australia. Divisions of General Practice arose as a
result of pressure from general practitioners on the federal government to provide them
with an avenue to participate in health policy decisions (Douglas, 1993). General
practitioners were concerned with the large differential in remuneration rates between

specialists and generalists and with the fact that most hospitals had become the domain
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the specialists (Douglas, 1993). In organisational terms Divisions of General Practice
can be described as a trade associations supported by government funds.

At the level of the regional health care network there is potential for conflict between

general practitioners and specialists over domain. Begun and Lippincott (1993) note that
in such disputes, "political conflict over the encroaching profession's licensure code,
situation in which conflicting views over the sufficiency of education and training, as

well as the resources of interest groups, determine the outcome of the fight" (p 95). Th
"political conflict" between specialist colleges and the Royal Australian College of
General Practitioners has been noisy and vigorous (Fisher et al., 1990). Joint
Consultative Committees have been established, involving the relevant colleges, to

resolve issues of vocational training, credentialing, delineation of clinical privilege
quality assurance and audit measures (Harris, 1992b). General practitioners are

concerned that, as specialists encroach on their domain, they become deskilled and, as a
result, their work is less satisfying (Douglas, 1993).

The hospital is the domain of private and public sector specialists. In addition, a pri

specialist typically owns a private firm. The role of the specialist is defined by his/
field of specialisation and it is common knowledge that among specialties, there are

substantial status differentials. Medical specialists also have access to specialist di

of medicine at the regional level (Illawarra Area Health service, 1994a). These division
are a long-standing tradition within the "professional bureaucracy" (Mintzberg, 1983:

194) of the hospital (Grant, 1985). Hence, at the regional level, specialists have had a
means of participating in public health policy development for some time. As with
divisions of general practice, specialist divisions meet regularly, and are chaired by
elected senior colleague supported by an executive. These "private sector", loosely
coupled, generalist and specialist medical organisations have considerable influence
within the regional network of policy makers and service providers.
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In addition, general practitioners and medical specialists, have strong ties to their
respective colleges and with the Australian Medical Association. Colleges tend to the

welfare of the respective groups of clinicians, with particular responsibility for trai
standards, accreditation, and negotiations concerning levels of reimbursement under
Medicare and government policies affecting the welfare of the medical profession.
However, over the last decade the medical profession in Australia has become
segmented. No one body speaks on behalf of the profession. The Australian Medical

Association has become closely allied with the interests of the specialist colleges. On
other hand, the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners has developed a high

public profile and its activities have become more politicised (Palmer and Short, 1994:
184-186).

The second group of organisations in the network includes medical and non-medical
specialist departments and agencies owned by the regional health authority and staffed

its employees. In addition, private medical consultants may contract with the departmen
to do sessional work. They may also admit private and public patients directly to this

unit. Specialist departments are to be found within major regional hospitals and the st
is predominantly medical and nursing. These departments are generally directed by a

senior doctor with specialist qualifications who may also have a university appointment
This person may also have some control over relevant specialist community based health

agencies. In addition, she/he may be a member of the executive of the specialist divisi

of medicine (Illawarra Area Health Service, 1994a). This organisation is consistent with
Friedson's observation that in health care there is a strongly ordered hierarchy which
dominated by the medical profession who control the activities of other occupations
(Friedson, 1970).

Specialist community based health agencies are generally small and commonly referred to
as teams. Each team has a designated leader who is responsible to the regional health
authority for service provision and use of resources. Walker (1992), refers to these
agencies as relatively small, multi-disciplinary organisations, with approximately one
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third employing less than 10, effective full time (EFT) staff, another third employing 11
to 20 EFT, and the remaining third with more than 21 EFT. Of the staff employed within

these agencies, approximately half are clinical health professionals, one third are cl
and administrative staff, and the remainder are social work and welfare personnel
(Walker, 1992). Characteristically, these small agencies have a simple organisational
design (Mintzberg, 1983: 159) and, are reasonably organic in structure. However,

according to Luhmann's (1982) structural inclusion theory they are lodged within a more
inclusive unit, namely, the regional health authority.

As with the distribution of doctors, there is wide variation in the distribution of al
health professionals, with many remote rural regions being disadvantaged (Harris,

1992b: 129-140). The allied health practitioner-to-population ratio is approximately 1:
(Grant and Lapsley, 1992: 149-151). Hence, in a region with a population of 500,000
people there will be approximately 650 allied health professionals. Three disciplines
relevant to this study in which shortages have been observed are psychology, social
work, and nutrition (Harris, 1992b). Like their medical colleagues, most of these non-

medical health professionals prefer to practice in a large urban area and most belong t
professional associations. However, apart for nursing, most of these associations are

small and in comparison with the medical colleges or the Australian Medical Association
have little political influence at the National, State, or Regional level.

Scott (1983: 100-101), notes that the division of labour among occupational groups in

the health industry is strongly influenced by their professional affiliations and asso

awards. He further observes that managers have little control over the allocation of w
and work routines, including coordination of activities. Friedson (1970: 132-133)

argues that "much of the inadequate coordination said to characterise the health servi
may stem more from their professional organisation than from their bureaucratic
characteristics." However, Begun and Lippincott (1993) propose that the rigid

professional structures, observed by Friedson in the 1970s, are being challenged in the
1990s. The same forces that are moving organisations to cooperate are impacting on the
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professions and only those that "are able to balance their o w n interests with the changing
and intensifying demands of external stakeholders" (p 221-222) are likely to do well.

Furthermore, external stakeholders are "calling for collaborative arrangements among t

professions, no matter how competitive their relationships in the 'open' market" (Begu
and Lippincott, 1993: 222).

The people in the network

For purposes of reimbursement under Australia's Medicare scheme, a general practitione

is defined as a medical practitioner who is either 1) vocationally registered under th
relevant health insurance act, 2) a holder of the Fellowship of the Royal Australian

College of General Practitioners, or 3) undertaking a training program approved by the
Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (Commonwealth Department of
Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services, 1993:3). Gaining entry

to medical school is highly competitive and registration requires five or six years of

undergraduate education plus two years of postgraduate supervised clinical practice. A

fellow of a specialist college undertakes a further three to six years of postgraduate
education (Doherty, 1988: 292-305). Specialist status depends largely on the expertise
which is assumed from more extensive education.

In the main general practitioners provide primary care level services to patients in t
own rooms. Some general practitioners also have hospital visiting privileges. Most

general practitioners are male (80%), aged 35-54 years (70%), who have been practising
for more than 10 years (70%). Approximately, 50 per cent are members of the
Australian Medical Association and fewer are members of the Royal Australian College
of General Practitioners (Bridges-Webb, Britt et al,. 1992: S14). Most general

practitioners depend on Medicare for their gross income which they receive on a fee-fo
service basis (Lawson and Forde, 1993: 354). There is no limit on the number of
services that any one doctor can provide in any one year, however, claims above the
norm are monitored. Payment to doctors under Medicare represented 18 per cent of all
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recurrent expenditure on health in 1991-92 and amounted to $4.5 billion (Australian

Institute of Health and Welfare, 1992). "Over 90 per cent of this expenditure is medical
benefit expenditure through Medicare" (Lawson and Forde, 1993: 354). These figures

highlight the curious fact that while most doctors (generalists and specialists) belie
are in private business, the nature of their business has become very public.

In Australia a medical specialist is a person who is registered as a medical specialis
State or Territory and who has qualifications approved by the Health Insurance Act
(1973). To be recognised as a specialist eligible for reimbursement under Medicare

requires, in addition to registration, a fellowship of a specified specialist college o
recognition by a Specialist Recognition Advisory Committee (Commonwealth
Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services, 1993:4).
Most medical specialists are men (75%) who function as small business operators.

However, specialists are remunerated according to their specialty and their overall in

is, on average, substantially higher than general practitioners (Lawson and Forde, 1993)
Furthermore, specialists are more likely to receive payment from other sources than

Medicare. For example, a specialist may contract on a sessional basis with a hospital to

provide services, or may be on salary as a staff specialist and maintain the right to p

practice. Hence, a specialist may be working both from his/her private office and within
the public hospital system. While the majority of general practitioners and medical

specialists receive incomes that put them among the top 12 per cent of income earners in
Australia, many medical specialists are among the top one per cent of Australian income
earners (Lawson and Forde, 1993: 360).

For purposes of this study a specialist allied health professional is defined as a per

with 1) a recognised qualification in a health related discipline, 2) who has undertaken

additional study in a specialised field. Such persons are usually licensed by governme
or certified by a professional organisation (Como, 1990: 547). Allied health
professionals with specialist training are mainly employed in the public sector and are

paid a salary. Many are registered nurses with specialist qualifications in mental hea
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diabetes mellitus. Relevant allied health professionals include dietitian/nutritionists,

social workers and occupational therapists with expertise in mental health, psychologist

and podiatrists. Psychologists and podiatrists, generally operate within the public syst
while some work privately. None of these professionals receive reimbursement on a feefor-service basis from Medicare as do general medical practitioners and medical

specialists. Hence, most allied health professionals relevant to this study are employed
within the public health sector on a salaried basis. Compared with their medical
colleagues, there are more women than men among this segment of the workforce, and
on average, their income is substantially less (Grant and Lapsley, 1992).

The culture of each group of professionals is to some extent unique, influenced by their
professional membership and whether they work within the public or private sector.

General practitioners and medical specialists who work mainly in the private sector hav
been described as a "loose collection of independent spirits" (Dawson, 1994: 10) united

by their profession and the high value they place on professional and personal autonomy.

Doctors consider themselves to be operating in the "market place" and they share a "free
enterprise" ideology; a culture of "possessive individualism" (Burt, 1982: 5). Handy
(1993) describes this type of culture as "the person culture" (p 189) in which an
individual views organisations as existing "to serve and assist the individuals within
(p 189-190). That is, the organisation has no "super-ordinate objective" (p 189-190).
These provider organisations are driven by the incentives inherent in a fee-for service
payment system.

Public and private sector medical practitioners share a common set of norms, values,

beliefs, and assumptions about the role of the doctor in the provision of health service
Doctors, as a group, see themselves as holding a dominant position among the health
professions (Willis, 1983). Attitudes to administrative staff and managers are confused.
Traditionally, in situations in which doctors have maintained "strategic autonomy",
managers have been seen as "subservient facilitators" (Dawson, 1994: 3). This still
holds true for the "independent spirits" where untrained women are often employed as
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receptionists, managers of patients records, and business managers. However, in the

public hospital clinical and administrative accountability has become more highly value
than professional autonomy. Within the large hospital, medical specialists are finding
"themselves actually becoming 'managers' as part of being 'professionals'" (Dawson,
1994: 19).

Furthermore, in the public hospital and the public sector specialist health agency, most
workers receive a salary and there is little need to be customer oriented. The
"superordinate objective" is defined by the regional health authority. Providers are
driven by the rewards of caring for clients and by the directives from state and regional

health authorities. Doctors and health professionals gain recognition and status throug

their position in the hierarchy, through the demonstration of technical competence to t
peers, and from positive feedback from clients (Harris, R. 1992). Using Handy's
(1993) typology of organisational cultures, public sector community health agencies can
be described as clusters of "the task culture" within "the role culture" (p 185-189). The

task culture is project oriented, while, the role culture emphasises logic, rationality
delegated authority (Handy, 1993: 187-189).

Walker (1992) concludes that two structures are important "mediators" of professional
norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and practices among public sector, community health
providers in Australia, namely, professional support networks which exist within and

between health agencies and special interest groups of professional associations. These
structures have a substantial influence on the development of a "community health
worker culture" (pp 263), on the enhancement of skills, and perhaps on the willingness

of specialist allied health professionals to develop alliances with general practitione
medical specialists. Other factors influence the culture of community health agencies.
the first place, the staff are multi-disciplinary. Hence, differences in professional
technical abilities tend to be highly valued. Secondly, as employees of the bureaucracy,
legitimate authority is respected. Finally, these people enjoy working in the community

rather than the large hospital. For these workers, "community health", is associated wi
101

a customer or service oriented approach to planning and delivering services. Hence,
people with a "community health" orientation are more open to working across
professional boundaries (Walker, 1992). In the United States, one study found mental
health case managers to be guided by professional "values of empowerment,
individualisation, independence, normalisation, and dignity" (Ellison, Rogers et al.,
1995: 110). T h e study concluded that as a group of workers, mental health case
managers could be likened to "other female-dominated 'semi-professions' - for example,
nursing, teaching - and that it is most closely linked with the discipline of social work.
These findings imply case managers' low status, limited power, and inseparability from
their employing agency" (Ellison, Rogers et al, 1995: 111).

Exchanges between members of the network
"Networking is the act of creating and/or maintaining a cluster of organisations for the purpose of
exchanging, acting, or producing among the m e m b e r organisations" (Alter and Hage, 1993: 46).

Patients in Australia generally "forage" for the services which they believe will best
their needs. Once they decide that they require assistance beyond their informal system
they usually seek help from their general practitioner (Commonwealth Department of
Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992). Under Medicare legislation, the
patient's right to choose a primary care doctor is preserved. The effectiveness of this
model depends on the patients knowledge of the services available and the primary care
service provider's knowledge of the availability of other services. Patients value their
right to see a qualified general practitioner, preferably in their local community
(Humphreys and Weinand, 1991). They respect the right of the general practitioner to
make referrals to specialists. However, they want some say in the choice of specialist to
w h o m they are referred. Furthermore, where a patient is referred to a specialist they
want administrative efficiency, in terms of appointments and feedback about their
condition (Harris, 1992b: 171). These patient criteria for a successful referral influence
general practitioner and specialist satisfaction with the outcomes of an exchange based on
a patient referral.
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There are three major pathways (Figures 4) by which patients access specialist services in
Australia, namely 1) referral by their general practitioner who acts as advocate and case
manager, 2) referral by one specialist to another, and 3) referral by a doctor working in
the casualty department of a regional hospital. The latter may or may not result in a
referral back to the local doctor.

Figure 4: Patient pathways to specialist medical services
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Source: Harris, M . G. (1992b) Final Report to Rural Health Support, Education and Training Program,
University of Wollongong, Wollongong.
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Under Australia's Medicare scheme, for purposes of reimbursement, a referral is defined

as "a request to a specialist or consultant physician for investigation, opinion, treatm
and/or management of a condition or problem of a patient or for the performance of a
specific examination^) or test(s)" (Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing,
Local Government and Community Services, 1993:5-7). Medicare regards the general
practitioner as the primary source of referral to specialists and indicates that cross
between specialists should usually occur in consultation with the patient's general
practitioner. Hence, referrals from general practitioners to medical specialists are
legitimated by government regulations concerning reimbursements to doctors
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community
Services, 1993:5).

Bridges-Webb, Britt et al., (1992) found that, on average, a general practitioner had 118
patient encounters per week, of which, 6 per cent resulted in a new referral to a medical
specialist, 2.6 per cent resulted in a referral to a health professional, and 1 per cent
resulted in an admission to a hospital, nursing home or other institution. Thus on

average, a full-time general practitioner would refer 8 new patients to a medical speci
per week, 2 new patients to a health professional and one patient to hospital or some
other institution. Carson (1982), in a study which excluded referrals for refraction

errors, found that general practitioner referrals to specialists occurred at 5.2 per cen
encounters, of which, one-third were continuing referrals and two thirds were new

referrals. Based on Carson's findings and including refraction error referrals of 2.1 pe

100 (Bridges-Webb, Britt et al, 1992), a full-time general practitioner seeing 118 patie

per week could be expected to refer approximately 8 to 9 patients per week of whom 2 to
3 would be continuing and 5 to 6 new referrals. Bridges-Webb, Britt et al, (1992) found
that mental health problems, which were classified as anxiety, depression and sleep
disorder, represented 6.6 per cent of all problems managed by general practitioners, or
approximately, 7 patients per week. In addition, mental health problems represented 5.9
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per cent of all problems managed that included a n e w referral to a specialist, and 7.1 per

cent of problems managed at encounters that included an admission to hospital. Diabetes
mellitus accounted for 1.3 per cent of all problems managed (one to two patients per

week), 2.1 per cent of all new specialist referral encounters, and three per cent of al
encounters involving an admission to hospital (Bridges-Webb, Britt et al., 1992). Tait

(1993) observes that, in Australia, people with a major psychiatric disorder consult t

general practitioner twice as often as they consult specialist mental health providers
observation supported by Falloon (1993) in the United Kingdom.

Reasons for general practitioners to consult specialists include, the need for "specia
knowledge", when the condition is complex or rare, the need for "technical or
investigative competence" when the specialist has the competence and access to the
required equipment or facility, and the need for "procedural" competence. In addition,

general practitioners consult specialists for reassurance, to gain further education a
development, and to avoid litigation (Harris, 1992b: 176). Of referrals to specialists
general practitioners, Carson (1982) found that 7.75 per cent were for diagnosis

confirmation, 13.4 per cent were for reassurance, 22 per cent were to confirm or refin
existing diagnosis, 30 per cent were for general management, and 31 per cent were

requests for procedures. Carson also found that younger doctors refer more patients for
diagnosis and procedures than older doctors.

Several studies reveal that factors other than the patient's immediate condition may
influence referral rates. For example, Cummins, Jarman et al., (1981) found no

difference in referral rates by general practitioners according to years of experience
general practice. They did, however, find that patients from lower socio-economic
classes were referred less frequently than were patients from higher social classes.
Wilkin and Smith (1987) had similar findings, suggesting that patient social standing
influence the rate of exchange between members of the network. In Denmark,
Christensen, Sorenson et al., (1989) found a correlation between referral rates to

specialists by general practitioners and size of practice and the proximity of the spe
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General practitioners in larger practices referred fewer patients, and, referral rates
increased with better specialist cover and decreased with distance from the specialist.

Reilly, Hermann et al., (1994) found that the high mobility of some mentally ill clients
raises problems in maintaining effective linkage between service providers.

The literature on general practitioner referrals in Australia reflects concern with
communications (Cooling and Walpole (1992), the need to improve the management of
chronic disease through better referral practices (Mudge, 1992) and the need to improve
relationships between general practitioners and health professionals (Commonwealth
Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992; Douglas, 1993). Of

particular concern to general practitioners is the lack of feedback they receive from he
professionals (Kingman, 1994).

Emmanuel and Walter (1989) concluded that outpatient referrals form the main interface
between general practitioners and hospitals. However, other researchers have examined
general practitioner relationships with specialist departments within hospitals. For
example, Eyers, Brodaty et al., (1994) examined referrer satisfaction with the services
provided by a tertiary referral mood disorder unit. They found that 74 per cent of

referrers were satisfied with their contact with the unit and that the important determi
of satisfaction were technical competence, feedback, and access.

Walker (1992), in a study of community health agencies, found that most agencies had

links with between 6 and 13 other organisations, of these, between one and six were seen
as central to their work. An interesting finding was that while clinical staff regarded
links as vital to the organisation, they were not confident that their agency managers
appreciated their importance. The reasons for inter-agency linkage in this study were

described as "services to clients and potential clients, organisational support, and pee

support" (p 260). With respect to services to clients, linkages with other agencies were

required when an agency was unable to meet all the needs of a particular client. Agencie
also accepted referrals from other organisations suggesting a "symbiotic" (Alter and
106

Hage, 1993: 59-68) relationship. Organisational support activities involved meeting with

other organisations in the interests of groups of clients rather than individual client
example, agencies may work together to advocate for resources to meet unmet needs.
Exchanges related to peer support had two orientations, one for professional skill and
knowledge enhancement and the other for personal support.

The literature on exchanges between generalists and specialists reveals some interestin

international differences in emphases. For example, in the United States there is inter

in 1) the decline in the number of primary care physicians (Aiken, Lewis et al., (1979)
2) the need to reform the system around community care networks with primary care
physicians playing a key role (Davidson, 1992; McManis, 1992), 3) the need to improve

continuity and quality of care (Glenn, Hofmeister, et al., 1983; Sabatino, 1992) and 4)
the outcomes of hospital activity directed towards developing alliances with referring

physicians (Shortell, Morrison et al., 1990; Johnson, 1992; Dolan, 1992; O'Gara, 1992).

The British literature reflects a high level of interest in general practitioner referr
behaviour since general practitioners were provided with funds to purchase specialist
services. This policy has raised interest in the volume and appropriateness of general

practitioner referrals (Wilkin, Metcalfe et al., 1989), and the extent to which general

practitioners are satisfied with the services they receive from specialists (Treasure, 1
These emphases in the literature suggest that the funding environment within which
generalists and specialists operate has a substantial effect on reasons for
interorganisational cooperation. For example, in the United States where hospitals are

seeking to establish partnerships with physicians the basis of these arrangements appea
to be revenue generation and uncertainty reduction. Whereas, in the United Kingdom,

there is considerable concern with cost reduction on behalf of the health authority and
uncertainty reduction on behalf of the specialists.
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Summary
This section of the thesis has used the literature to explore the structure of a typical
Australian health care network, including, the type and culture of the organisations
represented, the level and type of exchanges that occur between the players and situational
factors which influence generalist- specialist exchanges. These findings are summarised
in Table 2.

The next section of the literature review describes the practice of shared care and explo
the question as to whether shared care is a psychological contract between individuals or a
business or organisational contract between organisations. Factors associated with the
formation and maintenance of shared care are compared with factors associated with
alliance formation and maintenance.
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Table 2: The regional health care network

The

organisations

Technical level
• Small business generalist
medical firms with domain
over primary health care
• Small business specialist
medical firms with domain
over their area of expertise
including relevant hospital
departments
• Small business non-medical
firms (very few in number)
• Non-medical
specialist
agencies of the regional
health authority with domain
over their particular area of
specialty
• Specialist
hospital
departments staffed by
doctors and nurses

T h e people

Member

General practitioners
• Strong community support
• High status
• Less well paid than medical
consultants
• Dissatisfied with loss of
territory and associated deskilling
• Little influence
over
hospitals
• Primary source of referral for
medical consultants
• Paid on a fee-for-service basis

Exchanges
between
m e m b e r s of the network
are characterised by:
• Consumer driven to some
extent
• The centrality of the general
practitioner
• Exchanges between doctors
clearly legitimated by law
and funding regulations
• M o r e exchanges between
general practitioners and
medical consultants than
between general practitioners
and health professionals
• Communication problems
between general practitioners
and health professionals

exchanges

Medical consultants
• High status
• Well paid on a fee-for- service
basis plus other types of
remuneration
Other relevant findings
• Strong community support
• Able to influence relevant • General practitioners in
Administrative level
larger practices refer less
hospital departments and
• Divisions
of
General
patients
to consultants
regional
health
authority
Practice
•
Social
background of the
• Specialist Divisions of
patient
influences referral
Medicine
patterns
Allied health professionals
• Regional Health Authority
• Funding
arrangements
• Lower status than doctors
influence reasons for
interorganisational exchange
• Salaried professionals
Status differentials
• Reflect the traditional • Role less well understood by
the community
hierarchical structures of the
professional
health • Culture: empowerment of
bureaucracy - but under
clients in their
own
pressure to change
environment
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SHARED CARE
Shared care is a term which has recently emerged in the British and Australian health

literature. Being a recent concept it is poorly defined, particularly, with respect to m

illness. The concept has a longer association with physical conditions, such as obstetri

and diabetes mellitus (Beelaerts, 1994). Shared care is most frequently used to describe
formally developed collaborative arrangements between general practitioners and

specialist hospital departments and/or specialist community health agencies. It is clear

from the literature that these formal models of shared care constitute business contrac

involving, in some instances, individuals (general practitioners in the main) and specia
organisations such as hospital units and health professional agencies and in other
instances small business group practices and individual specialists (Rosen, 1993).

However, the term shared care is also used to describe informal collaborative
arrangements between generalist and specialist medical small business firms (Brown and
Tower, 1990; Thomas and Corney, 1993). Informal arrangements are central to this
study but little has been written about the structure or dynamics of this organisation.

Motivators for shared care
In mental health, changes in treatment methods and scarcity of resources have been

identified as a motivators of shared care. Of significance are increases in the number o

ambulatory patients with complex mental illness, a shortage of psychiatrists, and cuts i
public health expenditure (Adams, 1990; Michel and Valech, 1992; Muraski, 1994;
Eyers, Brodaty et al., 1994). Like other parts of the world (Kendrik, Sibbald et al.,
1993), rural Australia has a serious shortage of psychiatrists and mental health
professionals (Harris, 1992b; Jorm, Rosenman et al., 1993). The mal-distribution of
specialists creates problems for patients wishing to access specialist services and

problems for general practitioners in need of clinical support and training. Yellowlees
and Hemming (1992) propose that shared care, using a "comprehensive, integrated"
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approach supported by effective communication systems, could assist in addressing
some of the problems raised by the mal-distribution of psychiatrists in rural areas.

Government policies to "mainstream" and "integrate" mental health services act as

powerful external forces impacting on public and private sector organisations (Austral
Health Minister' Conference, 1992; Singh, 1992). These policies are directed towards

ensuring that mental health services become part of the mainstream health system and t
within this system a full range of mental health services continues to be provided.

Furthermore, the integration policy states that within each region, the services provi
to clients will be well coordinated (Australian Health Minister' Conference, 1992). In
subsequent policy document (Commonwealth Department of Health Housing and
Community Services, 1993) the federal government endorsed the need for shared care
involving public and private generalists and specialists and several State government
policy documents have followed suit (New South Wales Health Department, 1992b;
South Australian Health Commission, 1993). Shared care increases the number of
patients seen by general practitioners. Policy makers see shared care, therefore, as a

means to reducing hospital admissions (Tyrer, Ferguson et al., 1990; Falloon, 1993) and
referrals to psychiatrists.

At the organisational level, Rosen (1993) proposes that for general practitioners in
marginal practices, shared care provides an opportunity to maintain and capture new

client markets. Other researchers observe that many general practitioners are dissatis

with current service arrangements which tend to cut them out of the market (Berry, 1993
Michel and Valech, 1992; Llewellyn-Jones, 1993; Douglas, 1993). Llewellyn-Jones,
(1993) concludes that shared care has developed to overcome the problems of general

practitioners, significantly, their inability to access specialist support. In addition
general practitioners are under pressure from consumers to provide care as close as
possible to the client's home. Hambridge and Rosen (1994) argue that most general
practitioners do not wish to manage seriously mentally ill clients without assistance

specialist mental health services. This view is supported by Tait (1993), who states th
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general practitioners are less comfortable dealing with psychiatric disorders than physical
disorders. He cites data from a study by Coulter, Noone et al., (1989) which indicated

that 47 per cent of all patients referred to psychiatrists were for the psychiatrist to t
over patient management as opposed to 4-18 per cent of requests for specialists to take
over care of physical disorders.

Andrew and Parkes (1985) propose that shared care is needed to address the skills deficit

of general practitioners and mental health professionals caring for seriously mentally il
people in the community. Huxley and Goldberg (1980) found that among the patients of
general practitioners there was a substantial group who had a diagnosable mental illness
which the general practitioner had failed to recognise. Tait (1993) suggests that the
reason for the high level of unrecognised psychiatric morbidity in general practice is
because patients "somatise" mental illness. In other words, they present with somatic
symptoms and are treated for this rather than for a mental illness. Tait considers that
improved cooperation between general practitioners and psychiatrists is needed to assist
general practitioners recognise and refer appropriately and to manage depression,
anxiety, and sleep disorders.

Brown and Towers (1990) support Tait's conclusion, but add the qualifying statement

that closer collaboration with psychiatrists will only be supported by general practition
if they have the opportunity to actively share in patient assessment and treatment.
Thomas and Corney (1993) found that among general practitioners there was some
support for closer collaboration with mental health professionals. Berry (1993) also

found that general practitioners favoured receiving additional support from mental health
professionals. However, only 50 per cent of general practitioners knew of the existence
of the mental health services in the region and of those who knew about the service, one
third never used them. Berry concluded that there was a need for mental health
professionals to market themselves more effectively and to be more user-friendly. It is
interesting to note that much of the literature on shared care in Australia appears to be
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written from the perspective of the public sector specialist hospital department or health
agency. The motive for these organisations to form alliances is cost reduction.

Andrew and Parkes (1985) observe that many mental health professionals lack adequate
training in physical illness and that this poses a substantial problem given the high
incidence of organic disorders a m o n g people with mental illness. Shared care involving
general practitioners and health professionals is seen as an efficient and effective
approach to addressing this deficit in skills. Saltman, Sengoz et al., (1993) evaluated a
pilot program designed to improve the integration of general practitioner firms and
salaried community health agencies. Participant assessment indicated the benefits of the
project to be increased communication between providers, and improved access for
patients. A s a result of the project the dietitians decided to continue working with the
general practitioners, but the mental health workers did not. It seems that some health
professionals m a y work more readily with general practitioners than others.

There is some evidence to suggest that consumers favour shared care. Essex, Doig et
al., (1990) found that patients using a south east London mental health service supported
shared care. In particular, patients valued carrying their o w n shared care card and being
able to monitor their o w n progress.

However, while their providers (general

practitioners, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals) found that the shared care
record substantially improved communication between them, they did not like patients
holding their o w n record cards.

Expected benefits of shared care
Several writers have observed that there are a number of non-financial rewards for
participants of shared care in mental health. Professional rewards include increased
access to psychiatric knowledge and expertise for general practitioners, increased general
practitioner confidence to detect and m a n a g e mental illness, and more satisfying
communications between general practitioners, psychiatrists and mental health
professionals (Tait, 1993; Michel and Valech, 1992; Carr, 1993; Falloon, 1993; Warner,
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Gater et al, 1993). Llewellyn-Jones (1993) identifies improvements in client access,
quality and continuity of care as among the expected outcomes of shared care. For

general practitioners, he perceives the benefits to be increased knowledge and skills an
improved access to specialist support for client assessment and management, including,
crisis care (Llewellyn-Jones, 1993). The advantages for health professionals and
specialist hospital departments include better background information about clients and

increased job satisfaction (Llewellyn-Jones, 1993). For the health authority, the benefits

are the care of patients through the combined expertise of hospital specialist and gener
practice service, improved efficiency through less duplication (Consortium, 1994: 11)
and reduction in the burden on public hospitals (Hoskins, Fowler et al., 1993).

Table 3 summarises and compares the expected benefits of interorganisational alliances
and shared care. Of note is the high level of consistency between the two bodies of

literature. Of further note are the differences in expected benefits of interorganisatio

cooperation associated with funding arrangements. It is obvious that the type of funding
arrangement influences the intent of the alliance and the nature of the interdependence.
Hence, according to interdependence theory, different approaches to managing
interdependence can be anticipated in shared care arrangements involving public sector
organisations than apply in the private sector (Thompson, 1967; Zajac and D'Aunno,
1994).
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Table: 3

T h e expected benefits of shared care c o m p a r e d with the
expected benefits of interorganisational alliances

Expected benefits of alliance

Expected benefits of shared care

Private sector health care
Private sector/ manufacturing
• Revenue generation
• Revenue generation
• Opportunity to maintain and capture n e w
• Profit through adaptive efficiency:
client markets
- ability to respond faster to changing
• Access to specialist support
customer needs
- ability to respond faster to market • Better able to meet the expectations and needs
of customers
opportunities
- reduction in risks and costs of product • Increased access to specialised knowledge and
expertise for generalists
development
- shorter lead time for n e w product • Increased confidence in managing complex
problems for generalists
development
• M o r e satisfying working relationships
among multi-disciplinary providers
Private sector/health care literature
• Increase the number of referrals to hospitals
Public sector health care
• Increase in market share
• Improved efficiencies: through better • Cost reduction through reduced hospital
admissions and reduced referrals to specialists
utilisation of facilities and personnel/ through
•
Improved patient care: access; continuity;
shared objectives to rigorously contain
quality;
outcomes
internal and external costs
• Improved efficiencies
• Improved coordination
•
Address the skills deficit of
health
• M o r e comprehensive complement of service
professionals
re:
general
physical
health
delivery settings
problems and of general practitioners re:
• M o r e rewarding work relationships through
complex chronic conditions
greater clarity and less redundancies
• Improve the confidence of generalists to
manage complex problems
Public sector
• Improved background information for medical
• Reduction in costs
and non-medical specialist about the needs and
• Increased efficiency/more with less
backgrounds of patients
• M o r e satisfying working relationships
among multi-disciplinary providers
• Improved job satisfaction

Barriers to shared care
Barriers to shared care include general practitioner attitudes to people with mental illness,

general practitioner referral habits, entrenched professional attitudes and practices,
competition over territory, poor communication between providers, and a lack of
incentives supporting shared care. Tait (1993) and Hambridge and Rosen (1994)

observe that many general practitioners have negative attitudes to mentally ill clien

prefer to have them totally managed by a psychiatrist. Other researchers observed that
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some general practitioners are in the habit of using hospital admission in preference to

using mental health professionals for difficult clients (Berry, 1993; Stansfeld, Leek et
1992; Armstrong, Bird et al., 1992). Kendrick, Sibbald et al., (1993), and Jorm,

Rosenman et al., (1993) found that there was a tendency for mental health specialists of

all types to cluster in large training institutions, thereby, denying smaller general pr
firms opportunity to participate in shared care. Similarly, Andrews (1993) observed a
lack of collaborative activity among provider groups, while Brown and Towers (1990)
and Llewellyn-Jones (1993) found providers to be ambivalent about the roles of other
health professionals involved in shared care. Other researchers observed competition
between professional groups over territory and treatment paradigms (Greenley, 1992;
Huxley, 1993), and resources (Rosen, 1992; Sheppard, 1992). Jones and Jordan

(1993) reported that general practitioners receive relatively poorer feedback from hospi
inpatient child psychiatric departments than they receive from community based
psychiatrists. They concluded that the two exist in different systems with different
cultures and ethical expectations regarding feedback.

Rosen (1993) and Brodaty, Howarth et al., (1994) consider that the fee-for-service

payment system in Australia has inhibited general practitioner-psychiatrist shared care.
While Schneider (1993) in the United Kingdom proposes that where general practitioners
become budget holders, the "small business" culture of their practices may discriminate

against unattractive, time-consuming, mentally ill clients. Hence, shared care may not be
perceived as a desirable option. On the other hand, Rosen (1993), and Carr and
Donovan (1992), suggest that the introduction of general practitioner budget holders has
supported the development of shared care in the United Kingdom.

Huxley (1993) and Essex, Doig et al., (1991) suggest clinicians faced with threats of
financial rationing become committed to existing practice models and are therefore
unlikely to enter new collaborative arrangements at such times. A similar point is made
by Greenley (1992) in the United States who observes that management tends to perceive
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innovative approaches to patient care as an opportunity to achieve resource savings and
that this attitude is counter-productive.

Table 4 summarises environmental forces associated with the practice of shared care,
organisational needs which shared care has the potential to meet, organisational beliefs

and values influencing readiness to cooperate and barriers to the adoption of shared care
The forces leading to the development of shared care have much in common with the
forces leading to the formation of interorganisational alliances. Indeed, similarity
between environmental influences and organisational motivators pressing towards shared
care and alliances suggests that shared care is a form of interorganisational alliance.
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Table 4: Forces for and against shared care

Motivators a n d readiness to share care

Barriers to shared care

E n v i r o n m e n t a l forces motivating
organisations towards shared care
• Resource scarcity in the public sector with a
need to reduce expenditure
• Competition for clients in the private sector
and a desire to reduce uncertainty
• Rapidly changing medical technology
• Complexity of client problems
• Shortage and mal-distribution of specialists
• G o v e r n m e n t policies to mainstream and
integrate services
• Public sector managers ambivalent about
cooperation with the private sector

Barriers to shared care
Entrenched professional attitudes and practices
• Competition over territory and treatment
paradigms
• Entrenched attitudes to mental illness
• Traditional referral practices
• Poor communication practices
• A tendency for specialists to cluster in large
institutions
• Perverse financial incentives
• Poor management attitudes and practices

Organisational needs
• General practitioners:
- need clients
- dissatisfied with current arrangements
- lack the expertise to care for people with
complex chronic conditions in the community
- need the support of specialists
• Health professionals
- lack adequate training in physical illness
- health authority policy directives support
integration of service delivery
• Medical specialists
- need clients but shortage not evident
• Public hospital departments
- need to reduce costs through reducing client
load
Organisational readiness to cooperate
• General practitioner support for shared care
with medical specialists
• Strong public hospital support
• Ambivalence between general practitioners and
health professionals to collaborate
• C o n s u m e r support for shared care which
actively involves them
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Requirements for successful shared care
The literature suggests that successful shared care arrangements require attention to

definition of policies, the development of goals and realistic time frames, the provisi
financial incentives, attention to communication and management of conflict, the

recruitment and training of relevant providers, and the assessment of relevant outcomes

Tait (1993) emphasises the importance of clarifying the objectives and expected time
frames for implementation of shared care. These activities are considered essential
antecedents to the successful recruitment of busy clinicians. Tait (1993) and lies and
Auluck (1990) comment on the need to develop ground rales between collaborators about
roles and communication processes which are necessary for the development of trust.

Several articles refer to the important role that management plays in either inhibiting
progressing shared care (Greenley, 1992; Essex and Doig, 1992; Huxley, 1993),

particularly a need for managers to be sensitive to the cultures of the various provide
groups. They propose that managers should seek to encourage formal as well as
informal contact between member organisations. Brodaty, Howarth et al., (1994)
recommend the use of financial incentives to encourage shared care. Rosen (1993)
suggests managers assist in the development and assessment of measurable outcome
standards.

Summary

Table 5 summarises the requirements for successful shared care and compares this set of
criteria with the requirements for successful interorganisational cooperation. Table 5
indicates that, compared with the general management and health alliance literature,

shared care literature has paid little attention to the requirements for successful sha

care implying that shared care is in an early stage of development (Stein, 1995; 32-33).
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Overall, the review of the interorganisational literature has revealed a rich body of
knowledge concerning the forces for and against the development of alliances and the
factors associated with continuity in interorganisational cooperation. T h e shared care
literature indicates that similar environmental and organisational forces drive this
phenomenon as motivate interorganisational alliance activity. Furthermore, similar
factors appear to influence the success of shared care and alliances. These findings
support the notion that shared care represents a form of interorganisational cooperation
which can be appropriately referred to as an alliance. Hence, from this point, the term
alliance will be used.

The following section of the literature review explores issues in researching alliance
maintenance using a multi-theoretical and a multi-modal approach.
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Table 5: Requirements for successful interorganisational cooperation
compared with requirements for successful shared care
Requirements for successful
interorganisational cooperation

Requirements for successful shared care

Choice of partner
Careful analysis of organisations financial
situation and future prospects
Understand the critical phases of the
relationship
Personal chemistry between key players
Compatibility
of
philosophies/
values/objectives
Develop appreciation of each other
Symmetry in contribution and in strength of
partners
Choose a partner with a good reputation to
protect
Institutionalise the alliance-go public
Bring others along
Methods of coordination
B e flexible: allow the methods to evolve
Frequent communications
Resource and manage coordination
Integrate appropriate points of contact
Liberate managers/train managers
Negotiate roles and obligations
Develop boundary roles
Monitor costs and quality
Information system that addresses needs of the
alliance c/f needs of organisation
Employ appropriate technology
Psycho/social factors
Attend to the relationship: equalise the benefits
over time
Frequent communications
Define the focus to reduce conflict
Manage trust and reciprocity
Pay attention to longer term projects
Establish the ground rules
Review progress regularly
Situational factors
• Awareness of changes in customer preferences,
changes in legislation, changes in activities of
competitors
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Attention to recruitment and training

Articulation of policies, objectives, over time
and to be determined by objectives ground rules
and time frames
Attention to communication
Monitor and evaluate outcomes

Attention to communication and
management of conflict
Sensitivity to professional differences
Provide positive financial incentives
Appropriate m a n a g e m e n t attitudes
strategies
Financial incentives

the

and

ISSUES IN RESEARCHING ALLIANCES AND
NETWORKS
"Case studies provide one of the chief arenas in which quantitative and qualitative research can be
combined" (Bryman, 1989: 175).

The literature on networks and alliances strongly supports a research approach which
examines exchanges among organisations within the context of a network of business
relationships. The most frequent design to study organisational networks is the case
study (Levine and White, 1961; Galaskiewicz, 1989; Alter and Hage, 1993; Provan and
Milward, 1995) and there is a need for studies of networks to move beyond a single case
to the employment of multiple case study designs (Galaskiewicz, 1989). This approach
was adopted by Alter and Hage (1993) to explore variations in forms of coordination,
structure and operation of systemic networks using quantitative and qualitative
approaches to data collection. Similarly, Provan and Milward (1995) examined four
network systems and employed multiple methods of data collection to address the
question "What, if any, is the relationship between the structure and context of mental
health networks and their effectiveness?" (p 4). Larson (1992) also employed the case
study design to explore social control factors governing alliances between small
entrepreneurial firms. Using an ethnographic approach to data collection she found that
rewarding dyadic relationships operated within a network of business exchange
relationships. This researcher's unit of analysis was the alliance and she began by
identifying existing alliances and thereafter discovered the network. Informal alliances

the health industry involving generalists and specialists are not obvious, but the networ
for care of patients with a particular condition is easily identified.

The study of alliances within networks of exchange raises the question as to the

appropriate level of analysis. Should the unit of analysis be the alliance or should it b
the network or should it be both the alliance and the network? Alter and Hage (1993:
307) maintain that problems of data analysis are experienced when the network is taken

as the unit of analysis because data collected at the individual level has to be aggrega
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to provide either an organisational measure or a network measure. These researchers
observe that most network studies involving microstructural analysis do not aggregate
data twice, tending to leave the analysis at the organisational level. However, despite
challenges involved these researchers found it useful to undertake across-network data
analysis. Similarly, Provan and Milward (1995) employed multiple levels of analysis
(individual, agency and network) to gain an understanding of each of their cases which
were defined as four community mental health systems. These researchers followed the
case study design described by Yin (1989).

Case study research
Yin (1989: 23) defines a case study as "an empirical research that: investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of
evidence are used" (p 23). Hence, Yin emphasises the utility of the case study approach
for studying social phenomena which are not readily amenable to experimental research.
Furthermore, case study research involves the collection of data from multiple sources

and may involve the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data (Bryman, 1989:
172). Bryman proposes that in case study research, the emphasis should be on context,
interconnections and processes with the researcher gaining a feeling for what it is to
part of the particular organisation or network. Thus, case study involves detailed
investigation of phenomena; when a study involves more than one case it is necessary to
preserve the distinctiveness of each case.

1. Single case or multiple cases
Nevertheless, observations involving more than one case can yield invaluable
information. Bryman (1989: 171) maintains that two reasons support multiple cases in a
single study, namely, "the generalizability of the research may be enhanced, and
comparisons allow the special features of cases to be identified much more readily" (p
171). He cites Barley's (1986) study of the implementation of CT scanners in two
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radiology departments as a good example of h o w the use of multiple cases allowed
features applying to each department to be explored. In multiple case studies the

investigator needs to "show the reader that all the single cases have been treated fa

and that the cross-conclusions have not been biased by undue attention to one or a few
the entire array of cases" (Yin, 1989: 150). It is obvious that case study research
involving more than one case needs to be approached with care. In particular, the
researcher needs to ensure that each case receives fair attention through the use of
multiple sources and methods of data collection.

In a study involving more than one case, "appropriate analysis of the embedded unit of

analysis should first be conducted within each case. The results should be interpreted

the single-case level and may be treated as but one of several factors in pattern-mat

.... at the single case level" (Yin, 1989: 121). Patterns or explanations for each sin
case may then be compared across cases. This is the approach adopted by Alter and
Hage (1993: 307). However, in addition to employing pattern-matching and replication

logic as the basis for comparing cases, these researchers applied quantitative analysi

compare networks. Quantitative analysis was possible because of the number of cases (n
= 15) involved in their study of health and welfare networks.
2. Case selection
Case study research provides opportunity for detailed study of particular phenomena.

Like qualitative approaches to research, case study emphasises the context in which th
phenomena occur (Bryman, 1989: 167). Reasons for case selection require careful
definition with theoretical considerations as the guide. Cases may be selected on the

basis of expected similarities in patterns or because they are expected to provide ne

diverse evidence (Yin, 1989: 58). Unlike survey research, case study research does not
rely on randomisation for its validity (Bryman, 1989: 167). Bryman maintains that the
aim with case study research is to gain insights from people with experience with the
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phenomena and to elaborate patterns and themes which can be extended to a wider
theoretical domain.

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection begin with some
understanding or theory about given phenomena. However, the aim of case study
sampling is to maximise the "information richness" of the data, while quantitative
sampling aims to maximise the representativeness of the data (Patton, 1990: 169). With
each approach, theory development and verification influences the sampling process.
For example, with conventional quantitative research a relatively rigid theoretical model
is developed. The theory is then "tested in the context of a random sample (to avoid
investigator bias), using large enough numbers of subjects to demonstrate statistical
significance" (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 33). With qualitative inquiry, the researcher
starts with a theoretical base that is more flexible and seeks to progressively gain data
which adds n e w insight. In qualitative inquiry, initial sampling questions m a y include
"Which data sources are information rich? W h o m should I talk to, or what should I look
at first? A s theory develops, additional questions arise: Which data sources m a y confirm
m y understanding? Challenge m y understanding? Enrich m y understanding?" (Crabtree
and Miller, 1992: 33). Qualitative inquiry is sometimes described as employing
inductive logic in that it "generally begins with theory or understanding that is to be
modified and confirmed in the context of the study" (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 33). A s
a result the choice of subjects m a y change as the study progresses.

Crabtree and Miller (1992: 37-44) describe several approaches to qualitative sampling,
including, "critical case sampling", "theory-based sampling" and "confirming and
disconfirming cases" (39-41). In critical case sampling the researcher looks for the
particularly good case that can be used as a basis for "logical generalisation and
m a x i m u m application of information to all other cases, because, if it is true of this one
case, it is likely to be true of all other 'similar' cases" (Patton, 1992: 182). With theory
based sampling the researcher systematically looks for information that will confirm or
disconfirm the a priori theory or understanding (Crabtree and Miller (1992: 40). This
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approach to sampling is different to theoretical sampling as described by Glaser and
Strauss (1967) whereby "data is gathered to generate theory and the process of data

collection is controlled by the emerging theory" (p 44). Confirming and disconfirming
sampling strategies involve the selection of cases on the basis that they are likely

support or challenge the researcher's current understanding of the phenomena (Crabtr
and Miller, 1992: 40). The appropriate number of respondents in this situation is
determined by the "diminishing marginal contribution of each additional case; the

researcher will have no need to continue with further cases when the marginal utilit
an additional case approaches zero" (Gummesson, 1991: 85). However, when the case

is defined as a network of organisations, the issue of identifying and delimiting the
network becomes important (Burt, 1983; Morrissey, 1992).

3. Defining the network of organisations that constitute the case

The approach used to delimit a network depends on the researcher's definition of a

network. Axelsson (1992: 242) identifies three clusters of definitions of network, tw

of which are relevant to this thesis. The first approach defines networks as "the tot

pattern of relationships within a group of organisations acting in order to achieve a
common goal" (Van De Ven and Ferry, 1980; quoted in Axelsson and Easton, 1992:
242). Hence, appropriate research questions might include how to improve the overall
effectiveness of the network through improved organisation and it would be important

that all dyadic relationships pertaining to the network are identified. Cook and Eme
(1978), on the other hand, define network as "sets of two or more connected exchange
relationships" (p 725). With this definition, the focus for research is the exchange

activities which link the members of the network. If one adopts this approach, then a
focal organisation may serve to define the network of relevant exchanges.

In similar vein, Alter and Hage (1993: 298) describe two approaches to defining the
network of organisations for inclusion in a study of networks, namely, the
macrostructural approach and the microstructural approach. Many researchers employ
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the macro structural approach, including Galaskiewicz (1989) and Morrisey, Tausig et

al. (1985). This method requires the identification of "all pairwise relationships with
geographic area, using one medium or more of exchange (or type of relationship) as the

inclusion criteria" (Alter and Hage, 1993: 299). With the microstructural approach "the
inclusion criteria are set more narrowly This approach allows us to locate network

patterns that fit a priori criteria, detect similar sub-systems, and thereby compare th
structures and operations" (Alter and Hage, 1993). The microstructural approach
involves collecting "information from target organisations in order to set boundaries
all sub-systems within a selected group of organisations (without ever describing the

entire network), and then setting exclusion criteria in order to decrease the number of
sub-systems to be studied" (p 299). These researchers followed a four step process
which included defining the type and location of organisations to be studied, the

development of exclusion criteria, a survey of all the organisations that had survived
one and two, and the development of inclusion criteria. Alter and Hage (1993: 299)
warn that the researcher of interorganisational community systems faces considerable
challenges when confronted with "myriad political subdivisions and jurisdictional
boundaries" (p 298).

4. Strategies for enhancing validity and reliability

Case study challenges the researcher to address issues of construct validity, external

validity, internal validity and reliability. Construct validity refers to "the way a m

relates to other variables within a system of theoretical relationships" (Babbie, 1986:
113). Validation is therefore linked with theoretical deductions concerning the
phenomena of interest. Problems with construct validity in relation to case study
research can be attributed to two factors, namely, the researcher failing to develop a

systematic set of operational variables that address the phenomena of interest, and the

researcher failing to justify the measures selected to measure the particular phenomen
(Yin, 1989: 41-42). Using theory to predict relationships between variables is one
approach to demonstrating that a measure has construct validity. However, Bryman
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(1989: 63) notes that on this basis "a huge amount of research could be interpreted as

construct validation" (p 63). It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between an exer
in construct validation and the generation of a set of research findings.

Construct validation can be addressed by the development of a systematic set of

operational variables together with justification for using the measures selected (Yin

1989: 97). Three further strategies involve the use of multiple sources of evidence, t

establishment of a 'chain of evidence' and having draft reports reviewed by participan

By drawing on several sources of data the researcher is able to develop converging line
of inquiry, "a process of triangulation Thus, any finding or conclusion in a case

study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several diff
sources of information, following a corroboratory mode" (p 97). With respect to
employing both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection, Bryman (1989:
175-176) proposes that "one of the most obvious advantages of deploying the two in
tandem is to check the validity of findings using very different approaches to data
collection" (p 175). This approach is favoured also by Campbell and Fiske (1959) and
by Crabtree and Miller (1992: 177) who maintain that the use of multiple data sources
concerning given phenomena is growing in popularity among health scientists who
favour "increased humility about the indubitability of any proposition and seek truth
instead more pragmatically in the coherence among a wide variety of elements of
reasoning" (p 177).

External validity is concerned with the researcher's ability to generalise the finding

the entire study to other samples and settings. However, "no-one believes that a single
case can be representative of a wider population" (Bryman, 1989: 172). Hence, case
study research does not seek to "infer findings from a sample to a population, but to

engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance" (p 172). Similarly, Yin (198
43) proposes that case study research relies on analytic generalisation rather that

statistical generalisation as applies with surveys. Hence, case study research "should

evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that are generated" (p
128

172). B y drawing on information arising from more than one case to examine
similarities and variance with predicted patterns the researcher can address, to some
extent, the issue of external validity.

Internal validity is concerned with establishing causal links, whereby certain conditio

are shown to lead to other conditions (Yin, 1989: 50). A study that is internally valid

means that "any effects/changes or lack thereof in the dependent variable can be direc
attributed to the manipulation of the independent variable" (Yin, 1989: 50). This type
analysis is rarely possible in case study research.

Veney and Kaluzny (1989) define pattern matching as a process in which "empirically
based patterns are compared with predicted patterns, and data from each case are

assessed to determine if they support a set of theoretical propositions that are formu

as questions. If the case information matches the conceptualisation, then internal vali
is enhanced; the greater the number that match the conceptualisation, the greater the
external validity" (p 139). Living with some concerns about the external validity of
findings may be "a necessary cost of providing new insight in as yet incompletely
documented management processes in complex organisations" (Burgelman, 1985:142).

Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure (Bryman, 1989: 55) and it has two

elements, namely, external reliability and internal reliability. The first element conc
the extent to which a measure is consistent over time. The second element concerns the

internal consistency of a measure and is particularly important when using multiple-it
measures which are aggregated to produce a single measure such as may apply when
measuring job satisfaction (Bryman, 1989: 56-57). Strategies useful in case study

research for addressing issues of external reliability include the development of an o
study protocol, the systematic management of data collected from multiple sources and

the generation of reports at critical stages of the data gathering process (Yin, 1989:
60). The case study protocol should include the procedures and general rules to be
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followed, together with the data collection instruments to be used. Yin considers the use
of a protocol essential when more than one case is involved.

Because case study research requires "continuous interaction between the theoretical
issues being studied and the data being collected" (Yin, 1989: 62), this approach to
research is more demanding than the experiment and the survey. For these reasons Yin
maintains that data collection benefits from an experienced researcher since only the

experienced researcher is able to recognise opportunities for gaining new insights whil

avoiding the pitfalls of potentially biased procedures when following new opportunities

Variance analysis using survey research
Kaluzny and Zuckerman (1992) describe two approaches for researching alliances,
namely, variance analysis and process analysis. The variance analysis "focuses on

performance and identifies variables that account for variations in performance" (p 479

With this approach the challenge is to describe as much variation as possible with resp
to the selected performance indicators with little need to examine the sequencing of
events. Process analysis, on the other hand, places emphasis on the sequencing of
events by assessing the "conditions, events, or stages in the overall development or
adoption process rather than simply assessing change in some measure of performance"
(P 479).

Alliances can be studied at the level of the alliance, or at the level of the organisat

involved in alliance, or at the level of the individuals in alliance. Issues suitable f
analysis using a variance approach include the governance and reward structures that
characterise relationships between organisations, such as hospitals and medical firms
(Kaluzny and Zuckerman, 1992). These researchers predict that alliance outcomes and

implementation are associated with compliance with institutionalised "beliefs, norms, a
rules within which organisations are embedded" (p 481).
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Survey research provides opportunity to add objectivity to case study research through

the inclusion of probability sampling and quantitative analysis (Bryman, 1989: 175-177

The survey is useful for describing the "incidence and prevalence of phenomena" (Yin,
1989: 18) or when a researcher wishes to make a predictive statement about certain
outcomes. Survey is an appropriate method of data collection in combination with
qualitative methods for the present study.

1. Sample selection

Survey research requires a sample which is representative of the population of intere

To gain a representative sample the researcher usually employs a probability (or rand

sampling strategy, "wherein each unit of the population has a known chance of inclusi
in the sample" (Bryman, 1989: 107). Random sampling helps in overcoming problems

associated with selection bias, though the researcher can never totally avoid samplin
error. An acceptable approach to random sample generation is the stratified random

sample, in which "the population is divided into strata, and simple random samples ar
taken from each stratum" (Bryman, 1989: 108).

Mitchell (1985), observes that only 17 per cent of published articles concerning
organisational research were based on random samples, hence, most organisational
survey research uses convenience samples, that is, one which "was available to the
researcher" (Bryman, 1989: 113). As a result, significance testing in organisational

research is often inappropriate since it is based on observations arising from conven
samples. Bryman (1989: 114) proposes that tests of significance should only be
employed where random sampling has been conducted.

2. Sample size

Determining sample size needed to achieve specific research objectives is one of the

important procedures of research design. The usual steps to reach an estimation of th
appropriate sample size with respect to testing hypotheses are 1) clearly state the
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research objective which involves the testing of an hypothesis about a parameter or set of
parameters, 2) estimate the variability of the response variable, 3) define the null
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, 4) determine a suitable significance level
power for the statistical test, and 5) compute the sample size required (Marks, 1982).

organisational research there are few guidelines for estimating the appropriate sample
size. Each organisation is likely to differ in important respects from all others and
measures are frequently qualitative rather than quantitative. In addition, the focus
constantly moves between the organisation and the organisation members who are the
source of data. However, the ground rules for research provide a departure point. For
instance, it is generally accepted that the bigger the estimated difference in mi-ni2

smaller the required sample size, conversely the smaller the estimated variance the la
the sample required and the more heterogeneous the population the larger the sample

required. Additionally, it is generally agreed that a larger sample is more likely to b

representative. On the other hand, Bryman (1989) cautions that "there is a tendency for

larger samples to yield increasingly small increments in accuracy" (p 111). Sample size

is also dependent, to some extent, on the type of statistical calculation to be perfor

Cross-tabulations, for instance, may require a larger sample to avoid unacceptably sma
cell numbers. Sample size estimation also depends to some extent on estimated response

rate. If there are grounds for believing the response rate will be poor, then selection
larger sample would be wise (Bryman, 1989: 111).

3. Addressing issues of selection bias

Even with random sampling, bias may still occur due to inaccuracies in the sampling
frame and failure of sufficient units to respond. Sampling frame bias can be largely
overcome by having access to an accurate list of all possible units in the population.
However, such records may be beyond the control of the researcher.

Non-response bias concerns the extent to which the respective units choose to particip
in the study. Bryman (1989: 112) and Babbie (1986: 223) observe that interviews tend
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to produce lower levels of non-response bias than self-administered questionnaires.
Babbie (1986) maintains that a "properly designed interview survey ought to achieve a
completion rate of at least 80 to 85 per cent" (p 223). On the other hand, Babbie (1986:

221) accepts a response rate of 50 per cent as adequate for a mailed survey, a response o
60 per cent is good while a response of 70 per cent or more is very good. Following an
analysis of techniques to increase questionnaire return rates, Dillman (1978) recommends
attention to all aspects of survey administration. Included among his recommendations

are attention to the form of the questions, attention to instrument presentation, and a l

informing participants of the purpose of the study, the people involved, how participants
have been selected, why it is important for them to participate, and assuring that
responses will remain confidential to the researchers. In addition, he recommends the
provision of means for the easy return of the completed questionnaire, the efficient
administration of the mailing procedures, and the systematic mailing of reminder
postcards or letters (Dillman, 1978). As a result Dillman reports response rates from
mailed surveys between 50 per cent and 70 per cent.
4. Enhancing validity and reliability

The reliability of survey measures can be tested statistically. For example, the external

reliability of the instrument can be assessed using the test-retest method with particip

asked to complete the same questionnaire on two separate occasions involving an interval
of several weeks to several months (Bryman, 1989: 55). Spearman's rank-order

correlation coefficient or the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient are usuall
employed to estimate the external reliability of the study instrument. Bryman (1989)
maintains that a correlation of between 0.53 and 0.63 is "basically indicative of a

questionnaire with fairly good external reliability" (p 55). The internal reliability or
consistency of a study measure can be examined using Cronbach's Alpha in which the
"average of all possible split-half correlation coefficients is computed" (Bryman, 1989:
55) for all items of an index.
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The issue of validity concerns whether a measure "relates to the concept that it is claimed
to measure" (Bryman, 1989: 57). External validity has several dimensions, among
which is "face validity". Face validity concerns the match between the measure, or

question being asked, and the concept it addresses. Because the researcher defines the

variables for inclusion in the survey there is the possibility that the variables wil
little relevance to respondents, or even to the social phenomena of interest. One

approach to improving face validity is to have a panel of experts check the content an
comprehensibility of the measures (Bryman, 1989: 58). A further dimension of validity

is criterion validity, which involves the researcher making connections between a giv
measure and a relevant criterion. For example, one would expect a high correlation
between the score a driver achieves in a written driving test and how well they drive
(Babbie, 1986: 112).

Internal validity requires consideration in survey research because data tends to be

collected at a single point in time. Experimental designs, on the other hand, frequent
involve repeated measures over time to observe whether a particular cause precedes an
effect of some kind. That is to say, in an experiment, the researcher manipulates the

variables of interest. By contrast, the survey researcher describes relationships in a
cross-sectional design that throws light on associations between variables. Internal
validity of data may be important in terms of determining whether an observed

relationship is a real one (Bryman, 1989: 119). For example, a spurious association ma
emerge between two variables as a result of them being associated with a third,
intervening variable. One way of dealing with the problem is to impose a "post hoc"
measure of control. However, this process can become endless and fruitless and in the
final analysis the post hoc "imposition of control is a poor approximation" (Bryman,

1989: 122). Threats to internal validity arising from survey design are therefore best
managed by multiple data gathering by various approaches to ensure that reported

relationships are supported, wherever possible, by more than one source of information
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5. M e a s u r i n g satisfaction

Satisfaction as a unit of analysis has received considerable attention from social

researchers in recent times (Wilkin, Hallam et al., 1992: 230). Satisfaction is a compl
concept - a mixture of perceived need, expectations concerning a particular phenomenon
and experience (Wilkin, Hallam et al., 1992: 230). The concept of satisfaction is
examined more fully in Chapter 4. At this point the issue to be addressed is the
measurement of satisfaction.

Satisfaction is frequently measured in organisational research by the use of the Likert

(1952) scale, a visual analogue "in which the rater expresses an opinion by rating his/
agreement with a series of statements" (Streiner and Norman, 1991: 26). The Likert
Scale usually labels each interval within the scale and aims to provide balance between
options (eg. strongly agree - strongly disagree). Likert scales may employ between five

and ten categories along the scale. Number of categories within a given scale is a matt

of importance since reliability of the instrument is related to number of scale options
with greater reliability associated with more categories. For example, the loss in
reliability from 10 categories to 7 categories is marginal. However, there is a 12 per
loss in using a 5 point scale and a 35 per cent loss in using a 2 category scale. Other
considerations are whether the scale should contain an even or odd number of categories
and whether the order of successive question responses should change. The choice is
obviously up to the researcher. However, the researcher may wish to force the
respondent to make a choice by using an even number of categories, thereby, denying
the respondent choice of the middle category. Concerning changing the order of
successive questions, some respondents may not realise the order has changed, and they
may provide inaccurate data (Streiner and Norman (1991: 28).

Likert scales are frequently the device by which multiple measures are obtained which

can then be aggregated to provide an overall score. It seems that the measurement of job
satisfaction "is one of those rare instances in which simplicity wins out over
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complexity", (p 184) since there is strong evidence that a global measure of satisfaction
is more valid than detailed measures using a range of indicators (Robbins, 1993: 184).
Of further relevance to this thesis is the analysis of data gained from Likert scales.
Considerable debate surrounds this issue with arguments ranging from two extreme
positions. One position holds that Likert scales represent ordinal data and should be

analysed accordingly while others maintain that "the numbers themselves are interval (
1,2,....,7) and can be manipulated as interval data regardless of their relationship
underlying property being assessed" (p 28). Streiner and Norman (1991: 29) conclude
that "under most circumstances, unless the distribution of scores is severely skewed,

can analyse data from rating scales as if they were interval without introducing severe
bias" (p 29).
6. Common criticisms of surveys

Surveys are frequently criticised for being superficial, even artificial, because they

restrictions on respondents. This situation arises because it is the researcher who se
the parameters of interest rather than the respondent. Furthermore, it is argued that

survey research gives little attention to contextual matters or to how the variables of
interest relate to other organisational phenomena (Bryman, 1989: 135). Surveys are

certainly of little use in addressing "why" questions, for which qualitative approache
data collection are superior (Gummesson, 1991). On the other hand, survey can provide
invaluable information on "how" questions in an economical fashion.

Qualitative approaches to data collection
Data collection methods associated with case study research include "documentation,

archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physica
artefacts" (Yin, 1989: 85). To this list Bryman (1989: 170-187) adds the collection of

data by survey. The use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods i
single study has several advantages (Bryman, 1898: 176). First, it provides for the

cross-checking of data gained through the use of different methods and, secondly, it h
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the potential to "allow access to different levels of reality" (Bryman, 1989: 176). The
planning process in research which uses both approaches should give consideration to
the type of data best gained by each approach. Having explored the strengths and
weaknesses of case study design and survey research, attention is n o w focused on the
collection of qualitative data.

1. Changing paradigms: from positivism to hermeneutics
Organisational researchers are confronted with three challenges. The first is gaining
access to real world data. Without good access, no matter h o w rigorous the statistical
calculations, the researcher is in danger of reporting inaccurately. The second challenge,
concerns "pre-understanding",

that is, the researcher needs to have a good

understanding of the specific problem and the social environment before starting a study
in order to gain relevant data and m a k e sound judgements w h e n interpreting the findings.
Thirdly, the researcher needs to be aware of the value system underpinning their
approach to research. For example, researchers supporting a quantitative approach to
research tend to favour positivistic values while those favouring a qualitative approach
lean towards a hermeneutic perspective.

G u m m e s s o n (1991) maintains that

"hermeneutics represents a reaction against the awkward rigidity's of positivism in
relation to certain types of problems in the social field. Instead of trying to explain causal
relationships by means of objective 'facts' and statistical analyses, hermeneutics uses a
more personal interpretive process in order to 'understand reality'" (p 152). Consistent
with these values, qualitative researchers have developed approaches to data collection
which are more personal than surveys and the collection of data from documents and
archives. O f particular relevance to this thesis are the use of semi-structured and
structured interviews.
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2. Interviewing

Type of interview is distinguished by three questions to which answers are sought,
namely, "Who?", "How?" and "About what?" "Who" questions, will determine whether

the interviewing involves individuals or groups. Interviews with individuals frequentl

provide greater depth about a topic whereas interviews with groups "frequently genera
greater breadth of information" (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 16). "How" questions,

determine the degree to which the interview is structured. For example, the interviewe
may need to get information on one or more broad topics from busy senior executives
with no opportunity for re-visit. Under such conditions an unstructured interview may
be most appropriate in which the interviewer determines the topic area but the person
being interviewed largely directs the "conversation" (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 16).

Structured interviews, on the other hand, tend to be more like "spoken questionnaires"
and may involve the use of paired comparisons and questionnaires (Crabtree and Miller

(1992: 16). The semi-structured interview contains elements of both these approaches t
interviewing and usually involves the use of a protocol. A consideration in choosing

interview structure is the culture of the group being interviewed and the way "the to
question is usually shared in the culture or group of interest" (Crabtree and Miller,
17). For example, nurses and family physicians may share information in the form of
"explanatory talk" (p 17) while surgeons may share information more readily in the
operating room in an apprentice-style interview (Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 17).

Psychiatrists and endocrinologists share much in common with family physicians in tha
they provide care to people living at home with long-term illness. Interviews of the

explanatory type are therefore likely to work well. However, because medical education

is heavily positivistic in ideology, it is assumed that doctors will respond well to a

interview approach which is relatively structured. The "what" question concerns the ty

of information that is being sought, whether the researcher is seeking to "intensively

plumb a particular topic" or whether the researcher is seeking to understand "cognitiv

decision-making activity underlying human choices" (Crabtree and Miller (1992: 16). In
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the case of the latter, Weller and R o m n e y (1988) suggest that the researcher consider
using a 'rank order method' or a 'pile sort' within the framework of the interview.
3. Focus groups

The focus group approach to gaining data usually involves "eight to twelve participa

who are led by a moderator in an in-depth discussion on a particular topic or concept
(McDaniel and Gates, 1993: 192). The goal of the focus group is to discover what
people have to say and why they feel the way they do about a particular issue. Group

interaction is an essential component of focus group research in which the comments o
one person stimulate a response from another. Three types of focus groups are
described by McDaniel and Gates, (1993: 194), namely, "exploratory", "clinical" and

"experiencing". Exploratory focus groups are employed in the early stages of a resea

project to test wording on a questionnaire or to assist in hypothesis generation for

testing by empirical research. Clinical focus groups, on the other hand, seek to expl
the underlying motivations which people have about a particular issue while
"experiencing focus groups" seek to establish how people think and feel about a
particular phenomenon.

The focus group may stimulate new ideas and thoughts about an issue which would not

be gained from interviews or surveys of individuals. Furthermore, the group interacti

assists to keep the thoughts and verbal responses of individuals realistic and focus

provides a great deal of information fast (McDaniel and Gates, 1993: 194). However, i

is possible for the inexperienced researcher to falsely believe that they have gaine

understanding of an issue by focus group. Hence, it is important that information ari

from focus group be used in combination with other, more representative, approaches t
gaining information.
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4. Data m a n a g e m e n t a n d analysis

Because of the large amount of data generated by qualitative research, effective data
management is vital. Hence, word processing programs are a m o n g the useful tools for
the management of qualitative data. The first step is to record the data. Coding and sort
functions can then be applied to assist in identifying similarities and dissimilarities
(Crabtree and Miller, 1992: 133). O f particular interest are behaviour patterns that all the
participants share (ie. the norms of behaviour), those participants w h o deviate from the
norm, the reasons for compliance and non-compliance with norms, and the functions that
the respective behavioural norms serve (Babbie, 1986: 253). Furthermore, with field
research "the formulation of theoretical propositions, the observation of empirical events,
and the evaluation of theory are typically all part of the on-going process' (p 254).

5. Some pitfalls of qualitative research
Pitfalls associated with qualitative research include "provincialism", the drawing of
"hasty conclusions", the "suppression of evidence" and the "false dilemma" (Babbie,
1986: 257). "Provincialism" occurs w h e n the researcher interprets observations
according to the researcher's o w n point of view. Because of the small numbers involved
in qualitative research, the researcher m a y fall into the trap of drawing hasty conclusions
concerning given phenomena. Because the researcher works so closely with the data,
he/she m a y inadvertently select data which supports their theoretical position and ignore
data which challenges that perspective. "False dilemma" concerns the selection of a
particular position from a range of options. That is, the researcher m a y inadvertently
draw a false conclusion because he/she has not considered all possible alternatives.

Summary
The research literature supports the study of alliance maintenance within the context
network of interorganisational business exchange. T h e case study design is a suitable
vehicle for a study of alliances within an interorganisational exchange network. The case
study design accommodates multiple levels of analysis and gains validity through
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establishing a chain of converging evidence. Consistent with the development of a chain
of evidence, the case study design provides for the collection of data from multiple
sources using quantitative and qualitative methods, both obtrusive and unobtrusive.
Case study research requires prior decisions concerning the number of cases to be
studied, the selection of cases, defining the boundary of the network of organisations
that constitute the case and strategies for enhancing validity and reliability.

Variance analysis based on survey research provides a suitable design for the

examination of factors maintaining alliances because it allows for quantitative analysis
relationships between variables. The survey method has been described together with
some of the challenges applying to this method of data collection, including issues in
selecting a sample, in determining appropriate sample size, strategies for minimising

selection bias and enhancing the reliability and validity of the survey instrument and t

measurement of satisfaction. Surveys are frequently criticised for sacrificing quality a
richness of data for reliability. To overcome this potential difficulty two qualitative
approaches to data collection have been described together with research management
issues associated with undertaking qualitative research, including the adoption of a
research paradigm appropriate to qualitative approaches and the management and analysis
of data.
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSING ALLIANCES WITHIN
REGIONAL NETWORKS
"The key to success in any collaboration must be to give added benefits to both parties on an
equitable basis" (Bruce, Leverick et al., 1995: 42).

The principle that any activity is maintained by its rewarding consequences, first
formulated by Thorndike (1935) and Skinner (1938), has become so ingrained in our
understanding of what determines continuity of activity as to sound obvious.
Nevertheless, the application of this principle to organisational cooperation has only been
explored in the last two decades. Thus Bruce, Leverick et al., (1995) reaffirm that
organisations have a keen eye to "benefits", or perceived rewarding outcomes from
collaboration. Smith, Carroll et al., (1995) maintain that "cooperation will not continue
if its benefits do not equal or exceed its costs" (p 17). This principle underpins
exchange theory and, therefore, the conceptual foundation of this thesis. Furthermore,
according to exchange theory, benefits m a y be measured either in terms of increased
"reward" or reduced "costs". Hence, "organisations seek to form that type of exchange
relationship which involves the least cost to the organisation in loss of autonomy and
power" (Cook, 1977: 74).

In this Chapter, exchange theory, network analysis, coordination theory and
interorganisational knowledge are used to develop a theoretical framework for a study of
alliance maintenance. Nine assumptions underpin the framework and four propositions
are developed. In addition, seven operational hypotheses are formulated to facilitate the
collection and analysis of quantitative data and four questions are outlined to guide the
collection of qualitative data. The research design and methodology is presented in
Chapter 5.
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This Chapter first introduces the theoretical framework and then defines the key variables
and four propositions and argues their importance to the framework. Finally, the
practical and theoretical contribution of the framework is discussed.

A SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF
ALLIANCE MAINTENANCE
The literature provides insights into the costs and benefits of interorganisational

cooperation and the factors that influence the cost-benefit ratio for participants. What
the discipline examining the issue, whatever the industry involved, whatever the size of
the alliance or network, a common set of factors emerges. Among the expected benefits

of interorganisational cooperation are reduction in uncertainty, economic gain, improved

customer satisfaction, access to additional expertise and improved worker confidence and
satisfaction. Costs associated with interorganisational cooperation include redirecting
resources to manage the relationship, fear of exploitation, and loss of autonomy and
control. While the two sectors have much in common, Figure 3 (p 89) indicates that
public sector and private sector organisations have different expectations as to the

benefits of alliance. For example, among the important expected benefits of alliances for
private sector organisations is reduction in uncertainty and revenue generation through
adaptive efficiency and increased market share (Alter and Hage, 1993). Public sector

organisations, on the other hand, expect alliances to result in cost reduction through t
pooling of resources and improved coordination.

Figure 3 also identifies actions that the partners can take to enhance the benefits and
reduce the costs of interorganisational cooperation. Among the important factors
enhancing the benefits of cooperation are careful choice of partner, the development of
trust based on the partners delivering as expected and not seeking to exploit the

relationship, frequent communications and a long term orientation with respect to judgin
the fairness of the distribution of costs and benefits among alliance partners. However,

having a set of guidelines is one thing; taking action to maintain the alliance is anothe
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There is unequivocal evidence in the literature that the environment in which an industry

operates has a significant influence on an organisation's decision to enter a coopera
arrangement with other organisations. The more uncertain the environment the more
likely that organisations must depend upon others for essential resources (Robbins,
1993; Turner, 1991; Starkweather and Cook, 1988; Argote, 1982; Van de Ven, Delbecq,
and Koenig, 1976; Aldrich, 1974; Thompson, 1967; Levine and White, 1961). In
addition, differentiation within an industry increases the need for exchange among

organisations (Pfeffer, 1978). Because the health industry in Australia faces substant
resource constraints and it has a high degree of specialisation this thesis is based
assumption that alliances among private sector organisations in this industry emerge
because of a need to reduce uncertainty associated with resource dependency and

increasing differentiation associated with increases in the complexity of the tasks t

addressed. On the other hand, public sector driven alliances emerge because of the ne
to reduce costs and the desire to improve coordination (Thompson, 1967; Zajac and
D'Aunno, 1994).

The review of the literature emphasises the temporal nature of interorganisational
cooperation. Kanter (1989b) and Zajac and D'Dunno (1994) have described the stages

of interorganisational cooperation from early negotiations to mature relationship and
possibly, termination. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) have developed an interpersonal,
process model for analysing how interorganisational relationships develop over time,
based on the assumption that cooperation leads to commitment. They argue that the
maintenance of an interorganisational relationship is guided by a "simple set of

heuristic's .... based on assumptions that if parties can negotiate minimal, congruen
expectations for a cooperative relationship, they will make commitments to an initial

course of action. If these commitments are executed in an efficient and equitable man
they will continue with or expand their mutual commitments. If these commitments are

not executed in an efficient and equitable manner, the parties will initiate correcti
measures by either renegotiating or reducing their commitments to cooperate.
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Underlying these adjustments is a more complicated set of informal, social-psychological
dynamics which explain h o w and w h y cooperative interorganisational relationships
evolve through repetitive sequences of formal negotiation, commitment, and execution
stages or events" (p 99).

Anderson, Hakansson et al., (1994) go further and propose that cooperation causes
commitment. This thesis maintains that this is not necessarily the case in situations in
which alliance partners have opportunity to change partners as it does not take into
account the continuing autonomy of the partners. Ring and V a n de V e n (1994) claim
that interorganisational relationships are maintained "not because they achieve stability,
but because they maintain balance: balance between formal and informal processes" (p
112). These formal and informal processes involve negotiations and the development of
trust, grounded in experiences which meet the respective partners' expectations of
"norms of equity and efficiency" (p 99). These researchers contend that in the early
stage of an alliance, perceptions of equity and fair dealing are closely associated with
expectations about h o w people should behave in a given role. However, over time, as
the relationship develops personal liking and interactions become important and the
nature of the contract binding, the partners m o v e from an emphasis on the legal contract
to a reliance on a psychological contract. The proposition that maintenance of
interorganisational cooperation involves trust and judgements about fair dealing seems
unassailable. This is the very "nuts and bolts" of exchange theory.

The systems framework developed as part of this thesis is drawn, to some extent, from
Ring and V a n de V e n (1994). The construct depicted in Figure 5, proposes that the
actions of the various parties, in three key domains, either increase or decrease the
likelihood of other components occurring. In other words, this framework depicts a
system in which the key variables are interdependent; a characteristic which Parsons and
Shils (1976) maintain is a fundamental property of a system. "Interdependence consists
in the existence of determinate relationships a m o n g the parts or variables as contrasted
with 'randomness' or variability. In other words, interdependence is order in the
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relationship a m o n g the components which enter the system. Furthermore, this order
must have a tendency to self-maintenance, which is very generally expressed in the

concept of equilibrium" (p 107). In brief, my systems framework proposes that, within a
regional network, in which the parties voluntarily choose with whom to exchange, a

change in satisfaction with an exchange relationship results in a change in the degree

organisational interdependence among the actors. In turn, this has the effect of changi

the actor's compliance with norms of practice associated with the exchange relationshi
As a consequence, the rewards gained from the exchange relationship rise or fall, and,
they fall, when the costs outweigh the benefits, the relationship is likely to end.
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Figure 5: A systems framework for analysing alliance maintenance
within a regional network
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Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to select collaborators:
P2: actor satisfaction is positively associated with organisational interdependence;
P3: degree of organisational interdependence is positively associated with compliance by the
partners with norms of practice;
P4: compliance with agreed norms of practice is positively associated with satisfaction with
an exchange relation.
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Essential to m y theoretical framework (Figure 5), are four propositions which are
summarised here while supporting evidence is provided below following a discussion of

the variables. First it is proposed, that within a regional network in which the partie

have the opportunity to select collaborators, degree of alliance activity is positivel

associated with organisational interdependence. Secondly, it is proposed that degree o
organisational interdependence increases as actor satisfaction with an exchange

relationship increases. Organisational interdependence is, to some extent, a perceptio
and to some extent a set of behaviours. For example, a prime measure of
interdependence is the frequency of contact, or exchanges, between individuals or
organisations. Thirdly, it is proposed that degree of organisational interdependence
influences compliance with norms of practice. It can be argued that perceptions of

interdependence dispose individual or organisation A to make contact with B in order to

access the resources or expertise or experience that B possesses. This is not primaril

friendly contact but a business interaction designed to reduce need and enhance profit
these early exchange experiences prove rewarding, both economically and socially, the
number of exchanges is likely to increase between A and B. At the same time, the
number of exchanges that B has with C may decrease as a consequence of the growing
interdependence that has developed between A and B. Consequently, the exchange

relationship becomes increasingly important to both parties and each is likely to abid

the norms of practice that are associated with the relationship. Finally, it is propos
strong links emerge among cooperating parties built upon compliance with expected
norms of practice and positive assessments (or satisfaction).

The interorganisational literature indicates that situational factors influence the de
collaborate, the degree to which organisations depend upon one another (Levine and
White, 1961), the governance structures employed to manage transactions (Williamson,
1975 & 1992; Powell, 1990), and the type of coordination processes used to manage
cooperation (Aldrich and Whetton, 1981; Alter and Hage, 1993; Zajac and D'Aunno,
1994). Because of the potential impact of situational factors on interorganisational
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cooperation, this thesis is based on the assumption that alliance maintenance is most
appropriately studied in the context of the network of relationships within which alliances
are embedded

(Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992; Emerson, 1972).

KEY VARIABLES
Three variables are essential to my systems framework, namely, "actor satisfaction with
exchange relations", "degree of organisational interdependence", and "compliance with
norms of practice". Each of these variables was identified during the early stages of the
research by key stakeholders as important to alliance maintenance. It was noteworthy,
however, that analysis of the literature revealed little empirical evidence that collectively
these variables are important in alliance maintenance. While a number of studies dealt
with one or other of the variables, the literature had little to say about the ways in which
these three variables are related. Three important assumptions underpin m y choice of
variables, namely:
1) that satisfaction is a suitable measure at a given time of an individual's and an
organisation's judgements as to whether, and to what extent, the benefits of
interorganisational cooperation outweigh the costs;
2) that volume of exchange between members of a regional network is a suitable
measure of interorganisational interdependence;
3) that maintenance of successful exchange relationships between actors within
industry specific networks is governed by norms ofpractice. Within a regional
network, norms ofpractice incorporate behaviours unique to the members of the
workforce represented. For example, in the health industry, norms ofpractice
governing exchanges between doctors, nurses, and allied health professionals
apply.

Each variable is now defined and arguments put forward as to why it should be part of
the systems framework.
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Actor satisfaction with exchange relations

While actions may be a far more reliable measure of an actor's response to the actions o

another (Homans, 1974: 225-240), Parson and Shils (1976), maintain that "satisfaction is

an affective state which is likely to manifest itself 'objectively' as well as subjecti
is no more difficult to diagnose than anxiety or anger, and, in my opinion, should be
thoroughly investigated, since it is the most refined sign that we have of whether need
processes are being obstructed, advancing without friction, or attaining their aim, or

cessation of action, whether the effect did in fact appease the need" (p 456). By linkin
satisfaction with perceived need fulfilment, Parson and Shils (1976) indicate that
satisfaction can be an early indicator of successful adaptation with respect to
interorganisational cooperation.

Satisfaction has two kinds of determinants, "satisfiers" and "dissatisfiers" (Homans,
1974; Morse, 1953; Herzberg, Mausner et al., 1956). A dissatisfier is a condition which
promotes dissatisfaction when it is not present (eg. a poor environment in which to
work). However, when present, it does not lead to increased levels of satisfaction.
Parson and Shils (1976: 457) maintain that satisfaction associated with the removal of

dissatisfiers is specific to the object of dissatisfaction. For example, "a certain kin

dissatisfaction (eg. fullness of the bladder) cannot be relieved by any kind of satisfa
(eg. congenial discourse)" (p 457). The absence of a suitable referral letter could be
considered to be a dissatisfier to a consultant in exchanges with a generalist medical

"Satisfiers", on the other hand, are those factors which have intrinsic rewards for the
individual or organisation (Homans, 1974; Herzberg, Mausner et al., 1956). For
example, an opportunity to interact with a high status person may be intrinsically

rewarding and therefore measured satisfaction with the relationship is likely to be hig
Furthermore, a person may be satisfied with some rewards associated with an exchange
but not with others depending on the importance he/she places on particular rewards.
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In measuring an actor's satisfaction with an exchange relation, H o m a n s proposes that a
person may be able to weigh different "satisfaction's together so as to reach some
judgement about his/her overall satisfaction" (Homans, 1974: 227). He also maintains
that in exchange relations, people assess others according to what a person "gives in
social exchange - and what he/she gets from others" (p 225). Furthermore, in such

situations, a person "acts, if he/she can, so as to bring his/her rank on what he/she gi
at least as far as his/her rank on what he/she gets" (p 225). However, a partner to an
exchange only has direct control over what he/she gives, "since what he/she gives are
his/her own acts" (Homans, 1974: 225). With respect to what a person or group receives
from an exchange, the person can only exert indirect influence, "since what he/she gets

are the acts of others, though naturally his/her own acts may influence theirs" (p 225).
follows that in any exchange, an estimating process is going on all the time so that the
actors, individual or corporate, are able to determine, via their satisfaction with the
exchange, whether their giving and getting are in reasonable balance.

Simon (1956) suggests that personal satisfactions of an individual may be different from
the rewards sought by an organisation. For example, an individual may satisfy his/her
need for income by complying with the expectations of the organisation; the needs of

which may be different to the individual. In this respect Pfeffer (1978) claims that tho
with most influence within an organisation determine the needs which are addressed. In
addition, he contends that the priorities of influential people may not be based on the

rational needs of the organisation but on the desire of these individuals to maintain po
and influence. Perrow (1986: 121-122) maintains that when confronted with a choice,
organisations "conduct a limited search for alternatives along familiar and well-worn
paths, selecting the first satisfactory one that comes along" (p 122). In other words,

faced with options and the limits of human rationality, organisations "satisfice" (Perro
1986: 122). Furthermore, the standard of the decisions that are made are controlled by
the organisation and only to a limited extent by individuals (Perrow, 1986).

Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to suggest that "in their relationships wit
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one another, organisations appear to resemble individuals" (Adamek and Lavin, 1980:

208). On these bases it can be reasoned that satisfaction is both a personal sentiment,
also an organisational characteristic, whether consensually determined or the personal

conclusions of powerful leaders within the group. Furthermore, satisfaction is sought b

organisations as a validation that co-venturing has been successful in identifiable way

The convergence of theoretical concepts explaining organisational behaviour is incomple
at this time. Reasoning from individual action to group action tends to under-value the
importance of group influence on decision-making and the evolution of a corporate sense
of being well- or ill-served by a particular set of exchanges. Reasoning from

organisational theory to the sentiments of individual "key players" under-represents th
influence of personal judgement upon group activity. The concept of satisfaction, while
inevitably imbued with meaning derived from individual experience, has very strong
associations with group behaviour. As has been reasoned, firms or boards may delay
action until "satisficing" has been achieved or maintain exchange so long as there is
consensus on satisfactory outcomes derived from exchange. Furthermore, satisfaction
has the great advantage that it is widely understood, though on any given measure it

remains unclear to what extent an individual is responding idiosyncratically or as a te
member. These factors can only be isolated by measures based on very specific
instructions to the respondent, and, in the process, the risk to validity is increased.

Degree of organisational interdependence
There is considerable agreement that interorganisational exchanges become necessary in
circumstances of resource scarcity and differentiation within the industry (Levine and
White, 1961; and Pfeffer, 1978). Under such conditions, organisations restrict their
activities to specific functions (Levine and White, 1961). As a result, any one
organisation becomes dependent on other organisations for necessary elements. To

acquire elements necessary for goal achievement, organisations enter into exchanges wit
other organisations (Levine and White, 1961). The extent to which organisations become
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dependent on one another is largely determined by perceptions of need and perceptions of
the extent to which these needs are satisfied by exchange. Parsons and Shils (1976)
maintain that need provides the driving force for action, describing need as "the

fundamental variable, and, degree of satisfaction (hedone) the best indicator of its st
progress" (p 457). Organisational needs likely to be influenced by interorganisational
cooperation include the need to reduce uncertainty, to gain additional financial and
technical resources, and the need to extend influence (Figure 2, p 65).

The power of any one organisation within a regional network increases or decreases

according to the extent to which other organisations perceive that they need the resour
of the organisation (Marsden, 1983). The more specialised and unique the resources
controlled by a particular organisation, the more power that organisation is likely to

(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Whereas the more general, and readily available within th
network the resources controlled by a particular organisation, the less likely other
organisations will value what it has to offer, hence, the less power it will hold. It
follows, therefore, that within a regional network of exchange relations that those

organisations with the most specialised resources are likely to hold the most power. Fo

an organisation within a network to increase its power it must either increase the exte
which other organisations depend upon it or decrease the extent to which it depends on

other organisations (Emerson, 1972). However, Pfeffer (1981) notes the stability of the

distribution of power among groups implying that those with power tend to maintain thei
advantage irrespective of the actions of others. The picture which emerges from these

concepts, is a regional network of business exchanges in which the parties are constant

engaging in activities to enhance their ability to control resources vital to their sur

achievement of future ambitions. Scott (1995) suggests that alliances are a strategy us
by some organisations to extend their influence over resources, in other words, to
increase their "power".

Brass and Burkhardt (1992) found that level of activity, or volume of exchange, between
actors within a network was a useful measure of "centrality" or the "power" of a
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particular party. These researchers conclude that level of activity " m a y reflect
alternatives, and increasing alternatives increases one's power in exchange relationships"
(p 211). It follows that those parties within a regional network with relatively greater
opportunity to select alliance partners are likely to exert more power than those parties
with limited options. Furthermore, these powerful players are likely to have higher levels
of exchange with the parties with w h o m they choose to collaborate. C o o k (1977)
observes an association between level of organisational interdependence and increased
interorganisational activity. This notion is central to m y systems framework, in that to
examine the dynamics of alliance maintenance, it is first necessary to disclose the
presence of alliances.
Proposition 1:
Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity
to select collaborators, degree

of alliance activity is positively

associated with organisational interdependence.

It follows from this proposition that higher levels of alliance activity are likely to be
observed within a regional health network between generalists and specialists with a high
volume of exchange. The hypothesis which can test this relationship can be expressed in
the following form:
Hypothesis 1: Volume of exchange between generalists and specialists varies significantly with
alliance activity.

In addition to volume of exchange, Cook proposes that other useful measures for
exploring the ability to control or mediate the flow of resources within a network include
the "direction" of resource exchange and the location of an actor within the flow of
exchanges within a network. The research tasks are to describe the volume and direction
of exchanges and the location of actors within each network.

The factors directly and indirectly contributing to interdependence require an approach t
measurement which identifies core variables while respecting the limits to analysis which
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apply to any measurement method. In other words, core variables in interdependence

should be counted in some way, while contextual variables must be inferred to avoid an

unhelpful reductionism on the one hand or a superficial generalisation on the other. M
theoretical framework (Figure 5) acknowledges that situational factors need to be
considered in any study concerning continuity in interorganisational cooperation.

However, my intention is to develop a framework which facilitates an in-depth study i

the complex dynamics of alliance maintenance. I make no pretence to seek to control fo
all possible situational factors.

Two situational factors of major importance with respect to their effects on

interorganisational cooperation are the technology associated with the task and fundi
arrangements (Thompson, 1967; Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994). The technological

requirements associated with caring for a specific group of patients, such as people w

serious mental illness, are likely to have a substantial influence on 1) the objective
functions of the relevant organisations (Levine and White, 1961), 2) on the degree of

specialisation required to care for patients, hence are likely to influence the size o
network (Pfeffer, 1978), and 3) on the nature of workflow interdependence, hence, on
the methods of coordination used to manage exchanges (Thompson, 1967). According to
Thompson (1967: 51-65), the most complex form of interorganisational interdependence
is based on reciprocal interdependence. In this situation, the units have a close
connection and the exchange of inputs and outputs goes in both directions. My
theoretical model (Figure 5) seeks to identify differences in type of interdependence

associated with task technology by defining the regional network according to the typ

tasks to be addressed. This allows for differences between groups to be explored on th
basis of work-flow associated with medical condition. The research task to describe

differences in 1) the pattern of exchange between members of a regional network, and 2
the governance of exchanges associated with medical condition.

Similarly, funding arrangements which are largely externally determined influence the
reason for, and expected outcomes of, alliance formation and the nature of resource
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interdependence (Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994). T w o types of funding are of importance in
this study, namely, organisations which are remunerated on a fee-for-service basis

(private sector small business generalists and specialists) and organisations in the pu

sector that receive a fixed annual budget from the regional health authority (public se
organisations). Private sector organisations may hold the expectation that the alliance

will result in maintenance or enhancement of revenue generation while cooperating publi
sector organisations may expect cooperation to result in cost savings. In the first

instance, the nature of organisational interdependence is clearly reciprocal and satisf

with the relationship will be based on the extent to which revenue is generated, togethe
with sentiments about fairness of the distribution of costs and benefits. In the second

instance, the nature of the interdependence is based on the pooling of resources and the
outcomes will be judged accordingly. Similarly, the location of a regional network is
likely to influence the expected outcomes of alliances. For example, member

organisations of a resource-poor rural regional network may be likely to form alliances
order to pool their resources, while members of a city based network may be motivated
by the uncertainty created by competition. My framework (Figure 5) provides
opportunity to observe differences based on type of interdependence associated with
funding arrangements and geographic location. The research task is to explore how

alliances involving public sector and private sector organisations differ from alliance

involving only private sector organisations. Similarly, to describe differences associa
with geographic location.

Compliance with norms of practice

The literature provides insight into behaviours associated with enhancing the rewards o
interorganisational cooperation and behaviours associated with increasing the costs
(Figure 3; p 89). The consistency with which certain sets of behaviours are associated

with continuity in alliance suggests that established alliances are governed by norms of
practice expressed by activities to improve coordination (Kaluzny, Zuckerman et al.,
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1995; Kanter, 1994; Limerick and Cunnington, 1993) and the maintenance of trust
(Gulati, 1995; Ganesan, 1994; Granovetter, 1985).

Norms of practice are relatively consistent patterns of behaviour which emerge through
exchange between organisations to enable the partners in alliance to achieve their own
goals and meet the expectations of other organisation(s) (Larson, 1992). "Norms"

implies stability and reliability of organisational activity, such that both parties k
is expected/to expect in a given exchange. Norms may be overtly expressed in
agreements or protocols or may be covert. If covert, a norm can be inferred when each

organisation in alliance gives a concordant account of expected activities of all part
can be reasoned that "norming" processes accompany, and, perhaps, precede, the
emergence of trust.

Powell (1990) proposes that networks are an alternative form of organisation with a
distinct approach to governance characterised by a "heavy reliance on reciprocity,
collaboration, complementary interdependence, a reputation and relationship basis for
communication, and an informal climate oriented toward mutual gain" (p 77). Larson

(1992) found that organisations engaged in relatively stable relationships "were gover

in important ways by social controls arising from norms of trust and reciprocity" (p 98
Furthermore, Larson claims that "governance was explained in large part by
understanding the subtle control of interdependent and self-regulated players engaged
and committed to, mutual gains" (p 98). Thus, Larson raises the prospect of networks
being governed, to a large extent, by informal social "norms". Achrol (1991) proposes
that norms are particularly important in systems such as networks where the "goals are
open-ended and long term" (p 89). Furthermore, "one of the most important norms for
maintaining system compatibility is 'sharing' as opposed to 'dividing' benefits and
burdens" (p 89).

The research tasks to be addressed are to 1) define the norms of practice that govern

alliances involving generalists and specialists in the health industry, and 2) describ
157

differences in the governance of alliances involving small business generalists and
specialists and alliances involving small business generalists and public sector health
agencies.

A perception of fairness in the sharing of costs and benefits is consistently identifie
the literature as an essential requirement for alliance maintenance. Fairness is a perception
or judgement arrived at by an individual or a group on the basis of the delivery of a set of
expected behaviours, or norms. If the expected behaviour is not maintained, an
organisation will conclude that the norms have been violated. W h e r e norms of practice
are violated, alliance partners are likely to distrust one-another and believe that they are
being unfairly dealt with. Ganesan (1994) found that in buyer-seller partnerships,
delivering as expected in terms of expertise and other measures of performance was
associated with the development of trust. This should be contrasted, for instance, with
perceptions of the partner's good-intentions, which do not correlate with trust. Gulati
(1995) found that trust develops over time supporting the hypothesis that "familiarity
breeds trust" (p 105). Furthermore, over time, "firms appear to substitute trust for
contractual safeguards in their repeated alliance" (p 105), suggesting that trust influences
methods of coordination. However, for trust to develop, timely feedback as to the
actions of alliance partners, a frequent norm of practice, must be maintained.

According to exchange theory, feedback concerning the outcomes of an exchange is an
essential element in the realisation of rewards. Furthermore, H o m a n s (1974) proposes
that "the shorter the interval of time between the action and the reward, the more likely the
person is to repeat it" (p 17). Additional support concerning the importance of feedback
comes from coordination theory (Mintzberg, 1983; Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967).
According to coordination theory, mutual adjustment is the most appropriate method of
coordination for situations involving reciprocal workflow interdependence and complex
problem-solving. Feedback is central to effective coordination by mutual adjustment
(Thompson, 1967) and is an essential component of any self-maintaining system. It is
clear that feedback by a variety of communication channels is an activity which links
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interdependence, satisfaction and norms of practice. T h e most direct and influential
feedback is information on the costs and benefits of exchange activity related to the
productive goals of the organisation. In addition, verbal feedback strengthens exchange
activity by providing information on alliance partner perceptions, plans and future
intentions. Feedback approaches and technologies are an important aspect of alliance
maintenance.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES
Having identified the variables important to my framework, I now discuss the
relationships between these variables and develop propositions against which empirical
findings can be examined. In addition, operational hypotheses are developed which draw
on examples from regional health care delivery networks as outlined in the relevant
section in the literature review. These hypotheses provide a basis for analysing
quantitative data gained by survey from two randomly selected samples of general

practitioners representing two regional networks with different task-technologies withi
the same industry environment. While the organisations of relevance have been described
in the previous chapter, they are introduced again for purposes of clarity.

Corporate actors of relevance to this thesis include small business general practitione
firms, small business medical specialist firms, and public sector specialist hospital

departments and health agencies staffed in the main by allied health professionals. Sma

business general practitioner firms provide services at the primary care level and trea

wide range of conditions, including people with diabetes mellitus and people with mental

illness. The role of the general practitioner as "gatekeeper" for specialists services i
legitimated under Medicare legislation and patient reimbursement payments. The

objectives of the general practitioner firm are to generate sufficient revenue to survi
thrive. Under a fee-for-service payment system, this objective assumes the maintenance
of a viable patient load. The latter is perceived by general practitioners as being
dependent on satisfying the customer, maintaining control over his/her domain, having
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access to appropriate specialist support, and having specialists return patients (Harris,
1992b: 177). A s implied by their generalist role, general practitioner firms operate within
several networks as defined by patient condition; the general practitioner is sometimes
described as being "all things to all people".

Most small business medical specialists receive a large part of their funding on a fee-forservice basis. Hence, like general practitioners their goal is to maintain a viable patient
load through establishing good working relationships with general practitioners and
through satisfying their customers (Harris, 1992b: 183). However, medical specialists
m a y also receive referrals from hospital outpatient departments and from specialist public
sector health agencies (Figure 4, p 104). Medical specialist firms of interest in this thesis
are those staffed by psychiatrists, and those staffed by physicians with specialist expertise
in endocrinology.

Public sector specialist hospital units and health agencies are lodged within the
bureaucracy of the regional health authority. T h e objectives of these authorities are to
stay within budget, to provide adequate and safe services for the people within their
region and to attract and maintain competent staff (Harris, 1992b: 187). Hence, the
objectives of the specialist units and agencies are to a large extent determined by the
regional authority and reflect the broad aims of the authority. They must live within an
allocated budget. Furthermore, their survival depends on being seen to provide a
specialty service which the population needs and which enhances the prestige of the
health authority. This thesis is based on the assumption that the extent to which public
sector agencies are involved in exchange relations with small business generalist and
specialist firms depends on the extent to which they are perceived as a scarce and valued
resource and the extent to which key decision-makers of the health authority perceive
cooperation to be important (Pfeffer, 1978).

160

Satisfaction and organisational interdependence
"For all actions taken by persons, the more often a particular action of a person is rewarded, the
more likely the person is to perform that action" Homans, 1974: 16).

Homans' "success proposition", (above), states that "an increasing frequency of reward
leads to an increasing frequency of action. It is obvious that such an increase cannot go
on indefinitely. It has its built-in limits" (p 17). In addition, this proposition implies that
the less often an action is rewarded, the less often it is repeated. Furthermore, Homans'
"stimulus proposition" holds that "if in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus (eg
request for assistance), or set of stimuli, has been the occasion on which a person's
action has been rewarded, the more similar the present stimuli are to the past ones, the
more likely the person is to perform the action or some similar action, n o w " (p 22-23).
Hence, exchange theory predicts that continuity in interorganisational cooperation is
based on the rewarding consequences of alliance exchanges. Early and ongoing data on
outcomes from alliance activity form the basis of judgements by the actors as to the costs
and benefits of past actions (Bruce et al., 1995; Smith, Carroll et al., 1995; Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993). These researchers also emphasise the importance of having a long
term perspective with respect to assessing symmetry, or fairness, in the distribution of
costs and benefits. W h e r e alliance partners rush to a conclusion about outcomes they are
likely to m a k e errors in judgement, since the rewards m a y only distribute equitably over
the long term.

In a study of the long-term orientations of vendor-retailer partnerships, Ganesan (1994)
observed that satisfaction of retailers and vendors with past outcomes was significantly
related to intentions to continue the partnership. Ganesan also found differences between
retailers with a short term orientation to an exchange relation and retailers with a long term
perspective. While those with a short term orientation were only concerned with
immediate options and outcomes, retailers with a long term orientation were concerned
with current and future outcomes.
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This thesis is based on the assumption that the maintenance of an interorganisational

alliance within a regional network is a dynamic, on-going, cyclical process, rather tha
linear process, involving exchanges between the actors with each actor monitoring the
costs and benefits of the exchange relationship and making judgements about future
cooperation on the basis of the consequences of past actions.

With respect to exchanges involving general practitioners and medical specialists, socia
exchange theory predicts that general practitioners will have more exchanges with

specialists who "reward" their request for assistance and who do not play hard-to-get or
exact humiliating self-abasement from the general practitioner. This thesis is based on

assumption that the general practitioner sets a higher value on gaining support from the

specialist (including the costs involved) than on not getting the advice from the specia

For general practitioners, specialist advice not only assists them to care for the patie
current interest, but also, provides them with knowledge which they can employ with

similar patients in the future. In this way the knowledge and skills of the generalist a
constantly being upgraded. With growing specialisation and hospital restrictions on who
can admit patients many generalists have become concerned that their role is fast

becoming that of specialist referral agent. Furthermore, they believe that as a result o

these trends they are losing valued expertise and their work is becoming less rewarding.

Specialists, on the other hand, are most likely to respond positively when a request for
action is followed by social approval. This thesis is based on the assumption that the
specialist sets a higher value on responses which are accompanied by approval from the

general practitioner than on responses which do not elicit general practitioner approval

According to exchange theory, costs for a general practitioner in seeking assistance fro

a specialist are the amount of approval behaviour required to gain help, and the possibi

of the specialist refusing. For the specialist, the costs of exchange may include the ti

required to assist the general practitioner, travel costs, and the possibility of the ge
practitioner communicating poorly or aggressively.
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Proposition 2:
Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity
to select collaborators, actor satisfaction is positively associated
with organisational interdependence.

From this proposition, it follows that in a regional health care network involving gene
practitioners, medical specialists and health professionals, that general practitioner
satisfaction is likely to be higher with respect to exchanges with specialists and health
professionals with w h o m they have had a high volume of exchange during the previous
six months. The hypothesis which can test this relationship can be expressed as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Generalist satisfaction with a specialist firm varies significantly with volume of
exchange.

Exchange theory predicts that differences in rate of exchange will occur as a result of
status differentials. In particular H o m a n s (1974) maintains that people behave differently
in relation to status differentials associated with work place exchanges and status
differentials associated with personal exchange networks. With respect to work
associated exchanges, people "interact often with, and express approval or respect for,
others w h o are 'better' than they are in the services they perform" (p 317), whereas at the
personal level, people interact more with and prefer the company of people " w h o are
approximately their equals in the public sphere" (p 317-318). Furthermore, H o m a n s
proposes that, within status categories such as psychiatrists and health professionals (eg
social workers and psychologists), "approximate equals tend to seek one another out" (p
318). However, this is not the case across status categories. In this situation, H o m a n s
proposes "that the persons w h o wanted least contact with the other group were the low
status members of the high-status group (psychiatrists) and the high status members of
the low status group (the psychologists and social workers)" (p 316). This proposition
appears to run counter to H o m a n s ' prediction that "a person established as another's
equal hesitates to take any step that might suggest his/her inferiority to the other" (p 316).
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However, it seems that once superiority/inferiority has been clearly established by some
external social structure, such as professional status, there is no such hesitation.

The three types of organisation of interest in this thesis are professional groups of
different social status; medical specialist firms occupy the highest social status and general
practitioner firms stand between allied health professionals and medical specialists. This
situation provides rich soil for qualitative research. Resource dependency theory
suggests medical specialist firms m a y seek to gain greater market security by not being
overly dependent on any one referral category. Hence, medical specialists could be
expected to be as dependent on hospital units and health professional agencies as they are
on general practitioners. Furthermore, social exchange theory supports the notion that
medical specialists and health professional agencies will have a substantial volume of
exchange by maintaining that people belonging to widely separated status groups are
more likely to develop exchanges than people of proximate status groups.

Organisational interdependence and compliance with
norms of practice
T w o important dimensions for the measurement of interdependence are degree of
interdependence and the nature of the interdependence. Both dimensions influence the
norms of practice applying to interorganisational cooperation and compliance with norms
of practice by exchange partners. With respect to degree of interdependence, H o m a n s
(1974) claims that "the more valuable the result of his/her action, the more likely he/she is
to perform the action" (p 25) suggesting that the more important the exchange
relationship, the more likely a person is to comply with behaviours associated through
prior experience with gaining rewards from the relationship. Furthermore, the more
resources that an actor has invested in an exchange relationship, the more valuable it is,
and the more willing the actor to comply with expected norms of practice in order to
protect his/her investment. At the organisational level, this proposition is supported by
the findings of Alexander and Morlock (1994: 212-236). These researchers found that in
situations of high interdependence and "where the incentives to work together and
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coordinate activities are tantamount to organisational success" (p 219), there is less
political activity associated with exchange negotiations than in situations of high
interdependence but less incentive to cooperate.
Proposition 3:
Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity
to select collaborators, degree of organisational interdependence is
positively

associated

with

compliance

with

norms

of

practice

regarding methods of coordination and the development of trust.

Applying this proposition to the regional health care delivery network, it is expecte
degree of organisational interdependence between small business generalist and specialist
firms will vary according to h o w exchange partners comply with norms of practice. The
Medicare Benefits B o o k (Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing, Local
Government and Community Services, 1993), a study of referral practices, and the
practice of shared care give some indication of the norms governing exchanges between
general practitioners and medical specialists in Australia. The Medicare document
indicates that, w h e n referring a patient "the instrument of referral must be in writing by
way of a letter or note to a specialist or to a consultant physician and must be signed and
dated by the referring practitioner" (p 5). Expectations include: 1) that the referring
practitioner has turned his/her mind to the needs of the patient and communicates relevant
information to the specialist, 2) that the instrument of referral must be in writing and
must be signed and dated, and 3) that the specialist to w h o m the referral is m a d e must
have received the referral letter/note on or prior to the occasion of service to which the
referral relates (Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and
Community Services, 1993:5). Under law, a general practitioner can be charged with
negligence if he/she "treats a patient in circumstances where he/she does not have
sufficient skill or experience and fails to refer, or perceive the need to refer, the patient to
another more skilful or experienced practitioner" (Dix, Errington et al., 1988: 245).
Furthermore, failure to act on the advice of the other practitioner m a y indicate negligence.
In addition, the law requires that a referring doctor, whether generalist or specialist, "give
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adequate warnings and instructions to the n e w practitioner" (p 246). A study by Wright,
Parker et al., (1993) found that 80 per cent of psychiatrists w h o responded to their
survey, provided feedback after the initial assessment interview for at least 75 per cent of
referrals. Fifty per cent of psychiatrists reported providing feedback by letter, 35 per cent
by telephone and/or letter, and 4 per cent by telephone alone. With respect to the
information provided as feedback, two-thirds of psychiatrists included history, diagnosis
and management details, 9 per cent provided only a brief summary and 0.5 per cent noted
only whether they had accepted the patient for treatment. The practice of shared care
indicates that the actors have developed either a formal or informal understanding about
the w a y in which they will manage their exchange relation. T w o hypotheses which can
test the relationship between organisational interdependence and compliance with norms
of practice are as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Volume of exchange between generalist and medical specialist varies
significantly with specialist compliance with norms of practice (the more the
specialist - individual or firm - complies with norms of practice governing
exchanges the greater the volume of exchange between generalist and specialist).
Hypothesis 4: The volume of exchange between generalist and health professional agency is
positively associated with the provision of feedback by specialist agencies.

In the health industry, interdependence between small business general practitioner fi
and medical specialist firms is reciprocal. However, with respect to interdependence
between private sector providers and public sector providers, the resource
interdependence is mixed. Private sector providers expect revenue generation, and the
expected outcome for public sector providers is cost reduction. Medicare legislation
addresses the governance of exchanges between generalist and specialist doctors but it
says little about the governance of exchanges involving general practitioners and public
sector specialist agencies. This observation supports coordination theory with regard to
methods of coordination required to' manage reciprocal interdependence and pooled
interdependence. For example, Zajac and D'Aunno (1994) maintain that "one might
expect that the alliance motivated by the desire to increase patient volume would require
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substantial coordination, given that there is reciprocal interdependence between the
partners. In the case of the cost-sharing alliance, one would likely observe a combining
of similar resources requiring less active coordination, given that there is a pooled
interdependence a m o n g the partners" (p 281-282).

The literature indicates that familiarity of the parties is likely to influence the nat
norms of practice governing alliances. For example, Gulati (1995) concludes that
familiarity in an exchange relationship m a y lead to liking (Gulati, 1995), thereby,
increasing the rewards associated with the exchange relation and making negotiations
easier. Like propinquity, familiarity provides a necessary condition for friendliness, or
liking, to emerge. Ganesan (1994) found that retailers with a long term orientation relied
on relational exchanges to maximise their gains over a series of exchanges. This finding
is consistent with the proposition of Ring and V a n de V e n (1994) that as an
interorganisational relationship matures, the personal relationship becomes as important,
or even more important, than the role relationship. The hypothesis which can test this
proposition is as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Volume of exchange between generalist and specialist - individual or firm varies significantly with familiarity of the principals (the greater the number of
years the generalist has exchanged with the specialist the greater the volume of
exchange).

Compliance with norms of practice and satisfaction
Ganesan (1994) observed that three factors explained 75 per cent of the variance
associated with a retailer's long-term orientation toward a relationship with a vendor.
These factors were perceptions of the trustworthiness of the vendor, perceptions of
dependency and satisfaction with exchange outcomes. This observation is consistent
with Homans' claim that while measured satisfaction is important, it must be considered
in the light of what people actually do. (Homans, 1974: 227).
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Trust is apparently a determinant of continuity in an alliance (Korsgaard, Schweiger et
al., 1995; Gulati, 1995; Ganesan, 1994; Ring and V a n de Van, 1994; Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993). T h e findings of Ganesan (1994) are of particular interest because
they distinguish between two elements of trust, namely, trust as a sentiment or belief in
the good intentions of a partner, and trust as experience, specifically, whether the partner
has delivered as expected in terms of "expertise and reliability" (p 40). It would seem that
interorganisational trust has little to do with the first of these elements, namely, a belief in
the good intentions of the other partner.
Proposition 4:
Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity
to select collaborators, compliance by the partners with n o r m s of
practice is positively associated with satisfaction with an exchange
relation.

Homans' "success proposition" predicts that a general practitioner will initiate reques
for advice from a specialist w h o , in the past, has rewarded him/her in relation to such
requests. Similarly, a specialist will respond favourably to requests for assistance from a
general practitioner w h o , in the past, has m a d e such requests in a manner rewarding to
the specialist. Delivering as expected in terms of expertise rewards the purchaser and
builds trust (Ganesan, 1995). O f particular concern to general practitioners is the return
of patients by specialists (Harris, 1992b: 177). Under a fee-for-service system, there is a
financial incentive for a specialist to "take-over" the care of a patient and a social incentive
to refer-on an "interesting" patient to a high-status colleague. For the referring general
practitioner, this action is interpreted as "opportunism" (Williamson, 1975: 254). O n e of
the motivators for alliance formation is to strengthen the financial security of the
organisation through ensuring access to markets. In the case of general practitioner
firms, this means access to patients and the non-loss of patients. It is likely that general
practitioners will establish alliances with specialists on the expectation that the specialist
will return patients to them. A hypothesis which can test the proposition that satisfaction
with an exchange relationship is positively associated with compliance by the partners
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with agreed norms of practice, namely the return of patients to general practitioners by
medical specialists is as follows:
Hypothesis 6: The percentage of patients returned for on-going care is positively associated
with generalist satisfaction with the care provided to patients by medical
specialists.

According to exchange theory, feedback, about exchange outcomes is essential for
organisations to keep abreast of rewards and costs. Furthermore, H o m a n s (1974)
proposes that "the shorter the interval of time between the action and the reward, the more
likely the person is to repeat it" (p 17). Presumably a similar relationship exists between
feedback and organisational commitment to future exchange. Additional support
concerning the importance of feedback comes from coordination theory (Mintzberg,
1983; Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967). Coordination by mutual adjustment, which
relies on feedback, is the most appropriate method of coordination for situations
involving complex problem-solving. Exchanges between general practitioners and
medical specialists address issues which require complex problem-solving. Frequently,
the illness has a complex social dimension and several health care providers cooperate to
meet the needs of the patient. Eyers, Brodaty et al., (1994) found that a m o n g doctors
referring to a tertiary referral m o o d disorder unit, 74 per cent were satisfied with their
contact with the unit. Three sets of factors accounted for 63 per cent of the variance in
satisfaction, namely, technical competence (39%), communication (provision of feedback
and quality of the information) (15%), and access to care ( 9 % ) . A further hypothesis
which can test the proposition that satisfaction with an exchange relationship is positively
associated with compliance by the partners with agreed norms of practice is as follows:
Hypothesis 7: The percentage of patients for whom the generalist receives feedback from
specialists (medical firm or health professional agency) is positively associated
with generalist satisfaction with communication.

Homans' (1974) rule of "distributive justice" is particularly interesting with respect
exchanges between specialist consultants and general practitioners. The principle is that
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"if two people are equal, they should, in justice, receive equal rewards; if one is better

than the other, the better should receive the larger reward" (p 249). In determining the
measure of a person, Homans (1974) maintains it should include what a person invests

and what a person contributes to an exchange. On the basis of distributive justice it is
enough for a medical consultant to be expert in his/her field. Such a person, will also
expected to "devote his/her expert knowledge to the services of others" (Homans, 1974:
346). Hence, a high level of dissatisfaction is likely to be expressed by general
practitioners towards a consultant who is known to be competent, but, who responds
poorly to requests for assistance.

PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION
The systems framework outlined in Figure 5, seems to be a new formulation of salient
variables which are identifiable in the theoretical and applied management literature
bearing upon the study of interorganisational cooperation. This framework has been
developed using social exchange theory, coordination theory, the constructs of network
analysis, and empirical research which addresses interorganisational cooperation. It
contributes to management theory by providing a framework for research in a complex
field and for predicting conditions under which alliances are likely to continue.

In addition, the model offers a testable basis for analysis of alliances within regional
networks of exchange relations across a range of industries and cultures. Furthermore,
because it takes into account situational factors influencing alliance maintenance, it

hold over time and does not seem to be limited to any particular location (Whetton, 1989

Its theoretical contribution includes theory application and theory building. The
framework applies social exchange theory, network analysis and coordination theory in

new ways and provides opportunity to confirm or otherwise the utility of these paradigms

in the field of alliance maintenance. In addition, the thesis contributes to theory buil

with respect to the central role played by compliance with norms of practice which gover
established and mutually satisfying alliances.
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In the 1990's alliance maintenance is of topical interest in all industries. It is particularly
important in the health industry at a time when all providers are being asked to do more
with less. Well functioning alliances provide the opportunity to achieve an effective
balance between differentiation, associated with the need for specialisation, and
integration without the morale problems associated with cooptation and large
bureaucracies.

The systems framework presents an alternative to the traditional linear approach to the

empirical study of alliances. This model requires analysis to be undertaken at the level

interorganisational alliance and at the level of the network. Furthermore, the nature of

variables entered into the model and the inter-activity of the model between variables a
between levels of analysis suggest a need for the collection of both quantitative and
qualitative data by the use of a multiple-methods approach. The case study method
appears well suited to this task.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY
This research employs a case study design to address the question "Are alliances
maintained by organisational interdependence, satisfaction with the exchange relationship,
and compliance with 'norms of practice'?" Data gathering and analysis occurs at two
levels, namely, the network and the alliance. A research design is required which
accommodates both levels of analysis. T h e case study design has been selected in
preference to an experimental design because of the complex nature of exchanges between
generalist and specialist firms in the health industry. In such circumstances an
experimental approach would distort reality and is likely to be strongly resisted by the
relevant parties. The case study design provides a useful structure for a study of these
phenomena, deriving its validity from multiple data sources using multiple modes of
collection to develop a chain of evidence concerning the research question.

The study defines the network within which informal generalist-specialist alliances are
embedded as the case and t w o patient care networks within one urban region are
examined in detail. In addition, limited evidence is gained from two further service
provider networks selected on the basis of location.

This Chapter describes the research design and restates the theoretical propositions an
operational hypotheses. The latter relate to the analysis of quantitative data arising from a
randomised survey of generalists within the two urban networks. B y employing formal
hypotheses the aim is to gain an in-depth perspective of the dynamics of the maintenance
of informal alliances within the two regional networks under consideration by maximising
the analytic power w o n through randomisation. There is no claim that any other control
of networks has been gained, nor that the findings are generalisable in a formal,
quantifiable way, to other networks.
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In addition, questions are formulated to guide the analysis of qualitative data concerning
industry environment and patterns of exchange within each network. The sources of data
and the methods used for data collection are described within the framework of
developing a chain of evidence. Methods used to manage and analyse the qualitative and
quantitative data are outlined. The hypotheses are presented within the section of the

Chapter that describes data analysis. Finally, strategies designed to enhance the validit
and reliability of the study are outlined.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The systems framework developed in Chapter 4 and depicted in Figure 5 (p 147) guides
the research design. This framework assumes that alliances involving generalist and
specialist organisations occur within the context of a regional health network. The
network of service provider organisations is reasonably visible and accessible. The
research decision was therefore made to identify and access the regional network in the
first instance. It was assumed that within the network some organisations would be in
alliance and others would not. The challenge for the researcher was to measure

interorganisational activities at the network level so as to throw light on the second le
of analysis, namely, the alliance.

Case study research
Case study research frequently involves participant observation and the collection of a
large amount of qualitative data from various sources in order to develop a chain of
evidence concerning a study's theoretical propositions (Yin, 1989). Participant
observation is difficult when the units of analysis are the network and organisational
alliance. My research design seeks to achieve a comparable outcome through interviews
with key informants, focus groups, workshops and by coopting key organisational
representatives to work closely with the researcher during the twelve months of the data
collection period. However, there is a trade-off in that it was apparent from the outset

the study that the cooperation of these organisational representatives demanded a researc
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design which accommodates the provision of feedback. The case study design meets this
ethical obligation and provides opportunity for participant validation.

Quantitative data is sought by conducting a randomised controlled survey of generalists
and supporting specialists within the two urban networks. The purpose of the survey is
to expose alliances within networks and to gather quantitative data relevant to the
propositions supporting m y systems framework. The contribution of the survey is to
permit the researcher to specify with considerable confidence the relationship between
variables predicted to be associated with alliance maintenance.

Theoretical propositions
Four propositions support my systems framework. For purposes of clarity these
propositions are restated in Table 6.
Table 6: Research propositions
Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to select collaborators:
Proposition

1:

- degree of alliance activity is positively associated with organisational interdependence;
Proposition

2:

- level of actor satisfaction is positively associated with organisational interdependence;
Proposition

3:

- degree of organisational interdependence is positively associated with compliance by the
partners with norms of practice governing exchanges;
Proposition

4:

- compliance by the partners with the norms of practice governing exchanges is positively
associated with level of satisfaction with an exchange relation.

Situational factors requiring consideration
According to the literature and my theoretical framework, situational factors are likely
influence relationships between the key variables arising from the propositions
concerning alliance maintenance. The likely effects of these situational factors have been
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discussed in Chapter 4. A m o n g the contextual factors which m a y influence alliance
maintenance are:
• the location of the network;
• the type of medical condition;
• organisational funding arrangements (whether fee-for-service or allocated budget);
• the size of the network;
• status differentials among network members and the distribution of power;
• established patterns of exchange among network members.

My research design does not seek to exert control over any of these situational factors
Rather it describes the network within which established alliances are discovered to
explore the influence of these factors on alliance maintenance drawing on quantitative and
qualitative data. A number of questions have been framed to guide the collection and
analysis of data pertaining to describing each network (Table 7).

Table 7: Questions guiding the collection and analysis of data relevant
to describing each network

Industry environment
•

H o w does industry environment as defined by location (rural/urban/capital city) influence
observed generalist-specialist alliances?

Medical
•

condition

H o w does medical condition (diabetes mellitus/mental illness) influence observed generalistspecialist alliances?

Mediation of flow of resources
•

Within a network, do particular exchange categories mediate the flow of resources?

Funding
•

arrangements

H o w do alliances involving public sector and private sector organisations differ from alliances
involving only private sector firms?
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Key variables by level of analysis
Among the challenges of case study research is the analysis of data collected from

multiple levels. For example, data collected at the level of the individual is frequently
aggregated to provide an organisational response and further aggregation provides

network level data. In this study, the decision was taken to collect data from individual
generalist doctors by questionnaire and interview. This data would be analysed at the
level of the individual. In addition, this data would be aggregated to 1) explore
differences between categories within a regional network, and 2) examine acrossnetwork differences. A similar process would be followed with the data collected by
interview from specialists and managers.

The issue of level of analysis is particularly pertinent in this study because of the na
the organisations represented within the regional health networks and the nature of
generalist-specialist exchange relations. For example, private sector medical firms, are
the main, very small organisations. Exchanges between generalist and specialist doctors

mainly occur at the level of the individual. However, these individuals are predominantl
owner/ managers with a very keen interest in the financial welfare of their business.

Hence, in responding to questions about alliances they are likely to provide a "personal"
and an "organisational" perspective. Exchanges involving small business medical firms

and public sector organisations, once again, are most likely to occur at the level of the
individual. However, because public sector agencies are part of a larger bureaucracy,
professionals within these organisations are more likely to be influenced by the formal
and informal rules governing the bureaucracy and/or agency. Hence, they may be less
likely to provide a personal response. In discussing the findings emanating from these

various groups, the likely impact of these factors will be considered but no attempt wil
made to separate individual and organisational response. Figure 6 summarises the key
variables for each level of analysis in a manner consistent with my systems framework
(Figure 5, p 147).

176

Figure 6: K e y variables for a study of alliance maintenance within a
regional network
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Units of analysis

Table 8 operationally defines network and alliance along with the other core units o
analysis. Table 9 provides a similar summary of the structural and environmental units of
analysis.
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Table 8: Core units of analysis operationally defined

Unit of analysis

Operational definition

Actor

A n individual or a private business firm or public sector agency
capable of receiving reinforcement from its environment (Turner,
1991: 560).

Alliance

An arrangement with another provider organisation involving
either a verbal informal understanding or a formal written
agreement concerning the management of exchanges ("shared
care").

Exchanges

Business exchanges between actors, including, written and verbal
communications and patient referrals.

Exchange category

"The set of all actors who possess the same resources and value
the same resources to be received in exchange" (Cook, 1977:
69), for example general practitioner firms, medical specialist
firms and public sector health professional agencies.

Exchange network

A regional patient care network of generalist and specialist
organisations each of which has opportunity to conduct
exchanges with other organisations in the set.

Exchange relations

Patterns of ties that connect different actors to each other,
forming a network of relations (Turner, 1991: 565).

Familiarity

The length of time that a general practitioner and a specialist
have engaged in exchange with one-another.

Norms of practice - feedback and
trust

Actions expected of actors when exchanging with other actors in
the network. T w o norms of practice are measured, viz.,
provision of feedback and return of patients. For generalists, the
latter is a measure of the extent to which a specialist can be
trusted.

Compliance with norms of practice

A judgment by a general practitioner concerning specialists in
the network in respect of feedback and return of patients.

Organisational interdependence

The volume of exchange between actors and between exchange
categories.

Satisfaction-dissatisfaction

An actor's judgment about the rewards and costs of exchange
with other actors.
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Table 9: Environmental and structural units of analysis

Unit of analysis

Operational definition

Environmental
• Location

- Three regional network locations are relevant: disadvantaged
rural; representative urban; resource rich capital city.

• Methods of remuneration

- Three methods of remuneration are relevant: fee-for-service,
salary, and public hospital sessional payments.

• Task technology

- Task technology is inferred from patient condition (ie.. mental
illness or older-onset diabetes).

Structural
• Domain consensus

The extent to which there is agreement within a network
concerning the functions of the various actors.

• Level of alliance activity

The prevalence of alliances within a network and between
exchange categories.

• Network size

The number of organisations in a specified network: the
generalist and specialist organisations for care of people with
mental illness or with older-onset diabetes respectively within a
region.

Patterns of interdependence:
- Centrality

The extent to which an exchange category mediates the flow of
exchanges within a network as measured by 1) frequency of
contact with all other exchange categories; 2) number of other
positions with which an actor is connected; and 3) the extent to
which the location of an actor provides opportunity to control
the flow of exchanges.

- Directionality

The direction in which resources flow through a network, ie,
whether the flow is one-way or reciprocal.

- Volume

The volume of exchange activity between actors as measured by
participant-estimate of the frequency of contacts within a six
month period.

Status differentials

Differences in social status as measured by years of training
associated with discipline and qualifications of a particular
exchange category.
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Three environmental and structural units of analysis deserve attention in data gathering,

since the literature suggests that each is responsible for some of the variance associa
with alliance maintenance.

Geographic "location" is likely to have a substantial influence on the ability of
organisations within a network to access external resources (Levine and White, 1961)

with the local availability of health resources diminishing as the network becomes more
rural (Harris, 1992b; Stocks, 1994).

The ability of an organisation, or exchange category within a network of exchange

relations, to influence the mediation of resources addresses the issue of organisational
power and dependence. The measure used in this study to explore organisational ability
to mediate the flow of resources is centrality which may be estimated using several
dimensions, namely, "degree", "direction", "connectedness", and "location" (Brass and
Burkhardt (1992: 201).

Degree, or level of activity is calculated from the frequency of reported contacts that
focal exchange category has had with all other categories in the network during the
previous six months. Following Brass and Burkhardt (1992: 201), this number is
divided by n - 1 (where "n" is the number of exchange categories in the network).
"Frequent" contacts are given a score of 3 and are those which occur weekly,

"occasional" contacts are given a score of 2 and are those which occur on a monthly basi
while rare contacts are those which occur less than monthly.

The "direction" of exchange relations concerns the flow and sequence of resources
exchanged, namely whether the flow of resources is in one direction or reciprocal
(Turner, 1991: 553).

Two actors within a network of exchange relations are "connected" if the frequency or
magnitude of the transactions with one party is contingent upon exchange with another
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party (Cook, 1975). The parties are said to be "bilaterally negatively connected" if they
are linked by an "inverse function such as an increase in the frequency or magnitude in
one exchange leads to a decrease in the frequency or magnitude of exchange in the other
(or vice versa)" (p 69). The "location" of an exchange category within a network of

connected relationships may also indicate the extent to which the category influences th
flow of resources. "Where network organisations are engaged in the delivery of

multiple, differentiated services to clients, an organisation at the centre of the refer

flow, namely, one to which all clients must be referred, may gain power over those at th
periphery" (Benson, 1975: 233). The focus of measurement in this study is not on
mathematically derived, graphic determinations of centrality but on the flow and volume
of exchange between exchange categories and the extent to which any particular exchange

category is situated at the centre of this flow. In this study, qualifications and years
experience are used as a measure of status.

ESTABLISHING A CHAIN OF EVIDENCE: SAMPLE
SELECTION AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The research process involved six stages of data gathering and participant feedback. The

first was a preparatory stage to develop the research protocol and the instruments for d
collection and to define alliances and norms of practice governing exchanges among
generalists and specialists. Following this activity, a pilot study was conducted of
alliance maintenance within a small network of rural service providers. These two
activities enabled the ground work to be done to conduct a randomised controlled survey
of general practitioners and to identify two patient care networks within one health
region. The survey was conducted to provide comparative data on exchanges and
alliance activity within each network. In addition, interviews with generalists were
conducted to explore the "hows" and "whys" of alliance maintenance from the
generalist's perspective and interviews were held with specialists within the two
networks to gain their perspective. Workshops were held with participants and key
people to feedback the findings, thereby, providing a forum for participant validation.
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Interviews with managers provided data on the concerns and strategies of each exchange
category with respect to the two networks. Finally, a focus group was conducted with
general practitioners in a well resourced city health region to explore the influence of
location on alliance maintenance. The sample selection and methods of data collection are
described according to the sequence outlined in Table 10.
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Table 10: Establishing a chain of evidence: stages of data collection
1. Preparatory
- Research protocol developed
- Exploratory consultations and focus group
- Health regions selected
- Research Reference Group established
- Instruments prepared and tested for
validity and reliability

2. Pilot study: rural regional network
- T o test the methodology including:
• describing the network
• exploring issues in alliance maintenance
• trial-running the interviews with generalists, specialists
and managers
• trial-running the computer programs for data analysis
and management

1

3. Survey of patterns of exchange within t w o networks
in an urban region
- T o describe the industry environment
- T o describe and compare networks - patterns of organisational
interdependence
- T o explore relationship between volume of exchange and
satisfaction
- T o describe and compare alliance activity
- T o explore relationship between volume of exchange and alliance
activity

4. Two-case comparative study - factors maintaining
alliances in the u r b a n region
- T o define alliances involving generalists and specialists
- T o describe norms of practice governing alliances
- T o examine relationships between variables supporting
theoretical framework

5. K e y informant validation a n d m a n a g e m e n t strategies
to enhance influence - two-case comparative study

6. Alliance maintenance in a city network
- Focus group meeting with city-based generalists
- Interviews with key informants

183

Stage 1: Preparatory
1. Research protocol

The study was guided by a research protocol which was written by the researcher and

which included targets and time-line for achievement of data collection and data analy
and the generation of reports for participant validation and funding bodies.
2. Research management

The protocol was written in the form of a grant submission and was funded by the
Department of Human Services and Health and by the New South Wales Health

Department. Funding made it possible to employ a research assistant on a part time bas

for twelve months to assist with literature search, the administration of mailed surve
and data entry. All aspects of the study were managed by the researcher including the
formation of a Research Reference Group, negotiations with professional leaders,
conduct of the survey, interviews and consultations and data analysis.
3. Identification of health regions

Three health regions were identified as potential sources of information because they

very different in terms of the availability of resources. The three regions were a rur
region known to be disadvantaged in terms of access to services of all kinds, a well
resourced city region and an urban region. The urban region is commonly described by
planners as representative, based on broad socio-economic indicators and was selected
for detailed study. The city region is known to be among the most advantaged health
region in New South Wales, particularly, with respect to the provision of private
psychiatrists and public sector mental health services (New South Wales Health
Department, 1994).
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4. Access to networks
The researcher established a Research Reference Group to provide advice on the study
process and to assist the researcher to gain access to the networks. In each region the
researcher gained access to general practitioners through the relevant Division or
Association of General Practice. In each case the respective Executive Committee
suggested the approach to be used in gaining the sample. In the case of small business
medical firms, the doctor contacted was asked to represent the firm. With respect to
hospital departments, the Medical Director or relevant Clinical Director was asked to

provide information. In the case of health professional agencies, the approach was to t
team leader.
5. Approach to bounding the network
A micro structural approach to bounding the network was employed (Alter and Hage,

1993: 299). The researcher first collected information by survey of general practitione
in order to set the boundaries of the network. In addition, the information gained from
generalists was reviewed by key informants to determine whether all relevant

organisations used for the care of patients with the chosen conditions had been identif
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were used in order to decrease the number of groups
included in each network. Exclusion criteria was based on key informant judgments
concerning the importance of the contribution made by an organisation to the network.

Specialist inclusion criteria were as follows: 1) 20 per cent or more of responding gen
practitioners have nominated the specialist as one with whom they have an alliance, and

2) less than 10 per cent of responding general practitioners have nominated the special
as one with whom they have an alliance. In this way two groups of specialists were
gained, namely, those in-alliance with generalists and those not in-alliance.
Typically, private generalist and specialist medical firms are small (on average 2.5

doctors). Public sector specialist units and health professional agencies are also smal

(from 5 to 20 staff). However, the latter are located within the broad umbrella of a lar
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bureaucracy. In this study it was the public sector specialist operational units and
agencies that were included in the sample rather than the administrative or policy level
members of the regional health authority.
6. Instrument development
Four instruments were developed for data collection. They were 1) a questionnaire for
survey of generalist firms, 2) a structured protocol on exchange variables for use in

interviews with generalists, 3) an interview protocol for use with specialists, medical a
non-medical, and 4) a protocol for use with managers.
• Questionnaire for survey of generalist firms (Appendix 1)

A review of literature identified the issues to be addressed in the questionnaire (Levin
and White, 1961; Shortell, 1974; Kaluzny, 1991; Morrissey, 1992) together with the
findings of an earlier study of general practitioner - medical specialist relationships
conducted by the investigator.

In addition, a focus group was held with a group of six general practitioners to clarify
important issues for them in alliance maintenance. Questions were formulated on these
issues together with response options in questionnaire format. Six senior general
practitioners examined each item for relevance and comprehensibility to meet Bryman's
(1989: 57-58) standard of face validity.

Two forms of questionnaire were prepared. One sought information on exchanges and
alliances in relation to diabetes care while the second sought information on exchanges
and alliances in relation to mental illness.

Closed ended questions were developed together with standardised reporting format for
demographics, including, solo or group practice, methods of remuneration and to gain
information about alliance activity (nominal scale data). Further questions sought

information about patient referrals, feedback from specialists, the appropriate return of
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patients, and the number of exchanges between the general practitioner and specialists
during the past six months (ordinal scale data).

Questions on general practitioner satisfaction with exchange relations with the respective
specialist exchange categories (eg private psychiatrists, health professional agency)
employed seven point Likert (1952) scales. The respondents were asked to indicate their
satisfaction on a range of options from very dissatisfied to very satisfied. These rating
scales provided a single global rating for each issue (ie satisfaction with communications
with the respective exchange category of specialists and similarly satisfaction with the
care provided to referred patients). This provided opportunity for these two exchange
satisfaction measures to be examined independently and as a summation of generalist
satisfaction.

In addition to questions about satisfaction with patient care and

communications, the questionnaire asked about satisfaction with access to a number of
exchange categories of specialists. This measure was examined independently of other
measures of satisfaction.

Six norms of practice indicators were identified during the preparatory stage of the study
namely, the promptness and quality of the feedback received by the general practitioner,
appropriate return of patients to the general practitioner, communication skills with
patients, and the quality of treatments offered to patients. All six indicators were included
in the questionnaire to assess their validity as measures of norms of practice governing
exchange and to gain insight into the parameters of promptness of feedback, methods of
feedback and to explore the meaning of "quality" feedback.

• Face validity and reliability testing of questionnaire

The questionnaire was pilot tested with the assistance of 16 general practitioners in thre
locations (city, urban, and rural) and modified as necessary. C o m m e n t s by those
involved referred to the relevance, read-ability and user-friendliness of the questionnaire.
The external reliability of the questionnaire w a s tested by five experienced general
practitioners with a three week interval between test and retest. This yielded a coefficient
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of reliability of 0.76 (Spearman rho), an acceptable demonstration of the stability of the
instrument over time (Bryman, 1989: 55). Internal reliability was not examined because
no measures relied on the summation of a range of scores.
• Protocol to examine relationship between volume of exchange and
generalist satisfaction a n d volume of exchange a n d length of time
k n o w n - 'familiarity'- (Appendix 2)
To examine the relationship between volume of exchange and generalist satisfaction,
seven point rating scales were developed for the two measures of satisfaction, namely

generalist satisfaction with communications with specialists and generalist satisfaction
with the care provided to patients by specialists. The scale provided options from very
satisfied to very dissatisfied.

During Stage 2 of data collection, it was decided to address the question of whether

length of time that a generalist and specialist had known one-another was associated wit

the volume of exchange between a generalist and a specialist. To test for this possibili

three further seven point rating scales were added to the interview protocol among which

was a rating scale which asked the generalist to indicate the length of time that he/she
known the particular exchange partner (a few months to many years). The other two

items addressed the extent to which the generalist respected the professional contributi
of a specialist and the extent to which the general practitioner trusted the specialist.

• Interview protocols for survey of specialists, health agencies and
managers

The pilot testing of the generalist questionnaire sharpened the issues which needed to b
addressed in the survey of specialist firms and agencies. In each case a draft protocol
was produced by the researcher and a senior specialist and the Research Reference Group
examined each question for relevance and comprehensibility.
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7. Establishment of a data base a n d report generation

A data base was established for storage of quantitative and qualitative data. The Statist
Package for the Social Sciences was used to manage the analysis of quantitative data.
Qualitative data was managed using word processing software for text management.

Reports were generated at the end of each stage of data collection, ie., following the pi
study involving the rural region, the two-case study involving the urban region, and the
survey of general practitioners in the city region.

Stage 2: Pilot study - rural regional network

The purpose of the pilot study was to trial all aspects of the methodology and to explore
any additional factors relevant to alliance maintenance.

The region selected was a disadvantaged rural region known to have a high proportion of
elderly people. Hence it was expected that the prevalence of diabetes mellitus would be
comparatively high. Furthermore, the Region is known to rely heavily on general
practitioners for the provision of health services. However, like most rural locations,

supply of general practitioners is comparatively poor. Hence, it was expected that genera

practitioners in this location would value highly their relationships with medical and no
medical specialists and that the prevalence of alliance activity would be high.
Sample selection and data collection

Interviews were conducted with a convenience sample of six general practitioners. In

addition, each general practitioner completed the survey questionnaire and the protocol t
examine the relationship between volume of exchange and generalist satisfaction.

The interviews with general practitioners identified two resident specialist physicians
three visiting physicians. One physician met the criteria for inclusion as an alliance

specialist and the other met the criteria for inclusion as a non-alliance specialist. Bot
were interviewed by the researcher. The interviews served to delineate the patient care
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network which included the public hospital specialist unit and the one relevant specialist
health professional agency in the region. The unit and agency were included in the study
and representatives of these firms were interviewed by the researcher. In addition, the
regional manager of the health authority was interviewed, recent reports and archives
were consulted, and several artefacts were provided, namely, shared patient care
protocols, and referral letters.

Stage 3: Patterns of exchange within two urban regional
networks
1. Survey of general practitioners
The survey method was used with two samples of general practitioners to identify the
specialist organisations in the network, examine the prevalence of alliance activity, the
volume of exchange that generalists had with other organisations and the extent to which
general practitioners were satisfied with exchanges with other organisations and exchange
categories within the network.
• Estimation of sample size and sample selection

The sample size was estimated in the following manner:
1) The general practitioner population was known and finite (180). However, access to
general practitioners was via the Division of General Practice which required that a
sample of members be surveyed rather than the total population ;
2) The sample had to provide for the study to validly measure the factors associated with
alliance maintenance. That is, the sample needed to be representative of the
population. This was achieved by randomly selecting from the total population and by
stratifying proportionally according to sector or location of the small business practice;
3) The sample had to be large enough to establish the alliance activities of generalists;
4) Since the sample of specialists was to be gained from the generalists, the generalist
sample had to be large enough to capture a sample of specialists w h o would reflect a
broad range of specialist views and practices;
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5) Since the data from generalists were to include data gathered by mail survey, the
sample had to be large enough to accommodate loss due to non-response, calculated at
30-40 per cent. The sample required had to provide for analysis of data at two levels,
namely for comparisons to be m a d e between groups within networks and for acrossnetwork comparisons. A s a guideline, two sample size calculations were undertaken,
one for paired data and the other for comparison of independent means.
Concerning paired data, sample size estimation was based on the use of a two-tailed
test at the 5 per cent level of a null hypothesis that there is no difference in population
means (ie. m o = 0; z a = 1.96; zp = -1.65). Data from the Stage 2 study in the rural
region indicated 1) that the true difference in means m a y be as m u c h as 2.5 with
respect to generalist satisfaction with exchange relations with medical specialists; 2)
S\= 4.3, and 3) s d = 2.07. Following Colton (1974: 142-144) the required sample
size was estimated to be 9 or more pairs (Appendix 3).
The data from the Stage 2 rural study was also used to calculate the sample size
required to compare independent means in the urban region based on the use of a twotailed test at the 5 per cent level of a null hypothesis that m i - ni2 = 0. The pilot study
indicated a m e a n of 3.6, a standard deviation of 3 and a confidence interval of 2.6
with respect to generalist satisfaction with health professionals. There was very little
variation in response in terms of generalist satisfaction with medical specialists.
Using this data it was calculated that an "n" of approximately 30 was statistically
desirable for each network with a total "n" of 60 (Appendix 3). With data-loss
anticipated at 30-40 per cent, a sample of 100 needed to be drawn.
The two generalist samples were derived from the data base of the Division of General
Practice which was k n o w n to include 99 per cent of general practitioners within the
region. A 55 per cent sample of the membership was selected (n = 99) and this
sample was systematically divided into two groups (ie. 49 and 50) so that each general
practitioner was asked to provide information about one patient care network. Hence,
with an expected response rate of approximately 60 to 70 per cent this should provide
for an 'n' of 30 to 34 in each group. General practitioners were divided into two
groups to provide the two networks and to mitigate problems of " c o m m o n method
variance" associated with participant fatigue and similar methods of data collection in
two patient care networks. All general practitioners were surveyed by questionnaire.
In addition, from each group of general practitioners a subset of eight individuals were
randomly selected for further interview. Hence, with an expected response rate of
approximately 80 per cent this should yield a total of 13 interviews with general
practitioners.
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• Administration of mailed questionnaire and measures used to
address non-response bias
The questionnaire was administered by mail to the two groups of general practitioners;

one group was asked questions concerning exchange relations with specialists for the car
of people with diabetes mellitus and the other group was asked questions concerning
mental illness. The questionnaire was accompanied by a letter from the Chairman of the
Division of General Practice indicating his strong support and encouraging general
practitioners to respond.

To address problems associated with non-response bias, three reminder letters were
mailed at two weekly intervals following the cut-off date for return. Following Dillman
(1978), careful attention was also given to the total process of administering the
questionnaire, including, the presentation and the accompanying correspondence which

stated the aims of the research, the supporting bodies, the fact that the study had Ethi
Committee approval from both the University and the Regional Health Authority, and
notifying participants that they would be provided with feedback.

• Interviews with general practitioners

Before any personal contact was made by the researcher, general practitioners selected f

interview received a letter of invitation signed by the Chairman of the Division of Gene
Practice. Subsequently, the researcher arranged appointments by phone for a time
suitable to the doctor. Interviews were held in the office of the respondent. Written

records were kept of each interview. In addition, respondents were invited to participat
in research workshops at which the findings from the survey and from interviews were to
be reported.

In order to enhance the quality of the information gained from interview, respondents

were encouraged to reflect on, and to speak freely about their experiences with alliance
and the issues which they considered to be important. In addition, the respondent was
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asked to complete the survey questionnaire and to complete the protocol to examine

relationships between 1) volume of exchange and generalist satisfaction with specialists,
and 2) volume of exchange and the length of time a generalist had known a specialist. At

interview the general practitioner was asked to think of the specialist within the respec
network with whom he/she had the highest number of professional exchanges during the
last six months and to complete five rating scales in terms of that person. Later in the
interview he/she was asked to think of a further specialist in the network with whom

he/she had exchanges during the last six months and to complete a second, identical set of
rating scales in terms of that person.
2. Survey by interview of small business specialist firms and public
sector hospital units a n d health agencies
The second element which the study design had to incorporate was a data-gathering

exercise with small business medical specialist firms and public sector specialist hospit
units and agencies. It was an integral challenge to the study that the generalists and

specialists in question should be linked in collaborative patient care activity. Accordin
the general practitioner survey was completed before the specialist survey commenced.
The specialist sample was derivative of the generalist sample, being those specialists
whose names were provided by general practitioners.

• Sample selection
The survey of general practitioner firms produced two groups of specialists: one
pertaining to the mental health network and one related to the network for care of people
with diabetes mellitus. With respect to mental illness, a list of 18 psychiatrists, four
public sector health agencies, two hospital units, and six private psychologists was
produced. With respect to diabetes mellitus, a list of 16 physicians and one specialist
health professional agency was produced. From the two groups of medical specialists
seven psychiatrists and six physicians were selected for interview. Three specialists

within each network met the criteria for inclusion as alliance specialists, and the others
met the criteria for inclusion as non-alliance specialists.
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All relevant public sector specialist units and agencies were included in the study and in
the mental health network three private sector health professional firms were selected.

This list of organisations was examined by the Research Reference group to determine
whether any relevant firms and agencies had been omitted. No omissions were found.
• Data collection
In conducting interviews with specialist firms a similar format was followed to that
utilised with general practitioners. The Chairman of the Division of General Practice
signed the letter inviting medical specialists to participate and the respective health

authority manager contacted all specialists within the relevant health authority encourag
their participation. However, with respect to interviews with public sector health
agencies, each agency chose to participate as a team rather than have the leader provide a
representative response. Hence, the response from health agencies is an agency
consensus.
3. Other sources of data
Recent reports and strategic planning documents were accessed and public sector referral
records were consulted.

Stage 4: Factors maintaining alliances - two-case
comparative study
The purpose of this stage of data analysis was to explore variations in definitions of
alliance and norms of practice governing alliances within and across networks and to
examine relationships between variables in the light of the theoretical framework
developed in Chapter 4. Data for this stage of data analysis came from the mailed survey
of generalists and interviews with generalists and specialists.
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In addition, artefacts were provided in the form of treatment protocols and patient referral

letters. The first were used by generalists and health professionals to facilitate allia
management with generalists and the second were provided by specialists.

Stage 5: Key informant validation and comment
1. Participant validation
Following analysis of the data from the two-case comparative study, two research
meetings were held for people who had contributed. These research validation
workshops were strongly supported by the cooperating Divisions of General Practice
because they saw them as providing opportunity for improvements to be made in

generalist-specialist collaboration. In other words, the cooperating Divisions of Genera

Practice had an interest in research that was action oriented research (Prideaux, 1990).
The first meeting involved participating general practitioners, medical specialists and
academics with an interest in the study. The second meeting involved invited experts,
participating health professionals, medical specialists and academics. Separate medical
and health professional feedback sessions were held on the advice of the Research
Reference Group. Doctors considered that discussion would be more open and honest
between doctors in the absence of health professionals.

Each meeting was chaired by the Chairman of the Division of General Practice. Prior to

the meeting, copies of the findings of the study were made available to participants. Ea
meeting began with the presentation of the findings by the researcher. Following the
presentation, a panel of invited clinical and academic experts was asked to comment on
the validity and utility of the findings. Open discussion was then invited by the
Chairman. Participants were asked whether the findings reflected their understanding of
exchanges within the regional health care network.
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2. Interviews with chairmen of divisions of medicine a n d m a n a g e r s

The purpose of interviewing network leaders was to gain information about issues of
concern to each exchange category and the strategies being employed to mediate the flow
of resources within the relevant network.

Five managers were interviewed. These were the Chairmen of the Divisions of General
Practice, Psychiatry and Medicine, the Coordinator of Community Mental Health
Services and the Coordinator of the Diabetes Education Centre. Each leader was asked to
represent the specialist organisation at interview.

Stage 6: Alliance maintenance in a city network
A focus group with city-based generalists was convened to explore issues in the
maintenance of alliances involving generalists and specialists for care of people with

mental illness in a well resourced inner city environment. It was reasoned that within thi

well-supplied city region, alliance activity and governance in both the private sector and
the public sector could be different from urban or rural locations, especially in terms of
competition for patients.

Under the auspices of the local Division of General Practice, 11 general practitioners wer
personally invited by the Chairman of the Division to participate in a focus group. A
suitable venue was arranged together with an evening meal. A skilled moderator was
used to facilitate the process and the investigator recorded the discussion. Participants

also completed the general practitioner questionnaire utilised in the urban two-case surve
to provide data on their network of specialist support for mental illness.

This survey of 11 city general practitioners produced a list of 30 psychiatrists, three
mental health clinics and two mental health centres.
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In addition to the meeting with general practitioners, the Chairman of the Division of
General Practice, the Director of Mental Health Services and a senior psychiatrist were
interviewed and recent reports were consulted.

ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM ALL SOURCES AND
INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Data accumulation
Six sets of data were collected over the course of this study. These were:
1) Texts of interviews and focus group meetings with general practitioners during the
preliminary stages of the project. This data was used as the basis for questionnaire
development;

2) Quantitative record and text record of interviews with general practitioners, speci
and managers from a rural region;
3) Quantitative data from a randomised survey of general practitioner firms within an
urban region involving two networks and text record of interviews with general
practitioners;

4) Quantitative and text data from structured interviews with specialists and managers
from the same urban region and two networks;
5) Field notes of the proceedings of two research workshops;

6) Quantitative analysis and text record of focus group with general practitioners fro
city network.

This data was accumulated from approximately 60 hours of interviewing, six hours of
research workshops, and 78 completed questionnaires by generalist doctors.

Analysis of qualitative data
One of the aims of the study was to identify "norms" of practice associated with
exchanges between generalists and specialists. N o r m s of practice were described in the
urban two-case study together with c o m m o n deviations from accepted practices. The
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questions of interest were, " w h o deviated from the norm, w h y did they do so, and what
were the effects of deviations upon exchanges". Stage 1 of the study enabled the
researcher to generate a list of factors important to generalists in the governance of
exchanges with specialists. These factors included prompt, high quality feedback and
patient satisfaction with the referral to the specialist. General practitioners had two
concerns regarding patient satisfaction, namely, specialist communication with the patient
and the quality of the treatment provided. T o gain a clearer picture of the "norms of
practice", generalists were asked to nominate a specialist with w h o m they had an
established satisfying relationship and to describe the characteristics of exchanges with
the specialist in terms of the following:
- the promptness of the provision of feedback (a few days to longer than a month)
- methods of communication (fax, telephone, letter/memo, combination)
- the quality of the information (acknowledgment of referral to acknowledgment and
saying what he/she did and w h y and what the generalist should do);
- the specialist's communication skills with patients as indicated by feedback from
patients;
- the quality of the treatment offered by the specialist.

The compilation of this qualitative data provided a "norms of practice" bench-mark
concerning the governance of exchange relationships.

A coding system was developed to facilitate the identification of themes and issues. This
provided for the quantification of s o m e of the results and the retrieval of verbatim
statements useful for illustrating conclusions. Tables of verbatim statements were
prepared according to exchange category and variable of interest. This simplified the
examination of relationships and patterns arising from the multiple sources of data and
also the process of pattern-matching, since the aim w a s to compare the qualitative
findings with the systems framework for alliance maintenance developed on the basis of
theory.
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Analysis of quantitative data
Quantitative data in this study involve small numbers and tend not to conform with the
assumptions underlying traditional statistical methods. Therefore, extensive use has been
made of non-parametric methods of analysis. These methods tend to rely on tests of
significance rather than the determination of confidence levels (Colton, 1974: 219-226).
Non-parametric methods employed are

1) Spearman's correlation coefficient, 2)

Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test, and 3) the Mann-Whitney U-test.

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used for analysis of the quantitative
data and the following calculations were undertaken:
• Frequencies were used to display and inspect data;
• Spearman's correlation coefficient (Colton, 1974: 207- 217) was used to 1) assess the
reliability of the survey instrument employed to gain information from general
practitioners, and 2) to examine within network associations between the following
variables:
- The percentage of patients returned to the generalist's care by specialists and
generalist satisfaction;
- The percentage of referred patients for which the generalist received feedback
from specialists and generalist satisfaction;
- Generalist volume of exchange and the percentage of patients for which the
generalist received feedback.
• The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test (Runyon and Haber, 1972: 263-264)
was used to examine within network differences between high volume exchange
relationships and low volume exchange relationships with specialists on five "soft"
factors (listed below). In all cases volume of exchange w a s the response variable or
dependent variable and the "soft" factor, the predictor or independent variable:
- general practitioner satisfaction with communications with the specialist;
- general practitioner satisfaction with the care provided to referred patients by
specialist;
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-

the extent to which the general practitioner trusts the specialist;

- the extent to which the general practitioner respects the way the specialist
practices medicine;
- the length of time that the generalist has known the specialist.
• The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was also used to examine within
network differences between:
- generalist volume of exchange with in-alliance specialists and other specialists
with volume of exchange as the response variable or dependent variable and
being in-alliance the predictor or independent variable;
- generalist volume of exchange with medical specialists nominated as complying
with norms of practice and generalist volume of exchange with other specialists
with volume of exchange as the response variable or dependent variable and
compliance with norms of practice as the predictor or independent variable;
- differences in generalist report of private sector and public sector specialist
compliance with norms of practice (Ho - m [private sector] = m [public sector];
H a - m [private sector] > m [public sector];
- differences in generalist satisfaction with exchanges with private sector and
public sector health professionals (Ho - m [private sector] = m [public sector];
H a - m [private sector] > m [public sector].
• The Mann-Whitney U-test was used to examine:
- across network differences with respect to the two urban region general
practitioner samples, the null hypothesis being that both samples are drawn
from populations with the same distribution and the alternative (two-tailed)
hypothesis being that the populations from which the samples are drawn, are
different (Runyon and Haber, 1972: 257-261);
- across network differences between the urban and city region mental health
networks. This analysis was undertaken despite the city region sample being a
convenience sample to facilitate description of similarities and differences
associated with industry environment;
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- within network differences between services received by generalists in-alliance
with specialists and services received by generalists not in-alliance ("services
received" were measured by the percentage of patients for which the generalist
received feedback and the percentage of patients returned) (Ho - generalists inalliance receive the same level of service from specialists as generalists not inalliance; H a - generalists in alliance receive better services (ie receive more
feedback and have m o r e patients returned) than generalists not in-alliance;
- within network differences in satisfaction between generalists in-alliance with
specialists and generalists not in-alliance (Ho - the satisfaction of generalists inalliance with specialists is the same as the satisfaction of generalists not inalliance; H a - generalists in-alliance with specialists are more satisfied with
exchanges with specialists).
• The t-test for paired samples to examine differences in generalist satisfaction with
private sector and public sector specialists within the mental health network.

Table 11 lists each of the seven hypotheses which arise from the four theoretical
propositions supporting m y systems framework together with the null hypotheses, the
test statistic used to examine relationships between variables, and the instrument used to
collect data and measure the phenomena.
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Table 11: Hypotheses by
relationships

test

and

measure

used

to

examine

Hypothesis 1: V o l u m e of exchange between generalists a n d medical
specialists varies significantly with alliance activity.
H o m i = m 2 ; H a m i > m 2 (a one-tailed test); test statistic - Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test; instrument used General Practitioner Questionnaire: Questions 13 and Question 14 and
Question 21 (Appendix 1).
Hypothesis 2: Generalist satisfaction with a specialist firm varies
significantly with v o l u m e of exchange.
H o m i = mx, H a m i > m 2 ; (one-tailed test); test statistic - Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test; instrument used - protocol administered in interview (Appendix 2).
Hypothesis 3: Volume of exchange between generalists and medical
specialists varies significantly with specialist compliance with n o r m s of
practice.
H o m i = m 2 ; H a m i > m 2 (a one-tailed test); test statistic - Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test; instrument used General Practitioner Questionnaire: Questions 21 and Question 22
(Appendix 1).
Hypothesis 4: The volume of exchange between generalist and health
professional agency is positively associated with the provision of feedback by
specialist agencies.
H o - there is no association between volume of exchange and the provision of feedback by health
professionals; H a - there is a positive association between volume of exchange and the provision
of feedback by specialist agencies; test statistic - Spearman's correlation coefficient; instrument
used General Practitioner Questionnaire: Question 15 and Question 16 (Appendix 1).
Hypothesis 5: Volume of exchange between generalist and specialist firms
varies significantly with familiarity of the principals (the greater the n u m b e r
of years the generalist has exchanged with the specialist the greater the
volume of exchange).
H o m i = m 2 ; H a m i > m 2 (one-tailed test); test statistic - Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test; instrument used - protocol administered in interview (Appendix 2).
Hypothesis 6: The percentage of patients returned to generalists for on-going
care is positively associated with generalist satisfaction with the care
provided to patients by medical specialists.
H o - there is no association between the percentage of patients returned and generalist satisfaction
with patient care; H a - there is a positive association between the return of patients by
medical specialists and generalist satisfaction; test statistic - Spearman's correlation coefficient;
instrument used General Practitioner Questionnaire: Question 19a correlated with Question 12
(Appendix 1).
Hypothesis 7: The percentage of patients for whom the generalist receives
feedback from specialists (medical firm or health professional agency) is
positively associated with generalist satisfaction with communication.
H o - there is no association between the percentage of patients for w h o m the generalist receives
feedback and generalist satisfaction with communication with specialists; H a - there is a positive
association between the provision of feedback by specialists and generalist satisfaction; test
statistic - Spearman's correlation coefficient; instrument used General Practitioner Questionnaire:
Question 20a correlated with Question 11 and Question 20c correlated with Question 16
(Appendix 1).
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RESEARCH STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE VALIDITY
AND RELIABILITY

One of the strengths of qualitative research is gaining an understanding of the context i
which social phenomena occur. Limitations include problems of selective perception and
the possibility of drawing hasty conclusions. By combining survey research with
qualitative approaches to data collection, the researcher has sought to address, to some
extent, the limitations of each method. Several strategies have been recommended for
improving the quality of case study research which relies, in part, on qualitative data
(Yin, 1989: 41). Each strategy seeks to address one of four research design tests. These

include construct validity, reliability, internal validity and external validity. This st
has sought to minimise the limitations of the approach employed by applying many of the
strategies proposed by Yin. Table 12 summarises the strategies to address each design
challenge.

Multiple sources of evidence have been obtained to provide converging evidence and to
develop a chain of evidence concerning alliance maintenance. In addition, key
informants and participants have reviewed case study reports as a means of participant

validation. A panel of experts was used to address issues of face validity with respect t

survey instruments. Strategies used to address issues of external reliability included th
development of a study protocol and the use of questionnaires and interview protocols.
A data base was developed for the systematic management of information and reports
were generated at critical stages throughout the project, including reports for research
workshops and two reports for government funding bodies. A departure point from
Yin's (1989) design was the use of a randomised controlled survey involving two patient
care networks. This, within region survey, strengthens, to some extent, the external

reliability of the findings. Access to medical generalist and specialist firms in two fur
regions provided the opportunity to explore similarities and differences in alliance
maintenance in two further locations thereby strengthening, to a limited extent, the
internal validity of the study.
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Table 12: Research strategies designed
reliability
Test of quality (Yin, 1989: 41)
Construct validity
Use multiple sources of evidence:
convergence of evidence

to enhance

validity

and

Strategies employed in this study

Sources: two networks within one health region supplemented
by data from two further regions, involving representatives of
generalist and specialist firms and consultation of documents,
archives, and artefacts, and experts.
Methods: focus groups, surveys; interviews; workshops.

Establish chain of evidence

• Have key informants review draft
reports

Phases of data gathering: 1) preliminary stage to define allianc
and norms of practice and develop study instruments; 2) pilot
study of alliances within a regional network; 3) two-case survey
of generalists and specialists to describe the networks and
alliance activity; 4) two-case survey of generalists and specialists
to explore alliance maintenance; 5) research workshops and
interviews with managers; 6) additional data to explore the
influence of environmental on alliance maintenance and issues in
private sector/public sector exchanges.
Two research workshops to review draft reports- participant
validation
Panel of experts to review survey instrument (face validity).

Reliability
• Use a study protocol

Documented plan of action developed including study protocols.
Survey instrument tested for external reliability (Test-retest r
0.76).

• Develop a study data base

Quantitative and qualitative data bases developed with reports
prepared for research workshops and funding bodies.

Internal validity
• Do pattern matching

Pattern matching used across exchange categories and cases.

External validity
• Use replication logic in multiple-case Replication across cases
studies
Randomised controlled survey within two regional health care
networks defined by patient condition
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SUMMARY
This Chapter has listed the research questions and restated the propositions and
hypotheses supporting the Systems Framework developed in Chapter 4 (Figure 5). Like
other case study research involving networks, there are multiple levels of analysis and

multiple units of analysis. The primary unit of analysis is the alliance, however, in this
study alliances are examined within the framework of a regional network of exchange
relationships and it is the network that constitutes the case. The methodology provides
opportunity for the establishment of a chain of converging evidence with data collected
from multiple sources using a range of methods. Quantitative data collection methods
include survey method, structured interviews, and records from health authorities, while
focus groups, loosely framed interview questions, consultation with organisational
representatives and other significant people, provide qualitative data. The strategies for
managing and analysing qualitative and quantitative data have been described together
with the computations employed to test relationships between variables. Finally, the

Chapter outlines the strategies used to enhance the validity and reliability of the study.
These strategies address challenges to construct validity, reliability, internal validity
external validity associated with case study research and survey research.
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6. FINDINGS
The findings are presented in a manner consistent with Table 10 (p 183). In the first
instance, the participants in the study are reported. Then follows the results from the pilot
study. The pilot study is labelled Stage 2 since Stage 1 data was presented in Chapter 5,
Research Design and Methodology. Stage 3 describes and compares findings about the
two urban networks with particular emphasis on patterns of interdependence. Stage 4
addresses alliance findings and reports quantitative and qualitative outcomes including
descriptions of alliance and its governance. In addition, relationships between variables
and the outcomes from hypothesis testing are reported. Stage 5 presents outcomes from
two research workshops including participant validation of the study findings and the
findings arising from interviews with managers. Stage 6 reports the results of a focus
group of city-based general practitioners with particular emphasis on exchanges between
generalists and public sector specialist agencies.

STUDY PARTICIPANTS
In all, 148 people participated in the study (Table 13) of whom 78 were small business
generalists, 13 were small business medical specialists, 45 were salaried health
professionals from 7 agencies and 12 were managers.

In the Rural Region, 6 small business general practitioners participated and the two
resident small business physicians participated. The researcher interviewed the Chairman
of the Association of General Practice from the Rural Region and all relevant health
professionals in the region. In addition, the director of the hospital unit and the regional
health authority manager were interviewed.

In the Urban Region, 61 small business general practitioners and 11 small business
medical specialists participated. In addition, the three chairmen of the relevant medical
divisions participated, one of w h o m was also the director of public sector psychiatric
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services. All relevant public sector health professional agencies participated. In addition,

a private health professional agency was represented. The directors of the public secto
health professional agencies were among managers interviewed.

In the City Region 11 small business general practitioners participated including the C
of the Division of General Practice. In addition, the director of the public sector

psychiatric services for the region was interviewed together with a director of hospita
community psychiatric services. No attempt was made to involve small business
psychiatrists or health professional agencies in the City Region.

Table 13: Participants by network and stage of data collection

Category

Stage 2: Stages 3 and 4:
Rural
Urban Network

Stage 6:
City
Total

Diabetes Diabetes Mental 111. Mental III.
• Small business generalists
individuals interviewed

6

33

28

11

78

(6)

(6)

(8)

(H)
1

(3D

- Division Chair

1

1

• Small business medical
specialists

2

5

6

_

13

- Division Chair

-

1

1

1

3

• Specialist Hospital Units

1

-

1

1

3

• Health Prof. Agencies

(D

(D

(5)

-

(7)

- Individuals participating

2

6

37

-

45

- Managers interviewed

1

1

1

-

3

• Study participants

13

46

74

14

148

1

3

"•Individuals interviewed are subsets of the two samples of small business generalists.
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STAGE 2: PILOT STUDY - RURAL REGIONAL
NETWORK
This stage of evidence collection provided opportunity to gain data about generalistspecialist alliances in a disadvantaged rural region and to trial the study methodology
situation involving small numbers. One patient care network of service providers was

considered, namely, the network for care of people with diabetes mellitus. The report of
findings includes 1) a description of the industry environment, 2) sample response, 3)
the people in the network, 4) patterns of interdependence, 5) generalist-specialist

alliances including norms of practice governing alliances, 6) data relevant to exploring
relationships between variables pertinent to the research question.

Industry environment
The population of the rural region is 68,288. It is located approximately 200 kilometres
south of Sydney and 80 kilometres from the nearest secondary level hospital referral
centre. The residents are widely dispersed across 4,566 square kilometres (14.95

persons per square kilometre) of beautiful rural country side, much of which borders the
ocean. Because of its beauty, many people choose to retire in this area. Socioeconomically the people are less well off than most people in the State of New South
Wales, scoring 2.56 per cent below the State average (Illawarra Area Health Service,

1994a). Sixteen per cent of the population are over the age of sixty five, which is highe
than the State average and 2.52 per cent of the population are Aboriginal which is also
higher than the State average.

The provision of health services relies heavily on small business general practitioners.
However, like most rural areas in Australia the region has comparatively few general
practitioners. While the overall general practitioner-population ratio for the State of
South Wales is 1:754 (Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community
Services, 1992: 68), the ratio in this Rural Region is 1:1428 (Illawarra Area Health
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Service, 1994a). Patient access to services outside the region depends on rail transport or
the use of private cars.

Response: convenience sample
Eight of the 43 general practitioners registered with the local Association of General
Practice responded to a letter inviting them to contact the researcher. This approach to
gaining a sample w a s taken on the advice of the Chair of the Association of General
Practice. O f the eight w h o responded, two refused to participate and the remaining six
agreed to be interviewed. The two resident consultant physicians w h o were named by the
general practitioners agreed to participate in the study as did the three relevant public
sector health professionals and the director of community services for the region.

The actors in the network

The six general practitioners identified five physicians (two resident and three visiting
w h o provide support for the care of people with diabetes mellitus. Four health
professionals were identified (the hospital dietitian, two nurses with specialist expertise,
and one podiatrist). Table 14 reports the background characteristics of respondents.

In summary, the network for care of people with diabetes mellitus in the rural region
includes five exchange categories, namely: 1) small business general practitioners of
w h o m there are 43, 2) two resident small business consultant physicians, and 3) at least
three visiting physicians, 4) a small public sector hospital unit with 2.6 staff which
includes the clinical director of the unit, and 5) a diabetes education unit which consists
of two full-time and one half-time nurse. This unit is located within the local, public
sector community health agency.
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Table 14: Profile of respondents: Rural Region

Characteristics of respondents

Respondents
1.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Small business generalists (n=6)
Type of practice:
2 solo practice; 4 group practice
Time since graduation:
4 more than 10 years; 2 less than 10 years
Gender:
4 male; 2 female
6 yes
Vocationally registered:
Practice hours:
6 full-time
Method of remuneration:
6 fee-for-service

2 . Small business
• Type of practice:
• Qualifications:
•
•
•
•

physicians

Gender:
Years of practice in the Region:
Practice hours:
Method of remuneration:

Both solo
Both Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians
one with a Diploma of Education
Both male
16 years; 4 years
Both full-time
Both fee-for-service

3. Public sector health professionals
• Type of practice:
3 employees of the Regional Health Authority
• Qualifications
2 Registered Nurses & additional qualifications
1 Master of Science (Nutrition and Dietetics)
• Gender:
3 Female
• Years of practice in the region:
1, 5, and 10 years
• Method of remuneration:
3 salaried

4. Regional health authority
Personal characteristics:
Type of organisation:
Size:
Operating budget:
Organisation:

manager
Male; mid-forties; full-time salaried employee
Community health service
62 Full-time equivalent positions
$2,695 million
15 community teams - the diabetes staff of 2.5
persons is one of the teams with a budget
of $115,000

Patterns of interdependence
Three issues are explored with respect to patterns of interdependence, namely, the
direction of exchanges between actors, the volume of exchange between exchange

categories and the extent to which any exchange category mediates the flow of resourc
1. The direction of exchanges between members of the network

All six general practitioners reported managing up to 25 patients with diabetes mell

during the past twelve months. Four general practitioners said they referred 50 per c
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or more of their patients with diabetes to consultant physicians and two referred fewer

patients. All six general practitioners receive feedback from physicians for 100 per cen

of referred patients. In addition, they reported that 100 per cent of their patients were
returned to their care indicating that exchanges between these two categories are

reciprocal. However, general practitioners reported that they received substantially les
feedback from health professionals. For example, three general practitioners said they

received feedback for less than 25 per cent of the patients referred to health professio
indicating that the flow of exchanges is mainly one way between these two exchange
categories. Exchanges between specialist exchange categories were described as
reciprocal with the consultant physicians being used as advisers and resource people by
health professionals.
2. Volume of exchange between members of the network

Table 15 displays the volume of exchange between the four exchange categories based on
respondents' estimates as to whether verbal and written business exchanges have been
"frequent", "occasional", "rare" or "not at all". Each exchange category was numbered
from zero (not at all) to three (frequent exchanges). The findings indicate that all
participants in the network are exchanging frequently with at least one other category.
Variation in exchange is small, with the Health Agency scoring the maximum possible
weighted average of 3.

From interview it became clear that the averaging of scores within exchange categories
masks the influence of individuals on the flow of resources within the network. For

example, one physician has frequent contact with all exchange categories while the other
has few exchanges. Furthermore, one health professional, who has practised in the
region for more than 10 years, has frequent exchanges with members of all exchange
categories while other health professionals have less exchanges. This finding suggests
that the averaging of exchange category scores arising from survey data has serious

limitations unless combined with qualitative data which provides insight into the influe
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of individuals on volume of exchange. The Director of Community Services spoke

against the practice of doctors referring patients to nominated individuals within the

diabetic team. He preferred that patients be referred to the service. Should the Direct

implement a policy to achieve this objective, it would have a significant effect on the
ability of the individual health professional to influence the flow of exchange and

demonstrates a lack of understanding for the way doctors manage exchange relationships.
This policy could act as a barrier to improved service integration between health
professionals and doctors.

Table 15: V o l u m e of exchange
weighted average

Exchange
category

Health
Agency

• Health Agency

-

between

Private
Physicians

members

of the network-

General
Practitioners

Hospital
Unit

Frequent

Frequent

Frequent

-

Frequent

Frequent

• Private Physician s

Frequent

• Gen.Practitioners

Frequent

Occasional

• Hospital Unit

Frequent

Frequent

Weighted Score

3

2.7

-

Rare

2.3

Rare

-

2.3

3. V o l u m e of exchange and pattern of alliance activity
Five out of six general practitioners reported having an alliance arrangement with a
consultant physician and in all cases the same resident consultant (A) was nominated.
Consultant A had frequent exchanges with all members of the network. Consultant A had

been in the region for four years while consultant B had been in the region for more t
16 years. Consultant A reported having alliances with general practitioners while
consultant B had none.
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Three of six general practitioners reported having an alliance with health professionals and
the three health professionals all reported having alliances with general practitioners. The
comment was m a d e by health professionals that they only establish alliances with general
practitioners w h o demonstrate a willingness to communicate. S o m e health professionals
saw general practitioners as wanting a "doctor-only" alliance which acted as a barrier to
cooperation.

Health professionals also reported having alliances with consultant physicians.
Consultant physician A confirmed that he had alliance arrangements with health
professionals.
4. Satisfaction with exchange relations

Table 16 summarises satisfaction scores with exchange relations. The ratings on the
horizontal axis provide the s u m of the ratings for a given exchange category while the
ratings on the vertical axis indicate the satisfaction for the particular exchange category.
The ratings for each exchange category indicate reasonable levels of satisfaction with
patient care and communication. However, general practitioners and the public hospital
unit indicate mutual dissatisfaction. These qualitative findings refer to the first
proposition namely, that "actor satisfaction is positively associated with organisational
interdependence". T h e two exchange categories which received the highest network
rating are the two with the greatest volume of exchange (Table 15) and hence the findings
are in the direction predicted by Proposition 1.
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Table 16: Satisfaction with exchange relations
Exchange
category

Health
Agency

Private
Physicians

General
Practitioners

Hospital
Unit

Network
Average
Rating
(7 = very
satisfied)

PC*

C#

Health
Agency

Private
Physicians

7

7

General
Practitioners

4

6

6.5

7

PC

C

PC

C

PC

C

PC

C

6.5

4.5

4.8

3.6

6

6

5.8

4.7

7

6.6

4.5

4.5

5.9

6

3

2

-

5.5

5.7

-

7

3

2

5.7

4.8

4.2

4.2

4.6

5.2

5.3

5.2

5.1

Hospital

Unit

Exchange
Category
6
Rating
(7 = very
satisfied)
*PC = Patient Care
# C = Communication

6.6

6.5
6

-

4.3

4

Generalist-specialist alliances

At the alliance level of analysis, important issues include participant descriptions of wha
constitutes an alliance, the rewards pertaining to established alliances and the norms of
practice governing alliances. In addition, this section explores whether alliances
involving private sector generalist and specialist firms differ from alliances involving
public sector specialists and private sector generalists.

1. Definitions of alliance
Table 17 provides definitions of alliance from the perspective of three exchange

categories, general practitioners, consultant physicians and health professionals. There is
consensus among exchange categories as to the role of the general practitioner, the
consultant and the health professional. However, consultants were ambivalent about the
term "shared care". One indicated he did not use the term and the other thought it over-
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simplified a very complex relationship involving consultant and general practitioner.

Nevertheless, five of the six general practitioners reported that they have a "shared c

arrangement with this consultant and the three health professionals indicated they als
have shared care arrangements with this consultant.

Table 17: Definitions of alliance (shared care) from the perspective of
each exchange category
General practitioners
- Shared care is where the consultant acts as a consultant (ie. sees patients with problems) to the
benefit of both patient and general practitioner. This includes the consultant adopting an educator
role.
- Shared care is where the general practitioner manages the day-to-day ongoing care and refers
patients to consultants for special examinations with the general practitioner maintaining
responsibility for the on-going care of patients.
Consultant physicians
- The term shared care implies that the general practitioner should control the primary care needs of
their patients and the consultant should act as a consultant.
Health professionals
- Shared care involves sharing responsibility with someone else (ie. general practitioners with
medical specialists and health professionals).
- Shared care implies responsibility for the general practitioner in the day-to-day management of
patients - the general practitioner becomes the "linch-pin" and makes sure others, including
consultants, are used appropriately.

2. T h e rewards of alliances

Qualitative data about the rewards of alliances dealt with four subjects: rewards for
patients, rewards for general practitioners, rewards for consultants and health
professionals and rewards for the health care system (Table 18). Rewards associated
with alliances incorporate both "hard" and "soft" issues. Among the hard issues are
improved patient outcomes, better deployment of resources and reduced workloads. Soft
issues include "increased confidence in what the team is doing". Three exchange
categories in this "resource poor" rural region mention "decreased workload" as an

expected benefit of alliances suggesting that these providers have heavy workloads and
perceive a need to pool resources. Of interest is the emphasis placed on "knowledge of
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what other providers are doing" suggesting that alliances m a y help to reduce professional
isolation.

Table 18: T h e rewards of alliances
T h e rewards for patients (according to providers)
- Better quality of care and better health outcomes
- Greater confidence in what the various providers are doing
- Ability to cross-check what each provider is doing without duplication
The rewards for general practitioners
- Decreased workload
- Education and career support
- Knowledge of what other providers are doing
The rewards for consultants and health professionals
- Decreased workload
- Increased information base
- A more holistic view of the patient from communications with generalists
- Increased trust in what other providers are doing
- Knowledge that the team is guiding the patient to better self-care and selfmonitoring
- Seeing m y hard work have an impact on the skills of generalists and on patient health outcomes
The rewards for the health system
- Improved resource deployment. However, for this benefit to be realised consultants should
receive training in h o w to act as consultants to other health providers.

3. N o r m s of practice governing established alliances
The General Practitioner Questionnaire (Appendix 1) sought a description of the "gold
standard" of norms of practice governing exchange relationships between small business

generalists and specialists. The respondent was asked to nominate the specialist who sets
the "gold standard" and then to indicate the exchange behaviours of this person. This
provided the researcher with opportunity to examine similarities and differences between
specialists in terms of norms of practice. Consultant A was nominated by all six general
practitioners as setting the gold standard in this small rural network.

Table 19 summarises the norms of practice governing established alliances from the
perspective of each exchange category. Four norms of practice were identified, namely,
communication, competent patient care, trust and respect.
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The findings indicate differences in the norms of practice governing alliances involving
private sector general practitioners and public sector health professionals. Unlike small
business physicians, public sector health professionals did not mention trust as an
important factor. For health professionals, behaviours that demonstrate respect for the
role of health professionals are important while physicians did not mention this issue.
For health professionals, indicators of respect include acknowledging communications
and accepting recommended treatments. Like physicians, health professionals are only
prepared to enter alliance with generalists who meet their expected norms of practice;
approximately 25 to 50 per cent of generalists in the region were reported as meeting
these criteria.
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Table 19: N o r m s of practice governing alliances from the perspective
of each exchange category
General practitioners Consultant
Communication
- Feedback within a
week (5)
- Acknowledges
referral and says
what he did and
why (5)
- Communicates by
telephone and letter
(4)

Competent
patient
care
- Care provided is
good to very good (6).
- Communicates well
with patients.
Trust
- Returns all patients
(5).
- Speaks well to
patients about me(2).

Respect
- Respect for the way
the specialist
practices medicine(5)

physicians Health professionals

Hospital Specialty
Unit

- Contacts by telephone - Writes an informative
if concerned about a
referral letter which
patient.
indicates what he/she
- Writes a referral letter
wants m e to do and
with details about
contains information
investigations,
about medication
medications and asks
history, laboratory
specific, questions.
results and diet
Is available by
treatments.
telephone.
- Is available
by
telephone.

- S o m e o n e w h o is
approachable and
contacts
us
by
telephone.
- Writes an informative
referral letter.
- Someone who
communicates well.

- Picks up ideas quickly.

- Is knowledgeable.

- Is knowledgeable
and gives m e
- Is knowledgeable.
confidence in his/ her
ability to care for
- Gives m e confidence in
his/her ability.
patients.

- Trust is most
important - all other
factors
follow
automatically- patient
feedback is the best
indicator.
- Someone with w h o m
patients
feel
comfortable.
- Informal contact is
important.

- Treats health
professionals as
equals.
- Acknowledges receipt
of
communications.
- Respects what I
recommend.
- Understands the
role of health
professionals.
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- S h o w s respect by
talking with us and
accepting what w e
recommend.
- Treats us as equals.
- Demonstrates
understanding of
what w e do and of our
time constraints
- Is
willing
to
relinquish
some
power.

Factors maintaining alliances
This section presents data relevant to exploring relationships between 1) actor satisfaction
and volume of exchange, 2) volume of exchange and compliance with norms of practice,

and 3) compliance with norms of practice and actor satisfaction. Because of the nature o
the sample no statistical calculations have been undertaken. However, frequency tables

provide an indication of the direction of the data relating to the three relevant hypoth
1. Actor satisfaction and volume of exchange

The protocol for exploring this issue was trialed in interview with five of the six gen
practitioners (Appendix 2). The results are reported in Table 20. The data is in the
direction of the hypothesis that "Generalist satisfaction with specialist firms varies
significantly with volume of exchange".

Table 20: General practitioner satisfaction with exchange relations and
v o l u m e of exchange
High volume
Generalists(n=5) Satisfaction
(very dissatisfied = 1 ; with patient
very satisfied = 7)
care
Mean/Median

consultant

Low

volume

consultant

Satisfaction
with
communication

Satisfaction
with patient
care

Satisfaction
with
communication

6.6/7

3.6/3

3.4/3

6.4/6

2. V o l u m e of exchange and compliance with n o r m s of practice

The General Practitioner Questionnaire sought information about volume of generalist
exchange with specialists and specialist compliance with norms of practice. Table 21

reports the relevant findings. The data is in the direction of the hypothesis that "Volu

of exchange between generalists and medical specialists varies significantly with speci
compliance with norms of practice".
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Table 21: V o l u m e of exchange a n d compliance with n o r m s of practice

Generalists (n=5)

Consultant w h o most
complies with norms of
practice

Volume of exchange
Mean/Median

Other consultants with
w h o m the generalist has
had exchange during the
previous 6 months

129

891

21.5/23

17.8/13

Note:
1. A n average was computed for the volume of exchange with "other" nominated consultants after
removing the number of exchanges with sub-specialists with w h o m the generalist would be
expected on technical grounds to have a low volume of exchange.

3. Compliance with n o r m s of practice a n d actor satisfaction
The General Practitioner Questionnaire was also used to collect data about generalist

satisfaction with specialists, in terms of the care provided to patients and communication
in order to explore the relationship between specialist compliance with norms of practice
and generalist satisfaction.

With respect to physicians, there was little variation in compliance with norms of practic

All six generalists reported receiving feedback for up to 100 per cent of referred patient
and they were very satisfied with communication with consultants. Similarly, five of the
six generalists reported that up to 100 per cent of their patients were returned by
consultants and that they were very satisfied with exchanges with consultants.

The situation with health professionals was substantially different. The findings suggest

that the provision of feedback by health professionals is related to generalist satisfacti
with communication (Table 22).
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Table 22: General practitioner satisfaction with
feedback f r o m health professionals

Generalists

1
2
3
4
5
6

Proportion of patients for
which the generalist receives
feedback

communication by

Generalist satisfaction with
communications with health
professionals (very dissatisfied =
1; very satisfied = 7)

1
2
2
5
7
5

2 5 % or less
2 5 % or less
2 5 % or less
26-50%
51-70%
76-100%

Issues arising from the pilot study

As a result of the pilot study it was decided that the General Practitioner Questionnai
was a suitable instrument for conducting a randomised survey of generalists in the Urban
Region and that the interview protocols for use with specialists and managers worked
well. However, with respect to the protocol for use in interviews with generalists it was
decided to add a further Likert scale for exploring the relationship between the length of
time that a generalist had k n o w n a specialist and volume of exchange. This decision was
taken because several participants indicated that familiarity had a substantial influence on
the number of their exchanges with other actors. Furthermore, the literature supports this
proposition.
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STAGE 3: PATTERNS OF EXCHANGE WITHIN TWO
URBAN REGIONAL NETWORKS
This section describes the industry environment and the two networks, namely, the

network of small business generalists and specialists and public sector agencies for car
of people with mental illness and diabetes mellitus. The data for each case were first

analysed separately. However, the data for both cases are presented together so that the
reader can observe differences across cases.

A randomised controlled survey of small business general practitioner firms and the
specialist organisations with which they exchange was conducted and is reported. The
descriptive data concerning the two networks is presented under five headings: 1) the
industry environment, 2) the response rate, 3) the organisations and people, 5) patterns
of organisational interdependence, and 5) patterns of alliance activity.

The industry environment of the two networks
This Urban Region is located 80 kilometres South of Sydney. The area extends along the
coast for approximately 120 kilometres and covers an area of approximately 1087 square
kilometres. The population of the Region numbers approximately 231,200 of which 7.5

per cent are under the age of five, 12 per cent are over the age of sixty five, 24 per ce
the youth are unemployed, 58 per cent receive a low income, 13.5 per cent are from a
non-English speaking background and one per cent are Aboriginal (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 1991). Based on socio-economic indicators, the Region scores marginally
below the New South Wales state average.

The general practitioner-population ratio is approximately 1:1290 (Illawarra Area Health
Service, 1994a). Hence, like the Rural Region, the Urban Region has substantially fewer
general practitioners per head of population than the State average of 1:754
(Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services, 1992: 68).
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The headquarters of the regional health authority is located within the Region, as is the
Regional Hospital.

Little information was available on the extent to which people access resources outside
Region. However, managers of the Regional Health Authority are concerned at the
tendency for people to be referred to Sydney based hospitals because the "outflow" of
patients from the Region has a negative impact on the size of the Region's allocated
budget. Patient access to Sydney based services requires a car, rail or bus journey of one
to two hours.
1. Mental illness and its care

Data about the prevalence of mental illness in the region relies heavily on inpatient dat
According to this data 3.8 people per thousand have serious mental illness of w h o m 60
per cent are under the age of 40 and 86 per cent have functional psychotic disorders or
neurotic personality disorders (Illawarra Area Health Service, 1995). Residents of this
Region are hospitalised for psychiatric illness at a rate which is 20 per cent higher than
that for all N e w South Wales residents. In 1994, the hospital admission rate was 4.37
per 1,000 residents compared with 3.64 for the State as a whole. However, while
residents are hospitalised more, the average hospital stay is shorter, namely, 19.8 days
compared with 153.3 days for the State as a whole (Illawarra Area Health Service, 1995).

The small business psychiatrist plays an important role in caring for people with mental
illness. There are 16 resident psychiatrists. Other specialist psychiatric services include 2
acute care hospital units with a total of 34 beds and one rehabilitation unit with 20 beds, a
psychotherapy centre, a living skills centre, an industrial therapy centre, and an
accommodation service coordinator. A m o n g the health professional agencies are 2
community mental health teams with a total of 21 staff, an adolescent psychiatric service
with 2 staff and a crisis care team with 13 staff (Illawarra Area Health Service, 1995).
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2. Diabetes mellitus a n d its care

T w o - three per cent of residents have diabetes mellitus with the prevalence increasing
with age. This represents a 50 per cent increase from 1966-1981 (Illawarra Area Health
Service Diabetes Centre, 1994).

Specialist services for care of people with diabetes mellitus are heavily dependent on
small business consultant physicians, of w h o m there are 14 (Illawarra Area Health
Service, 1994b), and a diabetes education centre with six salaried staff. Diabetes
patients, w h e n admitted to hospital, are cared for within the general medical wards.

Survey response
The randomised survey of general practitioners achieved an overall response rate of 62
per cent (61/98). F r o m each sample of 49 generalists, 8 were selected by a second
random procedure for interview plus questionnaire completion. O f the 16 generalists
selected for interview, 15 were contacted and 13 (86%) agreed to be interviewed. Eleven
(85%) of the 13 medical specialists contacted were interviewed and 43 health
professionals participated of the 45 contacted (96%).
1. Response from the actors in the mental health network

Fifty seven per cent (28/49) of generalists surveyed about the network for mental illness
responded. All 8 generalists invited to interview agreed to participate.

The survey of general practitioners produced a list of 18 psychiatrists, 4 public sector
mental health agencies and 7 psychologists in private practice (4 practices). Six of the 7
psychiatrists contacted were interviewed (86%) and of these, 3 met the criteria for
inclusion as alliance psychiatrists. All 4 mental health agencies participated (36
individuals) and of 3 three private clinical psychologists contacted, one responded. This
psychologist represented a small group practice.
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2. Response from the actors in the diabetes care network

Sixty seven per cent (33/49) of generalists surveyed about the network for diabetes
mellitus responded. Six of the 8 generalists selected for interview were contacted and, of
these, 5 agreed to be interviewed (63%).

The survey of general practitioners produced a list of 16 consultant physicians and the
Diabetes Education Centre. Five of 6 physicians agreed to be interviewed, of w h o m , 3
met the criteria for inclusion as alliance specialists.

All 6 staff of the Diabetes Education Centre participated. Other people were nominated
physicians and staff of the Diabetes Education Centre as contributing to this network.
These people included 2 opthalmologists and one podiatrist. However, while their
specialist role is important for individuals with particular needs their contribution to the
network was not considered important. Accordingly, they were not included in the
study.
Table 23 summarises the response rate for each network.

Table 23: Response rate by network
Mental health network
Exchange

category

Contacted

Responded

Diabetes care network
Contacted

Responded

• Small business generalists

49

28 57%

49

33 67%

• Small business specialists

7

6 86%

6

5 83%

• Health professionals

39

37 95%

6

6 100%

• Total

95

71 7 5 %

61
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44 72%

Characteristics of respondents

Table 24 reports the characteristics of respondents. With respect to the two samples o
general practitioners, no significant differences were observed. However, the "eyeball"
test revealed that more women had responded to the mental health survey than had
responded to the diabetes care survey. Compared with general practitioners throughout
Australia the sample is characteristic of the profile of general practitioners in large
with respect to gender and years since graduation. However, with respect to type of

practice the sample approximates the metropolitan general practitioner profile and in te

of salaried/fee-for-service practice it appears to be more fee-for-service oriented than
general practitioner profile for Australia (Britt, Miles, Bridges-Webb et al., 1993).

Few differences were observed between the two groups of medical specialists, except th

the physicians tended to be a little older than the psychiatrists. However, among heal

professionals substantial differences were observed with the mental health professionals
being more numerous and heterogeneous with respect to qualifications and gender than
diabetes health professionals.
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Table 24: Characteristics of respondents by network
Exchange

category

• Small business generalists
- Graduated more than 10 years
- Vocationally registered
- Male
- Female
- Solo practice
- Group practice
- Full-time practice hours
- Part-time practice hours
- Fee-for-service payment
- Salaried payment
- Salaried and fee-for-service
• Small business specialists
and hospital specialists
- Years since graduation
•Range
•Mean

Mental health network Diabetes care network

(n=28)

(n=33)

78%
91%
82%
18%
31%
69%
68%
32%
89%
4%
7%

94%
96%
91%
9%
42%
58%
87%
13%
90%
7%
3%

(n=6)

(n=5)

6-28

20-24

15

22

-Male

6

5

- Solo practice
- Group practice
- Hospital Sessions

4

5

- Fee-for-service payment
- Salaried payment
- Sessional payment
- Years in practice in Region
•

Health professionals

1 P/T

1 P/T

3

2

4
2
3

5
1
2

5-15

11-19

(n=37)

(n=6)

- Qualifications
• Nursing with specialisation
• Clinical psychologists
• Social Work/Welfare
•Other

70%
19%
7%
4%

-Male
- Female

54%
46%

100%

- Group practice

100%

100%

- Salaried employees

97%

100%

- Years in practice in region

4-25

3-10

100%
(3 with M S c all
accredited in specialty)

The size of the networks
From the records of the Division of General Practice, information supplied by key

informants and survey of general practitioners an estimation can be made of the total
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of each network vis a vis m y two samples. Within the region there are approximately 100
small business general practitioner firms (57 solo practice firms and 43 group practice
firms). These organisations are c o m m o n to both networks. F r o m the information
provided by generalists and key informants, the overall size of each network is estimated
as follows:

1. The mental health network

In all, the mental health network contains approximately 134 organisations and 244
people which can be grouped into 5 exchange categories, namely, 1) small business
general practitioner firms, 2) 18 small business psychiatrist firms, 3) two public hospital
units, 4) four private sector health professional firms, and 5) four public sector health
professional agencies.
2. The diabetes network
The total number of organisations in the diabetes care network is approximately 118 and
the total number of people is approximately 205. The exchange categories in this network
include 1) small business general practitioners, 2) 16 small business physicians, 3) the
public hospital, and 4) a public sector health professional agency.

Hence, from a health provider perspective the mental health network is larger and more
diverse than the diabetes network. Furthermore, these findings suggest that medical
condition has a substantial influence on network size.

Patterns of interdependence in the mental health network
In this section each network is described in terms of the functions of the actors, the
direction of exchanges between actors, the volume of exchange between exchange
categories, the satisfaction of the actors and the extent to which any exchange category or
individuals mediate the flow of resources. Qualitative comparisons are detailed across the
two networks.

228

A n attempt w a s m a d e to gain a comprehensive description of the flow of resources by

consulting the records of the regional health authority concerning referrals to hospital
units and health professional agencies. However, the researcher was advised by staff of
the health authority that the data included in records was highly unreliable. Hence, the
information on flow of resources depends predominantly on data gained by survey.
1. The functions of the actors in the mental health network

Most general practitioners indicated that, in the last twelve months, they had managed 10

25 patients with mental illness and that most of their patients suffered from depression,
mood disorders and personality disorders. In interview, approximately fifty per cent of

general practitioners knew about the mental health services provided by the public secto
mental health agencies.

Private psychiatrists reported managing 40-70 patients per week (mean patient load 53).
The type of patient condition managed by psychiatrists varied substantially between
private sector psychiatrists and psychiatrists with public hospital appointments. Of
patients managed by private psychiatrists, approximately 50 per cent were reported as
having anxiety disorders, 28 per cent mood disorders and 17 per cent schizophrenia.
Private psychiatrists with public hospital appointments reported managing a higher
percentage of patients with schizophrenia (44%) and less patients with mood disorders
(27%). Public hospital psychiatrists reported that 77 per cent of their patients were
severely disabled, of whom 50 per cent had schizophrenia and 22 per cent were suicidal
and aggressive. All interviewed psychiatrists knew about the services offered by
community mental health agencies.

The crisis care team reported managing patients with schizophrenia and mood disorders

while the records of the regional health authority suggested that the majority of patien
managed by community mental health agencies suffered from anxiety disorders and/or
depression with a few suffering from psychosis. In interview, one of these agencies
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indicated having frequent contacts with general practitioners in their planning sector while

the other agencies indicated having few contacts with general practitioners. On the oth
hand, the four agencies indicated having frequent contact with one another through
regular team meetings and with the two public sector hospital psychiatrists.
2. The direction of exchanges between members of the mental health
network

Fifty per cent of generalists reported that they referred most of their patients with m
illness to a psychiatrist during the previous twelve months and 80 per cent of them
expected to have an on-going involvement with their patients. At the same time, 20 per

cent indicated that they referred most of their patients with mental illness and that t
not wish to have any further involvement with their care. Eighty five per cent of

generalists reported receiving feedback for 76-100 per cent of the patients they referr

psychiatrists. Hence, for those generalists who want continuing involvement in the care

of mentally ill patients, the flow of information exchange is reciprocal. However, only

52 per cent of generalists reported that 76-100 per cent of their patients were returne
suggesting that the flow of resources is not always in the generalises favour.

Private psychiatrists indicated that between 10-30 general practitioners refer to them

regular basis and that they receive 20-30 letters a week from general practitioners. Wi

the general practitioners who refer to them regularly, psychiatrists report having freq
exchanges of a reciprocal nature.

With respect to exchanges with mental health professionals, 30 per cent of general

practitioners reported having frequent contact with any of the services and only 23 per

cent reported receiving feedback from health professionals for 76-100 per cent of refer

patients. This suggests that exchanges between generalists and health professionals are

frequently uni-directional and that the flow of resources does not favour the generalis
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3. T h e volume of exchange between m e m b e r s of the mental health
network
As in the Rural Region a matrix was developed to describe the volume of exchange
between exchange categories. Table 25 summarises the volume of exchange between
members of the mental health network. However, one health professional agency has
been omitted from the matrix. This agency had few exchanges with any other members

of the network because of its very specialised role in the care of mentally ill adol

As with the Rural Region the figures are based on the respondent's estimate of wheth
exchanges have been "frequent", "occasional", "rare" or "not at all". Each category
given a number from zero (not at all) to three (frequent exchanges). The weighted

network score is 2.2. Table 25 indicates that the exchange category "private psychia

plays a central role in mediating the resources of the mental health network. Furthe

exchanges between all public sector health agencies and public hospital units are fr

While general practitioners, as an exchange category, have frequent contacts with pr
psychiatrists they have few contacts with public sector health agencies and units,
suggesting that they prefer to conduct exchanges with small business specialists.

231

Table 25: V o l u m e of exchange between m e m b e r s of the mental health
network (weighted average)

Exchange
category

Private
Psychia
trists

Crisis Care Community
Team
Health
Agencies

Public
Hospital
Units

General
Practitioners

Clinical
Psychol
ogists

Private
Psychiatrisl

-

Frequent

Occasional

Frequent

Frequent

Occasional

Crisis Care
Team

Frequent

-

Frequent

Frequent

Occasional

Rare

Community
Health

Frequent

Frequent

-

Frequent

Occasional

Occasional

Public
Hospital

Frequent

Occasional

Frequent

-

Rare

Rare

General
Practition.

Frequent

Occasional

Occasional

Rare

-

Rare

Clinical
Psycholgst.

Occasional

Occasional

Occasional

Rare

Rare

-

2.8

2.4

2.4

2.2

1.8

1.4

Weighted
Score

5. Satisfaction with exchange relations in the mental health network

Table 26 presents data about the satisfaction of the various actors with exchanges betw
members of the network. The horizontal axis provides the weighted average satisfaction

score for all exchange categories in the network with a particular category. For exampl

the category receiving the highest rating for patient care is private psychiatrists whi
communication the two categories receiving the highest ratings are crisis care and the

community mental health. On the other hand, the public hospital unit received the lowes
rating for patient care and general practitioners received the lowest rating for

communication. The vertical axis provides the overall satisfaction score for a particul
exchange category. Private psychiatrists are the exchange category most satisfied with
communications and patient care. The crisis care team, the public hospital and general
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practitioners are the groups most dissatisfied with exchanges. The general practitioner
rating is consistent with their low frequency of exchange with most exchange categories

apart from private psychiatrists. It is interesting to note that the group least satisfied
exchanges is the public hospital and this is also the group which receives the lowest
network satisfaction rating. The overall network satisfaction scores are 4.8 for patient
care and 4.9 for communication, somewhat lower than that recorded for the rural
network.

As with the rural network, this qualitative data support the prediction that actor
satisfaction with exchanges is related to volume of exchange given that the three most
satisfied exchange categories are those with the highest volume of exchange within the
network (Table 25).
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Table 26: Satisfaction with exchange relations in the mental health
network

Exchange
category

Private
Psychiatrists

C#

PC*
Private
Psychtrists.

Crisis
Care Team

PC
4

C
3

Comm.
Health
Agencies

Public
Hospital
Units

PCC

PC

5

6

6

4

5.7 5.8

6

5

5.3 4.8

7

7

3

6

4.5 3.8

5

5

5.1 5.7

3

6

4.3 4

-

4.6 5.5

4.6 4.4

-

4.2 4.6

-

6

4.3 4.3

-

Crisis Care
Team

6

6

-

Comm.
Health

6

6

5

6

-

Public

4

5

4

4

4

5

-

General
Practitioners.

5.5 6

4

4

4

4

5

Clinical
Psycholgsts.

5

5 5

5

4

-

4.2 4.2

5

5.2

C

General
Practitioners

PC

Clinical
Psychologists

C

PC

C

Network
Average
Rating
(7= very
satisfied)

PC

C

Hospitals

Exchange
Category
5.3
Rating (7 =
very satisfied)

5

5.6

2

3.4 4.5

4.6

4.5

5.7

5

4.9 4.2

4.6 4.3

5

4.8

4.9

* P C = Patient Care
# C = Communication

Patterns of interdependence in the diabetes care network
1. The functions of the actors in the diabetes care network

Seventy per cent of general practitioners reported managing 11 or more patients with

older-onset diabetes mellitus during the previous twelve months. Fifty per cent of gener
practitioners said they referred less than 75 per cent of their patients to consultants

20 per cent reported referring 75 - 100 per cent of patients. The remaining 30 per ce
indicated that they referred very few patients. At interview, all general practitioners
aware of the services offered by the Diabetes Education Centre.
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Physicians reported wide variation in the number of patients managed with diabetes and
the number of generalists from whom they received referrals. Interviewed physicians
indicated that the average number of generalists from whom they received referrals was
166 (range 100-400). The average per-week-diabetes-patient load for any one physician
was 63 (range 10-100) with some physicians reporting that 90 per cent of their patient
load were people with older-onset diabetes while others indicated that this condition
represented 50 per cent of their patient load. At interview all physicians were aware of
the services offered by salaried health professionals.

Staff of the Diabetes Education Centre reported that 75 per cent of their patient load
concerned people with older-onset diabetes with the remaining patient conditions being
gestational diabetes (15%) and early-onset diabetes (10%).

2. The direction of exchanges between members of the diabetes care
network

General practitioners refer fewer of their patients with diabetes mellitus than patients

mental illness. Furthermore, approximately 95 per cent of general practitioners expect to
have on-going involvement in the care of people they refer with diabetes.

Seventy seven per cent of general practitioners reported receiving feedback from

physicians for 75-100 per cent of referred patients. However, only 36 per cent of general

practitioners indicated that 76-100 per cent of their patients were returned by physicia
As with the mental health network, these findings indicate that flow of information
exchange is predominantly reciprocal, while resource exchanges are frequently unidirectional and favour resources flowing to the consultant physician.

Sixty two per cent of general practitioners reported frequent contact with the Diabetes
Centre and 60 per cent indicated that they received feedback from the centre for 75-100
per cent of referred patients. Hence, in comparison to exchanges with mental health
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professional agencies, exchanges between the Diabetes Centre and general practitioners
are more often reciprocal.

3. The volume of exchange between members of the diabetes care
network
The network for care of people with diabetes is homogeneous and dense (Table 27). All

exchange categories report having frequent exchanges with one another. Over 60 per cen

of general practitioners report having frequent contact with the Diabetes Education C

and the Centre reciprocates. Based on averages of reported contacts it appears that no
exchange category mediates the flow of resources in this network. When compared with

the mental health network, the diabetes network is smaller in total number of actors a
all actors are frequently in contact with one another.
Table 27: Volume of exchange between members of the diabetes care
network-weighted average

Genera]
Practitioners

Exchange
category

Private
Consultants

Diabetes
Education
Centre

Private
Consultants

-

Frequent

Frequent

Diabetes Ed.
Centre

Frequent

-

Frequent

General
Practners.

Frequent

Frequent

-

Weighted
Score

3

3

3

4. Satisfaction with exchange relations in the diabetes network

Table 28 presents data on the satisfaction of the various actors with exchanges betwe

members of the diabetes care network. All exchange categories report being reasonably
satisfied with exchanges in terms of the quality of care provided to patients with a
network average of 5.4. However, while the two groups of medical exchange categories
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are satisfied with communications, the staff of the Diabetes Education Centre are not as
satisfied with communications with either of these exchange categories suggesting that
there is a cost for health professionals of increased volume of exchange with doctors.

Table 28: Satisfaction with exchange relations in the diabetes network
Exchange
category

Physicians

PC* C #
Physicians

Diabetes
Education
Centre

PC

C

6

4

Diabetes
Centre

6.3 6.5

General
Practitioners

4.3 4.25

5

5.2

5.5

Exchange
Category
Rating
(7 = very
satisfied)

5.3

General
Practitioners

PC

-

3

3.5

C

Network
Average
Rating
(7 = very
satisfied)

PC

c

5.3 5.3

5.7

4.7

5.2 4.8

5.7

5.7

-

4.7

3.6

5.4

4.7

5.3

5

*PC = Patient Care
# C = Communication

Pattern of alliance activity within the mental health network
1. Prevalence of alliance activity

Forty three per cent of general practitioners report that they have alliance arrangement
with psychiatrists and 9 of the 18 psychiatrists in the mental health network were
nominated as people with whom generalists have alliances. Four of the 12 general
practitioners with alliance arrangements have alliances with more than one psychiatrist;
one doctor has an alliance with 4 psychiatrists.

All psychiatrists reported that they have alliance arrangements with general practitioner
The average number of general practitioners with whom each psychiatrist has an alliance
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is 20. Furthermore, all psychiatrists indicate keen interest in developing further alliance
arrangements.

Only 11 per cent of generalists report having alliance arrangements with mental health

professional agencies while all but one mental health agency said that they have alliance
arrangements with general practitioners. However, the number of general practitioners
with whom these agencies have alliances is small (2-3). Like psychiatrists, mental health
professionals expressed interest to develop further alliance arrangements with general
practitioners. Public hospital doctors recognised a need to improve relationships with
general practitioners.

2. Volume of exchange and pattern of alliance activity

Table 29 displays evidence that alliance activity is related to volume of exchange betwee
actors. At interview, general practitioners and psychiatrists indicated that they choose
their alliance partners carefully. For example, psychiatrists were only prepared to enter
alliance with general practitioners who 1) were willing to enter such an arrangement, 2)

did not "dump difficult patients on the psychiatrist, that is, he/she was willing to joint
sort the person's problems out", 3) was a good communicator in terms of letting the
psychiatrist know what he/she wanted and keeping the psychiatrist informed, 4) was
prepared to take instruction, 5) was willing to spend time with patients, and 6) employed
an appropriate "social model of care".

Table 29: G e n e r a l practitioner v o l u m e of e x c h a n g e with alliance
psychiatrists a n d v o l u m e of exchange with other psychiatrists
General
Exchanges with alliance
practitioners(n= 10) psychiatrists (previous 6 months)
• Number of contacts

Exchanges with other
psychiatrists (previous 6 months)

112

36

3-25

0-10

11.2/13

3.6/3

• Range
• Mean/median

Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p< 0.05
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Pattern of alliance activity within the diabetes care
network
1. Prevalence of alliance activity

Fifty per cent of general practitioners indicated that they have alliances with physici
Of those with alliance arrangements, one half reported alliance with 2 or more
physicians. Twelve of the 16 physicians in the network were nominated as alliancephysicians. Two alliance-physicians who specialise in endocrinology were nominated
three times as often as other physicians. However, two alliance-physicians, who also
specialise in endocrinology, were located outside the region. Interview, and general
practitioner satisfaction ratings, indicate dissatisfaction with two local physicians,

some general practitioners have gone outside the region for physician exchange. General

practitioner comments implied that some physicians manage the patient interface poorly.

All physicians reported alliance arrangements with general practitioners. Physicians

reported being in-alliance with 40-100 (mean 70) general practitioners and three of the
five physicians were keen to establish alliances with other general practitioners.

Twenty three per cent of general practitioners reported alliance arrangements with staf
the Diabetes Education Centre. This was corroborated by the staff of the Centre who
reported alliance arrangements with 20 per cent, or 30-40 general practitioners in the
Region.

2. Volume of exchange and pattern of alliance activity
More general practitioners reported alliance arrangements with other providers in the
diabetes network than in the mental health network. Furthermore, fifty per cent of
alliance general practitioners reported that they only exchange with physicians with
whom they have an alliance. Because over one-half of generalists in alliance only
exchange with alliance physicians, the number of generalists available to examine
differences in general practitioner volume of exchange with alliance and non-alliance
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physicians w a s small. Table 30 reports the findings for seven general practitioners in
alliance with physicians w h o also reported exchanges with other network physicians.
A s with the mental health network, the findings indicate that alliance activity is related to
volume of exchange between generalists and specialists w h e n analysed by the Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test.

No relationship was found between general practitioner/diabetes health professional
alliance and volume of exchange.

Like psychiatrists, physicians were only interested in alliance with general practitio
w h o complied with their expected norms of practice, described by one physician as "the
more able people". According to physician assessment, between one-third and one-half
of general practitioners met their criteria for "more able".
Table 30 G e n e r a l practitioner v o l u m e of e x c h a n g e with alliance
physicians a n d volume of exchange with other physicians
General
practitioners (n=7)
• Number of contacts
• Range
• Mean/Median

Exchanges with alliance
physicians (previous 6 months)

Exchanges with other
physicians (previous 6 months)

65

23

3-25

3-6

9.28/8

3.25/3

Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p< 0.05

Summary
This section has described the industry environment and the two regional networks. A
survey response rate of over 70 per cent was achieved for both networks. Small business
generalist and specialist doctors display similar personal profiles across networks, but
this was not the case with health professionals. T h e number and variety of health
professionals involved in the mental health network is greater than in the diabetes
network.
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The volume and direction of exchanges in the mental health network indicates that private
psychiatrists have greatest influence in the mediation of resources. The volume of
exchange between general practitioners and public sector mental health professionals is
small which may be partly explained by the fact that many general practitioners do not
know about the services offered by health professionals.

Communication exchanges between doctors within networks are generally reciprocal.
However, some exchanges such as the flow of communication between public sector

mental health professionals and general practitioners were from generalist to specialist

General practitioner satisfaction ratings reflect their displeasure with this state of a
However, in the diabetes care network general practitioners reported more feedback from
health professionals, frequent exchanges and being reasonably satisfied with exchanges.

In the diabetes network, generalists expect to have most of their patients returned to t

care by physicians, but only 36 per cent of generalists reported that 76-100 per cent wer
returned suggesting some opportunistic behaviour by physicians. The level of alliance
activity in the diabetes network is substantially higher than it is in the mental health
network with 50 per cent of generalists in-alliance with physicians compared with 43 per
cent in the mental health network.

The qualitative findings reported in this section support the predicted relationship bet
volume of exchange and actor satisfaction. The exchange categories most satisfied with
exchanges in the mental health network are those with the greatest volume of activity.

In the next section, evidence is presented concerning the nature of informal alliances an
the factors which serve to maintain them.
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STAGE 4: TWO-CASE COMPARATIVE STUDY FACTORS MAINTAINING ALLIANCES
This section revisits definitions and rewards of alliance and the norms of practice
governing alliances. First, qualitative data is introduced. Quantitative data is then
presented which examines relationships between variables relating to the theoretical
framework outlined in Chapter 4 (p 147).

Interorganisational alliances
The data concerning definitions, rewards and costs of being in alliance are presented in
tabular form to emphasise differences and similarities in themes across networks.
1. Definitions of alliance

Tables 31 and 32 indicate that general practitioners in this Urban Region associate alli
arrangements with greater financial security and control over the care of patients. Other
important factors for generalists are ready access to expertise and support.

Some physicians believe alliances are beneficial for their practice. For example, one
physician reported that he had m a d e an offer of alliance to 100 general practitioners and
40 had expressed interest.

In both networks the concept of alliance is predominantly associated with linkages
between general practitioners and medical specialists rather than between doctors and
health professionals. However, health professionals supported the practice of "shared
care" and were enthusiastic about developing further alliances with general practitioners.
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Table 31: Definitions of alliance in the mental health network from the
perspective of the actors
General practitioners
- A n arrangement in which both the general practitioner and the specialist look after the patient
- Continued involvement by the general practitioner in patient care following referral to a specialist
(ie. the patient sees the specialist less frequently).
- W h e n the general practitioner has a problem he can happily phone and get c o m m e n t and/or
assistance.
- It involves the general practitioner providing the specialist with feedback.
- It involves specialist - generalist interviews.
- W h e r e the psychiatrist sends patients back to you to supervise progress until the psychiatrist sees
them again.

Psychiatrists
- A n arrangement in which the generalist and the psychiatrist are equally responsible for a patient.
- T h e general practitioner does primary care; I do consultant care - the generalist coordinates the
patient's special needs. This can only happen with general practitioners w h o are prepared to care
for mentally ill patients in the community.
- A n arrangement which requires clearly defined roles- this has to be clarified depending on patient
condition and the expertise of the generalist.
- It involves joint case management. The general practitioner manages the patient- w e provide
information and education and work together as a team.
- W h a t it always should be - the psychiatrist sharing care with the general practitioner.

M e n t a l health professionals
- The joint management of individual patients by various service providers; ie. the client is being
cared for by more than one person.
- It involves multidisciplinary care ie. network care.
- A n agreement to co-manage a client's care needs by instituting an agreed plan with identified
responsibilities and a commitment to review progress.
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Table 32: Definitions of alliance in the diabetes care network from the
perspective of the actors
General practitioners
- A n arrangement in which the general practitioner and the specialist are both involved in the care
of patients with the physician seeing the patient annually and the patient seeing the general
practitioner in-between.
- It involves the general practitioner making the diagnosis and having the on-going management
and calling in the specialist as needed.
- It involves developing a treatment program for a patient which includes the general practitioner,
the physician and the Diabetes Education Centre.
Physicians
- I don't k n o w what it means. I guess it means where the general practitioner controls the referral
process.
- The law requires that all patients are shared through the referral letter.
- A n arrangement in which the care is shared- it involves team management.
- A n arrangement in which the general practitioner retains responsibility for the primary care
functions and the physician takes over the difficult problems.
- It involves m e doing some things and the general practitioner doing some things. S o m e patients
like to be seen by a physician and I do some things better, for example, assessing the difficult
things such as complications. I send the generalists biochemical test results and they send m e
details of the tests and medications that they have prescribed. This type of alliance arrangement is
still developing. O f the 100 or more general practitioners I have offered this type of arrangement
to 40 have expressed interest.

Diabetes care health professionals
- A n arrangement which makes the patient the focal point and uses a multidisciplinary approach to
provide holistic care.

2. T h e rewards of alliance for the respective players

There are similarities across network with respect to the rewards of alliance for each
group of actors (Tables 33 and 34). Participants from both networks emphasise that
alliance arrangements have rewards for customers with one small business physician
indicating that alliances are "good consumerism". According to providers, the rewards
for customers include better quality care, improved access to a range of appropriate
services and improved service coordination. Efficient communication between providers
appears to be equally important for diabetes and mentally ill patients.

For the general practitioner, skill enhancement and on-going education are important
rewards of alliance together with improved access to specialist support. This issue is
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particularly important with respect to the mental health network where the provision of
care to some clients may be quite stressful for providers.

Private sector specialists derive satisfaction from the role of educator and value alliance
exchanges which are free from misunderstanding.

Public sector specialists and health professionals emphasise the benefits for the system
which include improved cost-effectiveness and reductions in the demand on the public
system through transferring care to the private sector general practitioner.
Table 33: T h e rewards of alliance in the mental health network
T h e rewards for patients
- Access to a range of skills. The general practitioner is locally based and easy to access.
- Better quality care, better coordinated care, better consistency and continuity of care; a more
holistic approach with a general practitioner w h o understands and is comfortable with the
patient's h o m e situation.
- Greater confidence in treatment; the general practitioner is supported by the psychiatrist.
- On-going continuity of care with someone w h o knows patient and family and their problems.
- Rapid exchange of information between providers for one-in-three patients w h o need it.
- Satisfaction for the patient and their family.
T h e rewards for general practitioners
- Increased knowledge and support, hence, is able to provide more
comprehensive care.
- Access to specialist support and community facilities. M a n y clients are stressful to manage
and support is important "together w e muddle through".
- Fewer "stuff-ups".
- Satisfaction from knowing the needs of the patient (ie. personal fulfilment).
- Skill enhancement and increased understanding of the current mental health status/functioning
of patients.
T h e rewards for psychiatrists and mental health professionals
- Ability to tailor his/her practice to areas of interest and expertise.
- Gain more complete knowledge of the situation; mutual education "I learn about recent trends
in primary care medicine and the generalists learns specialist information".
- Personal satisfaction through the teacher role- "we try and do it with letters- there should be
more of it".
- Not having his rooms "clogged with cases that can best be handled by a phone call with a
general practitioner".
- Clarification of the expectations of each party and reduction of potential for misunderstanding.
- Less worry about clients through shared responsibility.
T h e rewards for the health system
- Each group of providers do what they do best; improved cost-effectiveness.
- It reduces the load on the public system through management by general practitioners.
- It enhances the professional network of care and enhances the system's ability to see more
clients and meet the needs of more people with mental illness.
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Table 34: T h e rewards of alliance in the diabetes care network
T h e rewards for patients
- Better care to patients; "I feel that the more w e work together the better w e look to our patients
and the more reassured the patient feels".
- They maintain their basic relationship with their family doctor.
- A better coordinated system of care with roles merged.
T h e rewards for general practitioners
- Further education via the letter from the physician which he/she can apply to subsequent
patients.
- Improved patient satisfaction leads to greater generalist and specialist satisfaction. "Alliance
arrangements are good consumerism."
- Retains and enhances the generalist's skills in the management of diabetes.
- Access to specialist support and enhanced communication with health professionals.
T h e rewards for physicians a n d diabetes care health professionals
- A better/broader view of the patient's whole situation.
- Is able to concentrate attention on the harder cases ("the superb general practitioner sends you
superb patients"; "I'm able to do what I a m interested in").
- Satisfaction with the educator role and from having better satisfied patients.
- A better informed consultant w h o is able to react effectively and have confidence in the ability
of others.
- N o fear in doing one another's jobs - less friction.
- Improved communication with general practitioners and physicians for health professionals.

T h e rewards for the health system
- Fewer unnecessary referrals to the public system.

3. T h e costs and pitfalls of alliance

Participants were asked about the costs and pitfalls of alliance. The predominant
message across both networks is the need for effective communication between alliance
partners (Table 35). Good communication prevents conflict and other problems for
customers, such as, confusion over who is responsible for providing their care and
problems of coordination. This was seen as particularly important in the care of people
with severe mental illness who may easily fall through the "net" and, as a result, fail
take essential medication.

For medical specialists one cost of alliance is being readily available to alliance partners
for informal telephone consultations. However, the rewards outweigh the costs of
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lengthy, unexpected telephone consultations. A s expressed by one psychiatrist, "the
smoothness of the relationship makes up for it".
Table 35: The costs and pitfalls of alliance in two networks
T h e mental health network

T h e diabetes care network

General practitioners
General practitioners
• S o m e patients are stressful for the generalist • Conflict m a y occur with respect to w h o is
w h o must take the good with the bad.
monitoring and prescribing medication for the
• Sometimes the general practitioner m a y
patient.
misunderstand a certain line of treatment and
fail to reinforce it adequately and this can have
adverse effects for the patient.
• Differences in opinion about diagnosis and
treatment m a y lead to friction.

Psychiatrists
• Costly if you do not communicate.
• The time spent on the phone (sometimes when
patients are with you), for which you receive
no payment. However, the "smoothness of
the relationship makes up for it".
• If communication breaks down, patients fall
through the gap or duplication occurs. S o m e
mentally ill patients are unreliable in turning
up for appointments and taking their
medication- it is easy for them to fall through
the gaps.
• General practitioners lack the skills for
managing aggressive and violent patients and
they m a y be exposed to situations they cannot
handle.

Physicians
• There are no costs to alliances.
• The potential to be over-used because you are
known to be available for consultation with
the practitioner.
• The potential for alliance partners to overuse
the informal system.
• If communication breaks d o w n patients m a y
wonder w h o is treating them, they m a y fall
between the gaps, they m a y feel they are
being pushed on to someone else.
• Public sector hospital units have used shared
care as a means of unloading difficult patients
on to general practitioners- "we get on very
well here".

Diabetes care professionals
Mental health professionals
• If you do not communicate effectively • If there is poor communication between
providers the patient is left in "limbo".
concerning role responsibilities:
- clients m a y fall through the gap
- the care provided m a y be poor
- conflict m a y occur over treatment
strategies and clients m a y become
confused.
• B e c o m i n g dependent on other service
providers.
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N o r m s of practice governing alliances

Stage 1 and stage 2 of data collection identified four norms of practice governing allianc
between general practitioners, medical specialists and health professionals, namely,
communication, competence, trust and respect. Private sector doctors placed greater
emphasis on issues related to trust while public sector professionals emphasized respect
and equality. In this section of data presentation, the norms of practice that apply to

medical specialists are further explored using data from the survey of general practitione
in the two networks. Because of the consistency between the data gained in Stages 1 and

2 and the data collected in Stage 4 in the urban region concerning norms of practice, this
qualitative data is presented in Appendix 4.

In 95 per cent of cases the medical specialist nominated by general practitioners as setti
the "gold standard" practice governing exchange relationships was nominated as an
alliance specialist.

Table 36 provides a general practitioner description of the behaviours of medical
specialists in the two networks who most comply with alliance norms of practice.

Approximately seventy per cent of general practitioners in both networks report that "gold
standard" medical specialists provide feedback within one week. Psychiatrists make
greater use of the telephone to provide feedback (p < 0.05) and receive a higher rating
with respect to communicating with patients (p < 0.05). Approximately 80 per cent of
generalists in both networks rate "gold standard" specialists as providing educative
feedback and "good" to "very good" quality of care.
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Table 36: A general practitioner perspective of "gold standard" practice
by medical specialists
Norms of practice

Communication
• Method of feedback
- Telephone and letter
- Letter
• Promptness of feedback
- Within a week
- Within a month
- > month

Psychiatrists

Physicians

(n = 28)

(n=32)

54%
46%

70%

30*%

71%
29%

73%
24%
3%

54%

46%

- Acknowledges referral, says
what he/she did & why

29%

27%

- Acknowledges referral, says
what he/she did

17%

27%

Quality of care
- Good to very good
- Average

83%
17%

88%
12%

Communications with patients
- Good to very good
- Average to poor

87%
13%

36%

• Quality of feedback
- Acknowledges referral, says
what he/she did & why &
what I should do

64*%

Mann-Whitney U-Test; p < 0.05

Missing from Table 36 is the "gold standard" measure of return of patients. Interviews
with general practitioners in both networks in the Urban Region confirmed that return of

patients is very important to general practitioners. As stated by one general practition
"I do not send any more patients to specialists who fail to return my patients or to
specialists who fail to communicate with me or to specialists who bad-mouth me in front

of my patients". The study found a significant relationship between the return of patien
and generalists with an alliance arrangement with physicians (Table 37) suggesting that

return of patients is one of the issues motivating generalists to maintain an alliance w
physician. Furthermore, significantly more patients (Mann Whitney U-Test; p < 0.05)
were reported to be returned to generalist care by psychiatrists than by physicians (52%
compared with 36%).
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Table 37: Generalist alliance with physicians a n d the return of patients

Alliance

Percentage of patients returned
< 25%

25 - 5 0 %

51 - 7 5 %

76 - 1 0 0 %

Total

3

2

2

7

14

3
4
6
•No
1. Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p < 0.05

2

15

•Yes

Further statements from general practitioners indicated that feedback from patients and
patient satisfaction with a referral to a specialist is very important. For example, one

general practitioner stated, "What is really important is how the patient feels after see
the specialist".

Four of the six interviewed psychiatrists proposed that personal contact with general
practitioners is important and that it should be fostered in order to improve exchange
relationships; a viewpoint not supported by the majority of interviewed general
practitioners.

Factors maintaining alliances
Having established within two networks that tangible and intangible rewards from
alliances are to be had by the actors and having discovered in both networks that the
norms of practice governing alliances are very similar, it is now necessary to explore
relations between variables in terms of the theoretical framework, namely, the
relationships between 1) actor satisfaction and volume of exchange, 2) volume of
exchange and compliance with norms of practice, and 3) compliance with norms of
practice and actor satisfaction.
1. Actor satisfaction and volume of exchange
The relationship between general practitioner satisfaction with exchanges and volume of
exchange, was investigated using data collected at interview and by questionnaire from
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general practitioners in both networks. The results pertaining to general practitionermedical specialist volume of exchange are presented in Table 38. The findings from both
networks support the hypothesis that "Generalist satisfaction with a specialist firm varies
significantly with volume of exchange".

Table 38: Generalist
specialists

Generalist
satisfaction
(n=13)
(7 = very satisfied)

satisfaction

and volume

High volume of exchange
consultant

of e x c h a n g e

with

L o w volume of exchange
consultant

Satisfaction
with patient
care

Satisfaction
with
communication

• Range

5-7

5-7

2-6

2-5

•Mean

6.11

6.62

3.8!

3.32

Satisfaction
with patient
care

Satisfaction
with
communication

1. Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p < 0.001
2. Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p< 0.001

Responses to the General Practitioner Questionnaire provided an opportunity to examine
any relationship between generalist satisfaction and the frequency of use of health
professionals. In the diabetes care network a weak association (Spearman's rho 0.438)
was found between generalist satisfaction and the frequency of use of health
professionals (Table 39) with 19 per cent of frequency of contact explained by
satisfaction with communication. N o corresponding association was found with respect
to generalist satisfaction and volume of exchange with mental health professionals. This
may be largely explained by the fact that general practitioners have fewer exchanges with
mental health professionals (Table 25) than they do with diabetes health professionals
(Table 27).
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Table 39: V o l u m e of exchange with diabetes health professionals a n d
generalist satisfaction with communication (1 = very dissatisfied;
7= very satisfied)
Satisfaction-communication
Frequency of contact
1 2
•Frequent
•Occasional
1
2
•Not at all
Spearman's rho = 0.438; p < 0.05

3

4

5
1

3

1

1
2
3

6
1
3

7
6
6

2. V o l u m e of exchange a n d compliance with n o r m s of practice

The General Practitioner Questionnaire provided opportunity to examine any relationship
between volume of exchange and compliance with norms of practice. The variables

considered with respect to medical specialists were the number of contacts with the "gol

standard" specialist and the number of contacts with "other" specialists in the generali
exchange network. With health professionals, the variables used were the proportion of
patients for which the generalist receives feedback and the frequency of contact.

Tables 4 0 and 41 report the findings for the mental health network. With respect to
psychiatrists, generalist frequency of contact varies significantly with specialist
compliance with norms of practice. Furthermore, with respect to mental health
professionals, there was a reasonably strong association (Spearman's rho 0.69) between

generalist frequency of contact and the receipt of feedback with 48 per cent of frequenc
of contact explained by the provision of feedback.
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Table 40: Generalist volume of exchange a n d psychiatrist compliance
with n o r m s of practice

General
practitioners (n=20)

Psychiatrist w h o most
complies with norms of
practice (volume of exchange
during the previous 6 months)

1

Other psychiatrists with
w h o m the generalist
exchanges (previous 6 months)

• Total number of
contacts

167

63.5

• Range

3-25

0-11

8.35/8

3.175/3

• Average/Median

Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p < 0.001
Note:
1. A n average was computed for the volume of exchange with "other" nominated psychiatrists after
removing the number of contacts with sub-specialists with w h o m the generalist would be
expected on technical grounds to have a low volume of exchange.

Table 41: Generalist volume of exchange and mental health
professional compliance with n o r m s of practice
Generalist frequency of
contact (n=23)

Percentage of patients for which the generalist
receives feedback
None

< 25%

• Frequent

1

• Occasional

4

•Rare

26-50%
1

51-75%

2
2

76-100%
4

3

2

4

Spearman's rho = 0.69; p < 0.05

As in the mental health network, generalist volume of exchange with physicians identified

as complying with norms of practice was greater than with other physicians (Table 42)
However, no association was found between generalist frequency of contact with

diabetes health care professionals and the provision of feedback. In this situation 6

cent of generalists reported using the service frequently and 95 per cent of these d
indicated that they received feedback for most patients.

It is concluded that the data from both networks supports the proposition that "degr

organisational interdependence is positively associated with compliance with norms o
practice regarding methods of coordination and the development of trust".
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Table 42: Generalist v o l u m e of exchange a n d physician
with n o r m s of practice

General
practitioner (n=24)

Physician w h o most
complies with norms of
practice (volume of exchange
during the previous 6 months)

1

Other physicians with
w h o m the generalist
exchanges (previous 6 months)

• Total number of contacts

201

108.7

• Range

3-25

3-18

8.37/3

4.5/3

• Average/Median

compliance

Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test; p < 0.001
Note:
1. A n average was computed for the volume of exchange with "other" nominated physicians after
removing the number of contacts with sub-specialists with w h o m the generalist would be
expected on technical grounds to have a low volume of exchange.

3. V o l u m e of exchange by familiarity

The general practitioner interview protocol was used to collect data relevant to examining

the relationship between volume of exchange and the length of time that a generalist h
known a specialist within the respective exchange network. The null hypothesis could
not be rejected (Table 43).

Table 43: V o l u m e of exchange by length of time that the generalist had
k n o w n the specialist
N u m b e r of years
k n o w n by the
general practitioner

High volume exchange
specialist

L o w volume exchange
specialist

fe=I2
• Range (years)

1 - 10 or more

1-10 or more

•Average/Median 5.3/4 4.5/5

4. Compliance with n o r m s of practice and actor satisfaction

Variables entering into an examination of the relationship between compliance with norms

of practice and general practitioner satisfaction include: 1) the proportion of patien

returned to generalist care by medical specialists and generalist satisfaction with th
provided to patients, 2) the proportion of patients for which the generalist receives
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feedback from medical specialists and generalist satisfaction with communications, and
3) the proportion of patients for which the generalist receives feedback from health
professionals and generalist satisfaction with communication.

Tables 44 and 45 present the relevant frequencies for both networks. Of note are across-

network differences in 1) the percentage of patients returned by medical specialists (Ta
44: Mann Whitney U-Test p<0.05) 2) the amount of feedback received by generalists
from health professionals (Mann Whitney U-Test; p < 0.01), and 3) generalist
satisfaction with feedback from health professionals (Table 45: Mann Whitney U-Test; p
< 0.05). General practitioners report receiving more feedback from diabetes health
professionals and being more satisfied with communications with these health
professionals than with mental health professionals.

255

Table 44: Specialist compliance with norms of practice: mental health
network and diabetes care network

N o r m s of practice: generalist
perspective (n=27 mental health; 31
diabetes care)

N u m b e r of
specialists w h o
comply: mental
health iletwork

n
•

Percentage of patients returned
by medical specialists:
- 76-100%
-51-75%
- 26-50%
- 1 5 % or less

• Percentage of patients for which
the generalist receives feedback
from medical specialists:
- 76 - 100%
- 52 - 7 5 %
- 26 - 5 0 %
• Percentage of patients for which
the generalist receives feedback
from health professionals:
- 76 - 1 0 0 %
-51-75%
- 26 - 5 0 %
- 2 5 % or less
- no feedback

N u m b e r of
specialists who
comply: diabetes
care network

n

14
8
4
1

52%
30%
15%
3%

11
6
5
9

19%
16%
29%

23
4

85%
15%

-

-

24
5
2

78%
16%
6%

6
5
3
5
4

26%
22%
13%
22%
17%

20
4
2
2
3

13%
6%
6%
10%

*Mann Whitney U-Test; p < 0.05

256

35*%

65*%

Table 45: Generalist satisfaction with exchange relations: mental health
network and diabetes care network
Measure of satisfaction: generalist
perspective (n=27 mental health; 31
diabetes care)

N u m b e r satisfied:
mental health
network

n
•

Satisfaction with medical
specialist patient care:
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied

• Satisfaction with
communications with medical
specialists:
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
• Satisfaction with
communications with health
professionals:
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied

N u m b e r satisfied:
diabetes care
network

n

24
1
2

88%
4%
8%

22
5
5

68%
16%
16%

24

89%

72%
19%%
9%

54*%
25%
21%

-

-

3

11%

23
6
3

9
5
9

41%
22%
37%

15
7
6

*Mann Whitney U-Test; p < 0.05

Furthermore, with respect to the mental health network a reasonably strong positive
association (Spearman's rho 0.769; p < 0.05) was observed between the amount of
feedback received by generalists from health professionals and general practitioner

satisfaction with communications with 58 per cent of generalist satisfaction explaine
the provision of feedback (Table 46). In the diabetes network a somewhat weaker
association (Spearman's rho 0.63) was observed between feedback received by
generalists from health professionals (Table 47).
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Table 46: T h e provision of feedback b y mental health professionals a n d
generalist satisfaction with communication
Percentage of patients for
w h i c h the generalist
receives feedback (n=23)

76-100%
51-75%
26-50%
<25%
None

Generalist

satisfaction

(1 = very dissatisfied; 7 == very satisfied)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2
1

1
1

1
1
2
2
1

2
1
-

2
2
-

1

1
2

Spearman's rho = 0.769; p < 0.05

Table 4 7 : T h e provision of feedback b y diabetes health professionals
a n d generalist satisfaction with communication
Percentage of patients for
which the generalist
receives feedback (n=31)

76-100%
51-75%
26-50%
<25%
None

Generalist satisfaction
(1 = very dissatisfied; 7 = very satisfied)

1
1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

5
.

.

2
2

10
-

1

.

.

1
1
.

-

.
1

.
.

.

Spearman's rho = 0.6258; p < .05

In the mental health network, no relationship w a s observed between the return of

patients, or the amount feedback provided by psychiatrists and generalist satisfaction. A

indicated by Table 45, there was little variation in generalist satisfaction with patient

and with communications with psychiatrists, 88 per cent and more of general practitioners
were satisfied to very satisfied. The situation was different in the diabetes network in

only 35 per cent of generalists reported that most patients were returned to their care a

generalist satisfaction with the care provided to patients by physicians was substantiall
lower. In this network a weak association (Spearman's rho 0.5) was observed between
the percentage of patients returned to generalists and general practitioner satisfaction
the care provided by physicians (Table 48) with 29 per cent of generalist satisfaction
explained by the return of patients.

258

Table 4 8 : R e t u r n of patients b y physicians a n d generalist satisfaction
Percentage of patients
returned to generalist care
(n=23)

76-100%
51-75%
26-50%
<25%
None

Generalist

1
1
1
~

satisfaction

(1 = very dissatisfied; 7 == very satisfied)
2
4
5
6
7
3

2

1
-

4

1
1
2
1

3
1

6
4
1

2

'
Spearman's rho = 0.539; p < 0.05

It is concluded that this quantitative data supports the fourth research proposition,
namely, "that compliance by the partners with the norms of practice governing
exchanges is positively associated with level of satisfaction with an exchange relation".

Issues requiring further examination
During analysis of the data from the two-case study in the Urban Region it became

apparent that substantial differences exist in exchanges between small business generalis
and specialist firms and exchanges between small business generalist and public sector
specialist organisations. Among the differences are expectations about the outcomes of
alliance arrangements and the norms of practice governing exchanges. While general

practitioners expect alliances with specialist organisations to result in the return of p

to their care and the provision of informative feedback, public sector organisations expe
alliances to result in cost reduction through the more efficient use of resources and the
transfer of costs to the private sector. With respect to the norms of practice governing
exchanges, both sectors consider effective communications and quality patient care to be
important, however, of high priority to general practitioners is the return of patients.
Public sector health professionals on the other hand, emphasize respect for the role of
specialist health professionals and being treated as equal members of the health team.
These differences were particularly apparent in the mental health network with its
extensive reliance on the public sector. Table 49 indicates that, on all satisfaction
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extensive reliance o n the public sector. Table 4 9 indicates that, o n all satisfaction
measures, public sector psychiatrists and health agencies receive significantly lower
ratings than their private sector colleagues from general practitioners.
Table 49: General practitioner satisfaction with specialist mental health
services by specialist sector of activity

M e a s u r e of satisfaction: generalist
perspective (n = 27)

Private sector
specialists

Public sector
specialists

Number satisfied

Number satisfied

n
• Satisfaction with the care
provided to patients by
psychiatrists:
- Satisfied to very satisfied
- Mid-range
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
- No contact
• Satisfaction with
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with
psychiatrists:
- Satisfied to very satisfied
- Mid-range
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
- No contact

• Satisfaction with patient care
provided by health
professionals:
- Satisfied to very satisfied
- Mid-range
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
- No contact
• Satisfaction with
communications with health
professionals:
- Satisfied to very satisfied
- Mid-range
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
- No contact

n

24
1
2

88%
4%
8%

-

-

24

89%

-

-

14*
6
5
(2)

56%
24%
20%

12*
7
6
(2)

48%
28%%
24%

(7%)

3

11%

-

-

12
3
3
(6)

66%
17%
17%

10* 50%
5 25%
5 25%

(25%)

(7) (267,. )

56%
10
11%
2
33%
6
(6) (22%)

* t-test for paired samples; p < 0.01
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8*
4
7
(8)

(7%)

42%
21%
37%
(30%)

Summary
Exchange categories in both networks consider that alliances have good outcomes for
patients and for private sector participants. The rewards for general practitioners of

alliance with small business medical specialists include greater financial security throu
the non-loss of patients, ready access to information and support, and skill and
knowledge enhancement. The rewards for small business medical specialists include

increased general practitioner loyalty to refer patients, personal satisfaction and fulfi
associated with the role of generalist educator and supporter, knowledge up-date in
general medicine, and "smoother" working relationships.

Private sector and public sector participants in both networks agree that feedback is an
essential norm of practice, and private sector participants additionally emphasise the
importance of trust. For the general practitioner, trust is associated with the return of

patients, the specialist speaking well of the generalist to patients and a specialist with

whom patients are satisfied. For medical specialists in both networks, trust is associated
with the generalist speaking well of the specialist to patients and willingness and
competence on the part of the generalist to comply with recommended treatments.

The prevalence of alliance activity between small business generalists and public sector

medical specialists and health professionals is substantially less than alliance activity
between small business generalists and specialists. Public sector alliance partners

emphasise the rewards for patients and the potential for alliances to reduce the workload
in the public sector. In both sectors, the costs of alliance are largely associated with
consequences of break down in communication.

Evidence has been provided which bears upon the theoretical framework with respect to
alliance maintenance. For small business generalists in both networks the maintenance of

alliance is strongly associated with specialist conformity with norms of practice governi
exchange. The quantitative data from the urban region provides support for 1) the
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proposition that "actor satisfaction is positively associated with organisational
interdependence", 2) the proposition that "degree of organisational interdependence is
positively associated with compliance with norms of practice" and 3) the proposition that
"compliance by the partners with the norms of practice governing exchanges is positively
associated with satisfaction with an exchange relation". However, no support was found
for the hypothesis that "volume of exchange between generalist and specialist varies
significantly with familiarity of the principals".

Within the mental health network, small business general practitioners were significantly
more satisfied with the services they receive from small business medical and nonmedical specialists than they were with public sector psychiatrists and mental health
professionals. Stage 6 of evidence presentation explores the complexities of private
sector/public sector collaboration further.
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STAGE 5: KEY INFORMANT VALIDATION AND
COMMENT
Fifty one people participated in two research workshops which were conducted with
equal representation from both networks following the analysis of the data from the T w o Case survey. T h e purpose of the Research Workshops was to gain key informant
c o m m e n t on the validity of the study findings. T h e first workshop included nineteen
small business general practitioners and six small business medical specialists w h o had
participated in the study, the Chairmen of the relevant Divisions of Medicine, and five
invited experts, four of w h o m had participated in the study. T h e second workshop
involved the Chairman of the Division of General Practice, 15 health professionals w h o
had contributed to the study, and the managers of the network-relevant public sector
health agencies, plus three invited experts.

Doctor validation and comment
Following the presentation of findings from the study, open discussion expanded and
clarified the results while the researcher recorded reactions of generalists and specialists.
It was agreed that the study provided n e w and useful information on exchange activities,
particularly in relation to alliances. It was agreed that identified norms of practice should
be publicised widely a m o n g generalists and specialists to promote a more intelligent
approach to interorganisational collaboration.

Invited experts highlighted issues of greatest importance to each exchange category (eg.
the poor quality of s o m e referral letters and failure by some medical specialists to return
patients to the referring general practitioner). M e m b e r s of each exchange category
responded.
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1. Mental health network

With respect to the mental health network, the Director of the public sector Mental Health
Service invited general practitioners to enter formal alliance arrangements with the
regional hospital. He acknowledged that psychiatry was not a popular field. He
described the hospital's need of medical staff to assist in the care of people with
schizophrenia, mania and psychotic depression. He also described a formal alliance
model in which the general practitioner trains at the hospital for six months and then

contracts with the hospital for three to five half-day sessions per week. He indicated t
a training program could be instituted that would lead to a Diploma of Mental Health. No
general practitioner took up his invitation.

Members of the expert panel raised the issue of general practitioner dissatisfaction wit
communications with the public hospital and with mental health agencies.

The group endorsed the relevance and authenticity of the findings. In particular the gro
agreed that general practitioners should be provided with guidelines for information
required in a good psychiatric referral letter. It was agreed that a brochure should be

developed for dissemination among general practitioners as to the services available fro

mental health professionals for the care of mentally ill people. Furthermore, it was agr
that members of the Division of General Practice should be informed on opportunities to
"share care" with the public hospital psychiatric unit.

2. Diabetes care network
Panel members raised two important issues concerning the diabetes network, namely, the

poor quality of some referral letters from general practitioners to physicians and failu
some physicians to return patients to general practitioners. Exchanges between
generalists and specialists were frank and challenging and, according to the Chairman of
the Division of General Practice, useful.
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With respect to exchanges with health professionals, several comments implied that "a
battle for territory" and patients exists between general practitioners and health
professionals and that this is counter-productive to good working relationships.

Recommendations from the meeting included the need to develop a "proforma" referral

letter which could be made available to all general practitioners to improve the quality o

letters to physicians. In particular, it was agreed that the referral letter should articu

the general practitioner's expectations about his/her on-going role in the care of patien
thereby clarifying expectations about return of patients.

The group formally endorsed the relevance and apparent accuracy of the findings.

Health professional validation and comment
A second research workshop dealt with the study findings relevant to exchange
relationships between health professionals and general practitioners. Two of the six

doctors invited to participate in the meeting attended. Health professionals noted the po

representation of doctors, taking it to exemplify a lack of respect characteristic of many
doctors in relation to health professionals.
1. Mental health network

Mental health professionals perceived that general practitioners had little time for ment
ill patients and, as a result, they have little interest in caring for people with mental

They stated that only three general practitioners in the region committed time to serious
mentally ill patients. Furthermore, the comment was made that problems in exchanges

between general practitioners and mental health nurses had existed for a long time and tha
entrenched, negative attitudes were difficult to overcome.

In response to the low satisfaction rating from general practitioners concerning the publ

hospital psychiatric services, health professionals indicated that the feelings were mutua

They said that the 10 per cent of general practitioners who referred patients to the hosp
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outpatients department failed to communicate about mentally ill clients with hospital staff.

It was agreed that it was time for health professionals and general practitioners to show
more respect for one another. It was recognised that effort is required to develop a
"culture of communication". One participant recognised that "what is needed is a system
which promotes rapid, reciprocal feedback". Referral protocols were proposed to
facilitate improved communication. Mental health professionals acknowledged a need to
clarify and publicise their activities and functions to general practitioners.
2. Diabetes care network

Diabetes care health professionals emphasised the importance of "giving and receiving of
good-will". The comment was made that "We are all very sensitive about what other
people say about us. We need to be careful what we say about other professionals.

Some people put themselves further up the status scale than others. By criticising other
they feel superior". This attitude was regarded as counter-productive to good working

relationships and the development of general practitioner - health professional alliance
Personal contact with general practitioners was seen as important to promoting improved
working relationships. A member of the expert panel proposed that health professionals
explore how to improve working relationships with general practitioners with whom it is
most difficult to work (ie. to move beyond working with the people with whom it is most
satisfying).

Manager validation and comment
The interviews with chairmen/managers were conducted to gain an administrative level

response to alliance maintenance and to qualitatively examine the utility and applicatio
the findings gained at the operational level. In addition, the findings gained from
managers provided opportunity to explore the extent to which leaders of exchange

categories perceived a need to equip constituents to influence the flow of resources wit
the respective networks.
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Three Chairs of medical divisions were interviewed, each was a fellow of his specialist
college and all were highly respected clinicians with m a n y years experience in their field
(eg. general practice, psychiatry, internal medicine). In addition the Coordinator of
Community Mental Health Services and the Coordinator of the Diabetes Education Centre
were interviewed. T h e former is a registered psychiatric nurse with m a n y years of
experience w h o also holds a Master of Science degree. The Director of the Diabetes
Centre is a registered nurse with five years experience and a Master of Public Health
degree.

1. Chair of the Division of General Practice

The Chair of the Division of General Practice revealed that general practitioners in th
region have been loosely organised under the umbrella of an association for 10 years and
in the past 12 months have gained divisional status. Being a Division of General Practice
means they receive an annual grant from the Federal Government of approximately
$170,000 dollars. The Division is an incorporated company organised as "a cooperative
of single-minded individuals" with a five m e m b e r executive w h o elect the chairperson.
Approximately 45 per cent of general practitioners have become members of the Division.
S o m e general practitioners perceive the Division to be a "government plot to take over
general practice and the members of the executive are seen as government agents". The
functions of the Division are to represent the interests and opinions of general
practitioners through liaison with other groups. The two groups of highest priority are
the Regional Health Authority, particularly the agencies involved in providing community
health services and specialist divisions of medicine which are seen as having substantial
influence in the policies of the Regional Hospital. In addition, the Division liaises with a
range of local government and non-government organisations and with medical
organisations, such as the Australian Medical Association at the State and Commonwealth
level. Secondly, the Division has a role in coordinating professional development
activities for general practitioners in cooperation with the medical education arm of the
Royal Australian College of General Practice, the local University and other Universities
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with medical schools. The Chairman also indicated that the Division has a role in
promoting "whole person care and continuity of care through research and information
exchange".

2. Interviews with Chair of the Division of Psychiatry and
Coordinator of C o m m u n i t y Mental Health Services

The Chair of the Division of Psychiatry also holds the position of Director of Psychiat
Services for the Regional Health Authority. He indicated that there are ten private
psychiatrists and four public sector psychiatrists resident within the Region.
Furthermore, one of the four public psychiatrists only works one-day per fortnight and
another provides very specialised services. He indicated that the public sector

psychiatrists are working unacceptably long hours and that there is a desperate need fo

additional specialist medical expertise. He reiterated his desire to develop formal all
arrangements with general practitioners. However, given the lack of response from
general practitioners at the Research Workshop to enter alliance with the Hospital
Psychiatric Unit he is considering training several nurses to function as "medical
registrars". He indicated that the Division of Psychiatry meets monthly with
representatives from the other medical divisions, including the Division of General
Practice and the Division of Medicine. These meetings are attended by the Chief
Executive Officer of the Regional Health Authority. Agenda items at these meetings
included clinical and financial matters and the Director regards attendance at these
meetings as very important.

There are four public sector mental health agencies, the largest has a staff of 13 and
smallest, a staff of two. The predominant culture was described as a "multidisciplinary
team" culture. The Crisis Care Team is the largest agency and its functions are
particularly demanding because the Team provides a 24 hour service, seven days of the
week and deals with a severely disabled group of clients. Groups with which these
mental health agencies have exchanges are numerous and include families and clients,

private psychiatrists, general practitioners, the public hospital and many other govern
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and non-government organisations such as the police and welfare organisations. Groups

perceived as most important in helping mental health agencies to achieve their objectiv
are the public hospital, private psychiatrists and general practitioners. The Director

like to see future changes including adequate information from psychiatrists and genera
practitioners to mental health professionals about referred clients, improved formal
exchanges with general practitioners, improved hospital discharge procedures, the
development of a computerised information system which would provide the mental
health network with a comprehensive data base, and the development by general
practitioners and private psychiatrists of a monitoring system for detecting seriously
mentally ill patients who fail to keep appointments. It was considered that the latter
innovation would reduce the number of calls upon the Crisis Care Team.

3. Interviews with Chair of the Division of Medicine and
Coordinator of the Diabetes Education Centre

The Chairman of the Division of Medicine indicated that his organisation is 20 years ol

and that its membership numbers 23. All office bearers are voluntary and the Chairman i

elected democratically. Like the Division of General Practice, the organisation is best
described as a cooperative. Meetings are held monthly and the office bearers receive
administrative support from the public hospital. The functions of the Division are

political and educational. With respect to political activity, the Chairman indicated t

Division's role includes the maintenance of individual privileges and hospital privileg

within the public system for physicians. Educational activities concern the maintenance

of standards. Like the Division of Psychiatry, the monthly Clinical Services meeting wi
the Chief Executive Officer of the Regional Health Authority is regarded as very

important. The groups most important to this Division are those which control the publi

hospital. Exchanges with general practitioners and staff of the Diabetes Education Cent
are regarded as less important. However, it was acknowledged that, for individual
members, exchange with these two organisations is important. The Chairman perceived a
need for general practitioners to have a greater role in the public hospital. He also
indicated that economics prevents more collaboration between physicians and general
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practitioners: "everyone is too busy to collaborate". A s with the mental health network
this leader would like to see a comprehensive information system developed which would
facilitate research on health outcomes and information exchange.

The Coordinator of the Diabetes Education Centre described her organisation as a team
which is embedded in the hierarchy of the Regional Health Authority. The purpose of the
Centre is to "assist diabetic patients and their families to use a holistic approach to
management of diabetes" through acting as a referral resource, providing education to
individuals and families, conducting community awareness programs and undertaking
research projects in cooperation with the Division of Medicine and the Division of
General Practice. Exchanges of most importance to the Centre are those with community
health organisations, the Division of General Practice and the Division of Medicine.
Exchanges between these organisations occur at formal and informal levels. As with the
other organisations, this group would like to see a network-wide information system
developed.

Summary
Strong endorsement of the validity of the study findings was provided by the meetings
with key informants. Research Workshops were well attended by medical and health
professional leaders.

The stipulation that separate meetings be held for doctors and health professionals refl

the sensitivity of interface between small business generalists and specialists about th

exchange relationships and the cultural divide between doctors and health professionals.

Discussions by doctors and health professionals about the mental health network

confirmed 1) differences in the type of client cared for by private sector and public se
organisations, with the public sector caring for more seriously disabled clients, 2)

dissatisfaction with communications across public sector-private sector organisations, a
3) the shortage of medical resources to care for people with serious mental illness.
270

Similarly, workshop discussions confirmed that in the diabetes care network,

dissatisfaction exists with exchanges concerning 1) the quality of some referral lette

2) the failure of some physicians to return patients to general practitioner care, 3) t
manner in which some physicians communicate with patients, and 3) poor
communications between doctors and health professionals.

Interviews with Chairs of medical divisions indicated that these organisations act as

associations in that their primary functions are to protect the interests of their mem
For example, the Division of General Practice regards liaison with the Regional Health
Authority Director of Community Services, who controls the use of public resources in

the provision of community services, and the Division of Medicine which largely contro
the use of hospital resources, as most important. This Division had also developed
collaborative research projects with the Diabetes Education Centre. However, no
comparable links have been developed with mental health professional agencies.

The Chairman of the Division of Psychiatry wears two hats; one private sector and one
public sector. However, he was predominantly concerned with the challenge of
adequately resourcing public sector services.

The Division of Medicine which represents the interests of many specialists holds
considerable influence over the use of resources within the Regional Hospital. The

groups most important to this organisation are those which can assist it to maintain it
influence over hospital resources.

Most managers perceive a need for the development of medical and management

information systems which facilitate across-network monitoring of utilisation patterns
health outcomes.
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STAGE 6: ALLIANCE MAINTENANCE IN A CITY
NETWORK

This section reports information gained from a focus group of city generalists and fr
interviews with associated public sector specialists.

Industry environment
The population of the City Region is approximately 734,726 and, according to three
indicators, the people are healthier than those in the Urban Region (Table 50).
Table 50: Population health indicators for the Urban Region and the
City Region
Health Indicator

Urban

Region

City

Region

• Standardised hospital separation rate

90.6

70.6

• Standardised mortality ratio

98.6

90

• Health Service index*

99.8

80.7

* The health service need index is a composite measure of population health service need which
takes into consideration mortality, rural-urban advantage and other socio-economic factors (New
South Wales Health Department, 1993).

The general practitioner/population ratio for Sydney is estimated to be 1:659 making
location one of the best resourced in Australia (Commonwealth Department of Health,
Housing and Community Services, 1992: 55-75). Similarly, with respect to access to
private psychiatrists, this Region is among the most advantaged in N e w South Wales
(New South Wales Health Department, 1994: 27). Furthermore, unlike the Urban
Region and the Rural Region, people in this City Region have ready access to services
outside the Region. Hence, it is expected that a m o n g small business generalists and
specialists there is likely to be considerable competition for patients.

The Regional Hospital of interest and the associated Community Adult Mental Health
Service receive referrals from a population of 170,000. The services provided by these
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organisations include a general hospital inpatient unit (15 beds) with back-up beds
available at a nearby psychiatric hospital, two community mental health agencies which
include a 24 hour, seven days a week, crisis care service, a mobile community
management team which provides assertive, home-based skill training and case

management, community-based residential services (42 beds) and rehabilitation services,
including a living skills centre and vocational training and family training programs.

Response: convenience sample
Eleven general practitioners participated in a focus group and completed the General

Practitioner Questionnaire. Participants were known to be interested in mental illness

some had links with the public hospital psychiatric service. The group does not repres

the City Region and their responses may be biased in the direction of favourable attit
towards alliance and towards collaboration with public sector organisations.

In addition to the focus group with general practitioners, interviews were conducted w

the Director of Psychiatry for the City Region, a senior psychiatrist, and the Chair of
Division of General Practice. These three leaders had recently begun discussions
concerning the development of a mental health service - general practitioner formal

"shared care" program. Hence, it was assumed that the public sector psychiatric unit in

this Region was experiencing similar problems to those experienced in the Urban Region.
However, it appeared that in this Region the psychiatric unit had managed to interest
general practitioners in alliance which suggests that exchanges between general

practitioners and the public hospital in the City Region were regarded as more rewardin
by some general practitioners than in the Urban Region.

Profile of respondents

No differences were observed between the profile of general practitioner respondents in
the City Region and general practitioners in the Urban Region (Appendix 5). The Chair
of the Division of General Practice is a woman with 14 years experience and she worked
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part-time in private practice and part-time as a salaried employee of the public hospital.
The Director of Psychiatric Services is a well respected senior Fellow of the Royal
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists with more than 30 years experience.
He works part-time in private practice and part-time as Director of the public sector

psychiatric services. The senior psychiatrist is also a Fellow of the Royal Australian a
New Zealand College of Psychiatrists. She has 24 years experience as a psychiatrist and
she is a full-time salaried employee of the public sector psychiatric services.

Identified mental health trends

Identified trends in the care of mentally ill people include an increase in the number of

people with mental illness who are unable to afford to consult a private psychiatrist, an

increasing need for community based services for clients and support services for carers,
the need for more supervised accommodation and a need for more community based

social workers. Among general practitioners, the identified trends are a growing need for
support from psychiatrists, including rapid telephone access for emergency care and the
development of alliance or "shared care" arrangements.

Urban Region/City Region differences
The survey of the 11 city general practitioners produced a list of 30 psychiatrists and
community mental health service agencies. This is almost twice the number of
psychiatrists produced by 28 general practitioners in the urban region.

As was expected, the city based general practitioners indicated that they manage more
patients with severe mental illness than the general practitioners in the urban region
(Appendix 6.1). Furthermore, city generalists reported that more patients were
functioning poorly (Appendix 6.2) and 82 per cent of city generalists, compared with 60
per cent of urban generalists expect to have a continuing involvement in the care of all

referred patients. Consistent with managing more severely disabled psychiatric patients,
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more city generalists indicated having telephone-only exchanges with the psychiatrist w h o
most complies with norms of practice governing exchange relations.

Ten of the eleven city general practitioners indicated that they had alliance arrangemen

with private psychiatrists (Appendix 6.3). Eight said they had alliance arrangements with
mental health professionals (Appendix 6.4), and three of the eleven had alliance
arrangements with a hospital psychiatric unit. On average, city generalists had alliance
arrangements with two private psychiatrists and one or two community mental health
agencies. Hence, while more city general practitioners have alliance arrangements the
pattern of private sector/public sector alliance arrangements is similar to the pattern
urban region. However, city general practitioners perceive that fewer patients are
returned by psychiatrists to their care (Appendix 6.5), supporting the notion that
competition for patients in the city region is greater than in the urban region.

No differences were observed between the urban and city samples of general practitioners

with respect to satisfaction with the care provided by private sector specialists and wit
communications. Surprisingly, city-based general practitioners were less satisfied with
access to private psychiatrists than their urban colleagues (Appendix 6.6). Respondent
comments indicated that "If they are good, access is poor for appointments and where
there is availability, patient satisfaction is problematic".

A further unexpected finding was that the eleven city generalists reported being less
satisfied on all three measures (patient care, communication and access) with exchanges
with public hospital psychiatrists than were general practitioners in the urban region
(Appendix 6.7).

Issues of concern to city based generalists
The focus group raised four sets of issues. Of greatest concern to the group was the

failure of some psychiatrists to comply with norms of practice, particularly the return o
patients and the provision of feedback. The third concern focused on exchanges with
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public sector organisations and the fourth item addressed the role of the Division of
General Practice.

1. Return of patients

These 11 doctors firmly believe that the city is different from rural or urban locatio
The comment was m a d e "There is a big difference between the behaviour of specialists in
rural and city areas. In rural areas specialists act more as consultants. In the city, it is
more convenient for the patient to go to the specialist and the specialist is more likely to
arrange return visits, thereby, bypassing the general practitioner". Further comments
emphasised the depth of feeling about non-returned patients: "Many regard themselves as
'come-back people,' that is, they take-over the care of the patient", "Some specialists tend
to refer-on to a further specialist, without any reference to the general practitioner. This is
unethical behaviour", "Cognitive specialists m a k e less money per patient visit than do
proceduralists, hence, they tend to hang on to patients more and to have more return
visits". For this group of general practitioners, return of patients is very important. This
fact helps to explain the difference between generalists in the urban and city regions in
terms of perceptions about the number of patients returned.

2. Communication
As in the Urban Region, information exchange was regarded as very important,
particularly telephone access.

Further desirable specialist behaviours included

approachability, and the provision of informative feedback within a week. The group
indicated that it is not easy to find psychiatrists w h o comply with expected norms of
practice and w h o meet the requirements of the patient. A s stated by one general
practitioner "I have one or two special psychiatrists w h o I use all the time and these are
people w h o act as consultants, that is they return patients, provide educative feedback and
are available for consultation". Further comments included " W h e n I find a good one I
stick with him/her", "I select one on the basis of results based on what the patient wants
and whether they return patients to m e and talk to m e . I thought I had a good one but he
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has let m e d o w n so I a m n o w looking for someone else to develop an alliance with",
"One of the important issues in alliance relationships is communication and the

clarification of who is responsible for managing the patient. A good consultant ensure

that this happens". The stigma attached to mental illness was seen as a barrier to goo
information exchange between generalist and specialist. The comment was made

"Sometimes patients do not want the psychiatrist to tell anyone about their illness -

even the general practitioner. If the general practitioner is deprived of information
cannot practice whole patient care which is based on the development of trust".

3. Exchanges with public sector hospital and community mental
health services

In the focus group general practitioners were asked to comment on the good news and th
bad news of exchanges with public hospitals. For this city based group of general

practitioners the bad news far outweighed the good news with respect to exchanges with
public hospitals (Table 51). While public hospitals are respected for the dedication

quality of their staff, they score poorly on all indicators of norms of practice gover
exchange relations.
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Table 51: Exchanges with public hospitals: the good n e w s a n d b a d
n e w s for generalists
The good news
• Quality patient care
- Commitment to poor patients in crisis.
- Specialists are more accessible and have emergency 24 hour back-up services.
- It allows acute emergencies to be reviewed quickly.
- The staff are more dedicated - less driven by the $ and are more academic.
• Respect
- The Hospital has a good reputation in the community.

T h e bad news
• Communication
- Communication is poor - specialists leave this to the registrars and residents.
- Often there is no communication to the general practitioner - even when patients are discharged
with a discharge summary it is usually prepared by a junior staff member and is totally
unhelpful to the general practitioner for continuing care.
- The feedback to general practitioners is inadequate - the patient gets lost in the system, hence,
returns to the community and does not receive comprehensive care.
• Quality of care
- Access is slower than in the private sector and continuity of care is poorer.
- Access for general practitioners to inpatients and inpatient information is poor.
- Consultations are often of a poor quality because most work is left to the registrars.
• Trust
- M a n y specialists cross-refer without reference to the general practitioner.
- The specialists are more inclined to take-over the care of the patient and exclude the general
practitioner.
- Public sector psychiatrists espouse shared care but do not practice it.
• Respect
- General practitioners feel excluded from the public hospital - it has an elitist
atmosphere.

General practitioners were also asked to comment on their reasons for infrequent use of

mental health professionals. Four reasons were given; the first was that some genera

were unaware of the services offered by mental health professionals. Secondly, there

were problems with gaining feedback from health professionals (eg. no feedback at a

delayed feedback and poor quality feedback). The third reason was that some menta

health professionals saw themselves as case managers and sought to take-over the ca

patients without reference to the general practitioner. Finally, the cost to patient

consulting a private psychologist was said to be as great as the cost of consulting

psychiatrist and the visit to the psychologist was not covered by Medicare. This app

even when the psychologist was the most appropriate referral. Hence, the patient had
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pay the full cost of the visit to the psychologist and most patients believe that medical care
should be free.

4. Strategies required to enhance the position of general practitioners
When asked about the actions that the Division of General Practice should be pursuing,
general practitioners focused on three issues. O f greatest importance was the failure of
private medical specialists to comply with the norms of practice governing exchanges.
Suggested strategies included "educate consultants not to cross-refer", "inform each other
of specialist facilities available and communicate our judgements to them - and let
specialists k n o w that w e are judging them", "educate specialists on etiquette and general
practitioner economics". Further comments addressed strategies designed to improve
communications between consultants and general practitioners and included "encourage
formal and informal meetings with consultants", "arrange education meetings involving
consultants about n e w medication regimens - especially in a climate of litigation",
"encourage consultants to use the telephone or the fax machine to improve general
practitioner referral information". Other strategies related to exchanges with public sector
health care organisations and included the need to "develop more power on the Hospital
Medical Board".

Summary
Compared with the rural and urban regions, the city region is well endowed with
generalist and specialist mental health services. Furthermore, the people enjoy better
health and have access to a wide range of services both within-region and beyond the
borders of the region. However, despite the greater affluence of the region, providers
perceive a need for additional mental health services, reflecting changes in methods for
the treatment of mental illness.

Comparisons between the city region sample and the urban region sample suggest that the
city group of doctors had access to more psychiatrists and mental health professionals,
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that they care for m o r e patients with serious mental illness, that in exchanges with
psychiatrists greater use was made of the telephone and that they were in-alliance with
more psychiatrists and mental health professionals.

Consistent with the notion that there is greater competition for clients in a "doctorcrowded" city environment, the city region generalists reported having fewer of their
patients returned. These findings suggest that in the city environment small business
specialists are more likely to behave opportunistically with respect to exchanges with

general practitioners. Consistent with this conclusion is the fact that general practition
would like to see the Division of General Practice taking action to encourage specialists
return patients.

Unexpectedly, the city sample of general practitioners was less satisfied with access to
private psychiatrists. Furthermore, despite purposeful selection of doctors known to
have begun alliance discussions with the public hospital, city region doctors were less
satisfied with the care provided to patients and with communications with public sector
organisations. The qualitative findings indicate that on all measures of performance, the

public hospital and the public sector health professionals fail to comply with the norms of
practice associated with exchanges between small business generalists and specialists in
the health industry. Consistent with these findings is the fact that general practitioners
perceive a need for joint political activity in order to have greater influence over the
mediation of resources within the regional network.

With respect to norms of practice governing alliances, the findings lead to the conclusion
that the norms of "gold standard" practice governing exchanges in rural, urban and city
locations are very similar and that failure by public sector organisations to comply with
these standards acts as a barrier to across-sector alliance development and maintenance
and consequently to improved service integration.

280

7. DISCUSSION
This thesis has addressed continuity in interorganisational cooperation. The research
question was " H o w are generalist-specialist alliances maintained?" A systems framework
(Chapter 4) w a s developed to represent influences acting on alliances involving small
business and public sector generalist and specialist organisations in the health industry.
Underpinning the framework was the assumption that alliances occur within the context
of a network of business exchanges in which the parties have opportunity to change
alliance partners. Furthermore, it was assumed that decisions concerning continuity in
alliance are constantly being m a d e based on past experiences.

Essential to my framework (p 147) was the proposition that level of interdependence is
related to alliance activity. The study confirms the positive association, noted by C o o k
(1977), between level of interdependence and alliance activity. In addition, it was
proposed that established alliances are maintained by three variables, namely, satisfaction
with the exchange relationship, organisational interdependence, and compliance with
norms of practice. The study finds that these factors all contribute to alliance maintenance
in the exchanges that were examined. Furthermore, it was considered that situational
factors would influence, to some extent, alliance activity and its maintenance. Following
m y systems framework (p 147), situational factors of importance were thought to include
"industry environment", "medical condition", "funding arrangements" and established
"patterns of exchange relations" within a network.

A case study design proved to be a suitable scaffold for the sequential analysis of
complex social phenomena at the network and at the alliance level. Inevitably, small
numbers and the snap-shots provided by cross-sectional data gathering limit the
generalisability of findings and, in particular, the extent to which causality can be
determined.
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A n alliance w a s defined as "a relatively enduring, voluntary, cooperative arrangement for
mutual benefit in which the actors have an informal or formal understanding concerning
the way they manage their exchange relationship" (p 4). A network was defined more

broadly as "as a regional cluster of legally separate organisations which have opportunit
for voluntary work-related exchanges" delimited by medical condition. The literature

does not distinguish consistently between alliance and network and so the definitions are
not entirely unambiguous nor would they be universally approved. Nevertheless, there is
general agreement that network means a "web-like" structure which links actors for some

common benefit. Similarly, there is growing consensus that an alliance is a collaborative
relationship which may develop within a network of business exchange relationships.
The quality of the alliance relationship is generally considered to be more enduring and
binding than mere network membership.

In this Chapter, I first discuss the study findings in terms of the four propositions

developed in Chapter 4 concerning the factors that maintain alliances. This is followed b
discussion of the descriptive findings about the environment of the regional networks in
which informal generalist-specialist alliances were discovered and the likely impact of

these external factors on alliance maintenance. The sequence of this latter discussion is
consistent with the questions guiding the collection of qualitative data as presented in
Table 7 (p 175). Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of the research design and
methodology are discussed including an examination of the level at which alliance
maintenance was analysed.

ORGANISATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND
ALLIANCE ACTIVITY

Proposition 1: "Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to sel
collaborators, degree of alliance activity is positively associated with organisational
interdependence".
The most obvious measure of interdependence between any two organisations is the

volume of traffic or exchange between them. This research has reasoned that alliances are
282

most likely to emerge between organisations which have already established business
exchanges with one another, presumably based on bilateral judgements of
interdependence. The notion that volume of exchange is linked to alliance activity is
consistent with Cook's (1977) proposition that "fields characterised by relatively high
degrees of interdependence could be predicted to exhibit higher levels of
interorganisational activity" (p 69). This study confirms this proposition in two ways.

First, at the level of the network, greater generalist alliance activity was observed in
diabetes network in which the volume of exchange was higher. Secondly, at the level of

the alliance, the degree of generalist-specialist interdependence was positively associa
with alliance activity.

Of importance to individual small business generalists is the maintenance of a viable
patient load for economic survival. Developing a good reputation among patients is
essential to maintaining patient load. A general practitioner who is known to be well

connected with medical specialists is likely to attract more patients. However, herein l

a dilemma for the generalist. Referrals to specialists contribute to one's reputation as

state-of-the-art practitioner, but except in rare situations, the generalist does not wi

lose these patients to specialists. Similarly, medical specialists need to maintain a vi
patient load and gain more business through developing a good reputation among patients
and general practitioners. The specialist's dilemma is to optimise economic gain by
getting as many referrals as possible while avoiding contact with generalists who make
"poor referrals" or who are of poor reputation. Hence, it can be argued that both
generalists and specialists in the private sector will seek to 1) exchange with, and 2)
enter alliances with people who assist them to enhance their reputation while not

diminishing their power to attract patients. Other things being equal, alliance resolves
important dilemma for both.

As the number of generalists referring to any one specialist in the network increases, t

specialist's need for additional patients decreases and the power of the individual gen
practitioner decreases correspondingly. Hence, the maintenance of an alliance depends,
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in large measure, o n the extent to which the specialist values the alliance and the
reputational and economic damage that he/she is likely to incur if he/she behaves in a
manner that is likely to terminate the alliance. If the specialist perceives that the general
practitioner is well connected and highly respected by his/her colleagues then he/she is
less likely to act in a manner that could damage the alliance. In other words, at the
interpersonal level, this exchange relation can be said to be "balanced" in that each party
holds relatively "equal power" (Cook, 1977: 67). Conversely, if the general practitioner
has little influence a m o n g his/her colleagues then the specialist m a y not place great
importance on complying with the norms of practice governing the alliance. Hence, the
relationship could be perceived as being "unbalanced" and the alliance is more likely to
fail. T h e findings of this study suggest that an alliance which is satisfying to both
generalist and specialist occurs in a situation in which each holds the other in reasonably
high "professional" regard.

It follows that the most influential generalists and specialists in the regional network
likely to be in-alliance while the less powerful generalists are less likely to be in-alliance
or m a y seek to form alliances with less influential specialists, such as those external to the
regional network. In this study approximately 50 per cent of generalists and specialists
were in-alliance and interviewed generalists and specialists indicated that they were only
prepared to form an alliance with a colleague w h o met their "gold standard" expectations.
Hence, these findings raise interesting questions concerning 1) the relationship between
level of expertise, compliance with norms of practice and ability to influence the flow of
resources within a network, and 2) the contribution that alliances m a k e to maintaining
and improving the level of generalist and specialist competence.

SATISFACTION AND ORGANISATIONAL
INTERDEPENDENCE
Proposition 2: "Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to select
collaborators, level of actor satisfaction is positively associated with organisational
interdependence".
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T w o sources of quantitative data support the proposition that satisfaction is positively
associated with organisational interdependence. Generalists from both networks were
significantly more satisfied with exchanges with medical specialists with whom they had
a high volume of exchange than specialists with whom they had fewer exchanges (Table
38). Secondly, a positive correlation was found between generalist volume of exchange
with diabetes health professionals and generalist satisfaction (Table 39). In addition,

qualitative data from the pilot study in the rural region (Tables 15 and 16) and the urb
mental health network support the proposition in that the three most satisfied exchange

categories in both networks are those with the highest volume of exchange (Tables 25 and
26). These findings confirm social exchange theory with respect to Homans' success
proposition and stimulus proposition.

It is hardly surprising to find that small business doctors have more business exchanges

with specialists with whom they are most satisfied. This aspect of social exchange theor
is well understood and accepted. The contribution of this study is to specify the overt
factors in alliance activity which contribute to participant satisfaction, namely, the
"satisfiers" and "dissatisfiers" of importance to general practitioners. These are
somewhat different to those normally associated with "social" exchange theory in that

they have a strong business orientation. Specialists, on the other hand, tend to emphasi

the social rewards of the exchange relationship, suggesting that their economic positio
more secure than that of general practitioners.

Satisfiers for general practitioners include the receipt of positive feedback from pati

and carers following a referral to a specialist, because satisfied customers are likely
loyal customers. Negative feedback from customers is a powerful dissatisfier.
Secondly, generalists place a high value on acquiring new knowledge and skills about a
specialist area of medicine which they can apply to the care of patients. They gain

intrinsic satisfaction from increasing their expertise, and they gain economically by n
having to refer some patients with a similar problem in the future. Thirdly, general

practitioners derive satisfaction from having their patients returned by specialists, s
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this implies that the specialist believes the generalist has the ability to care for the patient.
That is, it is rewarding for the generalist to receive a vote of confidence in his/her
professional competence. More importantly, return of patients means that the generalist,
does not lose control over on-going care and the associated income. A further satisfier
for generalists is the confidence, reassurance and reputation gained from having a
relationship with a specialist which ensures ready access to support. A dissatisfier for
generalists is conflict with specialists. Hence, an exchange relationship which is

relatively free of conflict is valued. Finally, general practitioners value a relationship
a specialist which allows them to see more patients, that is, exchange with the specialist
cost-effective.

Medical specialists value exchanges with general practitioners that result in increased
patient satisfaction and improvements in the quality of care. This is good for business
and is professionally satisfying. Like general practitioners, medical specialists value
educative communications; specialists like to be kept informed about recent trends in
general medicine. Some specialists gain satisfaction from acting as teacher and mentor to
general practitioners and health professionals. Specialists also value exchanges with

general practitioners which result in more referrals appropriate to their expertise. As wit

general practitioners, conflict in an exchange relationship is a dissatisfier and relations

that are relatively free of conflict are highly valued. Finally, small business specialists
like small business generalists, value a relationship which enables them to manage more
patients.

Health professionals place high value on educative communications, exchanges which
improve patient care and low levels of conflict. Unlike small business doctors, health
professionals value exchanges which result in lower utilisation of their services through
more appropriate referrals. A dissatisfier for mental health professionals is "dumping" by
small business generalists and specialists of difficult patients on their service. Health

professionals value exchanges which indicate that their specialist expertise is recognised
and respected. Furthermore, communications by doctors which emphasise differences in
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social status and marginalise the contribution of health professionals act as powerful
dissatisfiers. Hence, the social aspects of exchange are important to health

professionals. This is not surprising since society tends to be ambivalent about the rol
and status of health professionals. Recognition from high status doctors, particularly

medical specialists, is therefore likely to be rewarding. Since most health professional

are in the salaried workforce, they have no reason to look for personal economic rewards
in network exchanges.

Hence, while all exchange categories seek social and economic gains from exchanges

with other providers (a finding consistent with that of Larsen, 1995), the emphasis vari
according to professional group, funding arrangements and level of remuneration.

The likely implications of these findings for continuity in interorganisational coopera
are as follows: 1) funding arrangements, level of remuneration and professional status
have a substantial impact on the rewards which the respective parties seek from an

alliance; 2) unless both parties are satisfied with an alliance the level of interdepend

will fall and the alliance will cease; 3) it is not equality in the distribution of cost

benefits which maintains generalist-specialist alliances but that each party receives f

the alliance the specific rewards that are important to them; 4) there is no mechanism b

which alliance partners within regional networks can assess fairness in the distributio
costs and benefits, given there are no shared reports of inputs, outputs and outcomes.
What each party can, and does, assess is the extent to which they receive the specific

rewards that they seek from alliance. Hence, if an alliance is to endure it is important
each party understands and addresses the particular set of rewards sought by the other
party.

It would have been surprising to find that volume of exchange is not correlated with

satisfaction. The contribution of this study is to specify the overt factors in alliance

activity which contribute to participant satisfaction. Furthermore, the research confirm

that underlying a sentiment, such as satisfaction, is a sub-stratum of observations by t
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actor (individual or organisation), on the basis of which reward attainment is judged.

Furthermore, this kind of estimating of costs and benefits is a dynamic process such that
each individual exchange has to provide its own measure of reward or else the on-going

alliance is put in jeopardy. It is the observed interaction between satisfaction of alli
participants and volume of exchange which points to the vulnerability of alliance; it

appears that no generalist-specialist alliance is stronger than the most recent exchange
the light of this conclusion it is clear that a mechanism is required to ensure that
exchanges meet the benchmark of providing participant satisfaction.

ORGANISATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND
COMPLIANCE WITH NORMS OF PRACTICE
Proposition 3: "Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to select
collaborators, degree of organisational interdependence is positively associated with compliance
with norms of practice governing exchanges".

In this study norms of practice were defined as relatively consistent patterns of behavi
which enabled the exchange partners to achieve their own goals and meet the expectations
of the other partner. The study found support for the proposition that organisational
interdependence is positively associated with compliance with norms of practice. Three
sources of quantitative evidence supported this proposition. Across two networks

generalist volume of exchange with medical specialists varied significantly with perceiv
specialist compliance with norms of practice (Tables 40 and 42). In addition, a
significant and positive association was found between generalist volume of exchange
with mental health professionals in the two networks and the provision of feedback
(Table 41).

These findings are consistent with social exchange theory which predicts that the more
important an exchange relationship, the more likely the partners are to comply with
behaviours which, from past experience, produce rewards from the relationship. In
addition, the study contributes new knowledge concerning factors which govern alliances
between generalists and specialists, private sector and public sector. Norms of practice
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are widely agreed specifications for h o w practitioners should act for optimal professional

process and outcome. In relation to alliance maintenance, norms of practice refer to t
views of practitioners in the health industry as to how the interface with other

practitioners should desirably be managed. In this respect, greater consensus, or clea
defined "norms" were found among medical generalists and specialists than between
medical and non-medical practitioners. Norms of practice have much in common with the

social controls described by Powell (1990) and Larson (1992) governing entrepreneurial

networks and "network dyads" (p 98) in industries other than health, such, as telephon
equipment, clothing and computer hardware. Certain norms of practice were found to

apply to all alliances, while, some notable differences were evident between alliances
the private sector and across-sector alliances.

Irrespective of basis of funding, all exchange categories indicated that norms of pra
included timely and informative communications, the provision of competent care to

"shared" patients and activities associated with the maintenance of trust. Three head
are used to discuss similarities and differences in findings on organisational
interdependence and norms of practice, namely, timely and informative communications,
trust and credibility and supportive culture.
1. Timely and informative communications

Norms of practice governing networks and alliances reported in the interorganisational
literature include frequent communications and information sharing (Kaluzny, 1991;
Limerick and Cunnington, 1993; Bruce, 1995). This study confirmed the importance of
these findings for alliance maintenance. Decisions about whether to continue in an

alliance involved judgements about 1) the quality of written and verbal communications
and 2) the timeliness of feedback. With respect to the quality of the feedback from

specialists, generalists valued communications which enhanced their knowledge and lev

of expertise. With respect to the timeliness of the feedback provided by specialists,
standard" specialists provided feedback within one week and the majority of medical
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specialists complied with this norm. However, some public sector health agencies and
hospital units did not meet this standard and generalist volume of exchange with these
agencies w a s significantly diminished. This finding is consistent with social exchange
theory which maintains that the shorter the time between action and reward, the more
likely the actor is to repeat the action in the future. Most medical specialists understand
the importance of compliance with this norm of practice while some public sector health
agencies and hospital units apparently do not. The likely reasons for these differences are
discussed below.

Of importance to specialists was the quality of the referral letter from a general
practitioner, including its technical content and its grammatical and personal appeal. In
addition, specialists expected their generalist alliance partner to keep them informed about
patient outcomes, about problems which arise and about n e w developments in primary
care. These findings extend the traditional concept of generalist referral to specialist
which assumes communications cease w h e n the specialist writes back to the general
practitioner thanking him/her for referring a patient and indicating the treatments he/she
prescribed etc. The findings of this study indicate that with respect to patients with
serious chronic conditions, the norms of practice governing alliances include interactive
communications which are on-going and do not always involve a patient referral.

Among the factors leading to failure of alliances were misunderstandings over who was
doing what for patients, differences in opinion about diagnoses and treatments, an
unacceptable amount of time spent in telephone consultation (for which there was no
remuneration), patients falling through the "gap" or duplication of services, and a loss of
independence through becoming dependent on another service provider. All exchange
categories associated breakdowns in communication with alliance failure. In other
words, the study provides two kinds of evidence to support the proposition. Not only
was volume of exchange higher in exchanges characterised by consistent compliance with
norms of practice, but where volume of exchange was low or had ceased, there was
associated confusion over roles and poor compliance with norms.
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2. Trust a n d credibility

The interorganisational literature refers to a set of "hard" and "soft" issues essential
alliance maintenance among which is the development of trust (Limerick and Cunnington,
1993; Ganesan, 1995; Ring and Van de Ven, 1995). This factor was particularly

important to small business generalists and specialists and was rarely mentioned by pub
sector specialists. Furthermore, trust had a "hard" edge rather than a "soft" edge. That
is, trust was related to actions, or delivering as expected, rather than sentiments. For
example, general practitioners associated trust with the return of patients by medical
specialists. As stated by one general practitioner, "I do not refer any more patients to
specialist who fails to return a patient."

It is argued that trust/distrust is a conclusion arrived at by a participant in an alli

their alliance partner, based very largely on the extent to which the partner has complie
with norms of practice. When asked about their evidence for judging the costs and
benefits of alliance, generalists and specialists referred to trust, credibility and to
compliance behaviour. They seemed to make little distinction as if the connection
between "delivering as expected" and "trust" was instantaneous. This finding
demonstrated the close link between practices of one alliance partner and personal
judgements of that practice by the other. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the
process of determining trustworthiness of an alliance partner is any different, if the
partner is an individual practitioner or an organisation. In both cases,
trustworthiness/credibility seems to be determined on the basis of compliance with norms
of practice.

Both general practitioners and medical specialists considered that speaking well of the
other to patients was an important basis upon which trust could be built. Both groups

used patient feedback as an indicator of the extent to which the exchange partner could b

trusted. For example, a general practitioner reported that a specialist tore up his ref
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letter in front of the patient and dropped it in the waste paper bin. A s a result of this
feedback from the patient, the generalist decided not to refer any more patients to the

specialist. In addition, exchange partners use patient satisfaction as an indicator of th

extent to which the partner can be trusted to do well by patients. As stated by one docto

"The general practitioner gets blamed for the specialist to whom he/she refers a patient.
Specialists value their reputation among patients and prefer to form alliances with
generalists whom they trust to do well by patients. As with trust built on the return of
patients, trust based on patient feedback has a "hard" business edge as well as a "soft"

social exchange component in that satisfied patients are patients who are likely to be l

to both generalist and specialist. This finding is consistent with the findings of Ganesa
(1995) who found that, in buyer-seller relationships, decisions about remaining in a

relationship were based on "objective evidence of reliability" (p 47) rather than on bel
about the motives of the partner.

Thus, the present study found that, despite the considerable benefits of being in-allianc

generalists were quite prepared to terminate a long-standing alliance if a specialist fa
return a patient or communicate. Furthermore, while there was a significant positive
relationship between volume of exchange between generalists and specialists and alliance
activity, no relationship was found between volume of exchange and the length of time
that a generalist had known a specialist. Hence, compliance with norms of practice is a
stronger determinant than familiarity of generalist intention to continue an exchange
relationship. It would seem that in generalist-specialist alliances the time between
"emergence", "maturity", and "critical-crossroads" may be quite short (Zajac and
D'Aunno, 1994: 283-287).
3. A supportive culture

To date, the literature on interorganisational cooperation does not specify the elements

a culture supportive of alliance formation and maintenance, though Bruce and Leverick, et
al. (1995), suggest that alliances are unlikely to be sustained in the absence of an
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appropriate shared culture. S o m e steps have been taken in this study to specify elements
of a culture supportive to alliance maintenance in the health industry. One vehicle for

achieving this has been to identify alliance partner activities which alliance particip
"respect". It was reasoned that in a professional network of exchanges, actors seek

respect of their alliance partners and will comply with norms of practice in order to ga
and maintain respect. Furthermore, it was assumed that alliances are more likely to be

maintained with partners for whom an actor has respect. It is a question for debate as t

which practices promote respect among professional alliance partners and, to this extent
contribute to the formation of a culture supportive of alliance activities.

In the first place, medical specialists did not mention received respect but general

practitioners and health professionals accorded a high priority to receiving respect. T

finding suggests that medical specialists are comfortable with their status and they as

that exchanges with them will be undertaken in a manner appropriate to their professiona
status. For health professionals, respect related to the manner in which doctors

(generalist and specialist) communicated with them. Measures of respect included written
and verbal communications as evidence that the doctor held the agency in high regard. A

poorly written referral letter or a dictatorial or superior attitude were indicators of

respect. Consistent with the team-culture of the community health agency, staff expected

the generalist to act in a manner which indicated health professionals were equal member
of an alliance.

Generalists were of the view that alliance maintenance was dependent, to some extent, on

whether they had developed respect for the contribution made by a specialist to the care

patients within a network. This finding is consistent with the principle of "distributiv
justice" (Homans, 1974: 249) which maintains that a person who receives greater
rewards because of their superior expertise is expected to "devote his/her expert
knowledge to the services of others" (p 346). In the urban region, the most highly

respected specialists were those who contributed to educational activities. Hence, it is
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reasoned that general practitioners value the development of a learning culture. While
articles have been written on the contribution and role of general practice in multidisciplinary primary health care (Strasser, 1992), little work has been done on the
educational role of specialists. This is an area where further research m a y have a
substantial influence on work-flow exchange, given the powerful position which medical
specialists hold within the regional network. This issue is discussed at greater length
below.

The implication of these findings for continuity in interorganisational cooperation is
norms of practice govern exchanges and the norms vary from group to group. Hence, in
the process of establishing collaboration it is important that the parties 1) clarify the
practices which each considers should govern the exchange relationship, 2) develop
processes and procedures to ensure compliance, and 3) commit resources to these
activities so that procedures and processes can be monitored and reported in a timely
manner to all participants.

COMPLIANCE WITH NORMS OF PRACTICE AND
ACTOR SATISFACTION
Proposition 4: "Within a regional network in which the actors have the opportunity to select
collaborators, compliance by the partners with the norms of practice governing exchanges is
positively associated with level of satisfaction with an exchange relation".

Quantitative and qualitative evidence from networks in three locations support the
proposition that actor satisfaction is related to compliance with norms of practice. T h e
hypothesis that "Generalist satisfaction with the care provided to patients by medical
specialists is positively associated with specialist return of patients" was supported with
respect to generalist satisfaction with the care provided by physicians (Table 48). In
addition, support for the hypothesis "Generalist satisfaction with communication is
positively associated with the percentage of patients for w h o m the generalist receives
feedback from specialists" w a s found in both urban networks in relation to health
professionals (Tables 4 6 and 47). Compliance with this n o r m of practice by health
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professional agencies is associated with improved generalist satisfaction and an increase

in the volume of exchange. Furthermore, failure by hospital units and health agencies t

provide generalists with feedback about referred patients is associated with dissatisfa
and low levels of interdependence.

No relationship was found between generalist satisfaction and the provision of feedback

by medical specialists. This is most likely because the majority of medical specialists

provide feedback about referred patients while, among health professionals, the provisi
of feedback is patchy (Table 44). Furthermore, most generalists were satisfied with
communications with medical specialists (Table 45).

As already indicated, the rewards that generalists seek from exchanges with specialists
including public sector doctors and health professionals, are improved customer

satisfaction and loyalty, access to new knowledge and skills and increased confidence i
managing patients with complex problems. Failure by specialists to provide feedback is
perceived by generalists as indicating a lack of respect for them and their role.

As consequence of non-compliance by some doctors or health professionals with norms

of practice is the possibility that a group may develop a "culture of distrust", or eve
active dislike of the other group. Furthermore, shared cultural attitudes may have

developed over a long time and may be resistant to change. However, the findings of thi

study suggest that actions are more powerful than attitudes and that compliance by heal
professionals with norms of practice governing exchanges between generalists and

specialists results in a change in generalist behaviour. The challenge for policy maker

and managers who seek to promote alliances and the vertical integration of health servi

is to increase public sector specialist compliance with the norms of practice valued by
private sector generalists.

According to Pfeffer (1978) it is the power-brokers of an organisation who largely
determine where resources will be deployed. Hence, it follows that if the managers of
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public sector agencies give a low priority to exchanges with general practitioners, then
few resources will be allocated to make the venture work despite the best intentions of
individual health professionals. For example, in the diabetes network the health agency
management had taken deliberate action to ensure the provision of feedback. As a result,
65 per cent of general practitioners reported receiving feedback for all patients.
Conversely, only 26 per cent of generalists reported receiving feedback for all patients
referred to mental health agencies. Interventions to improve working relationships

between private sector and public sector organisations is an interesting area for further
research in the health industry.

Having discussed the findings pertaining to the four research propositions, I now discuss

the findings concerning situational factors and their effects on alliance maintenance. E
of the following four sections addresses one of the research questions used to guide the
collection and analysis of data relevant to describing each network.

INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT AND GENERALISTSPECIALIST ALLIANCES
Question 1: "How does industry environment as defined by location (rural/urban/capital city)
influence observed generalist-specialist alliances?"

The industry environment was not studied directly in this research. Information was
derived from interviews with generalists and specialists and from planning documents
about the three regions in which interviews were held. The environment was deliberately

different in each case as a result of a design decision to investigate rural, urban and c
experience. The question was the extent to which the three case-sites would deliver
different information on alliance maintenance. It could be reasoned that the environment
determines to some extent the quality of alliances between generalists and specialists.

Competition for patients for instance is a constant irrespective of environment. In rural

areas, however, scarcity of resources influences generalist-specialist activity in ways n
found in the city.
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The literature indicates that, in situations of resource scarcity, organisations m a y pool
resources in order to achieve mutual gain (Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994: 274-293) while in
highly competitive situations, organisations may cooperate to reduce uncertainty over

resource acquisition and to improve their adaptive efficiency (Alter and Hage, 1993: 39

40). The qualitative findings arising from the pilot study and the focus group with cit
region generalists are consistent with these propositions. In the disadvantaged rural

region, all but one general practitioners were in-alliance with a physician and each v
the arrangement. Being in-alliance was seen as beneficial because it assisted them to

the needs of clients, a finding consistent with the notion of pooling resources. Howeve

this was not the case in the well-resourced city network. While all generalists in this
location reported being in-alliance with psychiatrists, the driving force for these

arrangements seemed to be the return of patients. Hence, in this location generalists a
specialists may be said to be reciprocally interdependent and alliance is a means for
generalists to increase power and reduce economic uncertainty (Zajac and A'Aunno,
1994: 282) through maintaining a viable patient load. Specialists who failed to return
patients were perceived by generalists as opportunistic and untrustworthy. This is a

finding consistent with transaction-cost theory which maintains that organisations move
away from market exchanges to more formalised modes of exchange in situations
involving small numbers of exchanges combined with high risk of being exploited
(Williamson, 1975: 256; Powell, 1990).

Further evidence that alliance activity is influenced by competition for patients emer
from the urban two-case study. Generalist alliance activity was higher in the diabetes

network where there was greater competition for patients. It is not clear why there was
greater competition in this network but it may have to do with the perception of

generalists about the two patient conditions. Diabetes is acknowledged to be an importa
medical condition, while perceptions about mental illness are mixed. Many general

practitioners in the urban region, for instance, were not confident dealing with seriou
mental disorder. Twenty per cent of generalists were not interested in having patients
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returned by psychiatrists. O n the other hand, most were comfortable managing patients
with older-onset diabetes mellitus and expected that they would be involved in on-going

care. Furthermore, either alliance reduces specialist opportunistic behaviour or speciali
who ethically return patients choose to develop alliances. The study found a significant
relationship between generalists in-alliance with physicians and the return of patients
(Table 37). While there is a clear implication that alliance experience improves patient
return by specialists, the cause and effect is not clear.

It is likely that competition for patients is a powerful force for alliance formation amo
small business generalists and specialists, and the return of patients by specialists is

important determinant of alliance maintenance. Alliance, once established, sets up a kind
of peer review which is unusual in professional practice. Generalists and specialists

accept a level of scrutiny of their activities by their alliance partners in return for b

benefits. In turn, the alliance relationship seems to exert an influence on the actions o

partners which supports the proposition that increasing interdependence leads to practice

that strengthen the relationship. The potential impact of alliance on generalist-speciali
behaviour is an important issue to be addressed in future research.

In contrast to the interorganisational literature (Thompson, 1967; Zajac and D'Aunno,
1994), this study found little support for the proposition that the governance of small
business generalist-specialist alliances varies according to the type of interdependence

which exists as defined by the availability of generalist-specialist resources. Irrespect
of location (rural, urban, city), small business generalists and specialists were agreed

to the coordination processes that were important to alliance maintenance. These findings
suggest that the norms of practice governing exchanges between doctors are well
understood and accepted by the group. In other words, the "medical group" could be
described as highly cohesive (Yuill, 1970). Furthermore, the existence of norms of
practice supports the view which this research has advanced, namely, that medical
generalists and specialists manage autonomous small businesses, but they share in

important respects an organisational culture. Secondly, the findings suggest that funding
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arrangements are more important than the availability of external resources in determining
the norms of practice. Further support is found in the finding that there was little
agreement as to the "rules" governing across-sector (private-public) exchanges. Across

sector exchanges were characterised by differences in funding arrangements, professional
background and organisational structures and cultures.

MEDICAL CONDITION AND GENERALISTSPECIALIST ALLIANCES
Question 2: "How does medical condition (diabetes mellitus/mental illness) influence the nature of
generalist-specialist alliances?"

Two chronic illnesses were selected because of the widely held view that the medical
condition of the patient is a prime determinant of work-flow exchanges. Serious mental

illness and older-onset diabetes mellitus frequently require interorganisational cooper
among generalist and specialist organisations. No within-network or between-network
differences in exchange patterns were observed with respect to general practitioner
background including years of experience and postcode of practice. However, medical
condition was found to contribute to differences between networks in several ways,
specifically, the number of patients that generalists and specialists manage at any one

time, the level of interdependence among exchange categories and, to a limited extent, t
norms of practice governing exchange relations.

General practitioners manage twice as many patients with mental illness as patients with
older-onset diabetes, and 50 per cent of them refer most of their patients with serious

mental illness to specialists while only 20 per cent refer most patients with older-onse

diabetes. Hence, psychiatrists have fewer general practitioners referring patients to t

on a regular basis. A psychiatrist with approximately 20 generalists regularly referring

has a full work load and has little need to attract additional work. Physicians on the o

hand receive referrals from many general practitioners and their patient case load is mu
larger. According to social exchange theory, this ought to mean that fully-occupied
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psychiatrists would not be rewarded by further referrals while physicians would have a
higher satiation threshold. This could be the case, but, no evidence was found that
psychiatrists grow disinterested and, in the process, pay less attention to the norms of
practice governing exchange relationships. In fact, generalists reported that as an

exchange category, psychiatrists paid greater attention to these matters than physicians
This apparent contradiction of social exchange theory requires further investigation. It

could be that psychiatrists in the urban region had a long term perspective in regards to

maintaining the rewards of patient flow, even though it could result in too many referral
from time to time.

Exchanges between generalists and health professionals were fewer than with medical
specialists. Differences were also observed in the volume of exchange that generalists
had with categories of health professional, fewer with mental health agencies than with

diabetes agencies. One possible explanation for this difference is that a number of gene
practitioners were unaware of the services provided by mental health agencies while all
doctors were aware of the services provided by diabetes care agencies. Health
professionals in the diabetes network have been effective in raising awareness among

generalists about the services they offer while mental health professionals have paid li
attention to this issue. This finding is consistent with that of Berry (1993) who
concluded that there is need for mental health professionals to market their services.
Furthermore, it suggests that power-brokers in the public sector mental health hierarchy
place a low priority on exchanges with general practitioners while power-brokers related
to the diabetes network give high priority to exchange. However, differences in volume

of exchange may also be associated with differences in the complexity of mental illness i
public sector organisations compared with older-onset diabetes. This study did not

attempt to dissect variance in exchange arising from complexity of condition, though it i
obviously an important factor given the reported difference in the level of functioning

mentally ill patients cared for by public sector doctors and patients cared for by privat
sector doctors with the latter caring for those less severely disabled.
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T w o differences in methods of coordination associated with medical condition were
observed. In the first instance, psychiatrists made greater use of the telephone than
physicians in communications with generalists. This finding is consistent with the

challenges of caring for people with serious mental illness. For general practitioner

responsibility can be stressful and timely telephone access to psychiatrists is seen a
important. However, with older-onset diabetes, coordination depended more on written
communications. These findings are consistent with coordination by mutual adjustment

(Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983) and with the proposition that carecomplexity increases the likelihood of interaction and participatory decision-making
(Comstock and Scott, 1977). Qualitative evidence also supported this proposition. For

example, mental health professionals favoured the use of clinical protocols to coordi

exchanges with general practitioners because of the risk of patients "falling throug

gap". The findings of this study raise questions for further research about the effi

various methods of interorganistional coordination associated with medical condition
care complexity.

MEDIATION OF RESOURCES WITHIN NETWORKS
Question 3: "Within a network, do particular exchange categories 'mediate' the flow of resources?"

Within each regional network three "exchange categories" were identified, namely, sma

business generalists, small business medical specialists and public sector health age
In the urban two-case study, small business general practitioners were by design, a
category common to both networks. The network for care of people with mental illness

was larger (126 organisations of which 41 were included in the study) and more diverse
in terms of the professional disciplines represented than the diabetes network which
contained 118 organisations of which 39 were included in the study.

An examination of the pattern of exchange within both networks revealed that the volum

of exchange between medical generalists and specialists was greater than between med
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generalists and health professionals. Generalist and specialist doctors share m u c h in
common associated with their education, organisational structures and cultures and
funding arrangements. It is well understood that education leads to shared values and
practices. Similarly, organisational affiliation is associated with shared values and
common interests. For example, doctors who choose to work in the private sector are
commonly thought of as sharing values and ideologies associated with private enterprise
organisations. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that some private sector

doctors lack respect for their salaried colleagues in the public sector. Whether in grou

practice or solo practice, small business medical organisations are characterised by se
offices equipped for patient consultations and treatment and patient waiting rooms, and
administrative staff employed to manage appointments, files and accounts. Some

practices also employ nursing staff and allied health professionals. The culture of thes

organisations is service oriented and most doctors who work in them combine the roles of

owner, manager and service provider. Hence, they have a direct interest in the financial
welfare of their organisation.

This is not the situation with public sector specialists, who, in the main, are salaried
employees from diverse educational backgrounds. Some have a medical education and
many come from nursing or allied health disciplines. Furthermore, the structure,

processes and culture of the public sector hospital unit or health agency are very diff

to the small business medical practice. Hierarchical authority is the norm and staff gai
status and salary increases by climbing the hierarchical ladder. Hence, the formal and
informal norms governing the hierarchy are important and the culture is that of the
professional bureaucracy. A team culture prevails in the community health agency in
which the group places a high value on task achievement and democratic decisionmaking. This culture was evident in both networks in that all team leaders chose to
provide the researcher with a group response rather than provide the "manager's"
perspective.
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Differences between private sector and public sector organisations in the health industry
are variables which have contributed to observed differences in exchange rates across

sectors. Most generalists show a clear preference for exchanges within the private secto
and, when exchanges occur across-sector, generalists are less satisfied with the

transaction. This issue is addressed further in the section titled "Funding arrangements
and the structure of alliances".

Figure 7, indicates a bi-modal pattern of work-flow exchanges associated with funding
arrangements within the mental health network. Private psychiatrists report frequent

exchanges with private sector generalists, public sector hospital units and health agen

Furthermore, as already indicated they report managing a less severely disabled group of
clients than public sector psychiatrists. Provider preferences concerning medical
condition appear to influence the pattern of work-flow exchange. This proposition was

further supported at the "participant validation workshop", where the Regional Director
Psychiatry made a strong case for more private sector involvement in the care of the
severely mentally ill.
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Figure 7: Patterns of exchange within the mental health network
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Private sector medical specialists occupy a central location in each network (Figures 7 and

8) and factors other than medical condition contribute to their position. Hence
psychiatrists and physicians are well positioned to exert power over the flow of

in their networks. In the diabetes care network there was a greater volume of exc

between all exchange categories and the health professional agency is well positi

influence the flow of resources (Figure 8). This is a good example of Provan an
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Milward's (1995), principle, that because there is a limit to the number of organisations
with which one can maintain effective linkage, higher levels of integration are more
in smaller, more homogeneous networks.

Figure 8: Patterns of exchange within the diabetes network
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There are several theoretical explanations for the powerful position held by medical

specialists within each network. According to Pfeffer (1978) horizontal differentiat
may occur within a workforce as a result of increasing specialisation and disparity
of remuneration. Members of the workforce with specialist expertise, which is highly

valued and in scarce supply, acquire power due to their ability to choose from whom t
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accept or reject exchanges. Furthermore, higher levels of remuneration and status are
associated with the accumulation of wealth. Medical specialists are among the highest
income earners in Australia and as such they enjoy high social status. Social exchange

theory predicts that individuals of a lower social status group will seek to exchange w
people of a higher social status (Homans, 1974: 317-318). Hence, health professionals

and general practitioners are more likely to initiate exchanges with medical specialist

with each other. Furthermore, differences in funding arrangements, ideology, values and

social norms associated with professional training militate against general practitione

health professional exchanges. Interestingly, these professional-culture differences do
not appear to apply to exchanges between medical specialists and health professionals.

Here the social status difference is so great that little dissonance is aroused by cont

between the two exchange categories. Specialists and health professionals consequently,

are perhaps more free to focus their energy on collaborative task activity. Furthermore
because of their specialist role they may share a common language and professional
interests.

Resource dependency theory predicts that in the private sector, the relevant parties wi
seek to gain greater market security by not becoming overly dependent on any one
resource source (Zajac and D'Aunno, 1994: 274-293). However, general practitioners,

as initiators of referrals, have little opportunity to influence resource flow in their

direction from other members of the network. Furthermore, the more that patients access

services through other organisations and agencies, the less power general practitioners

hold with respect to the flow of resources. Medical specialists, on the other hand, are

an excellent position to influence the flow of resources in their direction from genera
practitioners, specialist hospital units and health professionals (Figures 7 and 8).

The exchange category, medical specialist, occupies a central location and general
practitioners compete with one another and with health professionals for the resources
the specialists (Figures 7 and 8). Cook (1977) maintains that bilateral negative
connections occur where organisations are "linked by an inverse function such that an
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increase in the frequency or magnitude in one exchange leads to a decrease in the

frequency or magnitude of exchange in the other (or vice versa)" (p 69). Hence, as th
number of generalists increases and the number of specialists remains constant,

competition for specialist resources increases. In this situation, members of the les
powerful exchange category are likely to form coalitions to bring about a balance of

power, with increased power gained through joint activity. The findings of this study

confirm Cook's proposition. For example, general practitioners in the highly competit
city environment and the somewhat less competitive urban environment had recently

established Divisions of General Practice to take political action to address the gr
power imbalance in the resource exchange ratio between themselves and private sector

and public sector specialists. This was not the situation in the rural location where

general practitioners had not formed a Division of General Practice and where the pa
perceived alliance as a means of pooling the limited resources available.

A further means by which general practitioners can reduce an imbalance in power with

medical specialists is to introduce additional resources into the network. For exampl

general practitioners may begin to specialise and exchange among themselves. However,

Cook (1977) warns that "if the same resources are introduced into the network by Bl a
B2, and the resources are uniformly distributed among B in the network, a form of
exploitation occurs maintaining A's position of dominance and B1 and B2 remain

competitors to their own eventual disadvantage" (p 73). This power-balancing strategy

was evident among general practitioners in the urban diabetes network. For example, t

Division of General Practice reported that several of its members had been successful
gaining government grants which provided for the introduction of specialist health

professional services under the control of general practitioners. The findings of thi

study concerning patterns of interdependence and the direction of exchanges indicate

within the regional network, medical specialists hold power of position and that effo
some generalists to enhance their power by, say, employing a health professional are
not likely to change the situation. Such changes may increase the competitiveness of
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entrepreneur initially, but his/her long-term viability depends on access to medical
specialists w h o retain most potential to exert influence across the network.

FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF
ALLIANCES
Question 4: " D o alliances involving public sector and private sector organisations differ from
alliances involving only private sector firms?"

Substantial differences were observed in the structure of small business alliances and
inter-sector (private-public) alliances.

Irrespective of funding arrangements all alliances were characterised by informal
agreements between two or more parties to share the care of patients with each provider
maintaining autonomy and ownership. Alliances differed from traditional patient referrals
in several ways. First, communications between generalist and specialist extended
beyond a referral letter and feedback from the specialist to on-going interactions between
the partners. Importantly, the generalist kept the specialist informed as to outcomes of
treatment and the specialist w a s available to the generalist for telephone consultation.
Secondly, the roles of each partner were clearly understood resulting in a balance in the
relationship and "smoother" negotiations on diagnosis and treatment options.

Small business alliances

With respect to alliances involving small business generalists and specialists, the role
the specialist w a s defined as consultant to the generalist w h o maintained on-going
responsibility for patient care. In this w a y the generalist reducedriskof losing the patient
to the specialist and the specialist understood that to gain further referrals he/she needed to
be available for consultation. Generalists were prepared to terminate an alliance with a
specialist on learning that the specialist had acted in an opportunistic manner or had
criticised the generalist or had failed to satisfy the patient. Hence, for the generalist trust
in the specialist plays a vital part in alliance maintenance. O n the other hand, the
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generalist understands that to maintain the goodwill of the specialist he/she must 1) refer
additional patients, and 2) keep the specialist informed about shared patients. The
specialist decides whether he/she can trust the generalist to do well by patients on the
basis of feedback. Hence, in the small business sector alliances provide a structure by
which generalists and specialists, in a symbiotic exchange relationship, share information
and power in an acceptable manner.

Inter-sector alliances

Substantial differences emerged in the structure of alliances involving small business
doctors and alliances between small business doctors and public sector health agencies.
Alliances in the small business sector were characterised by cooperation between
individuals. Inter-sector alliances involved agreement between a small business generalist
and a hospital unit or health agency team. Hence, inter-sector exchanges tended to be less
personal. For example, while all interviewed generalists k n e w the names of the medical
specialists with w h o m they had exchanges, very few k n e w the names of the staff of
health professional agencies.

The few inter-sector alliances that were discovered were characterised by specialist
agency compliance with generalist defined norms of practice and generalist compliance
with agency defined criteria. Hence, as with small business sector alliances, the parties
seek to establish balance in the relationship through compliance with norms of practice.
However, in the private-public exchange, the nature of the interdependence between the
parties is unclear as is the nature and distribution of power. The generalist expects the
alliance to enhance his/her business; an expectation consistent with reciprocal
interdependence. T h e public agency is interested in forming alliances in order to reduce
costs; a notion consistent with pooled interdependence. With respect to the distribution of
power, the status differential between general practitioner and allied health professional
implies a difference in power at the level of individual exchange. However, this is
ambiguous, given that m a n y specialist allied health professionals hold expertise which the
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general practitioner does not have. Furthermore, the exchange between small business
doctor and health agency is more complex than the private-sector exchange because the
agency is part of a publicly funded, regional health authority. Hence, while the generalist
doctor m a y hold s o m e professional authority, the health professional agency employs the
full authority of the professional bureaucracy.

Differences in values and ideologies between small business medical organisations and
public sector organisations also militate against continuity in inter-sector alliances. For
example, while an individual health professional m a y work hard to develop alliances with
general practitioners, once he/she moves to another position within the health authority
other individuals m a y not share similar values and priorities. Support for this proposition
came from s o m e generalists w h o indicated that the high tum-over of staff in public sector
organisations m a d e it difficult for them to establish good working relationships with the
staff of the unit or agency. This was not the situation with alliances in the private sector
where ownership of the practice provided stability in exchange relationships.

Despite these structural and cultural differences, small business generalists applied t
same criteria to the governance of alliances with public sector organisations as they
applied to alliance arrangements with small business medical specialists. That is, they
expected prompt and educative feedback, the return of patients, low levels of conflict and
satisfied customers. While m a n y public sector organisations appeared to not understand
or not share these norms, in situations where they complied with generalist defined norms
of practice the level of inter-sector exchange and alliance activity w a s increased.
However, this study can only indicate the private/public sector dichotomy for alliance
maintenance. A m o r e exhaustive study of interorganisational cooperation across
public/private sectors is obviously required.
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LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Often w h e n alliances are studied, the focus of interest tends to be on the administrative or

policy level. In this study, the focus has been the operational level. This decisio
due to the nature of generalist-specialist alliances in the industry under study,

significantly, exchanges between small business medical firms. Alliances between sm

business doctors are fashioned to a large extent by the skill of the individual par

However within each network, established alliances involving small business general

and specialists and public sector health professionals were also discovered. In thi
situation alliances were more complex involving an agreement between an individual
doctor and a specialist health agency.

The decision was made to obtain an organisational viewpoint from both types of

organisations from survey and interview with individual members of the firm or agen
However, first the researcher considered other options. For example, consideration

given to gaining standard form responses to questions about exchanges from all memb
of a firm or agency. Using this approach analysis would have required the creation

single organisation response, probably by averaging individual responses. Secondly,

thought was given to gaining an organisational response using "focus group" meeting

with each small business firm and health professional agency and hospital unit. Usi
this approach, analysis would require an interpretation by the researcher of the
predominant organisational view. These alternatives were rejected for two reasons.

First, they are both resource intensive. However, of greater importance was the pot

of both methods to introduce error into the data. In relation to the standard-form-

of all small business or agency members, error would be introduced from members who

have very little to do with alliance maintenance. For instance, receptionists, accou

physiotherapists etc., may have views on exchange which have nothing to do with the
way that firm exchanges, because those particular members are not exchanging. In

relation to organisation focus-group discussions, the threat to validity lies in th
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requirement for the researcher to interpret the organisational "mind" based on group
conversation.

It is not known what bias was introduced into the data because "organisational"
representatives were polled. However, the three main types of organisations - generalist
and specialist firms and public sector agencies - demonstrated very clear internal
consistency in their responses, leading to the conclusion that a valid "generalist firm",
"specialist firm", and "public sector agency" viewpoint was achieved. Public sector
agencies in both the mental health and the diabetes networks opted to provide a group
response. T h e questionnaire was completed at an agency meeting with all members
present having input if they chose. The decision by managers of these public sector
agencies to provide an agency response rather than an individual response suggests that
these larger organisations have greater difficulty in liberating individual "team members"
to 1) speak on behalf of the organisation, and 2) engage in alliance activity. T h e
individual in the public sector organisation is apparently more constrained by intraorganisational loyalties and duties suggesting that the larger the organisation involved in
alliance activity the more complex the research task of gaining an operational perspective
of alliance maintenance. It would be possible and useful in future research, to gain first
an agency consensus response so that the responses of individuals could be compared
with that of the group . This strategy was not employed in the present study, but would
be a w a y of specifying the likely error associated with organisational data-gathering from
one representative.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY

The research design outlined in Figure 6 (p 177) worked well in-so-far as I was able t
compare alliance maintenance across t w o regional networks with different tasktechnologies within the same industry environment. Furthermore, data from two regional
networks in other locations provided opportunity to explore, in a limited manner, the
effects of industry environment on alliance maintenance. The case study approach to
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research derives validity and reliability by employing multiple methods of data collection

and accumulating information on the study question in a series of data gathering exerci

each of which adds new evidence or confirms or refutes earlier work - a so called "chai
of evidence" (Yin, 1989: 101). This approach was successful in that data was collected

in a sequential manner from regional networks in three locations with evidence pertinen
to each research question being gained, as far as possible, from more than one source
using quantitative and qualitative methods. However, while quantitative across-network
comparisons were desirable, only limited quantitative analysis was possible due to the
unrepresentative nature of the samples in two locations. This deficiency however, does
not reflect on the study design but indicates problems associated with accessing the
population of interest. There were different cultures in each location among general

practitioners and differences in the sponsorship of the study in the three locations. T
would have been a less than satisfactory situation if it applied to all locations.

Fortunately, within the urban region I was able to access two random samples of general

practitioners and their network of supporting private sector and public sector speciali
which provided opportunity to test hypotheses concerning alliance maintenance. Given

that an acceptable response rate was achieved in each of these networks, the findings ca
be generalised to the health region from which they arise with confidence. However, as
indicated by my systems framework they cannot be generalised beyond the regional
network. The findings from the studies conducted in the other two regional networks

(rural and city) suggest that while the industry environment influences the reasons for

alliance formation the dynamics of alliance maintenance are very similar. This conclusi
is based on the high level of consistency in response to questions about the norms of

practice governing alliances and the influence of non-compliance on level of satisfacti
and organisational interdependence.

To the extent that the study has gathered and reported survey data, it suffers from the

limitations associated with survey research. For example, the findings rely on the views
of practitioners and managers about the volume and nature of exchanges rather than
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observations of actual exchanges (Homans, 1974: 18-20), hence, problems with c o m m o n
method variance may occur (Bryman, 1989: 129). Furthermore, relationships between
variables should be interpreted as associations rather than as cause-and-effect

relationships because of the correlational nature of the survey design (Bryman, 1989:
125-129). Hence, despite the fact that strong positive relationships have been found
between the key variables caution must be exercised in interpreting these findings.
problems of internal validity are dealt with to some extent in this study through

triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data and the collection of data concer
single issue from multiple sources using different methods of data gathering.
Considerable consistency was observed between data from several sources and where
variance was observed this served to strengthen confidence in observed positive
relationships. However, a prospective study across a number of years is required to

capture cause-and-effect relationships in generalist-specialist alliance maintenance
systems framework provides a vehicle for such a study based on repeated snapshots of
alliances.

The case study approach requires the collection of data from multiple sources includi

archives, documents and artefacts. Only limited use was made of these sources of data
for several reasons. With respect to archival records the available data on patient

within networks was unreliable due to differences in the way in which data was record
and in the importance ascribed to recording information about referrals. Planning

documents were a useful source of information concerning the industry environment and

the organisations within each network. Two type of artefacts were used namely, referr

letters and treatment protocols. Examples of very good and very poor referral letters
were observed during interviews with clinicians. However, with respect to treatment
protocols few were in use. Health professionals tended to favour the introduction of

treatment protocols as a means of improving interorganisational cooperation while ge

practitioners and medical specialists emphasised the importance of the referral lette
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The target organisations were small business general practitioners and they provided data
by which the boundaries of the patient care networks were set. This approach seemed

work well in this study. Consultation with key generalist and specialist informants

each network provided a validity check to the data gained by survey from generalists

Two distinct provider networks (mental health and older-onset diabetes mellitus) wer

identified by the researcher and generalists, specialists and other key provider inf
were agreed as to the important parties belonging to each network. However, the

networks gained by using this approach are inevitably medical. Had the departure poi

been different, say non-government charitable organisations, then the networks and t
alliances would have been different to some extent. The network may have included
additional players, for instance, but would not have excluded any of the network

members identified. Had I asked patients to define the network, a very different net
may have emerged. However, irrespective of the group used to define the network,
generalist-specialist alliances would probably have been defined and analysed in a
manner. This conclusion can be stated with confidence because the study gained the

alliance perspective from both generalist and specialist organisation. Further vali

would involve a case methodology which first interviewed specialists. However, there

little reason to think that this method would materially alter the main factors foun
maintain alliances.

The study would have benefited and possibly improved validity by the addition of a
customer perspective of the outcomes of generalist-specialist alliances on customer
satisfaction and health outcomes; a challenge which Provan and Milward (1995)

successfully achieved with respect to organisational networks for care of people wit
mental illness within the context of the United States health industry. The gaining

customer perspective is a complex, difficult and resource intensive enterprise which
beyond the resources available to the researcher.

The two urban networks have been described in terms of size, the functions and

satisfaction of the various exchange categories, the direction and volume of exchang
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and the extent to which any exchange category mediates the flow of resources. This
approach to describing the networks differs from that employed by some researchers.
One way of addressing the study would have been to include all members of each

network and to have graphed the ties using measures of density and centrality to disc

structural differences. However, this would not have allowed me to address the resear
question which required attention to alliance activity and maintenance. Rather than
my attention on the details of the "net", which would have required the inclusion of

possible members of each network, I chose to select a random sample of generalists an
supporting specialists. This enabled me to get to the alliances embedded within each
network and make inferences about elements of the networks which were not directly

observed. An overall response of 75 per cent and 72 per cent provides a reasonable ba
for discussing exchange relationships in the two networks with confidence, including
alliance activity, between members of a network.

Despite the above limitations the study has advanced understanding of the nature of

generalist-specialist alliances, and the norms of practice governing these very impo
linkages. Furthermore, it has identified serious problems in exchange relationships
between private sector generalist firms and public sector specialist agencies. The

improvement of generalist and specialist practices in relation to the patient referr

intra-sector and inter-sector exchange relationships has potential to increase the r
for the respective providers and seems likely to improve patient care.
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8. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis had three aims. The first was to contribute to interorganisational research
developing a framework for an in-depth analysis of alliance maintenance within the
context of a regional network. The second was to contribute to interorganisational theory
building on factors associated with continuity of alliances. Finally, the thesis sought to
contribute to management practice by exploring and describing the norms of practice
governing established generalist-specialist alliances in the health industry. Managers w h o
understand alliance norms of practice would be in a good position to influence the
rewards pertaining to the parties.

The research question was "Are alliances maintained by organisational interdependence,
satisfaction with the exchange relationship, and compliance with 'norms of practice'?"
Generalists and specialists in the health industry have been in the business of managing
interorganisational cooperation, based on reciprocal interdependence, for a long time and
their experience could provide useful knowledge on alliances. Furthermore, alliances
between small business doctors and public sector health agencies have not been studied
extensively.

This Chapter outlines the conclusions of the study and suggests areas for future resear

SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK
The study concludes that the systems framework (Figure 5, p 147) is a valid
representation of some important variables maintaining alliances within a regional care
network across various industry locations. T h e framework was developed by the
researcher to provide necessary orderliness to the diverse and voluminous literature on
interorganisational cooperation. The framework was an essential step in designing and
implementing the research, since, in the absence of such a conceptual scaffold, it would
hardly have been possible to m o v e from network definition to alliance analysis. T h e
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development of the systems framework was an integrating exercise. Throughout the
study and data analysis, the framework guided the researcher's thinking and activity.

In relation to complex social phenomena, a simple research study is naturally capable
elucidating only a few factors. The study has presented new information on variables
which maintain alliances within a regional provider network, the members and size of

which were well validated by reports of a number of participants. The environment of t
network however, though represented in the systems framework, was not really studied.

Rather, case locations were selected deliberately to examine variance in networks (and

alliances) and these environments were described in a qualitative manner. A case study

design provides flexibility to incorporate factors such as "industry environment" whic

are contextually important, but which the researcher does not seek to control in any w

Future research will be able to examine the impact of environment on alliance maintena
in greater detail.

The study concludes that the three variables predicted by the systems framework on the
basis of the literature and Stage 1 data are important in alliance maintenance. While

be considered obvious that volume of exchange and satisfaction are likely to be higher

well maintained alliances (social exchange theory has predicted as much for the past f
decades), compliance with norms of practice is not immediately obvious.
Interdependence was measured by volume of exchange, or "trading" between alliance
partners and other members of the network. Satisfaction was a direct measure of
perceptions of profitable outcomes (care and communication) at a given point in time.
Norms of practice was measured by return of patients and feedback while compliance
with these norms was defined as the extent to which there was a match between
expectations of one partner and delivery by another partner.

The study concludes that social exchange theory provides a suitable conceptual basis f

study of continuity in interorganisational cooperation in that it orients the investig

inquire about the rewards or "pay-offs" which each participant to an alliance receives
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the impact of rewards on actor behaviour. This research has revealed that, in the private
sector, the rewards of alliance activity are discernible, quantifiable and based on the
business needs of the participants. Judgements about profit or loss, attitudes towards

other participant and sentiments associated with alliance success or failure are largel
personal. On the other hand, the motivators for collaborating, the needs for which

satisfaction is sought and the content of the transaction are largely to do with meetin
needs of the business. The systems framework provides a structure for observing and
documenting the interplay between personal and business orientations. The framework
also provides opportunity to explore the effects of broader social phenomena, such as
funding arrangements, level of remuneration and social status on the emphasis given by
the respective parties to business and personal rewards.

The study concludes that the literature provides a rich source of information on

interorganisational cooperation and the characteristics of successful alliances. Howeve

considerable organisation of disparate theories and models is required before a templat
emerges to support empirical research. Furthermore, while alliance maintenance is
represented in the literature as an important issue for empirical studies into the
coordination and integration of health services, little work has been done to identify
dynamic processes and components which bring success. While it has been known that

rewards apply, and this study confirms the universality of social exchange, the question

is how the rewards of successful alliances are mediated by, and to, the participants. H

social exchange theory ceases to be of use on its own and network analysis has little to
offer beyond describing contextual factors. This study finds that norms of practice are
important in the mediation of rewards. Here, coordination theory and the
interorganisational literature in combination with social exchange theory have much to
offer.

The study concludes that people make alliances work, whether the alliance involves an
individual-to-individual arrangement or an arrangement between organisations. This

means that the maintenance of an alliance depends on the management of the interface and
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the successful meshing of two or more individuals w h o have contracted to seek improved

benefits to each party through common effort. Where alliances succeed it is because t

parties have found an appropriate set of behaviours - "norms of practice" - to provid
professional care in a manner that enhances the business outcomes for both parties.

Where alliances fail it is because the players have failed to provide professional be
of a standard that satisfies the expectations of the other. Furthermore, this set of
behaviours provides a structure which allows individuals and organisations to deal
equitably with one another under circumstances where equality - which is largely
externally determined - is not an option.

The study concludes that research into interorganisational cooperation must accept an

unresolved ambiguity which exists in the literature and in practice about whether the

individual, the organisation or the network of exchange relations is the more appropr
unit of measurement. Organisations may, by policy development, set themselves to
cooperate with other organisations. However, at the operational level, individuals
cooperate, network, form and maintain alliances. The systems framework and the case

study research design enabled the actors in interorganisational alliances to become v
and the dynamics of alliance maintenance to be explored.

CONTINUITY IN INTERORGANISATIONAL
COOPERATION

This thesis has contributed to interorganisational theory building with respect to th

relationship between norms of practice and reward attainment by parties to an allianc

Norms of practice mediate reward attainment because they are organisationally derived

expectations of the way things ought to be done. It follows that bi-lateral complianc

with norms facilitates a reciprocal realisation of rewards. However, this study has s

that organisational norms of practice are not necessarily well understood by the vari

parties to an alliance. It is therefore essential that the parties arrange some proce

clarify their expectations of the exchange in terms of what each party will undertake
However, compliance with norms may not necessarily follow even when the parties have
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taken steps to clarify their intentions and goals for one another. Compliance, it seems,
depends on the worth of the exchange relationship to each actor and this, in turn, m a y
depend on the power-brokers of an organisation rather than individual service providers.
In the small business sector, provider and power-broker are one and the same. However,
this is not the situation in the public-sector organisation. This aspect of alliance
maintenance requires further research.

The proposition that "an important determinant of alliance maintenance is the wort
the parties place on the alliance" calls into question Emerson's (1972) approach to
defining exchange. Emerson seeks to avoid the problems of tautology inherent in social
exchange theory by placing the emphasis of analysis on the "exchange relation" rather
than the individual actors. However, this study demonstrates that the researcher cannot
avoid examining what the actors, individual or corporate, are doing to maintain the
relationship.

The study concludes that the norms of practice governing small business generalistspecialist alliances in the health industry in Australia have m u c h in c o m m o n with the
norms of practice reported in the interorganisational literature (Kaluzny, 1991; Powell,
1990; Larsen, 1995). These can be summarised as 1) timely communications, 2)
appropriately informative and educative communications, 3) feedback concerning
outcomes of actions from each to each, 4) partner actions, rather than sentiments, which
lead to the development of trust, 5) partner actions which demonstrate respect for the
contribution of the other party, and 6) a communication environment which the parties
associate with learning n e w and useful things and low levels of conflict. O f these six sets
of behaviours governing alliances, the development of trust appears to be the most
complex. Under this rubric are partner actions which result in customer satisfaction,
hence, technical and relational competence are important, and have a very hard business
edge.
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The study concludes that understanding the benchmark standards of practice which each
party to an alliance expects is vital to alliance maintenance in the health industry.

However, there is a paradox here in the sense that a "norm of practice" is, by definit

view held by the organisation or group. Yet, from the findings of this study it is cle
that some in the group do not abide by the unwritten rules of the group. Norms of

practice are therefore really norms of "best practice", for there is a lot of practic

sub-standard, according to generalists, specialists and public sector agency speciali

This is particularly a dilemma when generalists seek to form alliances outside their o

discipline ie., with public sector health professionals. Predominantly, private sector
medical generalists expect staff of public sector organisations to abide by the norms
practice governing their exchanges with private sector medical specialists.

The study concludes that alliances are more prevalent and are maintained with greater

in situations in which the parties share similar funding arrangements, a common cultur

and where norms of practice governing exchanges in the industry are well understood. I

the absence of shared funding arrangements, shared culture and shared norms of practic

the rewards sought by each party are more diverse and alliances are less prevalent, mo

complex and less easily maintained. Some public sector organisations apparently do not

understand, or place little importance on, the norms of practice expected of them by s

business generalist doctors given their low level of compliance. This failure to compl

leads to generalist dissatisfaction, which in turn, reduces or eliminates exchange. Of
course, this sequencing of events implies a cause and effect process which the crosssectional data gathered in this study does not provide opportunity to assess. In this

sense, the systems framework remains a proposal as to how variables operate to maintai

alliance for all aspects of the model have not been tested by the research. In particu
the direction of causality among the three variables has not been substantiated. A
prospective study across a number of years is required for this purpose.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
For policy makers and managers interested in enhancing the vertical integration of health
service delivery, the findings of this study suggest that compliance by m e m b e r s of a
regional network with norms of "best practice" governing exchanges results in increased
interdependence and rewarding outcomes for all parties. It is concluded that managers
m a y take action at two levels. At the level of the alliance, collaboration can be promoted
through 1) clarification of the norms of practice which each exchange category considers
should govern exchanges, 2) the development of processes and procedures within public
sector organisations to improve compliance, and 3) the commitment of appropriate
resources to these activities. At the level of the network, it is proposed that strategies
should be directed towards enhancing the rewards to all players within a particular patient
care system (eg. the system for care of people with mental illness) through:
• the collection and dissemination of information about patient and carer health
outcomes, including satisfaction as to the services provided by all members of the
network;
• awareness raising activities to ensure knowledge of the type of services provided by
each, including the best w a y for patients to access services;
• education to improve understanding by all parties of "best practice" norms of
practice governing exchanges;
• the development of policies and procedures supported by resources that promote
efficient two-way communications between generalists and specialists for
clinical problem-solving and feedback about patient outcomes;
• educational programs, including professional development activities, for clinicians
in-training and practicing clinicians designed to develop competence in alliance
development and maintenance;
• educational programs, including professional development activities, for managers
designed to develop knowledge and skills relevant to the changing role of the
manager as the action in the health industry moves from "hierarchies to networks
and alliances" with an emphasis on the development of a learning culture.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Questions raised by this study which could become the basis of future research, include
• "To what extent is the systems framework, outlined in Chapter 4, able to be
replicated?"
• "What is the average lifespan of alliances within regional health networks and what
changes occur in the governance of alliances over time?"

• "To what extent do small business specialists facilitate the transfer of knowledge an
skills a m o n g members of regional health care networks with respect to their area
of expertise?"
• "What is the impact, if any, of informal alliances on generalist-specialist
competence?"
• "What rewards are sought by specialists in exchanges with general practitioners and
what are the norms of practice which facilitate the realisation of these rewards?"
• "How does continuity in alliance modify power differentials between actors?"
• "How do different methods of interorganisational coordination (eg case
management, patient held records, clinical protocols, informal alliance) impact on
patient outcomes?"

T h e development of inter-sector alliances are a recent and complex interorganisational
relationship, in an early stage of development. The study has discovered that few intersector alliances develop and those that do exist are more difficult to maintain than intrasector alliances. Sentiments of medical generalists about publicly funded health
professionals (medical and non-medical) are ambivalent and norms of practice have, for
the most part, not evolved to support alliances across private and public domains. In
public-private linkage the study has identified difficulties and revealed a need for more
extensive research. Questions that such research might address include:
• "Is the volume of exchange between small business generalists and public sector
health agencies positively associated with the compliance by public sector
organisation with small business general practitioner norms of practice?"
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• " T o what extent is public-sector organisation compliance with generalist norms of
practice related to public sector power-broker values about exchanges with general
practitioners?"

• "To what extent is the rewards-driven approach to the vertical integration of healt
services (outlined above under "Implications for management") effective in bringing
about desired change?"
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY OF
S M A L L BUSINESS GENERALISTS

Illawarra Division of General Practice Limited
(ACN062 587071)

11 Regent Street
WOLLONGONG
NSW 2500
Phone: (042)26 7052
Fax:
(042) 26 9485

4 March 1994
«Addressee»
«Address»
«City» «Postcode»
Dear Dr «Salutation»

Research Project: Specialist support for GPs caring for patients wi
condition - mental illness

I would like to personally ask you to support this research project.

As you are one of 100 Illawarra GP's randomly selected from our Div
database, your response will be statistically very important. Your information
will also enable direct feedback for the Division.

We are attempting to reduce the number of surveys an individual doct
receives each year by hopefully increasing the response from a smaller
number of doctors each time an appropriate program is endorsed by your
executive.

Your early reply would be most appreciated. Thank you for your assi
Yours sincerely

Michael J O'Halloran
Chairman
PS.
The attached questionnaire seeks information about the network of specialists
who, from time to time, assist you in the management of patients with serious
mental illness. Our definition of mental illness includes persons whose
mental functioning is seriously impaired, either temporarily or permanently.
While we recognise that psychogeriatrics and drug and alcohol intoxication
are very important in general practice, we have excluded these two groups of
patients from our study.

ILLAWARRA GENERAL PRACTITIONER SURVEY:

Specialist Support for General Practitioners
Caring for Patients with Mental Illness

The aim of this research project is to improve specialist support for general practitioners.

The study assumes that the GP is the linen-pin in the system linking consumers with local
distal specialists.
All answers are confidential to the researchers. Only aggregated data will be reported.

Please allow up to 15 minutes for completion of the questionnaire. Would you please answ
questions by either ticking the appropriate box, or circling the correct information, or writing
in the answer. Please return the completed booklet in the enclosed postage paid envelope within
the next two weeks.

Following receipt of your completed questionnaire and analysis of the data you will be i
to attend a meeting of GP's and specialists to discuss thefindingsof the study.
The project has been approved by The Human Experimentation Ethics Committee of the
University of Wollongong and Illawarra Area Health Service. This Committee requires
evidence of informed consent. Your completion of this questionnaire, which is entirely
voluntary, will be taken as evidence of your willingness to participate in the survey.

Thank you very m u c h for your cooperation and assistance.

Mary Harris, M P H , F C H S E
Chief Investigator

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Please write your answer or tick the appropriate box.
1. Years since graduation

2.

Postcode of main practice

3.

Vocational registration

4.

Male

5.

Solo practice

6.

7.

Full-time

years

Yes

•
•
•

•

No

•

•
•
•

Female

Group practice

Part-time

Method of remuneration:

Fee-for-service
Salaried
Both fee-for-service and salaried
Other

(Please

specify)..

•
•
•

PATIENT INFORMATION
Approximately h o w m a n y patients have you managed in your main practice during the
last 12 months with mental illness displaying any of the following sets of symptoms?
(Please circle appropriate numbers)

21-25

25 or
more

(5)

(6)

(7)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(4)

(5)

(6)

SymptonSet

None

1-5

6-10

a) Delusions
Hallucinations
Serious disorder of
thought form
Irrational behaviour

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

b) Severe depression
Severe disturbance of
mood

(1)

(2)

(3)

c) Personality disorder

(1)

(2)

(3)

11-15 16-20

9.

Of all the patients with mental illness that you managed in the last 12 months, what
percentage were:
Percentage

None

25%or less

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

functioning well despite
their disability

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

having some problems
coping

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

severely disabled

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

don't k n o w

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Level of Functioning
•

•

•

REFERRALS TO PSYCHIATRISTS
10.

O f all the patients that you managed with mental illness in the last 12 months what
percentage did you:

Percentage

Type of referral

None

2 5 % or less

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

•

not refer to a Psychiatrist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

•

refer as a n e w referral

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

•

refer as a continuing or
repeat referral with G P
involvement

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

refer as a continuing or
repeat referral with n o
G P involvement

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

•

Other (Please specify)

11.

For what percentage of your "new referrals" to Psychiatrists do you usually receive
feedback?

• • • • •
N o feedback

12.

2 5 % or less

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

Of your "new referrals" to Psychiatrists, what percentage of your patients are returned
to your care appropriately?

• • • • •
None returned

2 5 % or less

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

SHAREIM3AHE ARRANGEMENTS WITH PSYCHIATRISTS
13.

D o you practise any form of "shared care" arrangement, ie, do you have either a verbal
informal "shared
care" understanding or a formal written "shared care"
understanding with any of the Psychiatrists to w h o m you refer patients?

Yes - an informal "shared care" understanding LJ
Yes - a written formal "shared care" understanding wl
No "shared care" arrangements *—J

14.

If you answered "yes" to the previous question, would you please write the name/s of the
Psychiatrist/s with w h o m you have "shared care" arrangements. W e are seeking this
information to gain an understanding of your network of relevant specialists. Your
answers will remain confidential to the researchers.
N a m e of Psychiatrist/s:

CO-OPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
OTHER SERVICE PROVIDERS
15.

H o w often do you use the following services for care of your patients with serious mental
illness?
Not at all

Occasionally

Frequently

• Clinical Psychologist

(1)

(2)

(3)

• Community Mental Hlth Nurse

(1)

(2)

(3)

• Mobile Treatment Team

(1)

(2)

(3)

• Other (Please specify)

16. For what percentage of your patients do you receive feedback from the above
service providers (ie, those listed in Question 15)?

• • • • a
No feedback

2 5 % or less

26-50%

51-75%

76-100%

Comments please:

with any of Mental Health
17. Do you practise any form of "shared care" arrangement
Workers ?
Yes - an informal "shared care" understanding
Yes - a written formal "shared care" understanding
No "shared care" arrangements

•
•
•

18. If you answered "yes" to the previous question, would you please write the
Mental Health Worker/s with whom you have "shared care" arrangements. As with
Psychiatrists, we want to gain information about the network of other service providers.
Your answers will remain confidential to the researchers.
Name of Mental Health Worker/s:

SATISFACTION WITH SPECIALISTS
19.

During the past 12 months, how satisfied have you been with the care your patients have
received from the following specialists and service providers? Please circle the
appropriate number from (1) to (7) on the scale below (7 = very satisfied):

Satisfaction
Specialist

Very
dissatisfied

Very
No
satisfied Contact

• Private Psychiatrist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

• Psychiatrist in
Public Hospital

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

• Clin. Psychologist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

(6)

(7)

•

(6)

(7)

Q

• Community Mental
(DHlth
(2)Nurse
(3) (4) (5)

• Mobile Treat. Team

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Other (please specify):
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) r~|

20.

During the past 12 months, how satisfied have you been with communications between
you and the following specialists and service providers (7 = very satisfied)?

Satisfaction
Specialist

Private Psychiatrist

Very
satisfied

Very
dissatisfied

No
Contact

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Q

• Psychiatrist in
Public Hospital

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Q

• Clin. Psychologist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

• Community Mental
Hlth Nurse

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

• Mobile Treat. Team

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Q

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Q

•

•

Other (please specify):

SPECIALIST NETWORK INFORMATION
rv;^-Xy//.y.y;.y,yf.-.y.y-y-^Y.^^

21. This section seeks information about the specialists who assist you to manage patients
with serious mental illness. W e are looking for two pieces of information:
1) the names of the specialists who assist you to manage patients, and
2) the approximate number of times that you have made contact with them during the
past six m o n t h s . A s indicated previously w e need the names of specialists so w e
can understand the network. Your answers will remain confidential to the
researchers.
Approximate number of contacts
over the past 6 months

Specialist's N a m e
None

1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25

Private Psychiatrist

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Psychiatrist in Public Hospital

Clinical Psychologist

Other (please specify)

"BEST PRACTICE" WORKING
,-•"—
REIATIONSHIPSWITH PSYCHIATRISTS
22.

Of the psychiatrists you have already
good working relationship:

named, please select one with w h o m you have a

N a m e of Psychiatrist:

a)

H o w promptly do you usually receive feedback from this Psychiatrist about "new
referrals" "?

• • • •
Within a few days

b)

Within a week

Within a month

Longer than a month

W h a t methods of communication does this Psychiatrist usually use?

• • • •
Fax

c)

Telephone

Letter/memo

Telephone + letter

H o w would you describe the quality of the information you generally receive from this
Psychiatrist?

• • • •
Acknowledges
referral with
no information

d)

Acknowledges
referral & says
what he/she did

Acknowledges
referral & says what
he/she did and why

Acknowledges
referral & says what
he/she did and why and
says what the G P can do

From patient feedback, h o w do you rate the named Psychiatrist's communication skills
with patients?

• • • • •
Very poor

e)

Poor

Average

Good

Very Good

W h a t is your assessment of the treatments offered your patients by the named
Psychiatrist?

• • • • •
Very poor

Poor

C o m m e n t s Please:

Average

Good

Very Good

23.

Using location as a measure, h o w accessible is each of the following specialists and
service providers:

> 50kms

Not
accessible
at all

(3)

(4)

(5)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(l)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

• Community Mental
Health Nurse

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

• Mobile Treat. T e a m

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Specialist

Locally
based

Within
20kms

• Private Psychiatrist

(1)

(2)

• Psychiatrist/Public
Hospital

(1)

• Clinical
Psychologist

20-50kms

Other (please specify
specialist):

24.

H o w satisfied are you with access to each of the following specialists and service
providers? Please circle the appropriate number from (1) to (7) on the scale below (7 = very
satisfied):

Satisfaction
Specialist

Very
dissatisfied

Very
No
satisfied Contact

• Private Psychiatrist

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

• Psychiatrist in
Public Hospital

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

• Clin. Psychologist

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

• Community Mental
Hlth Nurse

(D

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

• Mobile Treat. T e a m

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

•

•

Other (please specify):

Thesei questions are optional However, w e would really appreciate your views
should you care to c o m m e n t

25.

W h a t gaps, if any, exist in your community for the care of patients with mental illness?

26.

W h a t actions do you think should be taken to improve the services provided to patients
with serious mental illness?

27.

A n y other comments?

28.

Please provide us with your n a m e and address if you would like to receive feedback about
the findings of the survey.

Name:
Address: . .

Thank you for taking thetimeand effort to complete this questionnaire.

Please return this completed questionnaire in the postage paid, returnaddressed envelope by
to:
Specialist Support for General Practitioners Project
Department of Public Health
University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue
W O L L O N G O N G N S W 2500

Should you wish further information about this project please contact
Mary Harris: (042) 214077

APPENDIX 2: PROTOCOL TO EXAMINE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERALIST
VOLUME OF EXCHANGE WITH
SPECIALISTS AND FIVE "SOFT"
MEASURES
G P - Specialist Relationship D y n a m i c - "Frequent contact consultant"

Please indicate the dynamics of this relationship using the following rating scales:

Satisfaction

Very
Satisfied

Very
Dissatisfied

• Satisfaction with the care your patients receive

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

• Satisfaction with communications between you (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Respect and trust

Very
Much

Very
Little

• The respect you have for the way he/she
practices medicine

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6) (7)

• The amount of trust you have in him/her

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Time known
• The length of time you have known him/her

For many years

Less than a year

(1)

(2)

(7)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

G P - Specialist Relationship Dynamic - "Infrequent contact consultant'

Please indicate the dynamics of this relationship using the following rating scales:

Satisfaction Very Very
Dissatisfied

Satisfied

• Satisfaction with the care your patients receive (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

• Satisfaction with communications between you (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Respect and trust

Very
Little

Very
Much

• The respect you have for the way he/she(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
practices medicine

• The amount of trust you have in him/her(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Time known

Less than a year For many years

The length of time you have known him/her (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

APPENDIX 3: SAMPLE SIZE ESTIMATION FOR
SURVEY OF GENERALISTS IN T W O
URBAN REGIONAL N E T W O R K S
1. Estimation for paired observations
Specifications:
Two-tailed test at the 5 per cent level of the null hypothesis that there is
in population means (mo = 0 and z a = 1.96).
Pilot study data:
The true difference in satisfaction may be as much as 2.5
(Hi = 2.5 and zp = -1.65); a d = JSg- = 443 = 2.07

Test statistic (Colton, 1974: 144): n =

(Za - Zp)<7

fl\-pl2

Required sample size:
-.2

(1.96 + 1.65)2.07
2.5

n=

n = 8.9 (i.e 9 pairs)

2. Estimation for Independent means
Specifications:
H o : ui _ M-2 = 0; H a : \i\ _ U2 = 2.6
a = .05;p = .01; <*2 = 9
Critical regions:
- = 1.960; (3= 1.282
2

Test statistic: ni = n2 = 2

(1.96 + 1.28)29
Required sample size: 2

2

(z1-a + zl-P) o

(2.6)2

= 27.98; n = 28

ni + n 2 =

APPENDIX 4: NORMS OF PRACTICE GOVERNING
ALLIANCES IN THE TWO URBAN
NETWORKS
1. Norms of practice governing alliances in the mental health network
General practitioners
Communication
- Promptness of feedback
- Telephone access
- Informative and educative
communications from
psychiatrist.

Psychiatrists

- A good listener and a good
communicator.
- Writes a good referral letter.
the - Contacts m e by letter or
telephone when he/she has a
problem (i.e. keeps m e
informed).
- Provides m e with feedback about
patients between visits.

Competent patient
care
- The quality of care provided to
patients is up-to-date and of a
high standard.
- Patient feedback indicates that
they are satisfied with the care
they received including
communications with the
specialist.

Trust
- Returns all patients
appropriately.
- Speaks well to patients about
the general practitioner.

Respect
- Respect for the w a y the
specialist practices
medicine.

Has a system for monitoring
patient attendance (i.e. if a
patient does not turn-up they
chase them up).
Is able to assess suicidal
patients.
Is prepared to give time to
mentally ill patients.
Someone who is able and
willing to keep m e up-to-date
with general medicine.
Someone who knows their
limitations.
Someone w h o looks at the
patient as a whole.

Mental health professionals

Provides an informative referral
letter.
Approachable and accessible.
Provides feedback about patient
outcomes.
Communicates freely by
telephone and in writing.

Is able to recognise an existing
or potential problem and to refer
appropriately.
Is willing to care for patients
with mental illness.

Speaks well to patients about
the psychiatrist and is honest
with patients about their
condition and about referring
them to a psychiatrist.
Able to be trusted with the care
of mentally ill patients.

Has respect for m y role as a
psychiatrist.

Someone w h o respects the role
of mental health professionals
and is willing to be involved in
the provision of team care.

2. N o r m s of practice governing alliances in the diabetes care network

General practitioners

Consultant physicians

Health professionals

Communication
- Feedback within a week.
- Ability to communicate. Tells
- Acknowledges referral and says
m e if he/she is having
what he did and why and what I
problems (i.e. does not wait for
should do.
six months to let m e know).
- Communicates by phone and - A referral letter that offers
letter.
information that I cannot get
from the patient (i.e. history,
medication, photocopy of
results, chronology of major
events, issues of relevance).
- Good two-way communications.
Competent patient
care
- Care provided is
average to very good.
- Communication skills with
patients is average to very
good.

Trust
- Returns all patients
appropriately.
- Speaks well to
patients about me.

Respect
- I have respect for the way the
specialist practices
medicine.

Frequent communication by
letter, sending us copies of
blood tests; communication via
the patient.
T w o - w a y communicationkeeps us informed of patient's
progress.

Willingness to carry out m y
suggestions.
Competence; I seek out
generalists with a level of
competence, someone who is
able to discriminate between
those patients with real
problems.
Someone who provides good
baseline care.
Someone who can make
patients change their lifestyles.
Someone who can be trusted
with respect to providing an
acceptable standard of care and is
guided by a suitable set of
ethics.
Someone with w h o m I feel
confident in returning the
patient to them.

- Treats health professionals as
equals; works with us as
members of a team.
- Acknowledges receipt of
communications and our role as
educators.

APPENDIX 5: CHARACTERISTICS OF CITY REGION
RESPONDENTS

Respondents (n=ll)

Characteristics of respondents

1. Small business general practitioner firms
•
•
•
•
•
•

Type of practice:
Years since graduation:
Gender:
Vocationally registered:
Practice hours:
Method of remuneration:

5 solo pratice; 6 group pratice
6 10-19 years; 5 > 20 years
7 male; 4 female
11 yes
9 full-time; 2 part-time
10 fee-for-service; 1 fee-for-service and salaried

APPENDIX 6: CITY REGION-URBAN REGION
COMPARISONS
Table 1: Patients managed during the previous twelve months with
severe depression/severe disturbance of m o o d
Location Number of patients managed
Mean Std. Dev. n
•Urban region 6-10 1.4 28
•City region 16-20 1.9 11
Mann Whitney U-Test; p<0.05

Table 2: Number of generalists reporting that their patients with
mental illness were functioning well
Location

Percentage of patients functioning well

None

• Urban region
• City region

1

5175%

25%
or
less

2650%

4

6

11

5

2

2

76100%

n

6

27
10

Mann Whitney U-Test; p<0.05

Table 3: N u m b e r of generalists with alliances with psychiatrists
Location

Alliances with psychiatrists

Yes

No

n

• Urban region

12

16

28

• City region

10

1

11

Mann Whitney U-Test; p<0.01

Table 4: N u m b e r of generalists with alliances with mental health
professionals
Location
professionals

Alliances with mental health

Yes

No

n

Urban region

25

28

City region

3

11

M a n n Whitney U-Test; p<0.01

Table 5: Percentage of patients returned to generalists care by
psychiatrists
Location
psychiatrists

Patients returned by

Mean

Std. Dev.

n

Urban region

51-75%

0.86

27

City region

26-50%

1.27

11

M a n n Whitney U-Test; p<0.05

Table 6: Generalist satisfaction with access to small business
psychiatrists
Location
very

Satisfaction (7= very satisfied; 1=
dissatisfied)
Mean

Std. Dev.

n

Urban region

5.8

1.4

27

City region

4.0

1.9

11

Mann Whitney U-Test; p<0.05

Table 7:

Generalist satisfaction with public hospital psychiatrists

Satisfaction

measure

Location
Urban
(n=28)

City
(n=ll)

Satisfaction with access
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
-Mean

78%
11%
11%
5.2

70%

Satisfaction with patient care
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
-Mean

56%
24%
20%

50%

4.68

4.2*

Satisfaction with communication
- Very satisfied to satisfied
- Mid-range satisfaction
- Dissatisfied to very dissatisfied
-Mean

48%
28%
24%
4.5

50%
17%
33%
4*

* M a n n Whitney U-Test; p<0.05

-

30%
3.6*

-

50%

